According to United Nations data, 26 percent of the world’s migrant population lives in the Americas, which means that migrants make up 7 percent of the region’s total population as of 2020. Of this total, 58.7 million are in North America, and 14.8 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to UNHCR’s 2022 Global Trends in Forced Displacement Report, by the end of 2022, at least 108.4 million people had been forcibly displaced globally. In the Americas, 9.2 million people moved across international borders. This figure represents an increase of 950 percent in the last ten years. Why do people move across the Americas?

The push factors are multiple and observe variations from country to country. However, in general terms, people migrate or are forcibly displaced due to increasing levels of violence and citizen insecurity, the forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime activities. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence are also important factors which particularly affect women and children. Added to this are persistent economic and structural causes, such as a weak rule of law, corruption, high poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities (especially for women, young people, and other vulnerable groups), food insecurity, and more recently the effects of climate change. This increase in human mobility across cities of the Americas poses opportunities for receiving countries but also challenges, and it is often local governments the ones responsible for providing the first response.

A recent study published by the Organization of American States and other partners entitled “The Role of Local Governments in the Reception and Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Cities of the Americas” confirms these trends. It proposes that there are opportunities for the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, and it shows that local actors can play a key role in the reception and integration of this population. Despite numerous challenges, the cases presented in the study demonstrate that with political will, innovative ideas, respect for human rights, and the support of international organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and the media, progress can be made at the local level to ensure a successful reception and integration of migrants and refugees in the region.

Based on the results of 231 interviews in 109 localities in 25 countries, the study proposes at least four lessons to capitalize on the work being done by the local governments facing these arrivals. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that local governments do not operate in a vacuum when working on the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, but there is an important influence of national governments on local actions—both in positive and negative ways. Migration policies are usually established at the national level, and local governments must respond with these in mind. It is, therefore, no surprise that for most local governments, coordination with national policies represents one of their main challenges. Another factor that also influences their work (and often supports it) is that of civil society and international organizations. They play a key role in most of the localities studied, and fill institutional gaps to meet the needs of migrants and refugees.

A second lesson from the study refers to the variation in local structures and capacities across cities in the Americas. Indeed, the study confirms that there is significant diversity in the structures and capacities of the 109 localities studied in the report. On one side of the spectrum, there are localities with a long migratory history and with resources which have stable structures designed to provide services to migrants and refugees. As documented in the study, some examples include the Mayor’s Office for Migration Affairs in New York City in the United States and the Coordination of Policies for Immigrants and Promotion of Decent Employment of São Paulo in Brazil. Other cities are facing new migratory dynamics, which has pressured their governments and have had to rely on international organizations as they develop local response initiatives, such as seen in several non-border localities in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

At the other end of the spectrum are border localities that are generally isolated and have few resources to respond comprehensively to the needs of migrants and refugees. These include border or rural cities that are in people’s migratory trajectories. One example is the locality of Darien in the border between Colombia and Panama. Lastly, in terms of capacities, although there are still significant gaps, training programs for local officials on issues of reception and integration of migrants were reported in 47 percent of the localities assessed. It is important to emphasize, however, that 42 percent of these programs are based on normative and rights issues, and do not focus on practical aspects of policy design and implementation.

Thirdly, the report also indicates that most local government actors prioritize socio-economic integration, followed by reception, although needs and priorities vary by type of locality. This suggests that upon arrival, cities really need to provide access for migrants and refugees to goods and services—including employment—to meet their basic needs and those of their families. The pre-condition for this access is providing them with regularization options or legal pathways. It is worth highlighting that for border localities in particular, the priority was reception, although this was often understood as the rapid processing of people and not as the comprehensive provision of services for the population. Lastly, in some of the newer destinations, in the absence of sufficient social networks that can provide support to migrants and refugees in host communities, there is greater awareness, urgency, and need for local actors to provide adequate reception and socio-economic integration services. One common challenge for cities evaluated in the report is counting on disaggregated and updated information on migrants at the local level to facilitate the creation and access to appropriate reception and integration services.

One last lesson the study points to refers to political integration and the often-ignored aspect of migrant and refugee integration. In this regard, the study confirms that there is still a long way to go to achieve political integration. In most of the localities studied in the report, there are almost no mechanisms for the political participation of migrants and refugees. Access to identity documents was identified as the main hurdle in this area. Concerning identity documents, it is important to highlight very innovative practices coming from cities to provide identification to these arrivals, who may not always carry a passport or ID with them. The study shows different models of municipal identification that have been adopted in Mexico City and in localities across the United States. Regarding political participation, in cities such as Bogota and São Paulo, permanent spaces for political participation have been developed for migrants and refugees. However, there is a long way to go and a pressing need to adopt an official narrative that presents migrants and refugees as neighbors, newcomers, and citizens and also to encourage social cohesion not only within migrant spaces but in other broader community spaces.

Although the focus on the local level is not entirely new, this report provides one of the first regional perspectives at a continental scale on migration and protection institutions and policies in the Americas, thanks to its comprehensive and diverse voices. What is novel is that it covers a wide variety of localities in a region that is profoundly diverse in terms of structures, institutional frameworks, and capacities, It reflects the perspectives of individuals on the ground who are directly involved in the challenges and opportunities posed by the reception and integration of migrants and refugees. The common denominator that emerges from the analysis is that these cities have been creating positive innovations to provide protection and better opportunities for the populations settled in their territories. It is precisely these positive innovations of receiving, protecting, and integrating that should be replicated and promoted at the hemispheric level.

The opinions in this article are personal. They do not represent those of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian is the Director of the Department of Social Inclusion at the Secretariat for Access to Rights and Equity within the Organization of American States (OAS). As Director, she oversees the OAS’s efforts to promote social inclusion and access to human rights, with a particular focus on vulnerable populations. Additionally, Betilde is a founding member and coordinator of the Network of Latin American Female Political Scientists, known as #NoSinMujeres. This project aims to promote and empower women’s work in Latin American Political Science. Betilde holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University.

The post Migrant and Refugee Integration in Cities across the Americas appeared first on Global Americans.

After over a decade as president, Nicolás Maduro has managed to consolidate his power amid a deep humanitarian and economic crisis, overcoming international pressure and dividing the opposition by persecuting, threatening, imprisoning, and even torturing its leaders and supporters. Maduro has successfully fostered mutual distrust of what remains of the opposition through the purchase of some of its leaders, the judicial intervention on opposition political parties, and the encouragement of new opposition parties loyal to the Chavista political system.

This is not the first time the opposition has found itself divided. Nor is it the first time it has had to reinvent itself. However, after more than 24 years of struggle against Chavismo, disagreement on the best strategy to fight for democracy, as well as mutual distrust, are the main obstacles to building a new opposition alliance that can mobilize the population to displace the apparatus of the authoritarian regime led by Nicolás Maduro. However, the near future presents a unique moment since presidential and parliamentary elections are fast approaching in 2024 and 2025. So, the lingering question remains, what can the opposition do to take advantage of this unique window of opportunity?

The Opposition After Maduro’s Decade in Power

The Venezuelan opposition is now an archipelago of leaderships, interests, and ideologies—ranging from democratic opposition to an opposition loyal to the authoritarian regime. Prevalent fragmentation and mutual distrust hinder opponents from finding any consensus. At present, the opposition seems to agree on prioritizing the upcoming presidential (2024) and parliamentary (2025) elections. It has agreed to hold internal elections in October 2023 to select its new presidential candidate. However, the electoral route will be an uphill struggle, which entails restoring fair electoral conditions that Chavismo has systematically eroded. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2022 country report on Venezuela highlighted the deep-seated irregularities in the parliamentary election of December 2020, which it described as “irregular from the beginning to the end of the cycle, including aspects such as its schedule; regulation; the registration of voters, parties and candidates; observation; the voting itself; the vote count; the audit; and the proclamation of elected representatives.” 

Likewise, the opposition also faces the challenging task of reversing its own anti-election discourse—it previously urged the population to boycott the presidential elections held in 2018 and the parliamentary elections of 2020, a major challenge in a society in which 77 percent of people distrust the electoral management body (CNE), according to a 2020 Latinobarómetro survey. Overall, the greatest challenge for the opposition is to rebuild a political consensus within its own diverse ranks, define a unified strategy path, and boost its credibility among a politically dejected population—still struggling to survive the multifaceted humanitarian crisis.

Chavismo and Corruption

While the opposition struggles with its internal challenges, Chavismo is also a heterogeneous group of actors seeking to retain power, avoid political change, and distribute the benefits of the Venezuelan’s oil earnings through corruption. The same  surmised the status quo as: “A petrostate in decay, the country is characterized by the amassing of political and economic power in the hands of an autocratic ruling elite, unfettered corruption, patronage networks, weak institutional arrangements and the brutal repression of dissent.” At present, different parties, businessmen, and, of course, the military, among others, coexist in tense harmony as long as the economic benefits flow. A report by the Venezuelan chapter of Transparency International shows that illicit economies are estimated at USD $9,444 million annually, representing just over a fifth of its GDP, making it the second most important sector after oil.

However, the easing of international pressure following the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as the fragmentation of the opposition, have allowed Nicolás Maduro to begin a purge of his alliance, confiscating the assets of those targeted by his anti-corruption drive and attempting to boost his image by fighting corruption. As part of his so-called special anti-corruption drive, more than 61 people, including mayors and pro-Chávez deputies, were arrested in March. Additionally, it led to the resignation of his Minister of Petroleum, Tareck El Aissami, one of the most loyal and powerful hardliners of the regime. This is the most important internal challenge to Chavismo during Maduro’s government, as it targets a minister in office and is part of a clean-up campaign promoted directly by the president himself. Meanwhile, Maduro has stated that he will request special powers from Parliament to continue his offensive—less than a year and a half before the presidential election.

Undoubtedly, the fragmentation of the opposition has helped consolidate Nicolás Maduro’s regime. The fact that opposition parties and leaders spend time, energy, and resources arguing with each other via the media and social networks, rather than challenging the authoritarian government, eases Maduro’s path to govern without major political challenges. For example, the opposition’s lack of internal cohesion prevented the building of an electoral coalition during the regional and local elections of November 2021, facilitating the victory of Chavismo in 16 Governorships and dozens of Municipalities. The opposition vote actually surpassed that of the governing party (PSUV, Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, per its Spanish acronym) and its allies, but ended up being shared among the different opposition candidates and parties.

Toward a Solidified Opposition

That said, the end of the interim government led by Juan Guaidó provides scope to construct a new, more solid opposition coalition. To achieve this, it must rebuild its trust with the Venezuelan people by listening to their needs and becoming a true messenger of their demands. Likewise, rebuilding trust with the Venezuelan people will require offering the country a political strategy that reaches out to all sectors of society, including the numerous followers of Chavismo, as well as including a wide range of civil society organizations, unions, and others—in short, incorporating all of Venezuela’s social capital.

Such an alliance, meanwhile, will require the international community to offer technical assistance and electoral observation through organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, as was the case in the 2021 elections. In short, holding internal elections to select the opposition candidate for the 2024 presidential elections is a good start for the opposition, though on its own will not be enough. After all, its success in perusing the electoral route will ultimately hinge on its capacity to reconnect with voters and to mobilize popular dissatisfaction and desperation.

Héctor Briceño is a PhD in political science, Researcher at the Center for Development Studies of the Central University of Venezuela (Cendes-UCV), and Guest Researcher at the University of Rostock. His topics of interest are democracy, political parties, and elections.

The post Opposition Struggles to Reunite against President Maduro appeared first on Global Americans.

Tras las detenciones, Maduro, en pos de aumentar su escasa credibilidad interna y legitimidad internacional, intensificó sus esfuerzos, afirmando en una reunión con los principales funcionarios del Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) que este es solo el “primer golpe” contra la corrupción en su gobierno, asegurando su “absoluta decisión de ir hasta la raíz misma para desmembrar todas estas mafias”. En una fuerte muestra de apoyo a Maduro, los arrestos también fueron respaldadas por otros aliados y posibles rivales internos, incluyendo al Primer Vicepresidente del PSUV, Diosdado Cabello, el presidente de la Asamblea Nacional, el jefe negociador, Jorge Rodríguez y el principal jefe militar de Venezuela, Vladimir Padrino López. 

Desde que Maduro asumió la presidencia en 2013, esta campaña podría considerarse el esfuerzo más significativo del régimen para “combatir” la corrupción entre los propios partidarios de su gobierno. Como tal, es posible que más funcionarios del régimen sean investigados. De hecho, hay motivos sólidos para creer que Maduro enfrentará la corrupción entre sus filas políticas con seriedad. En definitiva, el régimen venezolano no ha sido el único régimen autocrático en perseguir a funcionarios y antiguos camaradas por malversación, fraude e incompetencia. Lee Kuan Yew en Singapur, Khalifa al-Thani en Catar y Paul Kagame en Ruanda son reconocidos ejemplos de líderes no democráticos que redujeron de forma efectiva y exitosa la corrupción dentro de sus gobiernos. Al reducir la corrupción, estos regímenes autocráticos no solo lograron obtener mayor legitimidad y apoyo popular, sino que también consiguieron centralizar aún más poder y mejorar el desempeño económico. Teniendo en cuenta la variedad de problemas que existen actualmente en Venezuela, es posible que Maduro recurra a estas mismas prácticas autoritarias para hacer frente a la corrupción del régimen y mantener el poder político. Además de ser el presidente más repudiado de la región, Maduro se enfrenta a unas difíciles elecciones presidenciales en 2024, el salario mínimo más bajo de América Latina y un historial nefasto en la lucha contra la corrupción.

Además de motivaciones domesticas, el régimen de Maduro necesita enviar señales de liberalización política a espectadores internacionales, especialmente a Estados Unidos. Considerando las sanciones estadounidenses contra los responsables de la catástrofe económica y política venezolana, Maduro podría anotar puntos con Washington al dirigir las investigaciones anticorrupción contra funcionarios sancionados, como El Aissami, o arrestar a funcionarios procesados en cortes estadounidenses, como Joselit Ramírez. De hecho, John Kirby, Coordinador de Comunicaciones Estratégicas del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (NSC), afirmó que la administración Biden apoya las investigaciones de corrupción en Venezuela y “espera que las autoridades venezolanas” investiguen los esquemas de corrupción dentro del régimen “de manera muy responsable, transparente y creíble”. Esto es sumamente relevante en un contexto internacional mucho más favorable para Maduro, dada su decisión de regresar al proceso de negociación en México, así como la suavización de las sanciones estadounidenses en la comercialización del crudo venezolano y un enfoque diplomático más conciliador por parte de la administración Biden.

Si bien las experiencias de otras autocracias y condiciones políticas actuales sugerirían que Maduro está abordando la corrupción de buena fe, la realidad es que estos esfuerzos anticorrupción reflejan una táctica autoritaria para consolidar más poder, reorganizar las redes de corrupción y redistribuir sus beneficios dentro del régimen. Es ampliamente sabido que Maduro suele respaldarse en fachadas supuestamente democráticas que le sirven para purgar a rivales, expandir redes y oportunidades de corrupción y consolidar la disciplina partidista y gubernamental. 

Por ejemplo, en 2021, Maduro anunció inesperadamente que el PSUV se sometería a elecciones primarias para elegir candidatos para las elecciones regionales de ese año—en lugar de utilizar el método tradicional de selección de candidatos a dedo. Eventualmente, las primarias sirvieron para recompensar a aliados cercanos y leales, y castigar a funcionarios no confiables e ineficientes. La participación del régimen de Maduro en negociaciones con la oposición también ha mostrado ser una táctica destinada a ganar tiempo y dividir a la oposición. En fin, si bien la campaña anticorrupción puede mostrarse alineada con prácticas de transparencia democrática, es muy probable que esta cruzada culmine con una dictadura más consolidada y cohesionada internamente.

Los recientes esfuerzos anticorrupción de Maduro reflejan un amplio pedigrí de prácticas de “buena gobernanza” que es improbable que suprima la principal fuente de ingresos del régimen: las extensas redes de corrupción. Desde que las sanciones de Estados Unidos afectaron a la industria petrolera venezolana en 2017, el régimen se ha sustentado de otras fuentes de ingresos, a menudo turbias o ilícitas. El contrabando de oro y el tráfico de drogas se han convertido en fuentes recurrentes de divisas desesperadamente necesarias para el gobierno. Asimismo, miembros del PSUV, funcionarios estatales, jueces y oficiales militares ahora dominan la economía venezolana, con el apoyo financiero y logístico del régimen, al establecer importantes y lucrativos negocios en el sector privado.

Las recientes investigaciones anticorrupción también pueden aparentar ser, erróneamente, una lucha entre facciones en un régimen internamente fracturado. Sin embargo, las investigaciones exclusivamente en PDVSA y la selectividad de algunos funcionarios sobre otros sugieren que se trata de una falsa campaña anticorrupción diseñada por Maduro—probablemente destinada a reorganizar los esquemas de corrupción estatales y mantener el apoyo de los principales grupos políticos y militares. El hecho de que se hayan arrestado individuos relativamente desconocidos, pero no al importante exministro del petróleo Tareck El Aissami—quien es poco probable que enfrente encarcelamiento—indica que esta cruzada ni es un intento serio de abordar la corrupción, ni demuestra que el régimen está débil y fracturado.

Entonces, para aquellos que anhelan que los recientes esfuerzos anticorrupción de Maduro y sus aliados conduzcan a una reducción de la corrupción, la aplicación de la justicia contra altos jerarcas del gobiernos y mejores condiciones económicas, la realidad arroja una imagen mucho menos optimista. El régimen venezolano sigue manteniéndose en el poder firmemente y sin desafiantes creíbles. Por lo tanto, Estados Unidos y otros socios internacionales harían bien en no caer en las tácticas de Maduro y llamar a su reciente intento de frenar la corrupción por lo que realmente es: otro intento dictatorial para consolidar el poder.

Leonardo Di Bonaventura Altuve es estudiante de posgrado en la Universidad de Oxford y futuro estudiante de doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de California, Berkeley. Di Bonaventura Altuve es oriundo de Guanare, Estado Portuguesa (Venezuela)

The post <strong>No se deje engañar por las falsas campañas anticorrupción de Maduro</strong> appeared first on Global Americans.

On March 19, 2023, Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, initiated an unprecedented and unexpected anti-corruption campaign on Venezuela’s battered oil industry. The action provoked the resignation of oil minister Tareck El Aissami, a high-profile Chavista sanctioned by the United States. It also spurred dozens of arrests executed by Maduro’s “National Police Against Corruption”—including Joselit Ramírez (head of Venezuela’s crypto control agency), a legislator to the National Assembly, a mayor, judges, and junior military officials. The operation occurred upon uncovering that at least three billion dollars had gone “missing” from the state-owned petroleum company, PDVSA, from oil exported via sanction-circumventing channels. Many Latin American watchers were surprised by these anti-corruption actions given the Venezuelan regime has ranked among the most corrupt in the world in the recent years—even higher than countries like North Korea and Yemen. 

Following the detentions, Maduro doubled down in an attempt to earn much-needed domestic credibility and international legitimacy by stating at a meeting with key officials of his party—the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)—that this is just the “first blow” against corruption in his government and assured his determination to get to the “very root to dismantle all these mafias.” These investigations against inner-circle officials were endorsed by other Maduro allies and potential challengers. These include PSUV Deputy Leader Diosdado Cabello, National Assembly President and Chief Negotiator Jorge Rodríguez, and Venezuela’s top military official, Vladimir Padrino López. The wide spread support for these measures demonstrates Maduro’s broader approval and support among key figures within his government. 

This anti-corruption campaign could be considered the most significant regime-led effort to “combat” corruption against Maduro’s own government supporters since he took office in 2013. As such, it is possible that more regime officials fall prey to this corruption probe. In fact there are sound motives for Maduro to address corruption in earnest. After all, the Venezuelan regime has not been the only autocratic regime to target officials and former friends for embezzlement, fraud, and incompetence. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Khalifa al-Thani in Qatar, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda are popularly acclaimed examples of nondemocratic leaders who similarly initiated top-down, intra-regime campaigns that curbed corruption. These efforts have produced favorable results for these autocrats, allowing them to further centralize power, improve economic performance, and, above all, gain greater legitimacy and popular support. Beyond his standing as the region’s most disliked president, Maduro also faces challenging presidential elections in 2024, the lowest minimum wage in Latin America, and a comparatively awful record in curbing corruption. Given the myriad of issues in Venezuela today, Maduro may employ authoritarian practices to tackle regime corruption and maintain political power. 

Beyond domestic motivations, the Maduro regime may follow this corruption-control strategy to send signals of political liberalization to international audiences—especially the United States. In the face of American sanctions motivated against corrupt individuals responsible for Venezuela’s economic and political catastrophe, targeting listed officials—such as El Aissami—or arresting indicted individuals—such as Joselit Ramírez—could earn Maduro points with Washington. Indeed, President Biden’s Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council (NSC), John Kirby, stated that the administration supports corruption investigations in Venezuela and “expects Venezuelan authorities” to investigate intra-elite corruption schemes “in a very accountable, transparent, and credible way.” This is especially relevant in an international context that is much more favorable to Maduro given his decision to return to the negotiation process in Mexico as well as eased U.S. sanctions in oil trading and a softer diplomatic approach from the Biden administration. 

While experiences from other autocracies and current political conditions may suggest that Maduro is tackling corruption in good faith, the reality is that anti-corruption efforts likely reflect an authoritarian measure to consolidate power and reshuffle corruption networks. Maduro has often relied strategically on “good governance” practices and democratic facades that serve to purge current or would-be rivals, expand graft networks and opportunities, and consolidate intra-regime discipline. For instance, in 2021, Maduro caught everyone by surprise when he announced that his PSUV party would undergo primary elections to choose candidates for that year’s regional elections rather than using the traditional method of hand-picking candidates. However,, the primaries served to reward close allies and punish unreliable officials. Maduro’s participation in negotiations is also a well-known tactic aimed at buying time and splitting the opposition. While the anti-corruption campaign may appear in line with good governance and democratic practices, the outcome will likely result in a more united and powerful autocracy in Venezuela. 

Maduro’s recent anti-corruption efforts complement a long pedigree of “good governance” practices that are unlikely to curb the regime’s main source of income: extensive graft networks. Since U.S. sanctions hit Venezuela’s oil industry in 2017, the regime has relied on other—often shady or illicit—sources of income. Gold smuggling and drug trafficking have become recurrent sources of desperately needed hard currency. At the same time, party members, state officials, judges, and military personnel now dominate the Venezuelan economy—aided with financial and logistical support from the regime—by setting up new or taking over existing large and lucrative businesses. 

The recent anti-corruption investigations may strike one as a feud between factions in an internally fractured regime. However, the exclusive inquiries on PDVSA and selective targeting of some regime loyalists suggests that this is a phony anti-corruption campaign by Maduro—probably aimed at reorganizing corruption schemes and maintaining the support of key political and military groups. The fact that relatively unknown individuals were arrested, but not former oil minister Tareck El Aissami—who is unlikely to face prison and has put himself at the disposal of the PSUV to collaborate with the investigation—signals that this is neither a serious attempt to tackle corruption, nor is the regime weak and fractured. 

There is hope that recent anti-corruption efforts by Maduro and allies will lead to reduced corruption, the application of justice against wrongdoers, and better economic conditions. However, the true picture is less optimistic. The Venezuelan regime continues to hold on to power without credible challengers. The United States and other international partners would do well to not buy into Maduro’s tactics and call his recent attempt at curbing corruption what it really is: another authoritarian attempt to consolidate power.

Leonardo Di Bonaventura-Altuve is a graduate student at the University of Oxford and incoming Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Di Bonaventura-Altuve is a Venezuelan from Guanare, Portuguesa State.

The post Don’t Fall for Maduro’s Phony Anti-Corruption Campaigns appeared first on Global Americans.

What gets lost in today’s conversations about Venezuela is the continuing plight of its people: the stories of over 7.1 million people who were forced to flee, and the many more who still live within the country in desperate conditions. The migratory flows stemming from Venezuela are still the biggest ongoing issue in Latin America. As a migrant from Venezuela myself, and the President of Coalición por Venezuela, a global federation of Venezuelan refugee- and migrant-led organizations, I am in continuous contact with people in difficult situations. Their needs are pressing. So where exactly is this message getting lost between migrants like me and the international community?

Last week, I was invited to speak at the 2023 Conference in Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants and their Host Countries and Communities in Brussels, which aimed to “maintain the visibility of this crisis, and to continue to support host countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.” Despite this well-intentioned goal, I was one of the only speakers from the diaspora. It is striking that at a conference about how to support Venezuelan refugees and migrants, we barely heard from them. 

When the international community listens, they often learn that the Venezuelan crisis—despite its scale—is drastically underfunded, and refugee- and migrant-led organizations are leading the humanitarian response. Venezuelan civil society organizations are crucial in helping to integrate new arrivals into their host communities. When Venezuelans are forced to migrate, they often struggle to receive documentation, which limits their ability to work formally, move freely, and access education and health systems. Venezuelans, in particular, have trouble obtaining passports abroad due to prohibitive costs, the absence of consular representations in many countries, and extreme delays in the delivery of documents. This situation creates a lack of trust in our institutions, which then turn to refugee- and migrant-led organizations for guidance and assistance. 

To better support Venezuelan migrants, the international community should ensure that 20 percent of the USD $855 million raised from last week’s Donors’ Conference be allocated to grassroots organizations led by refugees and migrants. This can be done by earmarking a quota of funds for grassroots organizations or adopting a results-based funding model. Direct funding to grassroots organizations will increase the self-reliance of displaced communities and ease the obligations of host countries and communities. 

Another way the international community can effectively address this crisis is to systematically involve Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the design, implementation, and evaluation of national and multilateral regularization processes. As Colombia, Ecuador, and other countries in the region move past the initial phases of their integration process for Venezuelan migrants, it is crucial to involve us in highlighting best practices we have heard from our communities and identify gaps or difficulties in the design. For example, Coalición members in Perú have identified gaps in the regularization process that force Venezuelan migrants to renew their documents yearly and thus accumulate penalties. We are working closely with the Peruvian Senate to amend this law. In Panamá and Necoclí, we have sounded early alerts of new migrant displacements.

The international community has already begun to recognize the importance of incorporating a variety of perspectives in the design of its programs. Last Wednesday, the State members of the Quito process, a technical coordination group of Latin American states to address the flow of forcibly displaced Venezuelans, stated that responses to this situation should come from a “participatory and intersectional perspective” that creates comprehensive proposals by promoting “the contribution of all involved actors.” Similarly, the Chilean ambassador to the EU expressed support for increased involvement of civil society in the Quito process. We ask the international community to turn this rhetoric into action and formally create a refugee and migrant advisory board for the Quito process. 

Finally, we cannot effectively address the flow of refugees and migrants from Venezuela without addressing its root cause—political and economic instability. Here, too, the international community can play an important role. 

The next round of presidential elections in Venezuela is scheduled for 2024, and the international community must work together with civil society—inside and outside of Venezuela—to ensure these elections are free, transparent, and competitive. Support must include helping to implement strong mechanisms to allow members of the diaspora to vote; for example, updating the Electoral Permanent Register because of the 7+ million Venezuelans abroad, only around 100,000 are currently registered. We also urge the international community to provide continued support for multilateral efforts to strengthen respect for human rights. Furthermore, it is non-negotiable that the European Union Delegation or the Organization of American States (OAS) is sent as an international observer of the election, and that the international community promotes strong and safe voting systems and competitive candidacies. 

With a better-resourced and more widely consulted civil society, as well as free, transparent, and competitive elections, we can make great progress in resolving this crisis. In the end, all we want is to set roots and find peace at home.

Ana María Díez is a Venezuelan lawyer. She has a Master’s in Public Management and a diploma in Social Inclusion from the OAS. She was a former protection manager for HelpAge International and, in 2021, she was named an Inspirational Social Leader from Ernst & Young Venezuela. Currently, Ana María Díez is the President of Coalición por Venezuela, which she represents at UNHCR’s Advisory Board of organizations led by displaced and stateless people.

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Once again, the Venezuelan conflict seems to be at a standstill. An immediate political change certainly does not seem to be on the horizon. Since 2019, the opposition—with broad support from international actors—attempted a new political strategy to bring a transition, so far without success. Meanwhile, despite significant pressures, the government has managed to consolidate an authoritarian regime that, although volatile, still holds power. Under mediation with the Kingdom of Norway, a new negotiation between government elites and sectors of the traditional opposition has been reestablished. In theory, this space would represent a window of opportunity to set forth new rules of the political game. Yet, for whom and to what end? Taking a feminist perspective, we propose a different approach to the negotiations and to a possible democratization process.

As highlighted by the latest report of the United Nations International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela systematic human rights violations have not ceased. These human rights violations combined with the humanitarian crisis—which was aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic—have had differentiated impacts on women and girls. Authoritarianism has also exacerbated dependency, exclusion, sexism, and misogyny. Women are the ones who stand in long lines to get food and are even the last ones to eat. They are also the ones who are in charge of caring for their family members. Grandmothers and mothers are the ones who save on food, education, and avoid spending on their own health, including personal hygiene items, to distribute them among their sons and daughters. In addition, cis women and girls experience a lack of access to sexual and reproductive rights, including menstrual poverty.

In Venezuela, we observe a phenomenon called the “feminization of poverty,” a phenomenon in which women are the poorest in society. Moreover, violence against women is increasing. According to data from the Center Justice and Peace (CEPAZ, per its Spanish acronym), there were at least 290 femicides in 2021 and 199 femicides between January and September 2022. Trafficking and smuggling for the purpose of sexual exploitation of girls, adolescents, and women have also increased in recent years. Women activists, politicians, and communication workers are victims of violence, persecution, and criminalization. This situation requires urgent action that must be on the agenda before and after a transition. This must be part of a programmatic-ideological response from Venezuela’s democratic actors.

Venezuela’s Democratic Future must be Feminist

What do we understand as feminism(s)? It is important to emphasize that “feminism” is not a homogenous concept. In contrast, its theoretical approaches vary. Terms such as “feminism” and “patriarchy” have evolved over time. However, we think that feminism’s ultimate goal is always the same—the search for equality, non-discrimination, and, above all, the eradication of the roots of patriarchy. Following Patricia Hill Collins’s definition, for us, feminism is intersectional—implying that societies function within a system of oppression and privilege that do not depend solely on gender, but also on class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, among other factors. This practical, theoretical movement—which has been nominally co-opted by the ruling party—should be embraced by the democratic opposition. Both from a substantive and a formal viewpoint, feminist theories provide answers to Venezuela’s heteronormative opposition that—until now—has been led by privileged men from the capital of the country and whose goals have not been achieved.

For a new democracy to be sustainable over time, it should be feminist. Comparative studies show that the inclusion of women in conflict resolution and peace processes positively affects the likelihood of their sustainability. Furthermore, societies that have addressed their structural inequalities tend to be the most democratic, peaceful, and have the greatest potential for economic growth. Consequently, a feminist democracy should be the immediate demand of the Venezuelan population to its political elites.

Feminism is essential for any state whose ultimate goal is to achieve transformative changes in society. Therefore, political pacts should place gender equality at their core. Moreover, all public policy, humanitarian support, investment efforts, state reforms should have a cross-cutting feminist perspective aimed at strengthening society. Any approach should be aimed at addressing old and new power structures that have excluded women and other groups. In this regard, for a democratic and feminist transition, there are a number of measures that should be taken into account.

A Feminist Democratic Transition 

On economic policy, inclusion and equality mechanisms should be at the core of pre- and post-transition discussions. According to the United Nations, “in Latin America and the Caribbean, women devote more than three times as much time to unpaid work as men, and of the more than 14.8 million domestic workers, 91.1 percent are women.” Reforms that provide for equal hiring and pay practices should thus be considered. This, in turn, would require the implementation of concrete measures to achieve non-discrimination for individuals who have domestic responsibilities. The Venezuelan State has signed equal opportunity agreements with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that have not been enforced in recent decades. A strengthened and more equitable economy will only contribute to the construction of a new democracy if it addresses the diverse demands of society.

On the institutional level, it is crucial to consider the foundations of a more representative and sustainable democracy. For example, beyond building consensus around counter-majoritarian institutions, through decentralization and strengthening vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, parties should commit themselves to introducing elements that favor the pluralistic representation and participation of society. As civil society groups have demanded in the past, women should be incorporated in the negotiation process—a positive step toward the construction of a more egalitarian and feminist democracy. We also suggest that affirmative action policies should be developed. This could lead to positive steps toward achieving further female representation in historically male-dominated sectors. It also aligns with international treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and specifically its General Recommendation 25.

Regarding political representation, with its most recent special regulation issued in 2021 for municipal and regional elections, the pro-Chavez government has taken measures to facilitate greater participation of women. Such a measure is not sufficient and should be extended to all public offices, ministries, and diplomatic delegations. This should not be treated as a “cosmetic measure,” but a real transformation of the public sphere toward a feminist one where equality is the standard.

A new approach to the state-society relationship should be rethought with a gender and comparative perspective. Evidence from Latin America and Europe shows the impact of innovative gender policies on the quality of democracy. This requires extensive training in human rights and gender for those who hold public office. We welcome the training and capacity building that are being carried out to position women in leadership positions. However, we must be cautious not to replicate stereotypes about the inadequacy of women as leaders and the constant training requirement which leads to unpaid labor. These should be offered through mandatory short courses for the exercise of public office. The resources for a training program of this kind, as well as future public policy references, should stem from close institutional cooperation between universities and the state. In other words, the professionalization of any public policy on gender equality is key to achieving sustainable democracy. 

In addition, it is essential to design and promote public policies against gender violence. These campaigns should not only focus on women, but also on those who are, in most cases, the perpetrators of violence—through messages that discuss non-violent and positive masculinities. Such campaigns and measures would require a sufficient budget over time in order to ensure that this does not, once again, create unpaid labor. Likewise, universities, social movements, professional associations, and local NGOs could have a fundamental role in developing these policies. With more than 7 million Venezuelans abroad, the Venezuelan diaspora can similarly play a fundamental role in this process given that their comparative experiences may contribute to the knowledge transfer from the host countries to Venezuela.

These ideas could help build a feminist and democratic Venezuela that is inclusive of historically discriminated against parts of society. Feminism can represent an opportunity for collaborative work among political elites with a shared interest in producing sustainable change in Venezuela. After decades of confrontation and violence, human rights violations, and undermining democratic spaces, leveraging intersectional feminist approaches to equality and inclusion should be embraced by democratic opposition parties. Doing so would offer a historic opportunity to show their commitment to modern debates and ideas that have proven successful in building robust democracies. 

Maryhen Jiménez is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the University of Oxford. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and an MPhil in Latin American Studies from the University of Oxford and is a political scientist from the Goethe University Frankfurt. Her field of research focuses on comparative authoritarianism, democratization, opposition movements, and political parties.

María Corina Muskus Toro is a feminist lawyer and currently a Ph.D. student at Osgoode Hall Law School York University, where she studies non-carceral alternatives for women who have experienced violence in Venezuela. She holds an LL.M. from Osgoode Hall Law School and an LL.M. in gender and human rights from American University Washington College of Law.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors.

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Una vez más, el conflicto venezolano pareciera estar “estancado”. Ciertamente un cambio político inmediato no parece estar sobre la mesa. Desde 2019, la oposición, con un amplio apoyo de actores internacionales, intentó una nueva estrategia política con el fin de producir una transición, hasta ahora sin éxito. Por su parte, el gobierno, pese a presiones importantes, ha logrado consolidar un régimen autoritario que, aunque volátil, mantiene el poder. Bajo la facilitación del Reino de Noruega se ha propuesto retomar las negociaciones entre élites del gobierno y sectores de la oposición tradicional. Al parecer este espacio representaría, en teoría, una nueva ventana de oportunidad para establecer nuevas reglas del juego político. Pero ¿para quiénes y con qué fin? Este artículo, propone una aproximación distinta a la negociación y a un eventual proceso de democratización: una que entiende el proceso de cambio con una perspectiva feminista y transversal de género. 

Las violaciones sistemáticas a los derechos humanos no han cesado, tal y como indica el último informe de la Misión Internacional independiente de determinación de los hechos sobre Venezuela de Naciones Unidas. Estas violaciones junto a la emergencia humanitaria, agravada por el COVID-19, ha tenido un impacto diferenciado en mujeres y niñas. El autoritarismo además ha exacerbado patrones de dependencia, exclusión, sexismo y misoginia. Son las mujeres las que hacen largas filas para conseguir alimentos, incluso las últimas en comer; ellas son también las que están a cargo de los cuidados de sus familiares. Son las abuelas y madres las que evitan gastar recursos en alimentación, educación y salud propia, incluyendo artículos de higiene personal, para distribuirlos entre sus hijos e hijas. Además, son las mujeres y las niñas cis atraviesan la falta de acceso a derechos sexuales y reproductivos, incluida la pobreza menstrual. 

Lo que sucede en Venezuela es lo que se reconoce como la “feminización de la pobreza”, un fenómeno donde las mujeres son las más pobres. Asimismo, las violencias contra las mujeres van en aumento. De acuerdo a datos del Centro para la Paz y la Justicia (CEPAZ), en 2021 hubo al menos 290 feminicidios y de enero a septiembre de 2022 se calculan hubo 199 feminicidios. La trata y tráfico con fines de explotación sexual de niñas, adolescentes y mujeres también incrementó en los últimos años. Las mujeres activistas, políticas, trabajadoras en el área de comunicación son víctimas de violencia, persecución y criminalización. Esta situación requiere un plan de acción urgente que debe estar sobre la mesa antes y después de una transición, así como también de una respuesta programática-ideológica por parte de la alternativa democrática en Venezuela. 

El futuro democrático en Venezuela debe ser feminista

¿Qué entendemos por feminismo? Es importante destacar que, los feminismos son corrientes teóricas variadas y diferentes; “el feminismo”, así como el patriarcado, también evoluciona y cambia. Sin embargo, el objetivo final siempre es el mismo; la búsqueda de la igualdad, la no discriminación y sobre todas las cosas arrancar las raíces del patriarcado. El feminismo es interseccional y plantea que funcionamos en sociedades con sistemas de opresión y privilegios que no dependen únicamente del género, sino también de la clase social, etnia, orientación sexual, entre otras, tal y como lo define Patricia Hill Collins. Esta corriente teórica práctica, que ha sido cooptada por el partido de gobierno, debe ser abrazada por la alternativa democrática. Tanto desde una perspectiva de formas, como de fondo. Los feminismos dan respuestas a una oposición heteronormativa que, hasta ahora, ha sido liderada por hombres capitalinos y mayormente privilegiados, y cuyos objetivos no han sido alcanzados.

Ahora bien, para que una nueva democracia pueda ser sostenible en el tiempo debe ser feminista. Estudios comparados muestran que la inclusión de las mujeres en los procesos de resolución de conflicto y paz afectan positivamente las probabilidades de ser duraderos. Las sociedades que han atendido sus desigualdades estructurales suelen ser las más democráticas, pacíficas y las que cuentan con posibilidades de mayor crecimiento económico. En consecuencia, ésta debería ser la exigencia inmediata de la población venezolana a sus élites políticas. 

Esto es imperativo si el objetivo final es lograr un cambio transformador en la sociedad. Por tanto, los acuerdos políticos deben plantear como eje central la igualdad de género. Es más, toda política pública, apoyo humanitario, esfuerzos de inversión y/o reformas de Estado debe contar con una perspectiva feminista transversal cuyo objetivo sea fortalecer a la sociedad. Todo enfoque debería estar dirigido a atender viejas y nuevas estructuras de poder que han excluido a las mujeres y otros grupos. En este sentido, existen una serie de medidas para una transición democrática y feminista que deberían ser tomadas en cuenta. 

Una transición democrática y feminista 

En materia económica, los mecanismos de inclusión e igualdad deberían formar parte del eje central de las discusiones pre y post-transición. Según Naciones Unidas, “en América Latina y el Caribe, las mujeres dedican más del triple de tiempo al trabajo no remunerado que los hombres y en cuanto al trabajo remunerado, de las más de 14,8 millones de personas que son trabajadoras domésticas, el 91,1 por ciento son mujeres”. La solución a esta problemática debe incluir reformas que prevean contrataciones y salarios en condición de igualdad. Esto a su vez implicaría medidas concretas para la no discriminación de quienes tienen responsabilidades familiares. El Estado venezolano ha firmado convenios en materia de igualdad de oportunidades (ILO) que no han sido garantizadas durante las últimas décadas. Una nueva economía sólo podría contribuir a la construcción de una nueva democracia si atiende las necesidades diversas de la sociedad. 

En el plano institucional, es importante pensar las bases para una democracia más representativa y sostenible. Más allá de construir consensos en torno a edificar instituciones contra-mayoritarias, por ejemplo, a través de la descentralización y el fortalecimiento de mecanismos de accountability verticales y horizontales, los partidos deberían comprometerse con la introducción de elementos que favorezcan una representación y participación plural de la sociedad. Para esto, tal y como grupos de la sociedad civil han demandado, hay que incorporar mujeres en las mesas de negociación, lo cual es un paso positivo para la construcción de una democracia paritaria y feminista. Sino que además sugerimos se deben incorporar acciones afirmativas. Estas son medidas positivas para equilibrar y lograr la representación de mujeres en espacios históricamente dominados por hombres, las cuales se ajustan a tratados internacionales como la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación Contra la Mujer y su Recomendación General 25.

En el caso de la representación política, el gobierno chavista ha tomado ciertas medidas para facilitar mayor participación de las mujeres, con su más reciente reglamento especial promulgado en el 2021 para las elecciones municipales y regionales. Esta medida no es suficiente y debería ser ampliada a todos los cargos públicos, ministerios, delegaciones diplomáticas. Con esto no serían “cambios cosméticos”, sino una transformación real del espacio público hacia uno feminista donde la igualdad sea la norma. 

Por último, un nuevo enfoque sobre la relación Estado-sociedad debería ser construida con perspectiva de género y comparada. Hay casos en la región y en Europa que nos demuestran la relevancia de políticas de género innovadoras y su impacto en la calidad de las democracias. Esto demanda una amplia capacitación en materia de derechos humanos y género de todas las personas que ejercen cargos públicos. Aplaudimos las formaciones y capacitaciones que se llevan a cabo para posicionar a mujeres en puestos de liderazgo, sin embargo, hay que ser cautelosos con aquellos que replican estereotipos sobre la insuficiencia de la mujer como líder lo que requiere formación y trabajo gratuito constante. Estos se deberían dar a través de cursos cortos obligatorios para el ejercicio de la función pública. Los insumos para un programa de capacitación de esta dimensión así como futuras referencias en materia de políticas públicas, deberían proceder de una estrecha cooperación institucional entre universidades y Estado. En otras palabras, la profesionalización de toda política pública en materia de igualdad de género es clave para lograr una democracia sostenible. 

Además, es esencial el diseño y promoción de políticas públicas en contra de la violencia machista. Estas campañas no solo deberían centrarse en la mujer, sino en quienes son, en la mayoría de los casos, los perpetradores de las violencias, mediante mensajes que hablen de masculinidades no violentas y positivas. Por supuesto que estas campañas y medidas deberían contar con los recursos necesarios para sostenerse en el tiempo, y proveer de partidas presupuestarias para el mismo, puesto que de lo contrario, sería nuevamente reforzar los trabajos no remunerados. Asimismo, las universidades, movimientos sociales, gremios profesionales, ONGs locales son fundamentales para esta construcción. De la misma forma, la diáspora venezolana, con más de 7 millones de personas venezolanas en el extranjero, puede jugar un papel fundamental en este proceso debido a que sus experiencias comparadas podrían servir para transferir conocimientos de los países receptores a Venezuela.

Estos planteamientos servirían para construir una Venezuela feminista y democrática, las cuales por supuesto, deberán ser expandidas a otros sectores históricamente discriminados. Para nosotras, los feminismos pueden representar una oportunidad para el trabajo común entre élites políticas con un interés compartido de producir cambios sostenibles en Venezuela. Después de décadas de confrontación y violencia, violaciones a los derechos humanos y el socavamiento de espacios democráticos, la bandera de la igualdad e inclusión, haciendo uso del feminismo interseccional, debería ser abrazada por la alternativa democrática. Hacerlo le ofrecería una oportunidad histórica de mostrar su compromiso con debates e ideas modernas que además han comprobado ser exitosas para el progreso y la durabilidad de las democracias. 

Maryhen Jiménez es Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow en la Universidad de Oxford. Obtuvo su PhD en Ciencia Política y MPhil en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad en la Universidad de Oxford, es politóloga por la Universidad Goethe Frankfurt. Su campo de investigación se centra en autoritarismo comparado, democratización, movimientos de oposición y partidos políticos.

María Corina Muskus Toro es abogada feminista y actualmente estudiante de Doctorado en Osgoode Hall Law School York University, donde estudia alternativas no carcelarias para mujeres que han experimentado violencias en Venezuela. Cuenta con un LLM en Osgoode Hall Law School y otra maestría con especialidad en género y derechos humanos de American University Washington College of Law. 

Este artículo sólo refleja las opiniones de las autoras. 

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Anthony Eterno is a 20-year career diplomat who served as Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for Venezuela from 2019 to 2020. He previously served as Economic Counselor and Deputy Economic Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas before he was expelled from Venezuela by Nicolás Maduro. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government, the Biden-Harris Administration, the former Trump Administration, or Global Americans.

The recent decision by the Biden administration to authorize Chevron to resume limited natural resource extraction operations in Venezuela offered proof to those of us who originally designed U.S. sanctions policy between 2017-2020 that it was not as an abject failure as some critics would lead you to believe. In fact, sanctions continue to be some of the best tools to get the Maduro regime to the negotiating table and to hold the regime and its enablers accountable. While a more nuanced understanding of our sanctions is overdue, so is a more nuanced understanding of where we could have done better.

To Start With, Less Bark and More Bite

Unfortunately, our more pragmatic proposals under the Trump administration gave way to what was at many times a chest-thumping exercise by those who wanted to punish the Maduro regime with anything they could—regardless of strategic value. As a result, they were often rushed, poorly timed, or sporadic, giving the regime opportunities to adapt. The moments when more strategic targets were identified, they were unfortunately rolled out months after being placed on hold—the result of trying to manage expectations in an impatient White House that prioritized quantity over quality.

There are key strategic ways we could have barked less and bitten more. In addition to following and targeting more of the regime’s—and their enablers’—money, we could have also persuaded our allies to do so more robustly. We also could have more closely followed the money regardless of which side of the political spectrum it led to. Finally, “maximum pressure” should have been truly maximum—in a more comprehensive and simultaneous manner, which is key to creating the kind of game-changing disruption and chaos within a regime that we and others assessed was led not by ideology, but rather self-enrichment. It would have produced better results and more importantly, made life better for the Venezuelan people.

Follow the Regime’s Money

U.S.-Venezuela sanctions policy under the Trump administration often focused on the oil and gold industry, which was the principal source of regime self-enrichment. What could have been more powerful and impactful, however, would have been to complement these sectoral sanctions by targeting the self-enrichment process itself—more specifically, the regime’s most trusted financial facilitators, or “testaferros.” Journalists, bloggers, and other sources, including our own partners, have bravely identified illicit financial flows and a finite number of those who manage them that deserved much more attention from us. They are bankers, oil traders and brokers, accountants, financiers, and even family members who have operated with impunity for the last two decades. While they may have different tactics, they all help the regime plunder Venezuela’s resources, bribe its supporters and protectors, pay off senior military and loyalists, and ensure luxurious lifestyles for their families, which combined, achieve the regime’s ultimate goal of staying in power.

To be fair, important testaferros have been targeted successfully. They include Alex Saab, Raul Gorrin, Gustavo Pedromo, Alejandro Andrade, and others. These sanctions and arrests have been particularly gratifying because they have been visible and tangible—including freezing corrupt bank accounts, confiscating private jets, luxury homes, and cars as well as corruption convictions in the United States. Less visible or tangible are whether this instills enough anxiety among the regime, its enablers, and their families, to move the needle. That is often hard to measure. However, having sat across from a high-profile testaferro as he pleaded to have his own sanctions removed and assets unfrozen, I was convinced that taking away a man’s private jet and yachts produces significant cracks in the regime’s circle of trust. The regime’s herculean efforts to free Alex Saab also clearly demonstrated that there is no better way to influence regime insiders and enablers whose support for Maduro is purely transactional. If the net were cast wide enough to ensnare more family members and testaferros simultaneously, it would cause great personal financial loss and chaos for the regime.

Many Heads are Always Better Than One: Getting Allies More Robustly

Multilateral sanctions will always work better than unilateral efforts. A unified effort—including potential new allies in Asia, Africa, and Middle East, where Venezuelan oil and gold have been uncovered—could create extraordinary leverage to negotiate a genuine political solution. Our allies can significantly move the needle in the right direction, cutting off another principal pathway the regime uses to both hide and enjoy its theft.

In Europe, for example, where many of the Maduro regime’s family and enablers hide and enjoy their ill-gotten wealth, targeting banks could play a pivotal role in creating the kind of pressure that makes a political solution much more attractive. The actions by the Portuguese and U.K. governments between 2019 to 2021 to allow Novo Banco and Bank of England to keep a combined total of more than $3 billion of regime assets was a powerful blow. In February 2021, the EU followed through with its promise of additional sanctions on regime members, as well as renewing them until 2022. These efforts were a bold model for others to emulate. Many EU officials conveyed to us that individual financial sanctions against Venezuelan regime officials were preferred over sectoral sanctions, but building a consensus within the EU has proven more challenging. However, the EU’s unanimous consent to prohibit Americans entering its territory during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic was proof that quick action is possible. Given there are over 800,000 EU-Venezuelan dual citizens—mostly from Portugal and Spain—suffering under the Maduro regime, there should be an appetite to take action, which if could have resulted in closing other financial paths for the regime and its enablers to evade sanctions.

Follow Regime Allies’ Money

Strategically targeting the regime’s ability to pay their Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Turkish patrons has been powerful. At the very least, it has diminished optimism about the durability of their “friendship” with Maduro. For example, in a region where the Chinese government readily invests, it has denied any new infrastructure loans or investments, thanks in part to sanctions tightening the regime’s ability to pay back its debts, which further increased Beijing’s frustration with Maduro’s corruption and economic policies. Today, the China-Venezuela relationship is struggling. However, due to the sporadic and limited number of targeted measures during the Trump administration, China adapted—using Russian oil traders to transport Venezuelan crude, even as the relationship became a liability.

Had we simultaneously targeted more oil traders and brokers, insurance and licensing companies, and others who clandestinely facilitated these transactions, it would have been more powerful than interdicting tankers at sea. Agility is also key. For example, when the U.S. interagency decided to target Rosneft Trading and its board members with sanctions, Rosneft Trading’s senior executive resigned, Putin pulled Igor Sechin out of Venezuela, and tankers were ordered to cease loading Venezuelan crude in the Caribbean—proof of strain the Russia-Venezuela financial relationship. We noticed that several of Rosneft Trading executives wiped their backgrounds from the internet to avoid being targeted in the future. When the Russians continued trading Venezuelan oil under a new shell company—TNK Trading—it was sanctioned almost immediately, further debilitating support for the regime.

Follow Everyone’s Money: Sanctions Must Also be Apolitical

It is also important to not distinguish between adversaries or allies when talking about corruption. Unfortunately, some testaferros were reportedly involved with moving money for all sides of the political spectrum, likely hedging for a future change in government. Despite the fact that the Maduro regime has a monopoly on rampant and widespread corruption in Venezuela, corruption is still corruption. As one prominent Venezuelan business leader once told me, “If you don’t address opposition corruption as well, these will be the people who will spoil Venezuela’s future transition and recovery.” Such accountability also would send a clear message to the broader Chavista, military, and international community that the U.S. government is a credible broker for change, creating the confidence to help rebuild Venezuela with transparency and good governance.

Sanctions have been the most effective way to deal with one of the most brutal and corrupt dictatorships in the world. Measuring sanctions’ success based solely on regime change, however, is shortsighted. My biggest lesson from working on Venezuela sanctions in the last administration was that in order to have the best maximum effect, a more comprehensive, simultaneous, and agile effort to target regime members and enablers remains a powerful option to accelerate a political solution.

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Durante la década pasada, Venezuela vivió la mayor contracción económica documentada en la historia del hemisferio occidental. La implosión tuvo lugar al mismo tiempo que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos prohibió las compras de petróleo, congeló las cuentas bancarias del gobierno, prohibió al país emitir nueva deuda y confiscó los buques con destino a Venezuela. Uno pensaría que cualquier análisis de la contracción económica de Venezuela colocaría las sanciones económicas en un papel central.

Sin embargo, las sanciones suelen juegan un papel sorprendentemente limitado en la mayoría de los principales relatos sobre crisis venezolana. Un reciente artículo del Council on Foreign Relations atribuye el colapso económico del país a “décadas de mala gobernanza” y los “peligros de convertirse en un petroestado” al tiempo que menciona las sanciones solo de pasada. Asimismo, el subsecretario de Estado Brian Nichols desvió las preguntas sobre el impacto de las sanciones a Venezuela afirmando que “la responsabilidad por la situación humanitaria en Venezuela recae directamente sobre los hombros del difunto Hugo Chávez y Nicolás Maduro”.

Parte de esto era de esperarse. Cuando la Secretaria de Estado Madeleine Albright fue interpelada en la década de 1990 sobre el efecto humanitario de las sanciones de la ONU en Irak, respondió mostrando fotos de palacios construidos por Saddam Hussein. Cuando al senador de Florida, Marco Rubio, se le presentaron argumentos sobre los efectos del embargo de Estados Unidos a Cuba, respondió que el único bloqueo a Cuba es el impuesto por el régimen cubano. Las sanciones se utilizan en medio de conflictos políticos, por lo que es normal que los debates en torno a su uso se politicen rápidamente. Muchos opositores de Maduro ven las sanciones como el único instrumento a través del cual pueden presionar al régimen y temen que las discusiones sobre sus consecuencias negativas jueguen a favor de Maduro.

Pero si lo que queremos es entender cómo la comunidad internacional puede ayudar a los venezolanos, también necesitamos conocer los efectos reales de las sanciones. Comprender cómo y cuándo usar sanciones requiere un debate equilibrado y objetivo, centrado en la evidencia y no esté empañado por sesgos políticos.

Lo que dicen los datos

Durante los últimos cien años, la economía venezolana ha dependido en gran medida del petróleo, llegando a representar más del 90 por ciento de las exportaciones y más de la mitad de los ingresos fiscales. Cuando aumentan los ingresos del petróleo, independientemente de si se debe a un aumento de la producción o de los precios, la economía se expande, pero cuando se estancan, también lo hace el PIB.

Por lo tanto, no sorprende que el colapso económico de Venezuela coincida casi perfectamente con una disminución masiva de los ingresos del petróleo. Después de aumentar durante más de una década, los ingresos del petróleo cayeron 93 porciento entre 2012 y 2020. Durante este mismo período, el ingreso per cápita disminuyó 72 porciento. El detonante de la contracción económica fue que Venezuela se quedó sin divisas para pagar las importaciones que alimentan su economía. Hemos visto colapsos similares en Irak, Libia, Irán y otros exportadores de petróleo cuando enfrentaron sanciones que limitaban su capacidad para vender petróleo a nivel internacional.

Entre 2012 y 2016, la mayor parte de la disminución de los ingresos petroleros se debió a la caída de los precios del petróleo. El precio de una canasta de petróleo venezolano alcanzó un máximo de $103 en 2012 y luego se desplomó a $36 en 2016. Hasta ese momento, la recesión de Venezuela se parecía a varias de sus anteriores crisis, impulsada por una disminución en sus ingresos en moneda extranjera causada por cambios en las condiciones del mercado mundial del petróleo. Obviamente, Hugo Chávez y Nicolás Maduro tienen una gran responsabilidad en esta recesión, ya que su gasto excesivo y su mala gestión dejaron al país sin preparación para enfrentar el shock negativo de los términos de intercambio.

Sin embargo, la historia a partir de 2017 es diferente. Durante los siguientes dos años, los precios del petróleo subieron. Normalmente, durante estos años, al tener el país acceso a mayores ingresos petroleros, se debería haber registrado una recuperación económica. De hecho, cuando comenzó la recuperación de los mercados petroleros, muchos analistas proyectaron un crecimiento positivo para Venezuela. Ese crecimiento no se materializó porque la producción de petróleo disminuyó, una disminución en la que la evidencia muestra que las sanciones jugaron un papel importante.

Es instructivo mirar los datos más de cerca. Si bien hay quienes aún repiten que el declive de la industria petrolera venezolana comenzó mucho antes de las sanciones, los datos cuentan una historia muy diferente. La producción de petróleo de Venezuela se mantuvo estable en el período 2008-15. Luego disminuyó moderadamente en 2016 cuando los precios del petróleo colapsaron. Muchos otros exportadores de petróleo experimentaron caídas similares en ese momento. Sin embargo, cuando los precios del petróleo comenzaron a recuperarse en 2017, la producción se estabilizó en otros productores de petróleo, pero no en Venezuela. Ese fue el año en que la industria petrolera fue impactada por las primeras sanciones.

Producción petrolera de Venezuela, 2008-2020

Fuente: OPEP.

Hay tres puntos de inflexión claros en la serie de producción de petróleo: cuando Estados Unidos impuso sanciones financieras por primera vez, cuando impuso sanciones petroleras y cuando impuso sanciones a socios extranjeros que ayudaron a vender petróleo venezolano. Todos estos están asociados a fuertes caídas en la producción petrolera venezolana. Patrones como este, donde intervenciones políticas aisladas estén asociadas con efectos observables claros, son bastante raros en los datos de series temporales. Cuando ocurren, son el equivalente estadístico de evidencia incriminatoria irrefutable.

Hay otras formas de analizar los datos de producción de petróleo de Venezuela que también muestran que las sanciones tuvieron efectos negativos significativos en la industria petrolera venezolana. En un artículo publicado el año pasado en Latin American Economic Review sobre empresas mixtas (joint ventures) en la cuenca del Orinoco, hallé que las empresas que tenían acceso a financiamiento internacional antes de las sanciones fueron las que más sufrieron. Estos resultados confirman que aislar a la industria petrolera de las finanzas internacionales perjudicó su capacidad productiva y ayudó a impulsar la contracción de la producción de petróleo.

Un argumento repetido a menudo por quienes descartan el efecto de las sanciones es que la crisis de Venezuela precedió a la imposición de sanciones. Ellos argumentan que, dado que la economía estaba en recesión mucho antes de 2017, las sanciones no pueden ser la causa de la crisis. Desde el punto de vista lógico, este es un argumento muy deficiente. Parte de la premisa de que una crisis económica tiene una sola causa, por lo que, dado que la crisis comenzó antes de las sanciones, estas no pueden ser su causa. Sin embargo, los fenómenos sociales y económicos tienen muchas causas. No hay ninguna razón por la que las sanciones, la mala gestión, la corrupción y la caída de los precios del petróleo no puedan haber todas contribuido a la crisis. Lo que nos dice la evidencia es que el colapso económico de Venezuela es en realidad la combinación de dos crisis: antes de 2016, impulsada por la caída de los precios del petróleo, pero después de 2017, las sanciones impidieron que la economía se recuperara en un contexto de precios del petróleo más altos.

Más allá de las sanciones

Las sanciones fueron solo una de las medidas desplegadas por Estados Unidos como parte de su estrategia para derrocar a Maduro. Otra acción clave fue la decisión de reconocer al gobierno interino encabezado por Juan Guaidó y transferirle el control de los activos en el extranjero de Venezuela. Al hacerlo, impidió que Venezuela accediera a sus refinerías estadounidenses, obtuviera financiamiento de organizaciones multilaterales o incluso que utilizara la mayor parte de sus reservas internacionales.

Estas medidas tuvieron efectos significativos que van mucho más allá de su impacto en el gobierno venezolano. Por ejemplo, Venezuela experimentó una disminución del 65 porciento en la cantidad de bancos corresponsales que estaban dispuestos a procesar transacciones internacionales y una disminución del 99 porciento en el valor de esas transacciones entre 2011 y 2019. Esto significó que el sector privado de Venezuela fue menos capaz de participar en el comercio o pagos internacionales. A pesar de las afirmaciones de que las sanciones solo apuntaban al régimen de Maduro, estas tuvieron efectos indiscriminados en el país.

El fin de una estrategia

El 30 de diciembre, la Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela decidió poner fin a la presidencia interina de Guaidó. La decisión marca el capítulo final de una estrategia que buscó generar un cambio político en Venezuela a través del apoyo de la comunidad internacional.

El fracaso de esta estrategia no es sorprendente. Estados Unidos entró en Venezuela con la misma arrogancia con la que suele entrar en otros campos minados de la política exterior. A pesar de la abrumadora evidencia de que los boicots electorales hacen poco más que dar poder a los regímenes autoritarios, alentó a la oposición venezolana a no participar en las elecciones. Como era de esperar, los políticos de la oposición se volvieron más expertos en hacer lobby en Washington que en hacer el arduo trabajo de movilizar votantes para oponerse a Maduro. Múltiples escándalos de corrupción también alimentaron un creciente desencanto con la oposición.

Al igual que el resto de la región, Venezuela está increíblemente polarizada. La adopción de estrategias de sanciones de máxima presión profundizó esta polarización, convenciendo a muchos venezolanos de que la oposición respaldada por Estados Unidos tenia tan poca empatía como Maduro con los problemas de la gente. Al negarse a tener interlocución con fuerzas centristas y brindar su completo apoyo a grupos opositores radicales que parecían más interesados ​​en desplazar a Maduro que en abordar la grave crisis humanitaria de Venezuela, Estados Unidos ayudó a convencer a muchos venezolanos de que un cambio de gobierno no traería una verdadera democracia al país.

Es urgente que contemos con una nueva estrategia para respaldar la lucha de los venezolanos por la democracia y los derechos humanos. Esta estrategia debe priorizar la movilización interna, la construcción de alianzas con la sociedad civil y el enfrentamiento a Maduro en las urnas. El enfoque debe ser genuinamente local y reflejar la verdadera pluralidad de voces venezolanas que se oponen a Maduro. Dañar la economía venezolana no debería ser parte de ello.

Francisco Rodríguez es profesor de Asuntos Públicos e Internacionales de la Familia Rice en la Escuela de Estudios Internacionales Josef Korbel de la Universidad de Denver.

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During the past decade, Venezuela lived through the largest economic contraction documented in the history of the Western Hemisphere. The implosion took place at the same time as the U.S. government barred oil purchases, froze government bank accounts, prohibited the country from issuing new debt, and seized tankers bound for Venezuela. One would think it should be self-evident that any account of Venezuela’s economic contraction would place economic sanctions in a central role.

However, sanctions play a surprisingly limited role in most mainstream accounts of the Venezuelan crisis. A recent Council on Foreign Relations background piece on Venezuela mentioned sanctions only in passing and instead attributed the country’s economic collapse to “decades of poor governance” and the “perils of becoming a petrostate.” Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State Brian Nichols deflected questions about the impact of Venezuela sanctions asserting that “the responsibility for the humanitarian situation in Venezuela falls squarely on the shoulders of the late Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.”

Part of this is to be expected. When Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was pressed in the 1990s about the humanitarian effect of UN sanctions in Iraq, she responded by showing photos of palaces built by Saddam Hussein. When Florida Senator Marco Rubio was presented with arguments about the effects of the U.S. embargo on Cuba, he replied that the only blockade on Cuba was the one imposed by the Cuban regime. Sanctions are used in the midst of political conflicts, so it is normal that debates around their use get rapidly politicized. Many opponents of Maduro see sanctions as the only instrument through which they can pressure the regime and fear that discussions of their negative consequences play into Maduro’s hands.

Yet if what we want is to understand how the international community can help Venezuelans, we also need to know the real effects of sanctions. Understanding how and when to use sanctions requires a balanced and objective debate about their impacts that is focused on the evidence and not clouded by political biases.

What the Data Say

For the past one hundred years, Venezuela’s economy has been highly dependent on oil, which accounts for more than 90 percent of exports and more than half of fiscal revenue. When oil revenues rise— regardless of whether it happens as a result of increased production or prices—the economy expands. When they tank, so does GDP.

It is thus not surprising that Venezuela’s economic collapse coincides almost perfectly with a massive decline in oil revenues. After rising for more than a decade, oil revenues fell by 93 percent between 2012 and 2020. During this same period, per capita income declined by 72 percent. The trigger of the contraction was that Venezuela was left without foreign currency to pay for the imports that fuel its economy. Similar import and growth collapses occurred in Iraq, Libya, Iran, and other oil exporters when they faced sanctions limiting their capacity to sell oil internationally.

Between 2012 and 2016, most of the decline in oil revenues was caused by falling oil prices. The price of a basket of Venezuelan oil peaked at USD $103 in 2012, and then plummeted to $36 by 2016. Up until that moment, Venezuela’s recession looked like several of its other prior historical crises, driven by a decline in its foreign currency earnings caused by changes in world oil market conditions. Obviously, Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro bear a great deal of responsibility for this recession, as their overspending and mismanagement left the country unprepared to deal with the negative terms of trade shock.

However, the story from 2017 on, is different. During the following two years, oil prices rose. Normally, those years should have seen economic recovery as the country had access to increased oil revenues. In fact, when the recovery in oil markets began, many analysts projected positive growth for Venezuela. That growth did not materialize because oil production declined—a decline that evidence shows sanctions played an important role in.

It is instructive to look at the data more closely. While some may tell you that the decline of the Venezuelan oil industry began long before sanctions, the data tells a different story. Venezuela’s oil output was stable in the 2008-15 period. It then declined moderately in 2016, when oil prices collapsed. Many other oil exporters saw similar declines at the time. Yet when oil prices began recovering in 2017, output stabilized in other oil producers—but not in Venezuela. That was the year that the first sanctions hit.

Venezuela’s Oil Production, 2008-2020

Source: OPEC.

There are three clear inflection points in the oil production series: when the United States first imposed financial sanctions, when it imposed oil sanctions, when it placed sanctions on foreign partners that helped sell Venezuelan oil. All of them are associated with strong declines in Venezuelan oil production. Patterns such as this, where separate instances of policy interventions are associated with clear observable effects, are quite rare in time-series data. When they occur, they are the statistical equivalent of a smoking gun.

There are other ways to analyze Venezuela’s oil production data that also show that sanctions had significant negative effects on the Venezuelan oil industry. In a paper published last year in the Latin American Economic Review on joint oil ventures in the Orinoco Basin, I found that it was the firms that had access to international financing prior to sanctions that suffered the most. This confirms that cutting the oil industry off from international finance hurt its capacity and helped drive the contraction in oil production.

An argument often repeated by those who discount the effect of sanctions is that Venezuela’s crisis preceded the imposition of sanctions. They argue that if the economy was in recession well before 2017, surely the sanctions cannot be the cause of the crisis. Logically, this is a very sloppy argument. It starts from the premise that an economic crisis has just one cause, so since the crisis began before sanctions, they cannot be the cause. However, social and economic phenomena have many causes. There is no reason why sanctions, mismanagement, corruption, and declining oil prices cannot all have contributed to the crisis. What the evidence tells us is that Venezuela’s economic collapse is really the combination of two crises—prior to 2016, it was driven by falling oil prices, but after 2017, sanctions impeded the economy from recovering by reaping the benefits of higher oil prices.

Beyond sanctions

Sanctions were only one of the measures deployed by the United States as part of its strategy to oust Maduro. Another key action was the decision to recognize the interim government led by Juan Guaidó and transfer to it control over Venezuela’s offshore assets. Doing so blocked Venezuela from accessing its U.S. refineries, obtaining financing from multilateral organizations, or even using most of its international reserves.

These measures had significant effects that go well beyond their impact on the Venezuelan government. For instance, Venezuela saw a 65 percent decline in the number of correspondent banks that were willing to process international transactions and a 99 percent decline in the value of those transactions between 2011 and 2019. This meant that Venezuela’s private sector was less able to engage in international trade or payments. Despite claims that they targeted the Maduro regime, the sanctions had indiscriminate effects on the country.

The End of a Strategy

On December 30, Venezuela’s National Assembly decided to put an end to Guaidó’s interim presidency. The decision marks the final chapter of a strategy that sought to generate political change in Venezuela by relying on the support of the international community.

Its failure is unsurprising. The U.S. went into Venezuela with the same hubris with which it typically enters other foreign policy minefields. Despite overwhelming evidence that electoral boycotts do little more than hand off power to authoritarian regimes, it encouraged the Venezuelan opposition to sit out elections. Predictably, opposition politicians became more adept at lobbying Washington than in doing the hard work of mobilizing voters to oppose Maduro. Multiple corruption scandals also fed into a growing disenchantment with the opposition.

Much like the rest of the region, Venezuela is incredibly polarized. The pursuit of maximum-pressure sanctions strategies deepened this polarization, convincing many Venezuelans that the U.S.-backed opposition was just as insensitive as Maduro to the plight of ordinary people. By refusing to engage with moderate centrist forces and throwing their support behind hardliners more interested in wresting power from Maduro than addressing Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, the United States helped convince many Venezuelans that a change in government would not bring true democracy.

A new strategy is sorely needed if we want to help Venezuelans’ fight for democracy and human rights. This strategy should prioritize domestic mobilization, building of strong alliances with civil society, and confronting Maduro at the ballot box. The approach should be genuinely homegrown and reflect the true plurality of Venezuelan voices that oppose Maduro. Damaging the Venezuelan economy should not be part of it.

Francisco Rodríguez is the Rice Family Professor of International and Public Affairs, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.

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