July 2023 was considered the Earth’s hottest month on record, and possibly the hottest single month in roughly 120,000 years, according to a report published by the European Union’s Copernicus Climate Change Service and the World Meteorological Organization. One of the catastrophic impacts of these high temperatures has been the widespread devastation of coral reefs, especially in the Florida Keys, where water temperatures are at record-high levels.

As a teenager, those reefs mesmerized me with their colorful, teeming life and profound beauty. I knew from that young age that I would become a marine scientist. It is deeply heartbreaking to see those reefs—which have been in rapid decline for more than 50 years—estimated to be 80 to 90 percent dead. Making an already dire situation worse, the remaining corals are now bleaching in record-breaking ocean temperatures, facing a “disastrous bleaching event.” Climate change is a significant contributor to the death of coral reefs, which are being pushed beyond their thermal tolerance. This is resulting in the disturbing images we currently see in the media of bleached corals, a weakened state that often leads to their death.

Since 1970, the Caribbean has tragically lost half its coral reefs. It is estimated that the world will lose between 70 and 90 percent of its reefs by the end of the century. Coral reefs are essential to countless marine species that depend upon them—perhaps up to 9 million different species. Humans also depend greatly upon coral reefs, which help bring billions of dollars to the global economy from fishing, tourism, and coastal protection. For instance, coral reefs can absorb an astonishing 97 percent of wave energy. In the medical realm, more than half of new cancer drug research is focused on marine life, and much of that is on coral reef ecosystems.

While the media and public focus on climate change as the underlying cause of bleached coral reefs, research shows that a host of other factors are just as crucial to the health of coral reefs as the changing climate. For decades, these factors have slowly contributed to an underwater disaster, of which the public is largely unaware. Nutrient pollution, primarily from fertilizers used for agriculture and our lawns, fuels the rampant growth of algae in the ocean, which can smother and kill coral reefs. Meanwhile, herbivorous reef fish—many of which graze upon algae and keep coral reefs “clean” and safe from being smothered—end up on our dinner plates. A growing number of lethal diseases threaten coral reefs, some originating from human waste leaking from septic tanks and ships. Sedimentation from deforestation and coastal development can also be fatal to coral reefs.

As dismal and overwhelming as all of this may seem, there remains a message of hope: many of these are factors we can control, meaning that there are actions that we can take now to buy more time for corals in rapidly warming seas. Recent studies demonstrate that local factors are as important as (and perhaps even more important than) global factors (i.e., climate change) in ensuring the health of coral reefs. Despite the ravages of climate change, there are examples of remarkably healthy corals in parts of Cuba, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil.

While the past 60 years have seen the worst decline in ocean health in human history, Cuba’s coral reefs in particular remain remarkably healthy. I have spent more than two decades working in Cuba and will never forget the joy and disbelief of coming face-to-face with stunning, healthy coral reefs. I bore witness to an extraordinary part of a 30-mile-long barrier reef along the southern waters of Cuba, largely comprised of elkhorn coral, one of the most important reef-building corals in the Caribbean. The stands of beautiful, mustard-colored elkhorn coral I saw were impossibly packed with grunt, snapper, goatfish, and many other spectacular reef species. In contrast, elkhorn coral is now nearly gone from the Florida Keys, and is listed as a “Threatened” species throughout its range under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. It is also listed as a “Critically Endangered” species on the IUCN Red List, just one category away from being classified as “Extinct in the Wild.”

This begs the question: “Why are Cuba’s ocean waters so healthy?” The answer is deeply entwined with the country’s extraordinary and unique history, from its dramatic political past to its world-class environmental protections influenced by an unlikely partner, Jacques Cousteau, who had a profound influence on Fidel Castro after they met in 1985. Following their meeting, Cuba implemented a set of exceptionally strong environmental laws. The collapse of the Soviet Union largely resulted in a large loss of financial and agricultural support in Cuba. Subsequently, Cuban agriculture became, and continues to be, largely organic. Without industrial fertilizers, there is little nutrient pollution to fuel the harmful growth of algae on coral reefs. Additionally, the country has not overfished its coral reefs, related to the establishment of enormous marine-protected areas that restrict fishing.  

All these local actions have helped Cuba’s corals become more resilient (though not immune) to warming ocean temperatures. A recent study finds that coral reefs in Cuban waters represent 10 percent of the planet’s reefs most likely to survive by the end of the century. This, in part, has motivated strong collaboration between Cuban and U.S. scientists, considered to be one of the best examples of collaboration between the two countries despite political differences. As I observe in my new book, The Remarkable Reefs of Cuba, “… marine scientists…quietly and steadfastly built strong relationships between our countries where official diplomats and politicians had for decades fallen short.”

Examples of our collaborative activities include research expeditions, ecosystem mapping, research on sharks, sea turtles, manatees, coral reefs, environmental economics, and tourism impacts. We have also developed joint education programs and exchanges. Dozens of scientific publications have resulted from this work.

Cuba is a striking example of how, if we properly manage the local factors that impact coral reefs, we can build coral reef resilience worldwide, and along with it, hope for a brighter future for the ocean in the face of a formidable global threat.

Dr. David E. Guggenheim is founder and president of Ocean Doctor, a non-profit dedicated to ocean conservation. He is also an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He has spent more than two decades leading collaborative research programs with Cuba and is author of the new book, “The Remarkable Reefs of Cuba: Hopeful Stories from the Ocean Doctor.” He holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Science and Public Policy from George Mason University; a Master’s Degree in Aquatic/Population Biology from the University of California, Santa Barbara; and a Bachelor’s Degree in Environmental Studies from University of Pennsylvania.

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Although it was not a busy year, it was a productive one for promoting LGBTQ rights in Latin America and the Caribbean. A number of important achievements in the fight for LGBTQ rights took place in the region in 2022, especially in countries with lagging records in this area. Overall, the trend toward greater LGBTQ rights continues, which is not the case in many other parts of the world. Discrimination and violence against LGBTQ people remains rampant, but—legally at least—protections and representation are expanding. In this era of democratic backsliding, it is comforting to know that, on LGBTQ rights at least, there is less backsliding than progress in the region. Below are the five most important stories of the year.

5. Historic Apologies: Honduras and Peru

In May, the Honduran government admitted responsibility for the 2009 murder of Vicky Hernández, a trans woman activist and HIV-positive sex worker from San Pedro Sula. Authorities committed the murder when going after Hernández and others for violating a curfew imposed after the 2009 coup. Later in November, the Peruvian state also issued an official apology to Azul Rojas Marín, a trans woman who was searched, beaten, stripped, and raped by police officers in 2008. Both apologies were prompted by rulings from international bodies. In Honduras, the prompt came from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, while in Peru, it came from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. Both organs found the states liable. The rulings and the apologies are significant because Honduras and Peru are two states in Latin America that are lagging the most when it comes to LGBTQ rights. The apologies mark a departure from a general tendency toward state inertia in these countries when it comes to LGBTQ issues. In another positive story for Honduras, in 2022 Víctor Grajeda became the first openly gay congressman in the country.

4. A Landmark Election: Brazil

A number of important LGBTQ candidates won in Brazil’s general elections. Eduardo Leite, the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul who was forced to come out publicly once in office, won re-election. He defeated Onyx Lorenzoni, former chief of staff of far-right President Jair Bolsonaro, 57.1 to 42.8 percent. In addition, Erika Hilton (she/her) in São Paulo and Duda Salabert (she/her) in Minas Gerais won seats in the Brazilian Congress. They are the first trans people to be elected to the nation’s Congress. Overall, a record number of out-LGBTQ people ran for Congress this year in Brazil, perhaps as many as 300. LGBTQ representation in Congress increased from 9 to 18.

3. A Landmark Defeat: Brazil

The Brazilian elections were noteworthy not just because of who won, but also who lost. The biggest loser was of course President Jair Bolsonaro, perhaps the most openly homo- and transphobic president of the last decade in Latin America. Bolsonaro lost his re-election bid to former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, whose support for LGBTQ rights seems to have solidified since his first term in office. However, some worry that Lula was forced to make some appeals to conservative Christians to win the election. Bolsonaro’s failed re-election campaign relied on a variety of scare tactics—such as accusing his opponent of satanic ties and planning to close churches—aggressive efforts to mobilize Evangelicals, the spreading of unfounded doubts about the fairness of electoral authorities, and the rallying of conservative business groups from the interior. Many urban voters who supported Bolsonaro in 2018 turned away this year, possibly repelled by Bolsonaro’s policy mishaps during the pandemic, extreme homophobia, and Trump-inspired far-right populism.

2. Wrong mechanism; Disaster Averted: Cuba

In a country where citizens seldom get any political choice, Cubans were given the option this year to vote on a new family code allowing same-sex couples to marry and adopt children. It is never a good idea to ask majorities to decide on the civil rights of minorities, but fortunately voters approved the proposed code 66.9 percent to 33.1 percent. Elections and referenda in Cuba usually produce victories in the 90-percent neighborhood, so the relatively high negative vote on the referendum is worth noting. It probably included a mix of conservative voters—led by Evangelical churches arguing against same-sex marriage—as well as political dissidents—arguing against participating in any referendum organized by the dictatorship.

1. Small nations, Big Steps: the Anglo-Caribbean

Courts in three Anglo-Caribbean countries—Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Barbados—issued landmark rulings de-criminalizing homosexual acts. In taking this step, courts followed global trends of democracies declaring that the criminalization of same-sex relationships is unconstitutional and undemocratic. Anglo-Caribbean nations inherited a series of laws criminalizing homosexual acts from the British empire. Following the precedent set by Belize, these Caribbean court rulings effectively repeal these laws and may, in the process, prompt the remaining six Anglo-Caribbean nations that still criminalize homosexuality to follow suit. The Anglo-Caribbean is slowly but steadily leaving behind its reputation as an LGBTQ-unfriendly region in the Americas.

Javier Corrales is Professor of Political Science at Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts, and a member of the Advisory Board of Global Americans. His book Autocracy Rising will be published in February 2023.

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On July 27, 2022, the Chinese and Cuban governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Tourism Cooperation, underscoring one of the key instruments to tourism development.[1] The signatories will work on “the promotion, organization and management of travelers to Cuba and from there to China through diverse mechanisms.” The initiatives taken will be in accord with the identified interests in cultural tourism, health, historical heritage, and multi-destinations of the Caribbean. This piece discusses the significance of the MOU in the context of economic policies of the Caribbean, Chinese, and United States governments, as well as other stakeholders.

Cuba-China MOU on Tourism Cooperation

Cuba aims to double its Chinese tourist arrivals by strengthening its ecotourism, cultural, health, and nautical tourism industries, among other options.

In November 2019, Cuban tourism authorities signed with China Ctrip, the second-largest online travel company in the world, a memorandum to position itself as one of its principal destinations, as well as negotiating an arrangement with the Platform Alipay to facilitate digital payments for Asian citizens.

Cuban authorities hope that, despite its limitations, the arrival of tourists to Cuba will top the present year at 3.5 million, an amount that would confirm the reanimation of Cuba’s vital tourism sector.

The Chinese-Cuban MOU illustrates how China continues to use economic statecraft as a means to strengthen its strategic position in the region. As Dr. Scott MacDonald pointed out in The New Cold War, China, and the Caribbean Economic Statecraft, China and Strategic Realignments, China has heavily invested in all the major economic sectors of the Caribbean, including tourism. In Cuba, and most of the region, tourism is a main economic driver. China has also been influential in helping tourism in other parts of the Caribbean, such as the Bahamas, where China financed the finishing of the gigantic Baha Mar resort by Chow Tai Foot Enterprises, a family-owned conglomerate with close ties to the Chinese government. China also financed a new port facility in the Grand Bahamas and the three hotels by Hutchinson Port Holdings, a BVI subsidiary of Hong Kong company, Hutchison Whampoa, which has close ties to the Chinese government.[2]

Implications for U.S. and Caribbean Tourism Policies

On April 4, 2022, the U.S. and Greek governments signed a new MOU on tourism cooperation, updating the previous agreement signed 31 years ago.[3] Although the proximity of the U.S., especially its southeastern states, and shared culture in areas such as plantocracy, would make tourism cooperation as much a benefit for the U.S. as it would for the Caribbean, the U.S. government has not taken advantage of this opportunity.

The U.S. and Caribbean countries should consider concluding bilateral (or even a multilateral) agreement(s) on the development and facilitation of tourism, similar to the ones the U.S. has already concluded with other countries.^[4] These agreements provide, among other things, for: establishing government tourism offices and stationing personnel in each other’s territory; promoting the development of the tourism industry and infrastructure in each other’s territory; facilitating and encouraging bi-national cultural events; simplifying travel documents; saving certain visa fees; and promoting foreign investment in the tourism sectors. In furtherance of these goals, the agreements provide for cultural and tourism programs, tourism training, the exchange of tourism statistics, joint marketing of tourism, consultations (annual meetings), and additional tourism-related protocols.^[5]

Many long-trip tourists, such as those from Northern Europe and Asia, like to travel to parts of the U.S., especially the southeastern U.S., during the winter months. In 2019, international visitors spent USD $233.5 billion experiencing the U.S, bringing $640 million a day into the U.S. economy. The U.S. travel and tourism industry accounted for $1.9 trillion in economic output, yielding 9.5 million jobs.[6] If these tourists could take advantage of joint U.S.-Caribbean tourism products, such as plantocracy and cultural tourism packages and/or discounts on hotels and restaurants with operations in both the U.S. and the Caribbean, then they would have more incentive to take such trips to both the U.S. and the Caribbean.

Indeed, tourism agreements and MOUs are not new in the Caribbean. On January 25, 2022, at FITUR, the world’s most significant annual international travel and tourism trade show, Jamaica and Spain announced they would develop a tourism MOU to collaborate on various aspects of tourism development and economic transformation.[7] Jamaica has previously signed similar agreements with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, to develop and harmonize legislation on air connectivity, visa facilitation, product development, marketing, and human capital development. These agreements are designed to efforts to strengthen tourism relations.[8]

As discussed in a previous article, there are so many possibilities for the U.S. and the Caribbean to collaborate on cultural, eco, health, and other kinds of tourism.[9] They already do collaborate, but only in ad hoc ways, notwithstanding the importance of the hospitality sector in both the U.S. and the Caribbean. In terms of collaboration, many U.S. hospitality entities, such as hotels, casinos, restaurants, golf clubs, and transportation entities already have operations in both the U.S. and the Caribbean. Hence, they have an incentive to participate in joint tourism and collaborative hospitality programs.

If the U.S. is unwilling to conclude tourism agreements or MOUs with the Caribbean on the federal level, CARICOM or Caribbean countries should reach out to individual U.S. states, especially where there are large diaspora communities. In this regard, California has its own tourism agreements and MOUs. For instance, California has a tourism agreement with Mexico and an MOU with Israel. The one with Mexico aims to increase bilateral tourism flows, emphasizing luxury tourism, adventure and nature tourism, sports tourism, sun and beach tourism, cultural tourism, and organized group tourism.

Conclusion

Developing collaborative tourism cooperation with the Caribbean—which shares with the U.S. private sector-oriented economies, democratic ideas, and has large diaspora communities in the U.S.—represents a smart economic and political move for the U.S., creating new jobs and economic opportunities in both the U.S. and the Caribbean. In addition, strengthening the number one economic sector of the Caribbean while simultaneously cultivating the hospitality sector of the U.S. is a forward-thinking foreign and national security policy.

As the U.S. and Caribbean are following up on the Summit of the Americas and trying to implement concrete policies, both sides may want to prioritize the idea of tourism cooperation. Just as importantly, individual Caribbean governments should also seek to develop cooperative arrangements with the U.S., states, and even municipalities. Cooperative arrangements can also occur between universities that offer tourism and travel programs.

Hopefully, the stakeholders will take inspiration from the words of Alfred Lord Tennyson, who wrote about travel in Ulysses:

“It is not too late to seek a newer world.

Push off, and sitting well in order smite

The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds

To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths

Of all the western stars, until I die”

Bruce Zagaris is a partner with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP, fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and former lecturer at the Law Faculty of the University of the West Indies at Cave Hill, Barbados.

Footnotes

[1]  Cuba y China firman memorando para impulsar el turismo, OnCubaNews, July 27, 2022 https://oncubanews.com/cuba/cuba-y-china-firman-memorando-para-impulsar-el-turismo/.

[2]  Dr. Scott MacDonald pointed out in The New Cold War, China, and the Caribbean Economic Statecraft, China and Strategic Realignments 91-97 )2022).

[3]  Travel and Tourism Industry, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, updated, accessed May 22, 2022. Link.

[4]  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Hungarian People’s Republic on the Development and Facilitation of Tourism, July 12, 1989; see also Mexico-United States: Agreement on the Development and Facilitation of Tourism, Oct. 3, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 42 (1990).

[5]   For additional discussion of the content and utility of tourism agreements, see David L. Edgell Sr. and Jason R. Swanson, Tourism Policy and Planning: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow 217-218 (2013).

[6]  Travel and Tourism Industry, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, updated, accessed May 22, 2022. Link.

[7]  Vicky Karantzavelou, Jamaica to sign MOU on tourism development with Spain, Jan. 25, 2022 https://www.traveldailynews.com/post/jamaica-to-sign-mou-on-tourism-development-with-spain.

[8]  Jamaican Ministry of Tourism, Jamaica and Panama Sign Multi-Destination Marketing and Airlift Agreement, Jan. 24, 2020 https://www.mot.gov.jm/news-releases/jamaica-and-panama-sign-multi-destination-marketing-and-airlift-agreement.

[9]  Bruce Zagaris and Scott B. MacDonald , The Summit of the Americas, the Caribbean, and the Promotion of the Orange Economy, GlobalAmericans, June 3, 2022 https://theglobalamericans.org/2022/06/the-summit-of-the-americas-the-caribbean-and-the-promotion-of-the-orange-economy/

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The IX Summit of the Americas has arrived. The questions that drove headlines across the Western Hemisphere, and even in places as far as China, surrounding who the Biden administration would choose to invite and which countries will attend the summit have finally been answered. The Cuban regime failed to persuade the administration to allow them to participate in the summit. Instead, however, they effectively organized an impressive diplomatic campaign that completely hijacked the pre-summit political discussions and even prompted Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to sit out of the summit in their support. 

This diplomatic episode has left us with some interesting questions. Notably, why the Cuban regime has insisted on attending the summit hosted in the United States after decades of attacking existing hemispheric-led forums and institutions?

This question becomes even more relevant since the like-minded authoritarian governments of Nicaragua and Venezuela, both close allies of Cuba, have taken opposing stances toward the summit. The same week Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez complained that the U.S. was allegedly excluding Cuba from the summit, the Ortega-Murillo regime decided to seize the Organization of American States (OAS) building in Managua. Later, the regime took matters a step further when Foreign Minister Denis Moncada said that Nicaragua would no longer participate in the OAS and any similar forum, like the Summit of the Americas. Moreover, in recent days, on the 127 anniversary of Nicaraguan revolutionary leader Augusto Sandino, President Daniel Ortega said that his country is not interested in participating in the summit because it does not provide any benefit to Nicaragua. Likewise, President Maduro who although in recent days has echoed Díaz Canel complains has actively discredited (like his predecessor Hugo Chavez) all U.S.-inclusive forums and promoted alternative ones that exclude the United States and Canada, such as ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC. 

The Summit of the Americas: Origin and Purpose 

The Western Hemisphere has a rich tradition of shared forums dating back to the late nineteenth century. Since the first International Conference of American States, held in 1889, promotion and respect for democracy have been central to the inter-American system. Over the years, the Pan-American integration process changed and adapted itself to the needs of each particular era. In 1948, the Organization of the American States was established and soon became the main political organization in which countries from across the Hemisphere resolve disputes and promote shared values. Although, leaders continued to hold tangential conferences to enrich inter-American relations. 

In 1994, after a prolonged pause following the turbulent 70s and 80s, U.S. President Bill Clinton decided to inaugurate a new era in inter-American relations by launching a novel platform called ‘Summit of the Americas.’ The first summit, hosted in Miami, convened all democratically-elected leaders of the Americas to set a common approach to tackle shared challenges. In the context of the end of the Cold War and democratic rebirth in Latin America, countries created a consensus around preserving and strengthening democracy, integrating trade, and encouraging free market economics.

The Summit of the Americas soon transformed into a high-level, institutionalized set of meetings held every three or four years. The Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG) now organizes all summits. SIRG works closely with the OAS and other regional institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), among others. The Summit of the Americas is crucial because it provides heads of state and government the opportunity to meet face-to-face, build personal relationships, and coordinate policies. Additionally, it gives civil society leaders and business leaders a place at the table to express their opinions and contribute to policy solutions.

Cuba and the Summit of the Americas

Cuba participated in its first summit in Panama in 2015 and again in Lima in 2018. Its participation, which marked a clear break from the original 1994 commitment to only include democratically elected leaders, was followed by the normalization of the U.S.-Cuba diplomatic relations. In Panama, U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro met in the first high-level meeting between dignitaries of both countries since the Cuban revolution in 1959.

After Fidel Castro stepped down as leader of Cuba in 2008, his brother Raul Castro inaugurated a policy that promised to “modernize” the island and increase Cuba’s presence in the region and the rest of the world. Although Cuba has remained a repressive state, its new foreign policy, inaugurated by former President Raul Castro and continued under current President Miguel Díaz-Canel, constituted a breakdown of Fidel’s antagonism toward U.S.-led forums. During the Panama summit, the Cuban delegation took full advantage of the platform to advance its diplomatic, political, and economic interests in the Hemisphere. The delegation focused on increasing the flow of tourists to the island, allowing more remittances, attracting foreign investments, and relaxing the sanctions that prevent them from accessing the international financial system. 

Possible Explanation 

Explaining the degree to which dictatorships engage in international cooperation is difficult. The lack of transparency prevents fully comprehending the dynamics behind the decision-making process of the Cuban regime as well as any other authoritarian government. However, academic studies can help us speculate why Cuba has shifted its foreign policy and why it now insists on participating in the summit.

According to a study conducted by Michela Mattes from the University of California, Berkley and Mariana Rodríguez from Vanderbilt University, the answer lies in the different types of autocratic regimes. They have found data suggesting that single-party regimes are more successful at international cooperation than personalist regimes, which tend to prefer isolationism over cooperation. 

Mattes and Rodríguez suggest that in single-party regimes, “leaders are most likely to be held accountable by ruling elites, decision making is relatively constrained, and they are potentially more open to outsiders.” Therefore, “single-party regimes should have a cooperation advantage among autocracies.” In contrast, they found that personalist leaders are “more isolationists and limit their interaction with others.” Also the “reluctance of other regimes to reach out to personalist leaders may be driving the low levels of cooperation involving personalist dictatorships.”

Hence, in this case, evidence supports Mattes and Rodriguez’s claim. Since Fidel Castro stepped down, Cuba experienced some political reforms that potentially explain why Cuba has more interest in cooperating than in previous summit years. Bert Hoffmann, a leading scholar on Cuba, suggests that under Raúl Castro, Cuba transformed itself from a classical, charismatic-socialist regime to a bureaucratic-socialist regime. He points out that while Cuba remains a single-party regime, it has pursued some important reforms such as the depersonalization of the regime, the re-institutionalization of political structures, the liberalization of travel and migration, and rapprochement with the United States.

On the contrary, although Ortega-Murrillo’s Nicaragua and Maduro’s Venezuela share interests and ideological principles with Cuba, they have pursued differing regime transformations. For example, in Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo have established a personalist family dictatorship without any internal accountability structures. In this sense, Silvio Pardo, a leading Nicaraguan political science scholar, has suggested that as the Ortega-Murillo regime has further strengthened its rule, Nicaragua’s foreign policy has shifted from an ideological-minded internationalist vocation to a North Korea isolationism type. Similarly, in Venezuela, the Maduro regime’s legitimacy largely rests on the memory of former President Chávez and his decision to elevate Maduro as his handpicked standard-bearer of chavismo. As former Clinton advisor Eric Farnsworth wrote in an article deconstructing chavismo, “Maduro’s rule is no departure from chavismo—it is the logical result of the full manifestation of the chavista vision. Madurismo cannot be divorced from chavismo; it is chavismo.”

Consequently, this latest episode concerning who will attend the XI Summit of the Americas teaches us that the internal structures, in the case of Cuba, are important to understand foreign policy decisions and uncover how autocratic regimes act the way they do on the world stage. 

Alejandro Trenchi is a former intern at Global Americans. He received a master’s in political science from Leiden University. Follow Alejandro on Twitter: @trenchiale

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Many democracy activists in Cuba would say the Cuban government is responsible for the continuation of an ossified political and economic system on the island that restricts decision-making authority to a tiny elite. And they’d be right. The severe prison sentences that the Diaz-Canel regime imposed on the July 11 protestors are just the latest example of a regime that fears its own people. But there’s plenty of blame to go around, and the United States government, including the Biden administration, shares responsibility for the betrayal of the Cuban people. My time as a U.S. diplomat in Cuba during the Obama thaw of 2015-17 showed me what was possible to achieve when diplomacy was given a chance to work. The Biden administration’s May 16 announcement of limited humanitarian exceptions to the draconian Cuba policy are welcome, but don’t go far enough. It’s time to renew full constructive engagement, including individual U.S. travel, and stop punishing the Cuban people for the sins of an elite over which they have no control.  

U.S. policy towards Cuba has long been governed by domestic considerations, especially following the 1959 Cuban Revolution. The Cold War context and understandable exile bitterness promoted a regime change policy that ranged from efforts to topple the regime by force at the Bay of Pigs, through a campaign to kill Fidel Castro himself, to schemes to instigate the Cuban people to rise up against him. The primary vehicle for the latter hope has been the U.S. economic embargo of the island and its related myriad complex financial tentacles that combine to discourage most countries from trading with Cuba. In addition to Cuba’s economy not producing sufficient income to pay for goods, traders have to establish careful legal compliance systems to defend themselves against potential U.S. sanctions. The volume of Cuba-related business is not worth it.

The apparent U.S. theory of change is that unilateral economic sanctions will cause such misery that the Cuban people will realize their fate depends on a democratic uprising. This perspective is flawed in a number of ways. First, it fails the test of experience. This approach has not worked for over two generations. In almost any context in the public or private sectors, a policy that had so persistently failed to produce the intended outcome would have been changed long ago, and its supporters questioned about their continued adherence to a lost cause. Second, the theory of change is morally obtuse and has become more so with the passage of time. U.S. policymakers are prepared to promote widespread economic suffering for millions of people to achieve an objective they know to be illusory. And third, the policy is disingenuous on its face. The United States knows it has failed, and will continue to fail, yet its supporters persist by obscuring the real reason for its continuation—a decision by the White House to outsource U.S. policy on Cuba (and Venezuela and Nicaragua) to a small group of hard-line Cuban exile sympathizers in south Florida.  

My experience in Cuba as the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Havana from 2015 to 2017, the latter part of which was as charge d’affaires, demonstrates that a more constructive U.S. policy benefits both countries, and especially the Cuban people. We negotiated 22 diplomatic agreements with the Cuban government during the Obama administration that covered a wide range of issues associated with normal bilateral relations, including on matters of direct national security concern for the United States like migration, maritime search and rescue, public health, oil spills, and territorial limits in the Gulf of Mexico. These agreements will provide the basis for a future normalized bilateral relationship. Those sessions were never easy, and Cuban diplomats were always well prepared and committed to advocating for their positions. Yet they were concluded in ways acceptable to both countries, as diplomatic agreements can be if both sides are prepared to forego total victory and instead seek acceptable incremental progress.

The agreements we negotiated did not in themselves improve the lives of the Cuban people, of course, but related U.S. policies did, especially the liberalization of remittances that U.S. citizens could send to Cubans on the island and the expansion of easily-accessible legal travel options. The central benefits of this people-to-people exchange were to allow U.S. citizens the opportunity to visit a neighbor that had been closed to them for decades and to permit the Cuban people to earn money from the expansion of this travel. Both aspects worked out extremely well. More than a million Americans visited Cuba in 2017, for example, many staying at privately-run accommodations and eating in private sector restaurants. The Cuban middle class grew visibly. Equally valuable, independent Cuban civil society also emerged, working on cultural and political issues like LGBT rights and artistic freedom. The formal “dissident community” was divided in its assessment of the Obama policy changes. Some approved, on the basis that the hard-line policies had only entrenched the repressive regime and that new approaches were worth trying. Others opposed the changes, arguing that the Cuban government would merely pocket additional income from travelers and reinforce their grip on power.

I saw firsthand how morale and hope flourished in Cuba during 2016, perhaps culminating in President Obama’s visit in March. His live speech to the Cuban people was respectful of their independent history yet it spoke also of their agency—of the Cuban people themselves, and especially its young people, being the movers of history, on their own time and in their own way. The Cuban government’s reaction was swift and negative. They were caught off guard by the warm welcome that Obama received from the Cuban people and the excitement his speech generated. One Cuban told me that in the future Cubans will mark the days as “before Obama’s speech” and “after Obama’s speech,” replacing the Cuban revolution as the Rubicon moment in Cuban history. Cuban officials spoke negatively to the diplomatic corps about the remarks and Fidel Castro himself appeared as the closing speaker at the 7th Party Congress a month later to condemn the speech and the visit. Then Cuban officials began another crackdown on independent civil society, reflecting the same fear of losing political control that has animated the party elite for decades.

One element of U.S. policy that the Cuban government misrepresented was Obama’s commitment to seeing the Cuban people make their own decisions, in their own way, and in their own time. Cuban officials claimed it was just regime change by another name. But it was real. Obama knew that the United States could not impose democracy in Cuba and that any such outcome would be tainted by its provenance. The only sustainable solution to governance in Cuba must come from solutions worked out in Cuba itself, involving the largest possible number of Cubans on the island in making decisions. He felt the results of that effort were for Cubans to decide, not for Americans to impose. And this may explain the real reason for the Cuban government’s concern. The 2015-16 period in Cuba was one where Cuban expectations began to match their aspirations. Those expectations did not necessarily include an early introduction of a representative system of government, or even open discussion of different perspectives within the Communist Party, but they saw Cubans speak up about the kinds of lives and opportunities they deserved. 

We will never know what might have happened if the Obama approach to Cuba had been allowed to continue, but it’s not too late to make amends. The election of President Trump in November 2016 started the process of reverting U.S. policy back to its Cold War-inspired hostility, and in fact made it even harsher. The still-unresolved “acoustic health incidents” disrupted whatever diplomatic process remained and, in September 2017, then-Secretary Tillerson pulled most diplomats out. By then, bilateral relations were on life support anyway, where they remain.  

Candidate Biden made much of his intention to roll back the Trump changes, emphasizing the humanitarian value to the Cuban people of doing so, yet has done little to bring this about. To be fair, the Biden administration has been unable to determine what caused some diplomats to suffer debilitating illnesses in Havana and may feel it cannot protect its diplomats from whatever may have caused this to happen. Limited consular services appear to be resuming in Havana, and on May 16 the administration announced limited relaxations of some restrictive policies for humanitarian reasons. Yet they do not go far enough. The 2020 electoral outcome in Florida was disappointing to Democrats and the Biden team appears to have concluded that being perceived as not tough enough on Cuba was a principal reason. 

What should be done? First, the Biden administration should re-open the embassy in Havana at full strength. U.S. diplomats would volunteer to serve in Havana, despite concerns about health risks. I know this because my entire team sent a letter to the State Department on the eve of Secretary Tillerson’s decision to terminate our tours and asked to remain. This would allow the United States to process all pending refugee petitions and regular travel visas, important humanitarian steps that help promote family unification. Second, the United States should restore the liberalized travel rules that allowed so many individual Americans to visit Cuba and boost the Cuban private sector. This support for Cuban families is the least the United States should do after decades of actively seeking to make their lives miserable. Third, the Biden administration should again liberalize all financial transfers by U.S. citizens, not just Cuban Americans, to Cuban families. Those three policy changes, in the context of existing rules that require Americans to use private hotels and restaurants, would be administratively easy to do and require only a smattering of political courage. Arguments that such an approach would be “rewarding the regime” are unpersuasive and merely repeat the tired perspective of a policy that has failed for two generations.  

In themselves, such changes will not produce the regime change of Florida fantasy. But they will help to lighten the indelible stain on the diplomatic reputation of the United States that two generations of morally bankrupt policies have produced. More importantly, they will treat the Cuban people with the respect they deserve. The United States is not responsible for the mess that Cuba’s leaders have made of the island, but it is accountable for perpetuating it—and them. The U.S. approach entrenches the regime and regularly undermines U.S. regional diplomacy by alienating partners, as most recently seen by threats from leaders of Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia, and CARICOM to boycott the Summit of the Americas unless Cuba is invited. The Cuban people are no different from most Americans in their aspirations and willingness to work hard to achieve them. It’s time for the Biden administration to drop its timidity on Cuba.

Scott Hamilton is a former senior U.S. foreign service officer who retired in April, 2022 after almost 30 years of service. His most recent assignments were Consul General in Rio de Janeiro, Deputy Chief of Mission and chargé d’affaires in Cuba, and Director for Central American Affairs in Washington, DC. He also served at the US Mission to the OAS, and in Colombia and Ecuador, among other assignments. He is a graduate of Oxford University, Harvard Law School, and the National Defense University.

The post Belated Half Measures on Cuba appeared first on Global Americans.

Rodríguez went on to publicly ask U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to clarify if the U.S. will invite Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel. A spokesperson from the White House National Security Council and the Department of State responded by saying that the U.S. has not yet extended invitations to any government. Earlier this year, a senior Biden administration official responded to the same question by saying that although the administration had not finalized an official invitation list, it was looking forward to welcoming the democratically elected leaders of the Organization of American States (OAS). 

The most recent back and forth between Cuba and the United States comes after delegations from the two nations met last week to discuss bilateral issues for the first time in nearly four years. The talks were held in Washington D.C. and focused on the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords. Title 42 will expire on May 23, and U.S. officials are worried about a possible rise in migration on the southern border. Last month, U.S. Customs and Border Protection processed 221,303 migrants at the border—the highest number of migrants detained in 22 years. Of those detained, 33,141 were Cuban—representing a record for Cubans arriving by land. Last year, Nicaragua eliminated the Visa requirements for Cubans, which experts speculate accounts for the unprecedented rise in over-land crossings. As it stands, the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act allows any Cuban who legally crosses the border to apply for a green card after one year of U.S. residency.

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The government of Cuba has been planning an economic comeback with the help of the World Health Organization (WHO), which is considering emergency approval of one to four of Cuba’s five locally-produced COVID-19 vaccines. Cuba’s vaccine development helps explain why it has embarked on fierce repression after mass protests last July and why the country has refrained from needed economic reforms to alleviate its economic crisis.

The WHO and its regional representative, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), were early cheerleaders of its decision to start developing five COVID-19 vaccines in early 2020. Historically, both organizations have accepted Cuba’s reported data while disregarding conflicting information from independent sources and experts not beholden to Cuba’s authoritarian government.

Cuba already produces and commercializes several vaccines, and its friends and allies dismiss reports of systematic data manipulation and purchase its medical products and services uncompetitively. Moreover, few outside of Cuba know that many citizens, including numerous health workers, died during the COVID-19 spike of 2021 despite having the required three doses of the local vaccines. Emergency approval by the WHO precludes long-term evaluation of effectiveness or side effects, and large-scale production risks are only obvious a posteriori.

Far-left outlets have heralded Cuba’s “unique model of vaccine internationalism” on “behalf of the world’s poor,” as mainstream media including NPR, Bloomberg, NBC, CNBC, ABC, and The Washington Post herald Cuba’s so-called achievements and intentions uncritically. Unfortunately, the global poor won’t be fully informed about the WHO-approved Cuban vaccine—they’ve lacked protection and recourse for decades while Cuba’s “internationalist” doctors are allowed to practice in scores of countries with unverified credentials despite questionable training.

Cuba’s COVID-19 vaccines are of the traditional protein sub-unit type, composed of a fraction of the SARS-CoV-2 S protein, and its biotech industry produces eight such vaccines, some of which are exported. Cuba’s biotech industry is a state-sponsored monopoly, it operates with a weak legal and regulatory framework, lacks transparency and adequate sanitary standards, and conducts aberrant clinical trials as well as other unethical medical practices. Despite exporting products to 40 countries, it pays its employees miserly wages in worthless local currency. Finally, U.S. foreign policy officials and intelligence agencies suspect that Cuba conceals a bio-warfare program.

The Cuban government diverted resources for essential and life-saving medication needed in real-time to engage in a risky production of five different vaccine candidates to treat a new virus in competition with top global bio-pharmaceutical conglomerates. In January the president of the state-owned BioCubaFarma conglomerate explained why medication was extremely scarce for most citizens. He confirmed that the state had diverted 50 percent of the financing needed to import raw materials and inputs for the local production of drugs in order to develop and produce vaccines against COVID-19 and drugs in the virus treatment protocol, apparently available only to the nomenklatura and hard currency-paying tourists.

Cuba also plans to expand COVID-19 vaccine production through third-country technology transfer and has already negotiated such agreements with Iran, Venezuela, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Argentina. This development would translate into new partnerships in biotechnology, further increasing its global influence. Government authorities have said that Cuba could produce 120 to 200 million doses a year, which at USD $5 per dose—more than what bulk AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccines have cost some countries—would generate minimum gross annual revenues of $600 million to $1 billion. Earnings would greatly multiply from higher per-dose rates, increased productive capacity, third-country production, support services, and medical brigades sent by Cuba as part of the vaccine package.

The medical brigades are part of a rare state business, which the U.S. Department of State, among others, considers a form of trafficking in persons in violation of international law. Presented as humanitarian “collaboration,” the brigades generate export services officially constituting Cuba’s primary source of revenues. Furthermore, they are used to bolster populist regimes to help masquerade clandestine deployments of Cuban intelligence and military personnel. Cuba used this formula to spread its brand in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, which poses a grave threat to the region.

The flood of revenues would fund the Cuban regime’s vast apparatus for repression, propaganda, and intelligence, which operates internally and internationally. It would enable Cuba’s leaders to remain in power and continue expanding their international influence.

COVID-19 vaccines and related exports cannot ultimately rescue the faltering Cuban economy, and the local biotechnology industry lacks critical aspects for long-term, sustained growth. However, in the short-to-medium term, vaccine sales would greatly strengthen the dictatorship, neutralize the consequences of its extensive human rights abuses, and postpone the ultimate reckoning of its failed system. Vaccine sales would also defuse pressure for urgent economic reforms that would improve the lives of the suffering Cuban people, and they would weaken the pro-democracy movement.

The possibility of this alarming scenario calls for full transparency and careful oversight of the WHO vaccine evaluation process, as well as of the WHO and PAHO programs in Cuba. Vaccine approval should be conditioned on an in-depth evaluation of Cuba’s bio-pharmaceutical industry by an independent board of experts conducting unannounced, random visits to any laboratory, production plant, or health institution in Cuba. Additionally, the WHO and PAHO should interview émigré medical personnel not subject to reprisal from the Cuban state.

Medical and other civil society organizations of countries contemplating biotech purchases from Cuba should demand that their governments carefully address all of the above concerns. Procurement of any approved Cuban vaccines by any government or international organization, particularly GAVI, should be fair and transparent.

Finally, democratic governments should discontinue funding the Cuban government and any of its entities with loans or aid and, instead, channel humanitarian assistance through churches and verifiable independent groups, as well as support human rights initiatives.

Maria C. Werlau is the Executive Director of the non-profit CubaArchive.org.

The post WHO Approval for Cuba’s COVID-19 Vaccines Would Strengthen the Cuban Regime appeared first on Global Americans.

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El orden internacional de posguerra fría mutó de modo drástico con la intervención rusa en Ucrania. América Latina tendrá que hacer frente a un escenario internacional signado por la competencia entre grandes potencias con un mayor grado de fragmentación global en paralelo con una posible profundización de la crisis del orden liberal. Mientras tanto, las relaciones con Rusia tendrán un costo adicional. Aunque Moscú perderá influencia política, económica y comunicacional, no se puede descartar movimientos tendientes a fortalecer su presencia militar en la región.

Rusia está en guerra. Putin busca una victoria para fortalecer su hegemonía en el espacio postsoviético y neutralizar la ampliación de los intereses occidentales. Asimismo, también utiliza esta situación para mejorar su imagen—en bajos niveles históricos antes de esta crisis—y posicionarse frente a la campaña electoral de cara a las elecciones presidenciales de 2024.

En los últimos años la narrativa sobre la competencia entre grandes potencias estuvo en el centro de las discusiones en Washington. Salvo en algunas capitales puntuales como Moscú o Kiev, el grueso de los actores centrales del escenario internacional planteaba un mundo más cooperativo, o al menos con menos énfasis en las cuestiones relativas a la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza militar.

La invasión rusa a Ucrania alteró un número de certezas establecidas de la posguerra fría. Está nos introduce a una nueva era en los vínculos internacionales caracterizado por un renovado rol del poder militar, una mayor fragmentación, el establecimiento de zonas de influencia de facto y una erosión de las normas y reglas internacionales. Eso no quiere decir que la globalización ni la interdependencia se vean afectadas en sus trazos generales, pero el nodo ruso sufrirá un desacople. Las sanciones occidentales van en esa línea.

Para América Latina, esta desestabilización geopolítica no colabora con el esfuerzo global de desarrollo económico, menos aún la perspectiva de una inserción internacional centrada en una agenda pragmática y diversificada. En el plano económico los precios de los commodities energéticos y agrícolas afectarán negativamente a las economías locales a mediano plazo, mientras países como Brasil tendrán más dificultades para acceder a ciertos insumos rusos como fertilizantes. Al mismo tiempo, pese a la reticencia histórica a aplicar sanciones, la región comenzará a recibir recomendaciones y presiones por parte de los principales países de Occidente para sumarse a las sanciones, además de llevar a cabo acciones por motus propio. Por otro lado, no hay demasiados incentivos económicos. Como socio regional, Rusia no es un actor del primer orden en América Latina y el Caribe; actualmente no se encuentra ni en el top 30 de los destinos de exportación de la región.

Por otro lado, es imposible no considerar como una de las variables centrales dentro de este conflicto la crisis económica que vive Rusia desde hace algunos años. El colapso del rublo debido a la huida de capitales tuvo pocos respiros en los últimos años y se potenció con la pandemia de COVID-19. La economía rusa se contrajo aproximadamente un 4 por ciento del PIB en 2020 (desde +1,3 por ciento en 2019), debido a que se desplomaron las exportaciones, la inversión y la demanda de consumo. En este sentido, la agencia e influencia global de Rusia va a sufrir un golpe fuerte luego de esta guerra y se va a sentir en América Latina.

Desde un punto diplomático América Latina tendrá que calibrar qué tipo de mensaje quiere transmitir en un contexto crítico. Las reacciones iniciales luego del reconocimiento ruso de las repúblicas separatistas de Donetsk y Luhansk fueron bastante tibias por parte de algunos países (como, por ejemplo, México y Brasil). Sin embargo, luego del flagrante ataque ruso hubo un progresivo cambio que se expresó en las votaciones de condena a la invasión tanto en el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas—donde Brasil y México son miembros no permanentes—como en la Asamblea General. Las relaciones con Rusia van a transformarse en un dolor de cabeza para aquellos países que busquen una posición de equidistancia.

¿Quiénes apoyan a Rusia inclusive en esta circunstancia? Sus aliados firmes en su región: Cuba, Venezuela y Nicaragua. En las crisis euroasiáticas del pasado como en la guerra ruso-georgiana de 2008 o la crisis de Ucrania de 2014, Rusia reaccionó asertivamente en América Latina al percibir apoyos políticos y diplomáticos, lo que le permitió realizar ‘acciones espejo’ frente a las percibidas presiones de Occidente. Entre las demostraciones de fuerza que realizó Moscú incluyeron la participación de la Armada rusa en ejercicios militares con la Armada venezolana (VENRUS-200, 2008), el envío de dos bombarderos de largo alcance Tu-160 a Venezuela (2008), la apertura de un centro antinarcóticos en Nicaragua (2017) y el anuncio de la reapertura de una instalación de comunicaciones en Cuba (2019). Además de renovar la cooperación militar con Cuba y Venezuela, desarrollaron despliegues navales en diferentes puertos del Caribe y el Océano Atlántico. Tras la invasión de Ucrania, Washington parece adelantarse a la jugada; la semana pasada, envío—por primera vez—un submarino nuclear para realizar ejercicios con la Armada de Colombia.

El regreso de la centralidad del poder militar y la búsqueda de zonas de influencia por parte de las potencias euroasiáticas está alterando los modos de inserción internacional de América Latina. ¿Es posible tener un no-alineamiento activo mientras se desarrollan situaciones que ponen en riesgo la estabilidad global? ¿Qué margen de acción tienen los principales países de la región frente a este nuevo escenario de competencia estratégica? Las perspectivas no son muy alentadoras.

Ariel González Levaggi es professor de la Universidad Católica Argentina. Nicolás Albertoni es professor de la Universidad Católica del Uruguay.

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The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries’ relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost. Although Moscow will lose political, economic, and diplomatic influence, observers should not overlook the Russian push to strengthen its military presence in the region.

Russia is at war. Putin is seeking a victory to strengthen his hegemony in the post-Soviet space and neutralize Western expansion. He is also using the situation to increase his approval rating—at a historic low before the crisis—to position himself for the 2024 presidential election.

Discussions in Washington have centered on a narrative of great-power competition in the past several years. Outside of a few capitals such as Moscow and Kyiv, the majority of actors on the international stage have aimed for a more cooperative world, or at least one with less emphasis on the threat or use of military force.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine changed several certainties of the post-Cold War era. This event brings us to a new period in international relations, one characterized by a renewed emphasis on military power, greater fragmentation, the establishment of de facto spheres of influence, and the erosion of international laws and norms. The invasion will not affect the core structures of globalization and interdependence, but Russia will suffer as the country decouples from the system. Western sanctions fall along these lines. 

For Latin America, this geopolitical destabilization does not promote economic development, let alone the prospect of implementing an international agenda based on pragmatism and diversification. Economically, rising prices for both energy and agricultural commodities will negatively impact local economies in the middle term. Countries like Brazil will have difficulties accessing certain goods such as fertilizers. At the same time, despite a historical reluctance to apply sanctions, the region will start to receive recommendations and pressure from Western countries to adhere to the sanctions and take actions on their own accord. There are not many economic incentives for countries in the region to support Russian actions. As a regional partner, Russia is not a relevant actor in Latin America and the Caribbean; currently, Russia is not even among top 30 export destinations for the region.

On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore Russia’s persistent economic crisis in recent years as a key variable in this conflict. The Russian economy suffered a contraction of around 4 percent of GDP in 2020 (down from a gain of 1.3 percent in 2019) due to a drastic decrease in exports, investment, and consumer demand. In this context, global Russian influence will suffer a big blow after this war, and Latin America will feel it.

From a diplomatic point of view, Latin America will have to calibrate what type of message it wants to transmit in this critical context. The early reactions from some Latin American countries after Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics were quite timid, for example, those of Brazil and Mexico. Nonetheless, after Russia’s flagrant attack, Brazil and Mexico both voted to condemn Russia in the United Nations Security Council—where both countries are currently non-permanent members—and in the UN General Assembly. Relations with Russia will become a headache for those seeking a middle course between Moscow and the West.

Who is supporting Russia even in these circumstances? Its solid allies in the region: Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. In past Eurasian crises such as the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 or the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014, Russia reacted assertively in Latin America, as they perceived political and diplomatic support. This allowed them to conduct “mirror actions” in the face of perceived pressures from the West. Moscow’s shows of force included the Russian Navy’s 2008 participation in military exercises with the Venezuelan Navy, the 2008 dispatch of two Tu-160 long-range bombers to Venezuela, the 2017 opening of a counter-narcotics center in Nicaragua, and the 2019 announcement of the reopening of a communications facility in Cuba. In addition to renewing military cooperation with Cuba and Venezuela, they developed naval deployments in different ports in the Caribbean and the Atlantic Ocean. After the invasion of Ukraine, Washington seems to be ahead of the game; last week, it sent—for the first time—a nuclear submarine to conduct exercises with the Colombian Navy.

The return of the centrality of military power and the Eurasian powers’ search for zones of influence is altering Latin America’s modes of international engagement. Is it possible to have an active non-alignment strategy while global stability is at risk? What margin of action do the main regional countries have in the face of this new scenario of strategic competition? The outlook is not very encouraging.

Ariel González Levaggi is a professor at Universidad Católica Argentina. Nicolás Albertoni is a professor at Universidad Católica del Uruguay.

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This month, Cuban courts are packed with protesters who rose against their government last July in the largest protests the island has seen since the Cuban Revolution. The protesters, who are now accused of sedition and liable for decades-long sentences, called for greater freedoms, along with more access to food and other necessities. November 15, 2021, was supposed to be the opposition’s “second act,” demonstrating sustained discontent with the Diaz-Canel regime. Anticipating the demonstrations, the Cuban government quickly arrested dissidents, and even reportedly manipulated the price of chicken to prevent any organized gatherings. Crowds were notably missing from the streets of Cuba the day of the event.

November 15, coincidentally or not, was also the date that the country planned to reopen its doors to international visitors. From this date forward, vaccinated foreigners arriving in Cuba were granted admission without proof of a negative test or any mandatory quarantine. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, tourism has been virtually non-existent on the island. The shortage of tourists was aggravated last year when the country took extreme measures to fight the Delta variant. Today, despite relatively low case counts of COVID-19, tourists still have not returned. Low tourism revenue was one of several factors that caused Cuba’s GDP to fall an alarming eleven percent in 2020.

Amidst the pandemic, the extent to which the Cuban economy depends on tourism has become more evident. With international visitor arrivals approximately a tenth of what they were in 2019, Cuba’s dependence on tourism presents the Diaz-Canel regime with a pressing challenge: Does Cuba reorient its economic activity to rely less on tourism? Or will Cuba double down on its tourism investment in the hopes that tourists come back? Either choice will create severe economic pressures for the Caribbean island state in an atmosphere of political strife.

The Tourist Drought

Cuba’s tourism industry has suffered immense losses due to the pandemic. While the first wave of COVID-19 largely spared Cuba, last year’s Delta variant caused hospitals to overcrowd, complicated vaccination efforts, and resulted in shortages of basic necessities. The overall decline in tourism has been staggering. Prior to the pandemic, Cuba received an average of four million annual international visitors. This figure has fallen to 254,922 visitors as of November 2021—just over a 93 percent decrease.

Pre-pandemic, Canadian and European tourists dominated the Cuban tourism market and frequented popular beach resort towns such as Varadero. Russian arrivals have recently reached their 2018 and 2019 levels. In contrast, Canadian and European arrivals still comprise only about three percent of their pre-pandemic numbers. Thus, while Russians have returned in the same numbers as before the pandemic, the tourism market is receiving only a tiny fraction of its primary customers.

The lack of tourists doesn’t only threaten the tourism sector. Cuba uses the revenues from tourism to manage currency values, subsidize food production, and import materials used in agriculture and manufacturing activities. In fact, Cuba spends five times the amount on imports of what it receives in exports. President Díaz-Canel commented on this practice, explaining that “what we have on a weekly basis to pay credits, to buy raw materials and to invest, comes from tourism.” However, a troubling statistic recently revealed that imports which aid in food production and manufacturing have fallen nearly 40 percent since the pandemic began. Due to the pandemic, tourism has ceased to be the “breadwinner” it once was for Cuba.

Aggravating the inability to pay for imports, other sectors of the economy have also grappled with unfavorable conditions the past few years. On top of the U.S.-Cuba tourism restrictions enacted by the Trump and Biden administrations, exports that typically substitute for tourism have become less lucrative. Exports in which Cuba has an advantage, such as sugar and nickel, have suffered from world price decreases, and other Cuban export commodities have suffered from decreased worldwide demand due to COVID-19. Lastly, this poor economic environment is accompanied by increased U.S. sanctions on remittances, and the Venezuelan economic crisis. These economic misfortunes underscore the severity and urgency of the tourism market’s downward turn.

To Hold or to Fold?

Will tourists return quickly enough to revive the Cuban economy? This is the urgent question facing Cuban policymakers at the moment. According to government estimates, the tourism market will not reach pre-pandemic levels until at least 2023 or 2024. With food shortages becoming more common and a decreasing ability to pay for necessities, the regime must decide between two paths: reorient the economy away from an over-reliance on tourism, or recommit to tourism and “wait out the storm” for the coming years.

A reorientation of the state economy could diversify the country’s exports and cut down on food imports. To realize this, Cuba could shift resources from the tourism sector into its underdeveloped agriculture sector. This shift would provide more food production at home. The government could also mitigate the losses associated with reorientation by increasing production of its more fruitful export commodities such as tobacco, sugar, rum, nickel, and zinc, hoping that demand for these commodities will improve with worldwide post-pandemic recovery. Lastly, the government could also refocus its efforts on medical technology and service exports, considering Cuba has the most physicians per capita in the world.

Despite these available alternatives, any shift away from tourism will be risky. First, the tourism market comprised 10.6 percent of Cuba’s pre-pandemic GDP. In comparison, exports of commodities only contributed 1.2 percent. Therefore, shifting away from tourism by replacing the industry with exports will prove to be an almost insurmountable challenge. Second, a loss of tourism revenues will decrease the ability to pay for food imports on the island. Reorientation may reduce or even erase any food surpluses attained by producing more food domestically. Lastly, an abandonment of tourism in favor of these alternatives will likely reduce Cuba’s contact with liberal democracies, notably Europe and Canada, and drive the country into closer economic ties with Nicaragua and Venezuela—allies that are willing to bolster the Cuban economy and food supply.

The choice to reorient the economy away from tourism would require confronting powerful interests within the Cuban state. While the Ministry of Tourism shares ownership with some of the larger, foreign hotel chains, and local bed and breakfasts owned by Cuban citizens are permitted, the Cuban military owns the lion’s share of hotel rooms on the island and profits from the industry.

Alternatively, a recommitment to the tourism sector will see Cuba maintain good relations with liberal democracies, yet expose the economy to a risky economic gamble. The government is currently undertaking efforts to expand tourism capacity on the island and is looking at ways in which it can improve the industry. Continued government reinvestment could pay significant dividends should tourists come flooding back to the island. However, tourism investment will not yield what it did before the pandemic for at least the next few years, decreasing Cuba’s ability to pay for imports. In turn, this will leave Cubans hungry and reduce the government’s ability to repay its growing debt.

The Cuban government thus faces two unpleasant options. Reorientation away from tourism can increase domestic food production, diversify exports, and push the country closer to its undemocratic allies. Such a move may endanger food availability on the island, threaten vested interests within Cuba, and sour relationships with EU member countries and Canada. Recommitment to tourism would help maintain ties with liberal democracies and offer a return on investments should international visitors return in numbers not seen since before the pandemic. But this route would endanger both food availability and the economy as a whole should tourists fail to return. Whichever path the government chooses to take, the Cuban economy finds itself in its most vulnerable position since the fall of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the next few years will prove difficult for the people of Cuba as they seek to revitalize their post-pandemic economy.

Patrick Springer is a former intern at Global Americans and is pursuing a MA in International Affairs at American University.

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