The Puerto Rico Status Act (H.R. 8393) opens with an acknowledgment of the island’s prolonged struggle as an unincorporated U.S. territory: “For far too long, the residents of Puerto Rico—over 3 million U.S. citizens—have been deprived of the opportunity to determine their own political future and have not received the full rights and benefits of their citizenship because they reside in a U.S. territory. H.R. 8393 would take a historic step towards righting this wrong by establishing a process to ascertain the will of the voters of Puerto Rico regarding three constitutional options for non-territorial status.”

Hoping to “put the future of Puerto Rico’s political status in the hands of Puerto Ricans, where it belongs,” Representative Raúl Grijalva of Arizona and 62 cosponsors introduced the bill in July 2022. In December 2022, the bill passed in the House and was received in the Senate. Although Democrats lack the votes to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, the Puerto Rico Status Act provides for a plebiscite to be held in November 2023 to resolve the territory’s political status, raising historical issues that have hindered Puerto Rico from addressing structural vulnerabilities and building resilience.

From natural disasters to food crises, Puerto Rico faces numerous issues—all of which are inextricably linked to each other and deeply rooted in the territory’s colonial history. One example of the territory’s inability to avoid certain catastrophes and build resilience can be found in the aftermath of Hurricane María in 2017, when residents went hungry as ships were unable to dock at the damaged ports. For context, the island imports about 85 percent of its food; worsening natural disasters, economic crises, and mismanagement have led to the island’s dependence. Furthermore, U.S. policies, like the Jones Act and Operation Bootstrap, have restrained local agriculture. For many, this catastrophe demonstrated the need for absolute change.

H.R. 8393 is historic in many ways. It is the first time the House passed a resolution requiring a binding referendum mandating the federal government to recognize the territory’s decision. The binding referendum would also be the first time that Puerto Rico’s current status as a U.S. commonwealth is not included as an option. Instead, the three options are independence, sovereignty in free association with the U.S., or statehood. The bill also promises to provide for a transition to and the implementation of Puerto Rico’s chosen status.

In June 2023, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization approved a draft resolution reaffirming Puerto Rico’s inalienable right to self-determination and independence. According to its press release, many spoke out in favor of autonomy, although it was pointed out that the foregoing was a minority opinion, with a majority of Puerto Ricans voting in favor of becoming the fifty-first state in the most recent referendum held in November 2022.

Among those who preferred statehood, Yadira Ofarrill, speaking for the Congressional Extended Delegation-Georgia Chapter, argued that statehood was a valid form of decolonization, and that Puerto Ricans deserved the same fundamental rights granted to U.S. citizens on the mainland. Xiomara Torres, on behalf of the Party for Socialism and Liberation, asserted that statehood would not “cut out the cancer that is colonialism.” The general consensus, however, seemed to be that the decision must be made by Puerto Ricans living on the island. Representative Grijalva, the sponsor of the bill, expressed similar sentiments: “It is crucial to me that any proposal in Congress to decolonize Puerto Rico be informed and led by Puerto Ricans.”

In her heartfelt piece on Puerto Rico’s fight for justice, Puerto Rican writer, journalist, and professor, Jaquira Díaz, also points to Hurricane María, arguing that it was not just a natural disaster, but a political event that provoked a historic shift. “Nine months after María, people still have no electricity. They stop waiting for FEMA. Instead, they look to their neighbors. They take care of one another. This is how it has always been […] There is no benevolent American savior coming to help Puerto Rico. Every day, people see that there is only them, doing everything for themselves. Every day, more of them come to understand that Puerto Rico has always stood on its own. This is why I believe that independence, not statehood, is the path we must pursue.”

Díaz acknowledges that the path to independence would be challenging. She argues, however, that the future of a free Puerto Rico does not need to be easy to be just. To reach that point, Díaz states that the U.S. has a responsibility to set a policy of reparations that acknowledges generations of environmental destruction, human rights violations, economic dislocation, and more. According to her, this process would be complex, imperfect, and messy, but “the point is that self-determination for Puerto Ricans necessitates not just cutting them loose, but also restoring what has been taken and otherwise making amends.”

Advocates of H.R. 8393 recognize Puerto Rico’s history of colonization and current political status as drivers of the island’s structural vulnerability. Disasters like Hurricane María revealed unsustainable practices and inequitable power relations, demonstrating the need for a change in status. What that change ends up being depends on the Puerto Rican vote. However, all three options listed on the bill require the U.S. to address the historic and modern injustices that Puerto Rico’s status has brought upon the island.

Rachel Lee is a former newsletter intern at Global Americans. She holds a bachelor’s degree in global studies with a minor in sustainability from Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. She is currently a master’s student pursuing a dual degree in international affairs and sustainable development at American University in Washington, D.C. and the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

The post The Puerto Rico Status Act’s Historic Push Towards Self-Determination appeared first on Global Americans.

President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has opened yet another battlefront in Mexico’s belligerent political context. In violation of the constitution, the national education law, and the most basic sense of decency and morality, but with the usual levels of opacity and cynicism, AMLO’s government has drafted and published new textbooks for public schools nationwide through the Ministry of Education. The textbooks are fraught with manifold math, science, and history errors and reveal a total disregard for knowledge and education.

Rightly so, there has been a strong reaction and outrage by opposition parties, civil society, and parents for this assault against public education. Several local governments have refused to distribute the textbooks and have filed lawsuits before the Supreme Court. Some federal judges have already issued precautionary measures against their distribution, given the violations in the legally required drafting process, which was conducted opaquely and without the necessary consultations with the various actors within the education system. Regardless of the legal effects of these cases, the episode is a clear representation of the government’s nature and political intentions. If some doubts remained about AMLO’s political and ideological goals, the textbooks now expose it in black and white.

One of AMLO’s first actions as president was to eliminate the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE), an autonomous government agency in charge of evaluating the development and shortcomings of education nationwide. It made sense. If education is no longer a priority, why bother to measure it? Likewise, only a few months after the inauguration of his presidency, he capsized the educational reform made by the previous administration, yielding enormous influence to radical teachers’ unions in exchange for their political backing. The textbooks are just another stride in a hurried race to place public education in a place from where it will be hard to rebuild.

Mexico’s public education was already in crisis. Public schools have long lacked proper equipment and infrastructure, paired with the fact that results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA test have repetitively shown lower scores than the average of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries. To make matters worse, during the pandemic, the Ministry of Education was negligent enough to allow 1.4 million children to abandon school. But the current blatant destruction of anything resembling an education system is a new phenomenon; this is a political provocation to lower the standard below anything imagined in the past, an attempt to create apathy, cynicism, and a political climate in which barely anything astonishes anymore. It is a cruel plan to use children for a petty political project and perpetuate dogmatism into the future.

According to one of Mexico’s most renowned education experts, Gilberto Guevara, the textbooks are filled with “dogmas, fanatism, and are a pedagogic absurdity.” They destroy the national education policy to satisfy the interests of a single political movement, abandoning logical thinking and erasing the line between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. This should come as no surprise. The textbooks are a representation of the movement’s three basic hallmarks.

Firstly, the ideological nature. The textbooks are a reliable exemplification of an antiscientific government and its determination to politicize public life. Flooded with historical errors and vulgar manipulations of information, the textbooks disseminate a cognitive relativism in which any form of knowledge is equally valid and displaces the student’s individuality with “collective values.” The manipulations of history include, among many others, AMLO’s lie about the 2006 electoral fraud against him, a bigoted narrative for which no evidence has ever been presented. Based on the rancid ideology known as ‘epistemologies of the South,’ which attempts to repudiate Western values and to surpass “the rotten roots of neoliberalism,” math and sciences are portrayed as part of an oppressive model that corruptly promotes individualism and meritocracy.

Secondly, the textbooks are representative of the regime’s opacity. The government has reserved the information about the elaboration processes for five years, a clumsy admission of guilt. The Marxist firebrand and fanatic in charge of the textbooks, Marx Arriaga, with the help of a former public official of the Maduro regime and a small cohort of people with no expertise in education or pedagogy, were responsible for the elaboration process. Given their backgrounds, it is no surprise that they hid how they worked together.

Finally, the textbooks signal the government’s distinctive incompetence. In this case, ill intentions go in tandem with ineptitude. Some mistakes are also the result of carelessness, even for their propagandistic enterprise, i.e., errors in pictures of the solar system and the birthdates of former presidents.  

Sadly, even critics of this assault have fallen into a trap. By asking for the mistakes to be corrected, they overlook that AMLO’s party is a movement that nurtures itself through provocation and disruption and where conflict is inherent in every action. Correcting the mistakes is not a solution because it misses the purpose of the original intent: the textbooks are no longer tools to educate but to indoctrinate. In propaganda leaflets, mistakes become requirements. AMLO and his political movement are conscious that any personal achievement, aspiration, and personal development are kryptonite for a project that feeds itself from resentment and prides itself on anti-intellectualism.

Public education should be the guidepost of long-term policies that transcend government idiosyncrasies. The Mexican constitution forbids the ideology of incumbent governments to be translated into public education; the third article mandates that: “the criteria that will guide education will be based on scientific progress, the fight against ignorance […] fanaticisms and prejudices”. Not surprisingly, some of Mexico’s most brilliant and renowned intellectuals were appointed as ministers of Education and responsible for the drafting of public textbooks during the 20^th century. Yet, it would be naive to think that all previous governments have continually placed public education on an apolitical and unreachable shelf. In 1939, the opposition party, PAN, with the help of the catholic church, emerged with freedom of education as a political banner, given the inclusion of socialist ideas in the constitution during the 1930s. Spawning a political tug-of-war for the ideological content of education. But the flagrant destruction of any basic moral or pedagogical standard is new. The current petty debate in Mexico around how much communism in the textbooks is too much is irrelevant to the millions of children who will not care about the label we use for books that will harm their future.

AMLO’s books do not contain mistakes because he is not trying to educate.  This is another step in a broader scheme to propagate lies in the prevailing ambush to eliminate research centers, public universities, and scholarships. For a self-declared antiscientific government and a president who repetitively prides himself in having “other facts”, belittling science and knowledge is no mistake—it is the natural outcome of the disdain.

There is an old and common trap used by radicals against moderates and common sense: to avoid being called a bigot, one must always be willing and capable of finding the golden nuggets in the dirt. However, this is a set-up and a fallacy nonetheless. We mustn’t fall into the ploy of finding merits when something sprouts from a rotten core. If a whole model is corrupted and, more importantly, devised to corrupt, it must be rejected and condemned, regardless of the glitter to conceal it. Propaganda disguised as education is propaganda, not education with mistakes. Yes, Mexico’s education system was already in a ruinous situation, but the recent events are not the aggravation of an existing crisis but rather the upholding and propagation of disaster as a political aim. Destroying public education is not a mistake for someone who sustains his power in lies and political instability. The textbooks are a faithful projection of the political project.

Those who claim that AMLO should “fix” the mistake of not teaching children math, for example, are missing the point. They are scrutinizing a fantasy and a projection of what they would like to be analyzing. The existence of mistakes presupposes a basic concern for facts and the truth. Well-intentioned liberal critics have created their own veil, through which it is extremely difficult to comprehend a level of ignorance and irresponsibility that throws the public education of millions of children under the bus without any shame. But such is the case. AMLO has fooled his critics once again by making them believe and reiterate that his “textbooks have mistakes,” ignoring the most important fact: the books are made for his purposes, not theirs.

Emiliano Polo is a graduate student of global affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His research focuses on applied history and Latin American politics. He currently works in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

The post There Are No Mistakes in AMLO’s New Textbooks appeared first on Global Americans.

Despite some analysts claiming it has lost its middle power status and foreign policy relevance, Canada has been at the forefront of significant international peacemaking efforts in recent decades. Canada’s sustained efforts to support peace in Colombia—though not as glamourized as efforts made by the U.S., the Organization of American States (OAS), or other countries and organizations—are significant.

With Canada reaching its 70th year of formal diplomatic relations with Colombia, it is important to recognize its quiet contributions to the Andean country’s long peace and justice process. As stated in a public memo from Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s foreign policy goals in Colombia mainly relate to its security and political future, all strengthened through international assistance and commercial diplomacy. Canada’s efforts toward peace, justice, and democracy in Colombia have not changed. The country has provided direct and indirect foreign assistance to Colombia over the last five decades, hoping that such efforts, as put by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion said in a 2016 meeting in Cartagena, will “make peace stick.”

Canada has aimed to promote “growing mobility between [the] two countries,” through increasing bilateral ties since the start of Colombia’s civil conflict in the mid-1960s.  Under Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau—who governed from 1968 to 1979 and from 1980 to 1984—Canada’s focus on diplomatic engagement contrasted with that of its U.S. counterparts. While the United States supported anti-communist activities, paramilitary groups, and governments against democratic regimes hostile to American commercial interests, Trudeau engaged with actors across the political-ideological spectrum. He created the Latin American Task Force, founded the Bureau of Western-Hemispheric Affairs, and joined the Organization of American States (OAS) as a permanent observer in 1972.

Beginning in 2004, the Canadian government, under both Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, mirrored former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s diplomatic approach to managing relations with Colombia. This was done through the organization of several official trips, the creation of bureaucratic structures, and the establishment of communication channels to support peace, justice, and engagement with Colombia. These institutions helped promote dialogue and diplomatic engagement with Colombia, advancing Canada’s role in the 2016 Peace Accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Another central objective was the cooperation on regional and multilateral issues, including within institutions and gatherings that facilitated cooperation and dialogue with partners.

As part of this effort, Canada became one of the main financiers, along with the United States, of the Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS). The MAPP/OAS is tasked with “[fostering] peaceful coexistence, recognizing victims’ rights, and creating spaces conducive to reconciliation.” Additionally, Canada has provided various grants to MAPP/OAS, as well as to the United Nations (UN) Verification Mission in Colombia, and organized visits to their offices in Bogota. The MAPP/OAS and UN Verification Mission are essential to promoting multilateral dialogue within Colombia and to building lasting peace that includes all relevant actors and sectors of society. Relatedly, Canada’s Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP) provides financial support to these two institutions, reaching up to USD 4.4 million annually.

Canada has been actively working towards including human rights in Colombia’s peace process by raising the issue in every phase of the negotiation and reintegration process, including business, security, and political capacity-building. One example of that is Canada’s engagement with the non-governmental sector to work toward peace and justice and “creating economic opportunities for vulnerable populations” and “responding to humanitarian needs.” Canadian NGOs like Oxfam Québec, SOCODEVI, and Cuso International are working with the government to support civil society initiatives in conflict-affected regions of Colombia. Desjardins Bank has also granted loans to small business owners in conflict-affected areas of Colombia to promote economic growth.

The Canadian government, working with the Colombian Mine Action Authority (DAICMA), has cleared out over 57,000m² of minefields, provided 26 cleared minefields to local communities, and helped with the identification and mapping of another 21 minefields. With Colombia as the second most-affected country by anti-personnel mines, at least 27,000 people have directly benefitted from the mine clearance, and another 60,000 are looking to be re-integrated into their communities after the demining is completed.

Another foreign policy goal of Canada in Colombia is built around promoting gender equality and integration within the peace process. Women are a key part of the structure of many criminal armed groups in Colombia, most particularly the FARC. In partnership with ProFamilia, a Colombian NGO, the Canadian government has provided services for 9,069 girls and their families who were victims of gender-based violence. Colombia was also put as a “priority country” within Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. This fits within Canada’s stated desire to pursue peace through civil society engagement, as well as “advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.”

Finally, Canada has looked to advance the peace process to foster democracy in Colombia by supporting peacebuilding efforts. To combat disenfranchisement, Canada has rhetorically and financially supported free and fair politics in Colombia. To do so, the Canadian government sent electoral observers in partnership with the OAS to Colombia and provide grants for public diplomacy and peacebuilding organizations through Global Affairs Canada. Additionally, Canada provided grants to NGOs, media organizations, academic institutions, and small businesses in Colombia. Moreover, Canada has built a Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP) that, since 2006, has “provided $40 million in funding to support peacebuilding efforts, with a focus on supporting the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC.” The program is specifically focused on implementing the promises of the deal, including transitional justice and fighter reintegration. As a result of these efforts, Colombians have felt more included in the democratic process, and the demobilization of criminal armed forces became less costly and more efficient.

In conclusion, Canada has pursued an effective approach to peace and justice in Colombia, centered on advancing mutual security, as well as diplomatic, political, humanitarian, and commercial goals. Governments across the region should abandon power politics in Colombia in favor of government re-integration and mediation efforts. To help guarantee a successful transition to peace and a delivery of justice to millions of Colombians, the Canadian model in Colombia should be emulated by neighbors and partners, while efforts from the Canadian government continue to shape the peaceful relations between the two countries.

Joseph Bouchard is a journalist and analyst covering geopolitics, crime, and energy in Latin America. His articles have appeared in The Diplomat, The Brazilian Report, Mongabay, and London Politica. He is an MIA candidate at Carleton University in Ottawa.

The post Canada, The Modest Advocate for Peace in Colombia appeared first on Global Americans.

The following piece is an adaptation of a special edition of the Americas Migration newsletter, available at www.migrationbrief.com.

While migration to the United States has traditionally been dominated by Mexicans and then Northern Central Americans, the last few years have seen new trends in increasing migration from South America, the Caribbean, and extracontinental migrants from Africa and Asia. This has both highlighted the regional—and global—nature of migration and increased the number of countries—and borders—between home countries and the United States. 

Despite the changes in migration dynamics over the years, the U.S. Congress has yet to pass any level of immigration reform for decades. Amid a stagnant legislative framework, the Executive Branch has had to be creative to develop policy and respond to migration. Recent years have seen a newfound regional approach to thinking about migration from Washington, with the Trump administration collaborating with partners across the Americas in an effort to restrict migration and asylum. In contrast, the Biden administration has sought to employ a dual approach focused on both deterrence and the expansion of legal pathways to the country for both labor and protection.

Excluding perhaps the Obama administration’s Alliance for Prosperity Plan for Northern Central America, the Trump administration implemented some of the first real regional migration policies from the U.S. government. Coordination with Mexico on border enforcement deployment and asylum-restricting policies such as metering and the Migrant Protection Protocols (often called the “Remain in Mexico” program) represented a greater collaboration with the next-door neighbors across the southern border. Moving further afield, the move to establish Safe Third Country Agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras was historic in terms of expanding to a more regional approach on migration, albeit squarely focused on deterrence and preventing would-be asylum seekers from reaching the U.S. border.

The Biden administration, by contrast, has broadened the scope of a regional migration policy from Washington and has even looked to set up regional processing centers across the region to facilitate access to migration pathways while reducing pressure at the U.S. border. New pathways for migration that help prevent dangerous and unregulated irregular migration include a humanitarian parole program for up to 30,000 total Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans per month; expanded temporary labor migration visas for Central Americans and Haitians; and expanded family reunification pathways for select nationalities. Finally, the refugee cap has increased significantly from the record lows set during the Trump administration.

This new way of approaching migration and thinking regionally has had many benefits, including increased coordination and information sharing between stakeholders, expanded regular migration for both those with protection needs and those seeking better job opportunities alike, stronger initiatives to promote integration in receiving countries across the hemisphere, and improved efforts to clamp down on human and sex trafficking. 

Even still, deterrence has remained the underlying status quo. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, signed in June 2022 under the leadership of the Biden administration, was a historic recognition of the regional and multifaceted nature of migration across the Americas. Since the declaration’s signing, however, the clearest follow-through at a regional level has been the expansion of hardening border enforcement measures and efforts to halt migrants in transit in their tracks, as highlighted in late May by reports of senior Biden administration officials looking to send U.S. troops to the infamous Darien Gap jungle that separates Colombia and Panama.

Nowhere is the deterrence-oriented approach to regional collaboration more evident than with the implementation of visa restrictions.

Thinking regionally has brought increased coordination on these border enforcement efforts. The four countries that have received the most attention of late for their migration to the United States are Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Using the tools available without congressional reform, the Biden administration has implemented an innovative humanitarian parole policy for these four countries and sought to expand their family reunification pathways; it has also pushed for countries along the route north to introduce visa restrictions in an effort to deter asylum seeking at the U.S.-Mexico border. Less than a decade ago, Venezuelans could enter Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama without a visa en route to the United States. Today, Venezuelans must go through laborious and expensive processes to enter those same countries. 

One example that slips under the radar but is emblematic of the policy approach is that of Belize, where new visa restrictions have been implemented for Haitians and debated for Jamaicans due to their use of the country as a landing point before continuing on by foot to head north. Per the Caribbean Community’s CSME and the Treaty of Chaguaramas, both Haitians and Jamaicans should generally have visa-free entry for up to six months in Belize.

These maps are available in closer detail and for download here.

Visa restrictions also act as a deterrent for extracontinental migrants. Migrants from Africa and Asia are increasingly looking to seek asylum at the U.S. border, but most are pushed to fly to South America—often Ecuador or Brazil—before taking off on foot heading north. The trend has grown since the COVID-19 pandemic but began as far back as 2013. 

Despite a proliferation of targeted visa restrictions, the reality is that migration has continued. As the option of flights and other regular travel further north has been taken off the board, this has only pushed migrants to take more dangerous paths to the U.S. border, most infamously through the Darien Gap. Over one hundred and twenty thousand migrants crossed the Darien Gap between January and April 2023—six times more than over the same period last year. And even though the Biden administration announced new deterrence measures following the expiration of Title 42 that have been labeled an “asylum transit ban,” migrants have continued to make the trek north. 

Relying solely on deterrence policies has consistently proven to be ineffective in preventing migration, whereas the opening of legal pathways has facilitated safe, orderly, and regular migration to the U.S. While the Trump administration focused solely on the former, the Biden administration’s dual approach has proven more constructive, albeit still prioritizing a deterring approach to regional collaboration. Washington is now thinking more regionally about migration, but the question becomes where its priorities lie and where they will head as we approach the 2024 presidential election and beyond.

Jordi Amaral is the author of the Americas Migration Brief newsletter and a freelance researcher and writer specializing in Latin America and the Caribbean, migration, and politics. He has worked with Hxagon, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), among others.

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Now imagine that this animated conclave was organized by the normally staid, cautious diplomats of the U.S. Department of State.

Amazingly, just such a thrilling, iconoclastic gathering convened in Denver, Colorado, at the inaugural “Cities Summit of the Americas” this April 26 -28. Secretary of State Antony Blinken personally closed the Summit and was greeted by a standing ovation.

Among the roughly 200 mayors in attendance in the mile-high city were Claudia Sheinbaum, mayor of Mexico City and front-runner for Mexico’s 2024 presidential contest; Claudia López, mayor of Bogotá and accomplished environmental advocate; Eduardo Paes, mayor of Rio de Janeiro and driver of the Anti-Racist Cities Network; Carolina Cosse, mayor of Montevideo and celebrated former minister of industry, energy, and mining; Luis Donaldo Colosio Riojas, mayor of Monterrey, an emerging hub for electrical vehicle supply chains; Monserrat Caballero Ramírez, mayor of Tijuana, San Diego’s sister city; and Carolina Mejía, mayor of Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic—whose country will host the tenth presidential-level Summit of the Americas in 2025.

U.S. mayors from Miami, Seattle, Phoenix, Oklahoma City, Atlanta, Memphis, Des Moines, Hoboken, and of course Denver, among many other municipalities were also in attendance. (However, the mayors of the three most populous U.S. cities—New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—did not attend.)

The State Department farmed out the organization of the dozens of concurrent panels to prominent U.S. think tanks and other prestigious non-profits as well as leading international organizations including the Inter-American Development Bank and CAF—the Development Bank of Latin America. To judge from the diversity of opinion, organizers were given wide latitude—and were even encouraged to include dissident, cutting edge perspectives. For example, the Washington Office on Latin America co-hosted a panel on drugs that included Cat Brooks, a long-time activist from Oakland, California, who passionately invoked the name of Black Panther martyr Fred Hampton and whose website calls for cutting the budget of the Oakland Police by 50 percent.

However, the “Summit of the Americas” label was something of a misnomer as the Cities Summit was principally organized by the U. S. government. Conversely, the periodic presidential-level Summits of the Americas is a more multilateral process, with the 35-member Organization of American States playing a large hand. (The first Summit of the Americas was convened by President Bill Clinton in Miami in 1994 and the ninth Summit of the Americas occurred in Los Angeles last June, while various Latin American and Caribbean countries hosted the intervening presidential summits.)

Despite the many constructive, collegial exchanges that occurred in Denver, the Cities Summit was not devoid of controversy. However, in comparison to the hard, adversarial edge that sometimes erupted at recent presidential-level Summits of the Americas, the Denver meeting was at once more relaxed, more substantive, more free-flowing, and more authentic.

One possible contributing factor: in the Americas, there are many more women mayors than there are female heads of state. Indeed, the Denver summit was unbound of the super egos of some heads of state that too often disrupt traditional summits, even if some mayors may aspire to higher office; unbound of the many formalities and intense security of high-level official affairs; unbound of the baggage of two centuries of contested inter-American history and governments jealously protecting their “national sovereignty”; and unbound in large measure by global and regional geopolitical rivalries. The municipal officials were also not obliged to draft baroque consensus declarations, even if the mayor of Denver, Michael Hancock, gathered some 50 participating mayors to sign a Denver Declaration.

Another key reason the Cities Summit was more relaxed and creative than recent presidential summits, including the Los Angeles meeting: absent presidential participation, the White House allowed the State Department a freer hand in running the Cities Summit. The preparations for the June 2022 Summit in Los Angeles were plagued by White House indecision and political agendas that severely restricted U.S. diplomats. One stunning example of this freedom from national-level politicking—Denver’s Biennial of the Americas, the Cities Summit host committee partner, empowered a Havana-based cultural center, Fábrica de Arte, to curate an independent cultural warehouse hosting some 100 visual, performance, and fashion artists from around the Americas. An influential Cuban American in Denver, Maria Garcia Berry, facilitated this Cuban presence. Garcia Berry prides herself on her independence from the hardline exile community in Miami, that strenuously objects to any enterprise operating on the island and hence, in one way or another, co-existing with the Cuban Communist Party. In stark contrast at last year’s Los Angeles Summit, the White House decision to exclude the Cuban government dominated the headlines and soured the mood even among participating delegations. In the run-up to Los Angeles, the president of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, vociferously objected to the exclusion of Cuba and refused to attend. In Denver, his most likely successor, Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum, participated actively and constructively. In Denver audiences thrilled to a wider diversity of Latin American creative talents.

State Department organizers, including U.S. Summit of the Americas National Coordinator Kevin O’Reilly and the newly appointed Special Representative for City and State Diplomacy Nina Hachigian, astutely eschewed hints of U.S. heavy-handedness. Instead, they gave wide latitude to the think tanks and other non-profits and international organizations that selected panel participants.

Gracious U.S. speakers recognized that their Latin American counterparts were frequently ahead of them. For example, Nicole Anand from Los Angeles found inspiration in other countries’ transparency-in-governance initiatives.

Yet, international politics was not entirely absent in Denver. Mayors from the Ukraine, including the mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, were showcased. Dissident mayors from Venezuela, opposed to the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, were also invited. In addition, younger, up-and-coming mayors from Latin America were exposed to the points of view of U.S. government agencies and U.S.-influenced multilateral institutions.

There was also a decidedly partisan political tone to the Denver proceedings. Among the U.S. participants, Democratic and other progressive voices dominated the discourse. In his keynote remarks, White House Senior Advisor to the President Mitch Landrieu delivered an impassioned, if boilerplate, endorsement of President Joe Biden.

Denver 2023 also highlighted the shifts in policy priorities since the first Summit of the Americas convened back in 1994. To be sure, the big themes of Denver—social inclusion, access to health and education, gender equity, indigenous rights, democratic governance, clean energy, environmental protection, development finance, and civil society participation—were also present, albeit to varying degrees, in the official declarations of Miami.

Logically however, Denver placed priority on today’s top concerns: climate change, migration flows, rule of law, and social justice.

Notably, one policy shift stood out: the treatment of international trade. The 1994 Miami Summit launched negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In June 1995, Denver was the site of the official launch of the FTAA discussions, with the presence of enthusiastic trade ministers and more than 1,000 corporate executives. The expectations were high: the United States eventually signed free trade agreements with 11 Latin American and Caribbean nations.

While the full FTAA vision remains unrealized, it is now discarded by the Biden trade team. In fact, at the Cities Summit, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reiterated her accusation that “for too long, workers were largely excluded from the benefits of increased trade.” The former Congressional staffer regularly distances herself from the market-opening trade agreements negotiated by her predecessors—both Democrats and Republicans.

In Denver, few people attended Tai’s remarks, an indicator of the declining salience of U.S. trade policy in the Americas. Instead, at the 2023 Cities Summit, the term “integration” referred to humanitarian assistance to migrant laborers—not to the binding of national economies through trade in goods and services.

In Denver, Jose Fernandez, the State Department’s lead on international economics, announced a promising “Cities Forward” initiative. It will provide funds and technical assistance to two dozen cities—12 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 12 in the United States—to develop and implement sustainability action plans and share them among the other networked cities.

While Blinken expressed his hope that the Cities Summit of the Americas will repeat, no dates or places were announced. One option that surfaced in Denver: at the 2025 Summit of the Americas in the Dominican Republic, mayors might convene a second Cities Summit. Similar gatherings—such as the CEO Business Forum—already meet in parallel with the presidential Summits.

The Denver Cities Summit of the Americas demonstrated the potential of sub-national diplomacy—gatherings of national and municipal officials together with international organizations and financial donors—to exchange best practices and confront their shared challenges. Despite its many internal problems, the United States retains the power to convene such substantive dialogues and to do so with efficiency, intelligence, and yes, even humility.

Richard E. Feinberg is a member of Global Americans’ International Advisory Council. He was a principal architect of the first Summit of the Americas in Miami 1994, while he was serving as Special Assistant to President Clinton for Inter-American Affairs, and he has attended seven of the eight subsequent inter-American Summits. He is the author of Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1997).

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Price: USD 28.00 | 280 pages

Daniel Runde’s forthcoming book, The American Imperative: Reclaiming Global Leadership through Soft Power, is a sweeping examination of the U.S. role in international development. Runde, a Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has worked on the front lines of development policy for the last two decades and, fittingly, draws on this experience to explain why U.S. rhetoric has so often differed from policy in recent years. Just as importantly, he charts a new course for U.S. leadership in development amid rising great power competition.

Runde divides his book into two sections—the first assessing the challenges in international development today and the second proposing tools to overcome these challenges. His view of international development is transformational, where outside assistance can catalyze internal reforms and lead to broad-based economic growth.

His view is also a political one. In a refreshingly candid analysis of U.S. aid, Runde not only accepts, but also endorses the combination of strategic and altruistic motives that drive foreign policy decisions.

In recounting the history of U.S. overseas assistance, Runde adds nuance to the narratives that many of us have previously heard. Many accounts of the East Asian economic miracle, for example, stress the role of domestic infrastructure investment. This was certainly a major factor in the success of the Four Asian Tiger economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. However, as Runde notes, outside help was also a significant catalyst. In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. aid was roughly half of the public investment in Taiwan. For South Korea during the same period, U.S. scholarships provided high-quality, low-cost education to thousands of future leaders in business and government. These leaders drew on their educational experience to propel the country’s postwar economic boom. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) office in Seoul closed in 1980 and, by 2009, South Korea had joined the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Once an aid recipient, South Korea is now a major donor.

Runde’s book is at its strongest when he examines a puzzle from recent history. The Trump administration constantly questioned U.S. aid commitments, proposed a 30 percent budget cut for diplomacy and development, and even sought to subsume USAID under the Department of State. Yet, in the end, Trump’s time in office was not nearly as catastrophic for the United States’ global development posture as it could have been.

What explains this puzzle? In part, it was the advocacy of Runde and his conservative internationalist allies. When the White House sought to cut funding for USAID and the Department of State, Runde lobbied his Congressional colleagues in the Republican Party to prevent the move. When China advanced its favored candidate as head of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—an obscure, but important multilateral body—it would have been easy for isolationists and unilateralists in the Trump administration to do nothing. Instead, Runde organized State Department officials to successfully back a pro-U.S. Singaporean candidate for the role. Runde’s advocacy not only limited the harms of the Trump administration, but also advanced new, positive initiatives, such as the launch of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation.

In both his advocacy with policymakers and his book, Runde roots his arguments for U.S. global leadership in the need to respond to China. Here, however, his analysis is on more contentious ground. At several instances in the book, Runde argues that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a form of “debt-trap diplomacy,” a concept that has gained currency among foreign policy hands, but is disputed by leading BRI experts such as Deborah Brautigam, Meg Rithmire, and Jonathan Hillman. As I have previously written for Global Americans, choosing a Chinese loan over a U.S. or multilateral offer entails tradeoffs for any developing country. Leaders who accept a Chinese loan are not necessarily being tricked or taking bribes; rather they could be making the best choice for their people. This is particularly true in Latin America, which suffers from deep and persistent infrastructure gaps.

Whatever the shortcomings of Runde’s analysis of China’s foreign policy aims, he astutely recognizes the political benefits of framing the need for U.S. leadership in terms of U.S.-China competition. Runde’s success in advancing U.S. engagement is largely due to his argument that the United States is losing to China and that policymakers must do more to keep up. This argument has shown continued relevance in the Biden years, as Runde has successfully pushed for the confirmation of several ambassadorial nominees and marshaled support for a U.S. candidate to replace the Chinese head of the International Telecommunication Union.

With the continued influence of “America First” legislators in the U.S. Congress, Runde’s approach to garnering support for U.S. engagement will stay relevant. By emphasizing the benefits of diplomacy and development and framing them in a way that is compelling to policymakers across the ideological spectrum, Runde’s book could not have arrived at a more important time.

Robert (Bo) Carlson is a Research Associate at Global Americans and a MA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He has previously written for World Politics Review and The Diplomat. You can find him on Twitter: @bocarlson1.

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Although the United States is embroiled in an ongoing political fight over what content students should and should not be taught in school, the debate often ignores other important elements of what should be incorporated—not only to create a better-educated populace but to improve U.S. standing worldwide. In particular, discussions around history tend to ignore the need to teach students about Latin America and the Caribbean and how interconnected the world has become. This hole in the U.S. education system is reflected in a lack of attention to the region in U.S. foreign policy. To bolster engagement with the rest of the Americas, the United States should expand its education system’s coverage of Inter-American history and Latin American studies.

The U.S. public has traditionally shown more interest in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East, leaving much to be desired regarding its understanding of and engagement with Latin America. Not only does the region share a long and complicated history with the United States, but it represents a wealth of opportunities. U.S. trade with countries in the Western Hemisphere totaled USD $1.5 trillion in 2019. The United States has free trade agreements with several countries across the region, including Colombia and Peru. Furthermore, the region’s geographic location and ties to the United States have meant that it has periodically been of extreme importance to U.S. geopolitical interests.

The two regions not only share close historical ties, but Latin America provides a useful mirror to examine several contemporary issues impacting the United States. While there is a clear connection between understanding the politics and history of Latin America and current issues, such as immigration, deepening our understanding of dynamics in the region can also provide important insights into other critical issues. For instance, although the dynamics are different, Latin America and the Caribbean continue to face the legacies of colonialism and slavery. Understanding how these factors play out in other countries can help us better understand their legacies within the United States. Furthermore, understanding the complicated history of U.S. engagement with the region can help us better understand contemporary diplomatic challenges. 

Given these ties, it is clear that the United States government should be more focused on improving engagement with and understanding of the dynamics of the Western Hemisphere. Boosting public interest in the region can have long-lasting implications for policymakers looking to develop deeper relations across the Americas.

One of the most efficient ways to boost such engagement is to increase the region’s prevalence within the U.S. education system. At several points in U.S. history, the federal government recognized the value of fostering closer regional ties through educational programs—some of which are still in place today. While efforts to impart information about Latin America to the U.S. public were central to President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, the most enduring attempt to integrate the study of Hemispheric affairs into U.S. education came in 1958 when the government passed Title VI of the National Defense Education Act; Title VI was later added to the Higher Education Act of 1965. Efforts such as these—originally created to combat the spread of Soviet influence—still exist today and provide critical funding to regional studies programs at the university level. More specifically, Title VI funding supplies resources to two key areas: National Resource Centers (NRCs) and Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships. While the NRC funding provides specific support for studying different regions, FLAS fellowships offer important resources that allow undergraduate and graduate students to develop foreign language skills.

Title VI funding is essential if the United States wants to increase interest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Not only does funding for NRCs and FLAS fellowships allow universities to hire additional faculty with regional expertise—thus allowing for more classes on these subjects—but it can also invoke interest among students to study the region by providing opportunities to earn scholarships and pursue unique study abroad programs. In the 2022–2025 funding cycle, approximately 19.8 percent of Title VI funding for NRCs and FLAS fellowships was awarded to programs focused on the Western Hemisphere, for a total of 19 NRCs and 22 FLAS programs. Canada was disproportionately represented, receiving approximately 1.8 percent of total funding—or just over 9 percent of the total budget for the Western Hemisphere. While the share of Title VI funding going to Hemispheric studies is up compared to previous years, it remains far too low for a region so closely linked with the United States.

Source: U.S. Department of Education. National Resource Centers Program. Accessed 10/5/22.

Additionally, Title VI funding has an added element incorporated into many of these programs: targeted efforts to promote the development of Latin American and Caribbean topics in K-12 education. Some Latin American studies centers are doing this already. For instance, several universities across the country provide K-12 teacher training and outreach programs. These trainings can provide teachers with new ways of thinking about how to incorporate Hemispheric issues into their curricula. Furthermore, these same centers are often involved in developing lesson plans that can be used for younger audiences. These plans include exploring ties between one’s own state and the region, looking at different Latin American and Caribbean celebrations, and examining the migrant experience through literature, among many more. With younger students already being exposed to the region through popular films like Disney’s Coco and Encanto, teachers have an easy entry into engaging students about the region in fun and interactive ways.

These educational opportunities can further manifest at the high school level in the form of classes focused specifically on Inter-American history. Although there are important ways that this could be integrated across all of the high school history curricula, one area where there is a notable gap is in Advanced Placement (AP) classes. While some AP classes already exist for U.S., European, and World history, such programs do not exist for Africa or Latin America. By developing and offering more specialized regional courses, students will have the opportunity to develop their interest in different geographical regions far before they pursue higher education, which is when many of these classes are typically first offered.

However, this is not a new concept. The United States is already promoting Hemispheric solidarity through international exchanges and study abroad programs. Initiatives such as the 100,000 Strong in the Americas program seek to boost the number of U.S. college students studying in Latin America and vice versa. Likewise, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs’ Fulbright program provides an important avenue through which students and scholars from around the world can interact with one another. Programs focusing on people-to-people connections can generate interest in the region by creating lasting impacts beyond what is taught in the classroom. Efforts to promote study abroad programs for high school and community college students can provide similar benefits—and they are already underway, including in the form of U.S-Brazil Connect, Rotary Youth Exchanges, and the Youth Ambassadors Program. However, more can be done to expand the availability of these types of opportunities for students.

Building bridges with countries across the Americas is in the United States’s national interest. However, creating meaningful connections without developing interest and expertise among the U.S. public will not be easy. Integrating Hemispheric studies into the U.S. education system is a simple way to increase the U.S. public’s engagement with the region. Building upon existing programs and working further to integrate Hemispheric studies into the U.S. education curriculum could be an important first step in highlighting both to the American public and to the region that the U.S. is interested in developing longer-term connections across the Americas.

Adam Ratzlaff is the Deputy Director of Global Americans. Ratzlaff has consulted for the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. He holds an MA from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, a BA from Tulane University, and is currently pursuing his doctoral degree.

Diana Roy is a writer and editor covering Latin America and immigration issues at the Council on Foreign Relations. She received her BA from American University in Washington, DC. Her global affairs work has previously been featured in International Policy Digest, the Center for International Policy, and the Inter-American Dialogue. The views expressed herein are strictly her own.

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An areal view shows people protesting against the electoral reform proposed by Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) and in support of the National Electoral Institute (INE), in Monterrey, Mexico, November 13, 2022. Photo: Reuters.

On Sunday, Mexicans took to the streets across the nation to protest President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s plan to replace the National Electoral Institute (INE) with directly elected delegates. The protest culminated when José Woldenberg—former head of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), INE’s predecessor—joined the protest and called on Mexicans not to permit “the pretension of aligning electoral bodies to the will of the government.” Lorenzo Córdova, the Executive Secretary of INE, also expressed gratitude to protestors who took to the streets “in defense of democracy.” However, on Monday, López Obrador said that the protest was not carried out by the people, but by corrupt anti-democratic politicians “in favor of racism and classism.”

INE is an autonomous constitutional body in Mexico responsible for regulating electoral processes. Created in 1990 to address electoral disputes, IFE presided over Mexico’s first transfer of power in 2000 after 71 years of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) control. AMLO’s National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party and its allies fall short of the supermajority control in congress required to pass such constitutional reform. However, there are plans to discuss this proposal in the coming weeks. The current reform also proposes funding cuts to political parties and electoral authorities as well as a reduction in the number of legislators in both chambers of Congress.

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The 2022 U.S. midterm election results cement a trend that impacts U.S.-Latin American policy—hardline positions are largely bipartisan in Florida. Those positions congeal Cold War-era views and complicate policy change. They are shared by enough Democrats that President Joe Biden, whose attitude toward Latin America is generally centrist (and in the past was even sometimes hawkish), will certainly feel tempted not to alienate his own party with strong views on Latin America.

For years, conventional wisdom held that demographic changes in Florida would likely shift U.S. policy toward Cuba away from the status quo. Younger Floridians, even Cuban Americans, held more pragmatic views and were open to changing long-standing policies—most notably the embargo. However, those views do not seem to hold. Younger Cuban arrivals tend to have more liberal views on social needs, but those change over time as they are integrated into Republican-leaning communities. This view peaked in 2014, when President Barack Obama announced the thawing of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Two years later, Donald Trump was elected president and won Florida again in 2020 despite losing the election.

Further, Cuban policy is not the only game in town. Since that 2014 peak, governments in both Nicaragua and Venezuela have slid further down the hole toward authoritarianism. Additionally, Colombia elected not only a leftist leader in their last election, but a former guerilla. At this point, all of these countries get attention in Florida politics. During the 2022 mid-term elections, even Democratic candidates sound like Richard Nixon at his anti-Communist best. These bipartisan trends will have direct impacts on U.S. foreign policy—particularly toward Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia.

Holding Fast to the Cuba Embargo

Florida International University’s poll of Cuban America in 2008 found that only 45 percent favored continuing the embargo, while 55 percent opposed its continuation. However, the same poll in 2022 revealed a different picture—57 percent of Cuban-Americans now support the continuation of the embargo, a number which rises to 63 percent if you remove “don’t know” as an option from the poll.

Almost any shift in U.S. sanctions on Cuba immediately generates bipartisan criticism and leads Democratic candidates to complain that the Biden administration is tone deaf when it comes to Florida politics. Facing the typical calls of being socialist, Democrat Annette Taddeo, who lost handily to incumbent María Elvira Salazar for a House seat, felt compelled to praise the Helms-Burton Act. Although Biden eased some sanctions on Cuba, he has gone no further. Furthermore, unlike Obama, he does not criticize the embargo and has been cautious about pushing policy change toward the island.

Slow Change on Venezuela Policy

As with Cuba, there is broad bipartisan agreement in Florida that sanctions against the Venezuelan government are appropriate. When the administration floated the idea of easing sanctions on Venezuelan oil imports, there was a bipartisan wave of condemnation. Democrat House Member Darren Soto, for example, opposed any change in U.S. policy that was not endorsed by Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó. In order for the Biden administration to shift U.S. policy toward Venezuela, it would have to accept opposition from both Democrats and Republicans.

Although there is also widespread support in Florida for Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelans, there is no unanimity about how to address immigration more broadly. In fact, 50 percent of Latinos in Florida favored Governor Ron DeSantis’ stunt of flying Venezuelan migrants to Martha’s Vineyard. Although the Biden administration derided this stunt, it also announced a measure that made it more difficult for Venezuelans to enter the United States, using a policy (known as Title 42) to expel them to Mexico. For Biden, Venezuela is a decidedly domestic issue which leads to a greater emphasis on border security.

Disagreement on Colombia

With Colombia, the Biden administration more clearly differentiates itself from Florida politics. Taddeo (a Colombian American) denounced the administration’s decision to remove the terrorist designation from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) which laid down its arms in 2017. Democratic Miami-Dade Mayor Daniella Levina Cava was also vocally opposed to this decision, saying the U.S. should “should double down to reject the extremist communist agenda.” However, this very agenda has been rejected by the FARC itself for years. While Florida Democratic figures criticized the Biden administration’s decisions on Colombia, that was not enough for Republican Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar, who referred to Colombian President Gustavo Petro as a “thief, socialist, Marxist, terrorist.” Taddeo herself said she was “very worried” about Petro becoming president.

Here, at least, President Biden made clear that he looked forward to working with President Petro on the 2016 Peace Accord and other issues. Secretary of State Tony Blinken also recently met with Petro in Bogotá. At the same time, Petro has only been in office four months, so the relationship remains untested.

Looking Forward

Governor DeSantis easily won re-election, and for the first time in 20 years, a Republican gubernatorial candidate won Miami-Dade County. In the 2024 presidential election, we should expect little disagreement in Florida on hardline positions and an uphill battle for any Democratic presidential candidate, particularly if they are vocal on shifting U.S.-Latin American foreign policy. President Biden won the 2020 presidential election while losing Florida, so the conservative bent within his own party in Florida does not have to sway him. Nonetheless, Biden tends to lean in that direction. Moving forward, a key question is whether Biden is willing to risk alienating elements of his own party to make changes in his foreign policy toward Latin America. That calculation is further complicated by the fact that Latino voters nationally are backing Republicans in greater numbers.

Dr. Greg Weeks is a professor of Political Science and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including The Military and Politics in Postauthoritarian Chile (2003), Irresistible Forces: Latin American Migration to the United States and its Effects on the South (2010), The Bachelet Government: Conflict and Consensus in Post-Pinochet Chile (2010), Understanding Latin American Politics (2014) and U.S. and Latin American Relations, 2nd Edition (2015). Follow Greg on Twitter at @GregWeeksCLT.

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Whether you have children or not, at some point in the past year, you have undoubtedly heard “We Don’t Talk About Bruno” from Disney’s Encanto. In the song, both the Madrigal family and members of the town surrounding their home complain about Bruno—blaming him for their own frustrations and highlighting that, because of their bad history, they don’t talk about Bruno. This particular song captures the general spirit of popular U.S. perceptions of Latin America. Today, the U.S. public pays little attention to its southern neighbors. In the instances that it does, it is largely through a negative and imagined lens, driven by concerns over immigration and media portrayals of corruption, drugs, and violence. If the United States wants to improve relations with the region—a pledge President Biden made during his 2020 campaign—U.S. officials need to build enduring public support for engaging with Latin America.

Engaging the U.S. Public Historically

U.S.-Latin American foreign policy has often oscillated between intervention and neglect. Two key challenges perpetuate this cycle for the United States: first, events in other parts of the world that require U.S. attention, such as the war in Ukraine; and second, a lack of electoral incentives from much of the U.S. populace. If the U.S. government is serious about improving relations with the region, it will need to ensure that any engagement is long-term and intentional—having support from the public can help bolster this approach. Shifting public interest toward the region is critical to long-term engagement with Latin America, as improved visibility can supersede changing leadership.

Within various “golden” eras of U.S.-Latin American relations, officials have embraced popular engagement with the region. In the early nineteenth century, the United States supported its “sister republics” in the south as they launched their own democratic movements. During this period, the United States adopted a more favorable impression of Latin America as officials envisioned an epoch of inter-American cooperation characterized by shared values and democratic ideals. In contrast to war-torn Europe, the public perceived the Western Hemisphere as a united front.

Likewise, under President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, the U.S. government took concrete steps to improve not only perceptions of the United States in Latin America but also perceptions of Latin America amongst the U.S. populace. To this end, the Roosevelt administration created the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA). The CIAA oversaw several projects based on Latin America for U.S. audiences; it even sent Walt Disney on a goodwill tour of the region to boost popular perceptions of the United States while gathering film material.

Following the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent missile crisis, both of which piqued U.S. interest in Latin America, President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress with the goal of improving bilateral relations through people-to-people connections. As part of the program, Kennedy created the Peace Corps, which in its inaugural year, sent approximately twenty-thousand volunteers to South America.

The Partners of the Americas, a nonprofit organization inspired by Kennedy’s actions, focused on promoting closer inter-American ties. Created at a time when U.S.-Cuba relations were particularly tense, the organization operated outside the government, establishing community chapters in countries across Latin America and in the majority of U.S. states. At the behest of Kennedy, David Rockefeller later established the predecessors to the Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS/COA) as a means to encourage business and cultural cooperation.

Each of these examples highlights the importance of engaging with U.S. domestic audiences as a means to positively shift U.S.-Latin American foreign policy. To be sure, each period was also marked by a degree of changing U.S. foreign policy. However, maintaining public support was critical to ensuring the success of these policies. Today should be no different. While the Biden administration announced several new policies intended to improve relations across the Americas at the IX Summit of the Americas, U.S. officials have done little so far to boost perceptions of Latin America in the United States or build domestic support for Summit initiatives. There are, however, ways in which the United States can, and should, leverage pop culture and education to build buy-in for improved hemispheric affairs.

Power of Pop Culture

Perhaps a less visible avenue of cooperation is Latin music, which is growing in popularity among Americans. Latin singers like singers J Balvin, Maluma, and Bad Bunny have released some of the world’s top hits and have often collaborated with American pop artists. The rise of reggaeton among U.S. listeners is a potential way to increase cooperation and shift perceptions of the region, much as Bossa Nova did for Brazil in the 1960s. Seen as the music of the “new” Latin America, reggaeton is reshaping how people talk about and address misconceptions of the region. Beyond its cultural implications, reggaeton can also be political.

Another potential agent of change is the film industry. Given the growing popularity and success of Latin American directors, the U.S. government may find partners that can help paint a more holistic and positive image of the region while also highlighting shared experiences. But while the prevalence of Hispanic and Latino culture in the media is something to applaud, representation is still limited and relies on stereotypes. For example, the television show Narcos has dramatized actual events in Colombia whilst boiling the country down to a land of drugs and violence.

Despite the sometimes simplistic, and often negative, representations of Latin America, there are opportunities for the U.S. government to partner with Hollywood and improve public perceptions of the region while respecting the diverse cultures of the Americas. Like Disney’s work during the Good Neighbor Policy, the studio has again played a role in promoting more positive images of the region and its national differences to children through recent films such as Coco and Encanto. Despite some criticism, both films were overall well received by citizens of Mexico and Colombia. Yet, unlike the earlier Disney experience, these films were not directly supported by the U.S. government, nor used to promote a Pan-American identity that resonated with citizens in the United States or across the region.

Teaching About Latin America in the U.S.

Beyond pop culture, educational reforms and incentives could also help improve hemispheric relations. Fearing the global spread of communism, the U.S. government in 1958 passed Title VI of the National Defense Education Act and subsequently incorporated it into the Higher Education Act of 1965. Title VI provided funding for the establishment of area studies centers—including Latin American Studies centers in several universities across the country—designed to promote the development of regional expertise. While Title VI funding still exists—supporting 17 national resource centers for Latin America in 2022—the amount of money allocated to such centers has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Increasing funding for Latin American Studies centers could help boost interest among university-level students and faculty.

In addition to promoting the study of Latin America within higher education, the United States should work to boost interest in and understanding of the region among primary and secondary school-age children. While Advanced Placement (AP) courses already exist for U.S., European, and World history, such programs do not exist for Africa or Latin America. In many instances, U.S. history cannot be understood without exploring Latin America. By offering more specialized classes such as AP Inter-American History or even more diverse language courses (to include Indigenous languages), students will develop their interest in the region, which they could then continue to pursue in higher education. Should global issues occur that involve the region, it will be more likely that future generations will have the skills and knowledge to be proactive rather than reactive in their response.

It’s Now Time to Talk About LAC

Without public buy-in, it will be difficult for U.S.-Latin American relations to endure changing administrations or the twenty-four-hour news cycle. Connecting U.S. public support and business interests through government action can create avenues for long-lasting policy. This requires moving beyond Narcos and public misperceptions to engage with the region—both through education and recognition of the cultural connections shared by the Hemisphere.

Adam Ratzlaff is an analyst and editor with Diplomatic Courier and the World in 2050, specializing in Inter-American Affairs. His work has also been featured in Global Americans, The National Interest, and Charged Affairs, among other sites. Ratzlaff has consulted for the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. He holds an MA from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, a BA from Tulane University, and is currently pursuing his doctoral degree.

Diana Roy is a writer and editor covering Latin America and immigration issues at the Council on Foreign Relations. She received her BA from American University in Washington, DC. Her global affairs work has previously been featured in International Policy Digest, the Center for International Policy, and the Inter-American Dialogue. The views expressed herein are strictly her own.

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