Following the first-round of presidential elections on June 25, 2023, the losing candidates, representing the ruling party and the Guatemalan political establishment, initiated a series of controversial judicial actions that essentially attempted a veiled coup d’état. Through the Public Ministry of the Attorney General’s Office, such candidates questioned the results and tried to prevent the certification of the second-place candidate, Bernardo Arévalo (Movimiento Semilla Party). Failing that, they sought to ban him from the second-round on August 20, 2023. The coup attempt continued after Arévalo won the runoff with approximately 60 percent of the votes.

The Guatemalan government and the political establishment fear Arévalo’s intention to eradicate corruption and impunity. Some even suspect that he wants to reinstate the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG). (In May 2023, the U.S. government designated Guatemala’s current Attorney General, María Consuelo Porras, for her involvement in corruption). His anti-corruption stance was his main campaign motto and appeal to marginalized groups and young voters. 

The new attempt at a veiled coup seeks to further harm Arévalo. A minimum of popular support (0.30 percent of registered voters) is mandated to participate in elections. Even though he obtained significantly more support than required in both ballots , a prosecutor from the Attorney General’s Office ordered the Voters’ Registry Office to suspend his party, also alleging irregularities in the registration of its members. The prosecutor had previously ordered the Registry to seize the party’s records and issued an arrest warrant for its director and two of its officials. Paradoxically, the day before the suspension, the Electoral Tribunal (TSE) validated the results of the ballotage and proclaimed Arévalo President-elect.

After the suspension, the Guatemalan Congress stopped recognizing the Movimiento Semilla Party as a congressional bloc and declared its members as independent legislators, barring them from participating in committees and essentially curtailing their influence. This was an attempt to force the President-elect to abandon his proposal against corruption.

Given the threats to the integrity of the electoral process, Member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States, and Uruguay convened a second meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on September 1, 2023 (the first one was held on July 26, 2023), to address the political situation in Guatemala. During that meeting, OAS’s Head of the Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), former Paraguayan Foreign Minister Eladio Loizaga, and the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) Tania Reneaum, expressed their concerns about the new attempts by Guatemala’s Public Ministry to interfere with the process and disqualify the legitimate election winner.

Most significantly, the Member States unanimously approved a stern declaration, which welcomed the TSE decision to certify the results of the presidential election and declare Arévalo as the winner. The document also poses concerns about the post-election judicial actions by partisan forces and the Attorney General aimed at subverting the popular will, suspending Arévalo’s party, and intimidating the candidate, his party officials, and electoral authorities. 

OAS’s declaration also appealed to all institutions and civil society to respect and guarantee “the civil and political rights of the Guatemalan people…” and called on them “to avoid interference in the presidential transition process” and to respect “the separation of powers.” However, the Member States also recognized Guatemala President Alejandro Giammattei’s measures to guarantee the personal safety of the President and Vice President-elect, as well as his “commitment to guarantee an orderly transition process,” while also noting his “invitation to the OAS secretary general, Luis Almagro, to observe the process.”

While President Giammattei has recognized Arévalo’s victory and appears to respect the electoral authorities’ decision, and has started the presidential transition, his Attorney General continues to interfere with the process. Moreover, the pro-government losing party UNE has yet to recognize Arévalo’s’ victory. This makes one wonder if there is a double game being played here.

Nevertheless, the concern expressed by the hemispheric democratic community appears to have had an impact: the TSE canceled the Registry’s decision, citing the fact that the electoral process does not officially end until October 31, 2023. Under Guatemalan Electoral Law, no party approved to participate in the process can be suspended while it is in effect. The transition process started with the presence of the OAS Secretary General, who has also called “for the cessation of actions that erode the rule of law and for adhering to democratic principles and respecting the will of the citizenry.” The Biden administration itself has dispatched an envoy to speak with President-elect Arévalo and President Giammattei. There is no guarantee, however, that the attempt to suspend the party will not continue until inauguration day on January 14, 2024.

The actions by the Permanent Council and the Secretary General demonstrate the continuing validity of the OAS and its Democratic Charter as the principal instruments for the defense of democracy in the Americas. They also confirm the collective commitment to ensuring electoral integrity in Member States through electoral observation missions (EOM). Despite the OAS’s actions in favor of democracy, what ultimately saves it from collapse is the commitment and respect for democratic values and institutions by its citizens and leaders.

Rubén M. Perina is a former OAS official and author of the book “The Organization of American States as the Advocate and Guardian of Democracy: An Insider’s Critical Assessment of its Role in Promoting and Defending Democracy.”

The post The OAS and a Veiled Coup Attempt in Guatemala appeared first on Global Americans.

La aplastante victoria de Bernardo Arévalo en la segunda vuelta de las recientes elecciones presidenciales de Guatemala ha sido la más clara señal de rechazo del pueblo guatemalteco hacia la actual clase política. El país, asolado por la corrupción, ocupa los últimos puestos en todos los índices relativos internacionales más citados. Según el último informe de percepción de la corrupción en el sector público de Transparency International, Guatemala ocupa el puesto 150 de 180 países.

Los tiempos de la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) representaron un breve periodo de esperanza. Desde el 2007 hasta su expulsión en 2019 por el expresidente Jimmy Morales, Guatemala parecía estar a la vanguardia de los esfuerzos regionales anticorrupción. Con la salida de la CICIG, la capacidad para combatir el Pacto de los Corruptos, como se denomina a las redes de corrupción que involucran a las élites políticas, económicas y judiciales, ha decaído abruptamente. Según el Índice de Capacidad para Combatir la Corrupción de Americas Quarterly (AQ), Guatemala sólo puntúa por encima de Venezuela y Bolivia, y sus valores han ido en negativo todos los años desde que se empezó a medir el índice.

Con Arévalo, Guatemala puede volver a ser el foco entre las cruzadas anticorrupción en América Latina, pero para eso necesitará aliados. La gran atención que la comunidad internacional le ha brindado a la persecución judicial contra Semilla, el partido de Arévalo, muestra que la situación del país no pasará desapercibida. Para Estados Unidos, esto implica tomar pasos concretos para fortalecer su relación con el gobierno guatemalteco más allá del tema migratorio.

El reto de gobernar en tiempos de persecución judicial

El plan de gobierno de Arévalo se centra en los principales problemas estructurales del país: falta de infraestructuras físicas y digitales, acceso desigual a la educación, seguridad fronteriza, sanidad ineficaz e ineficiencias de las instituciones públicas y del sistema político. Estos temas son de gran importancia para los guatemaltecos, cuyas condiciones de vida se ven directamente afectadas por la falta de oportunidades que los obliga a emigrar hacia Estados Unidos. A la base de todos estos problemas, la estrategia de Arévalo contempla la lucha contra la corrupción, piedra angular de estos y otros desafíos estructurales como el crimen organizado y el retroceso democrático. Por eso, la materialización de la primavera democrática prometida por Arévalo, aunque sea solo en sus primeros pasos, dependerá principalmente del éxito de sus esfuerzos anticorrupción.

Lograr gobernar y hacer reformas será un reto enorme para el gobierno de Arévalo. Por un lado, en el Congreso no cuenta con una bancada mayoritaria. Además, los esfuerzos para cancelar su partido pueden llevar a que sus diputados no participen en las discusiones para la definición del presupuesto y de la agenda legislativa. Por otro lado, tiene un sistema de justicia en su contra, con la elección de nuevos jueces y magistrados que lleva postergada casi cuatro años y, sobre todo, con los esfuerzos de la fiscalía general para judicializar a los miembros de su partido y socavar la voluntad popular. Sumado a esto, Arévalo deberá hacer alianzas claves con actores tan diversos como la comunidad internacional, empresarios, el ejército y el poder local.

El apoyo desde el exterior: EE. UU. y la comunidad internacional

Como nota positiva, hay que reconocer que el apoyo externo recibido por Arévalo ha sido contundente. El Secretario de Estado de EE.UU, Antony Blinken, se sintió obligado a felicitar a Arévalo por segunda vez tras la certificación de su victoria por el Tribunal Supremo Electoral. “Una segunda vuelta justa y pacífica“, dijo el presidente estadounidense Biden, en un contexto donde no todos los actores políticos reconocen la victoria de Arévalo. La Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) también ha estado muy pendiente de Guatemala:  la visita de Almagro al país y su canal de diálogo abierto con el presidente Giammattei han contribuido a mantener la presión sobre quienes se oponen a la toma de posesión de Arévalo el próximo 14 de enero.

La preocupación de la comunidad internacional sobre el futuro de la transición democrática en Guatemala se ha profundizado con la reciente denuncia de un posible golpe por parte del presidente electo. Aunque la investidura de Arévalo parece destinada a producirse como previsto, la suspensión del partido Semilla (temporáneamente revocada hasta el 31 de octubre) contribuye a la intensa incertidumbre sobre lo que podría significar para gobernar sin partido.

Si Guatemala logra una transición ordenada, se deberá a la resiliencia de las instituciones democráticas guatemaltecas y de la presión popular. A pesar de ello, el apoyo del cuerpo diplomático estadounidense y su continua visibilización desde el exterior será clave, como lo fue en las últimas elecciones de Brasil.

Una oportunidad de renovación

El compromiso de la administración de Biden con las elecciones de Guatemala es un avance bienvenido considerado el frágil estado de la relación bilateral. Al mismo tiempo, es una oportunidad única para re-equilibrar la relación en un tema que no sea únicamente controlar los flujos migratorios. Durante la administración de Trump, la relación descansó en la intimidación verbal y el agite del “ban” y las amenazas arancelarias, que presionaron al gobierno guatemalteco a firmar el acuerdo de “tercer país seguro” y aliviar la presión en la frontera.

La migración ha sido, y seguirá siendo, la principal preocupación relacionada con los países del Triángulo Norte. La región no ha sido prioritaria en el gobierno de Biden a pesar de la estrategia “Causas Raíces” y no ha contado con interlocutores fiables en la región. Pero ahora, después de las elecciones, Estados Unidos podría encontrar en Arévalo y Semilla el socio fiable y democrático que tanto tiempo llevaba buscando. Si bien Guatemala tiene una importancia relativa en la agenda de EE. UU. con respecto a otros socios estratégicos como Colombia y México, una profunda cooperación bilateral contra la corrupción es una oportunidad única para EE. UU. de mejorar sus relaciones con la región.

Hacia una nueva agenda anticorrupción

La lucha contra la corrupción es prioridad para el próximo gobierno de Arévalo y para ello ha definido una serie de 10 acciones concretas para combatirla. Aunque la mayoría dependan del Congreso, la identificación de actos de corrupción en el gobierno, el despido de funcionarios públicos corruptos y la cancelación de contratos acordados a través de prácticas corruptas son un gran avance para el país. Sin la CICIG, los esfuerzos anticorrupción solo pueden ser más modestos que a los que se aspiraba previamente. Al mismo tiempo, es necesario aprender de los errores del pasado que, en el afán de luchar contra la corrupción, provocaron fuertes reacciones no calculadas de las élites políticas y económicas que llevaron a la persecución judicial de los fiscales y jueces anticorrupción, así como al retroceso democrático.

La llegada al poder de Arévalo representa una oportunidad clave para tener un interlocutor estratégico en la región. Por ello, es clave que, dentro de la estrategia “Causas Raíces” se reconozca la lucha contra la corrupción y la recuperación de las instituciones, como una de las bases para crear mejores condiciones socioeconómicas, y así evitar la migración forzada. Esto permitirá la identificación de objetivos comunes y la definición de acciones concretas entre los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Guatemala.

Para apoyar a Guatemala en la lucha contra la corrupción, será de vital importancia el apoyo técnico para acciones a corto plazo que otorguen al gobierno de Arévalo un mayor respaldo social. Estas acciones pasan por la prevención de sobornos, detección de contratos sobrevalorados, identificación de tráfico de influencias, transparencia en las contrataciones públicas y una limpieza de las “plazas fantasmas” en el poder ejecutivo.

Este apoyo técnico del gobierno estadounidense sienta las bases para la posibilidad de un apoyo político en la recuperación de las instituciones del sistema de justicia. Esto será a través de sanciones a actores claves y presión internacional para recuperar el sistema democrático guatemalteco. Estados Unidos ya ha apoyado a administraciones anteriores de la fiscalía general en la identificación de redes criminales a través de recursos técnicos, financieros y tecnológicos. Hoy estos recursos se utilizan para perseguir fiscales, jueces, sociedad civil, periodistas y políticos de oposición que han denunciado y judicializado actos de corrupción. Por tanto, es del interés regional recuperar la institución de la fiscalía general de Guatemala, y el sistema de justicia en general.

Conclusión

Estados Unidos tiene la oportunidad de colaborar con el próximo gobierno de Arévalo y tener un aliado estratégico clave en la región centroamericana. Además, es una ocasión de redención histórica, ante el vergonzoso papel que Estados Unidos jugó en el golpe de Estado de 1954 que terminó con la “primavera democrática” en Guatemala.

Para ello, Estados Unidos necesitará adoptar estrategias conciliatorias antes que impositivas. El apoyo de los Estados Unidos es clave para que Arévalo resista el embate de los actores no democráticos. La relación bilateral EE.UU.-Guatemala podría recibir un nuevo impulso cooperando en la lucha contra la corrupción, y sentar las bases para abordar otros temas y construir relaciones más armónicas que bajo las administraciones anteriores de ambos países.

Andrea Colombo es estudiante del Máster Erasmus Mundus en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Salamanca, la Universidad de Estocolmo y la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III. Ha trabajado en Inter-American Dialogue, Insight Crime y actualmente dirige la sección América Latina de Lo Spiegone, un periódico italiano en línea. Ha publicado artículos en Inter-American Dialogue, LAA-Advisor, LSE Blog, ISPI and Affari Internazionali. Twitter: @AColomboLAC

Carlos Muñoz es estudiante del Máster Erasmus Mundus en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Salamanca, la Universidad de Estocolmo y la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III. Ha trabajado en el Instituto Nacional Demócrata de Guatemala, la Comisión Presidencial Contra la Corrupción, y fue pasante en la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Además fue asistente de investigación y profesor auxiliar en la Universidad Rafael Landívar.

The post La oportunidad de renovar la relación bilateral EE.UU.-Guatemala a través de la lucha contra la corrupción appeared first on Global Americans.

According to United Nations data, 26 percent of the world’s migrant population lives in the Americas, which means that migrants make up 7 percent of the region’s total population as of 2020. Of this total, 58.7 million are in North America, and 14.8 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to UNHCR’s 2022 Global Trends in Forced Displacement Report, by the end of 2022, at least 108.4 million people had been forcibly displaced globally. In the Americas, 9.2 million people moved across international borders. This figure represents an increase of 950 percent in the last ten years. Why do people move across the Americas?

The push factors are multiple and observe variations from country to country. However, in general terms, people migrate or are forcibly displaced due to increasing levels of violence and citizen insecurity, the forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime activities. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence are also important factors which particularly affect women and children. Added to this are persistent economic and structural causes, such as a weak rule of law, corruption, high poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities (especially for women, young people, and other vulnerable groups), food insecurity, and more recently the effects of climate change. This increase in human mobility across cities of the Americas poses opportunities for receiving countries but also challenges, and it is often local governments the ones responsible for providing the first response.

A recent study published by the Organization of American States and other partners entitled “The Role of Local Governments in the Reception and Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Cities of the Americas” confirms these trends. It proposes that there are opportunities for the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, and it shows that local actors can play a key role in the reception and integration of this population. Despite numerous challenges, the cases presented in the study demonstrate that with political will, innovative ideas, respect for human rights, and the support of international organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and the media, progress can be made at the local level to ensure a successful reception and integration of migrants and refugees in the region.

Based on the results of 231 interviews in 109 localities in 25 countries, the study proposes at least four lessons to capitalize on the work being done by the local governments facing these arrivals. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that local governments do not operate in a vacuum when working on the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, but there is an important influence of national governments on local actions—both in positive and negative ways. Migration policies are usually established at the national level, and local governments must respond with these in mind. It is, therefore, no surprise that for most local governments, coordination with national policies represents one of their main challenges. Another factor that also influences their work (and often supports it) is that of civil society and international organizations. They play a key role in most of the localities studied, and fill institutional gaps to meet the needs of migrants and refugees.

A second lesson from the study refers to the variation in local structures and capacities across cities in the Americas. Indeed, the study confirms that there is significant diversity in the structures and capacities of the 109 localities studied in the report. On one side of the spectrum, there are localities with a long migratory history and with resources which have stable structures designed to provide services to migrants and refugees. As documented in the study, some examples include the Mayor’s Office for Migration Affairs in New York City in the United States and the Coordination of Policies for Immigrants and Promotion of Decent Employment of São Paulo in Brazil. Other cities are facing new migratory dynamics, which has pressured their governments and have had to rely on international organizations as they develop local response initiatives, such as seen in several non-border localities in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

At the other end of the spectrum are border localities that are generally isolated and have few resources to respond comprehensively to the needs of migrants and refugees. These include border or rural cities that are in people’s migratory trajectories. One example is the locality of Darien in the border between Colombia and Panama. Lastly, in terms of capacities, although there are still significant gaps, training programs for local officials on issues of reception and integration of migrants were reported in 47 percent of the localities assessed. It is important to emphasize, however, that 42 percent of these programs are based on normative and rights issues, and do not focus on practical aspects of policy design and implementation.

Thirdly, the report also indicates that most local government actors prioritize socio-economic integration, followed by reception, although needs and priorities vary by type of locality. This suggests that upon arrival, cities really need to provide access for migrants and refugees to goods and services—including employment—to meet their basic needs and those of their families. The pre-condition for this access is providing them with regularization options or legal pathways. It is worth highlighting that for border localities in particular, the priority was reception, although this was often understood as the rapid processing of people and not as the comprehensive provision of services for the population. Lastly, in some of the newer destinations, in the absence of sufficient social networks that can provide support to migrants and refugees in host communities, there is greater awareness, urgency, and need for local actors to provide adequate reception and socio-economic integration services. One common challenge for cities evaluated in the report is counting on disaggregated and updated information on migrants at the local level to facilitate the creation and access to appropriate reception and integration services.

One last lesson the study points to refers to political integration and the often-ignored aspect of migrant and refugee integration. In this regard, the study confirms that there is still a long way to go to achieve political integration. In most of the localities studied in the report, there are almost no mechanisms for the political participation of migrants and refugees. Access to identity documents was identified as the main hurdle in this area. Concerning identity documents, it is important to highlight very innovative practices coming from cities to provide identification to these arrivals, who may not always carry a passport or ID with them. The study shows different models of municipal identification that have been adopted in Mexico City and in localities across the United States. Regarding political participation, in cities such as Bogota and São Paulo, permanent spaces for political participation have been developed for migrants and refugees. However, there is a long way to go and a pressing need to adopt an official narrative that presents migrants and refugees as neighbors, newcomers, and citizens and also to encourage social cohesion not only within migrant spaces but in other broader community spaces.

Although the focus on the local level is not entirely new, this report provides one of the first regional perspectives at a continental scale on migration and protection institutions and policies in the Americas, thanks to its comprehensive and diverse voices. What is novel is that it covers a wide variety of localities in a region that is profoundly diverse in terms of structures, institutional frameworks, and capacities, It reflects the perspectives of individuals on the ground who are directly involved in the challenges and opportunities posed by the reception and integration of migrants and refugees. The common denominator that emerges from the analysis is that these cities have been creating positive innovations to provide protection and better opportunities for the populations settled in their territories. It is precisely these positive innovations of receiving, protecting, and integrating that should be replicated and promoted at the hemispheric level.

The opinions in this article are personal. They do not represent those of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian is the Director of the Department of Social Inclusion at the Secretariat for Access to Rights and Equity within the Organization of American States (OAS). As Director, she oversees the OAS’s efforts to promote social inclusion and access to human rights, with a particular focus on vulnerable populations. Additionally, Betilde is a founding member and coordinator of the Network of Latin American Female Political Scientists, known as #NoSinMujeres. This project aims to promote and empower women’s work in Latin American Political Science. Betilde holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University.

The post Migrant and Refugee Integration in Cities across the Americas appeared first on Global Americans.

The efforts to block the SEMILLA party from participating in the runoff election continued in Guatemala, with no end in sight. On July 21, the offices of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) were raided by the Attorney General’s Office for a second time, as were the headquarters of SEMILLA. On July 22, the Constitutional Court denied a request from the TSE to protect it against several government offices but reaffirmed that the runoff election must take place on August 20 with the two parties that obtained the majority of the vote. 

Guatemala’s 2023 electoral process will most likely dodge a bullet, and the presidential runoff election between Bernardo Arévalo of SEMILLA (Movimiento Semilla) and Sandra Torres of UNE (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza) will take place on August 20, 2023. The runoff campaign itself will be highly polarized, and in the broader picture, there are huge challenges ahead for governability in the short-run and for Guatemala’s democracy in the long-run.

A Polarized Runoff Campaign

Although the certification of the runoff election winners was on hold for almost three weeks, and candidates were not allowed to campaign during that political standoff, the social media campaign by followers or detractors of both candidates began in full force the day after the election, with peculiar ruthlessness, even for Guatemalan standards. The social media campaign against Arévalo has been particularly vicious and misleading, accusing him of endangering the future of Guatemalans because of communism or for promoting the LGBTQ agenda (Arévalo has strongly denied the accusations).

One of the first challenges in this election is the legitimacy of the candidates themselves. Both candidates obtained a low percentage of the total vote in the first-round election. According to Guatemalan analyst Rodolfo Mendoza, the 15.8 percent obtained by Torres and the 11.8 percent obtained by Arévalo are the lowest ever for the top two candidates in the first-round of the ten presidential elections that have taken place since 1985. Furthermore, if one takes into account that there are 9.3 million registered voters, Torres’ 881,592 votes represent around 9 percent of the registered voters, while Arévalo’s 654,534 votes represent 7 percent of the registered voters (3,692,521 registered Guatemalans abstained on June 25). Both candidates are expected to increase their public support in the runoff election, but their original legitimacy is extremely low.

Another important challenge is that more than in the previous nine elections, Guatemalans face the runoff profoundly polarized and divided. There is a rural-urban divide that became very clear in the first-round election on June 25. Arévalo won handily in the urban centers across the country, particularly the capital city, while Torres swept in the rural areas. This pattern is likely to be replicated in the runoff election.

There are other splits, even within urban areas: there is a divide between religious and non-religious Guatemalans, with the latter leaning towards Arévalo—even between religious Guatemalans themselves (Catholics and Evangelicals comprise almost 90 percent of Guatemalans, with an even split). Evangelicals are likely to lean towards Torres because her running mate is a former Evangelical pastor, and some Evangelical pastors have openly asked their followers to avoid voting for SEMILLA. On the other hand, the Catholic Church has called for respecting the electoral process without taking sides.

A class divide or a generational divide is not evident at this time. However, Guatemalan analysts believe that young urban Guatemalans were a key constituent for Arévalo in the first round. It is relevant to remember that SEMILLA emerged after the 2015 anti-corruption protests as an urban party formed by young professionals—which is still part of their appeal in urban areas.

A more thorough analysis of the demographic variables influencing voting behavior can’t be performed since exit polls are not normally used in Guatemala. However, survey data from Vanderbilt University’s Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) can shed some light on Guatemalans’ perspectives about some of the key issues that are proving to be relevant in this runoff campaign. Figure 1 shows that most Guatemalans are highly religious—83 percent of them indicated that religion plays a vital role in their lives. The figure also shows that 73 percent of Guatemalans believe that the majority of politicians are corrupt. Lastly, the figure indicates that only 16 percent of Guatemalans approve of homosexuals running for office, which is one of the lowest scores in Latin America.

Figure 1. Relevant Issues That May Play a Role in Guatemala’s 2023 Runoff Election

Ideology is also an interesting variable in this election. Both candidates are declared Social Democrats (center-left in the political spectrum). Still, Torres has switched to a socially conservative discourse in 2023 to attract conservative voters while trying to keep her appeal among rural voters. Arévalo’s vote in the first round was not ideological but rather a vote of rejection against the corrupt political establishment. Yet, the extreme right has tried to frame this election as an ideological battle. LAPOP surveys have shown that a significant majority of Guatemalans place themselves at the center of the political spectrum, as demonstrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Distribution of Ideology in Guatemala by Age

The survey data presented above suggests that in the runoff, Arévalo would have to emphasize the fight against corruption, and this would give him an upper hand against Torres, who is perceived—especially in urban areas—as part of the alliance of the corrupt. Also in his favor is the symbolism of the fact that Arévalo is the son of a reformist president Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951), who many Guatemalans remember positively—although at the same time, this may play against him with people on the right who still, up to the present time, mistakenly associate him with communism. Lastly, while the legal attacks on Arévalo’s party may backfire and generate him support, his detractors may succeed, creating doubt about SEMILLA among citizens who are unaware of the complex legal details.

On the other hand, Torres has in her favor name recognition, especially in rural areas. She was first lady (2008-2011), this is her third time running for president (she lost the runoff elections in 2015 and in 2019), and she retains a country-wide party structure with UNE, something that SEMILLA lacks. Unlike the previous two elections, her switch to social conservatism could effectively attract urban voters this time around, given that she may be deemed as a less threatening candidate in a highly religious and socially conservative society like Guatemala (as Figure 1 shows).  

At the end of the day, the vote on August 20 will not be a vote for a political party. LAPOP data shows that less than 10 percent of Guatemalans sympathized with a party in 2019 (one of the lowest percentages in Latin America), but it will be a vote for two individuals who represent change or continuity. Those who chose Arévalo will likely be the ones who are fed up with the high levels of corruption in the Guatemalan political system and long for a change—even if some are socially conservative. Those who chose Torres will be the ones who are highly religious or staunchly conservative and prefer to continue the status quo rather than risk a change, as well as those citizens in rural areas who are lured by clientelism or remember Torres’ social assistance programs as former first lady.

Furthermore, it is hard to predict abstention, the null, or blank votes. The confusion created by the legal entrapments may discourage voters from going to the polls on August 20 (turnout in the runoff, which has always been lower than in the first-round election, holds a 45 percent average). Likewise, the harshness of the campaign could also discourage participation in the runoff election or again trigger null or blank voting. Nonetheless, it may well be that the attempts to derail the election spark unusual turnout.

In general, this is an election that is hard to predict, and polls—as they did in the first round—may again miss the target given the emotional rollercoaster that Guatemalans have experienced since the June 25 election.

What are the Chances for Reverting Democratic Erosion?

Once the new president takes office on January 14, 2024, two things will be on the table: governability in the next four years and the long-term prospects for democracy in Guatemala. In terms of governability, if Arévalo wins, political power would be dispersed between the Executive and the Legislative powers. He would face stiff opposition in Congress, where parties affiliated with the alliance of the corrupt will have a majority of the 160 seats in the unicameral Congress. Arévalo’s party obtained 23 seats in the congressional election and perhaps could find support in other progressive and moderate parties, which would give him around 50 seats. However, it will be difficult for him to do things as simple as getting the national budget approved.

If Torres wins the runoff, political power would be concentrated. She would run the Executive and could also control Congress through the 28 seats of her UNE party in alliance with establishment parties that obtained an important number of seats in Congress. This could be done with the incumbent party VAMOS (39 seats) and VALOR/Unionista (12 seats), plus a number of smaller conservative parties. She would find it much easier than Arévalo to enact her agenda without needing to negotiate with the minority parties. Since these three parties have in the past four years been supportive of the alliance of the corrupt, under a Torres presidency the status quo would be likely to continue—unless she were to reverse course and disentangle her party from the establishment.

In terms of reversing democratic erosion, Guatemala faces an uphill battle. The alliance of the corrupt has done immense damage to the weak institutionality in the country—which was weak even prior to the current Giammattei administration. Guatemala was downgraded from an electoral democracy in 2019 to an electoral autocracy in 2022 by the V-Democracy Index. Still, it was already considered a low-performance electoral democracy by organizations such as IDEA International long before Giammattei came to power.

Assuming that Torres continues her alliance with the establishment parties, her presidency would not contribute to counter democratic erosion. Guatemala may have a better chance of beginning to reverse democratic backsliding under an Arévalo presidency, but his options are limited. The road to reestablishing judicial independence and other important features of democracy will be challenging for him because, in addition to Congress, other key institutions such as the Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court will still be dominated by the establishment. Additionally, SEMILLA only won one of 337 municipal governments in the June 25 election, whereas the ruling party VAMOS obtained 131 and UNE won 38. Therefore, power at the local level will not be in his favor either.

Lastly, another lasting consequence of the bumpy 2023 electoral process will be the Guatemalan population’s perspective of democracy and its institutions. According to LAPOP data from 2021, only 52 percent of Guatemalans supported democracy, one of the five countries in Latin America with the lowest support. Additionally, trust in the institutions of representative democracy hovered below the average for Latin America. The power struggle between institutions in the past few weeks will likely decrease that trust even further. In conclusion, it is difficult to predict at this point whether the result of the runoff election will imply a watershed moment for Guatemala’s democracy or the continuation of the questionable political system that existed before June 25.

Dinorah Azpuru is a Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University. She has published extensively about democracy in Latin America. She served as Director of Vanderbilt University Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for Guatemala for several years. She was Secretary General of the Commission for Electoral Reform derived from the Peace Accords in Guatemala.

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After the Cold War, Cuba and China developed a strong and comprehensive alliance. Today, their collaboration is two-fold. Firstly, the economically-dependent Cuba helps China advance its myriad of interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. Secondly, the alliance meets China’s strategic needs in two broad areas: military-intelligence and biotechnology/neurosciences.

Cuba is a poor investment and trade partner, has failed to repay China billions of dollars in loans, and requires major support and humanitarian aid. However, the country has enabled China’s enormously successful economic, political, and geostrategic offensive into the region.

China has become South America’s first trading partner and the region’s second-largest after the United States. With trade growing from USD 12 billion in 2000 to USD 445 billion in 2021, China has secured new markets and privileged access to raw materials. The roughly USD 150 billion in loans from China have given it control over critical infrastructure projects, including 56 ports and telecommunications in 29 countries. Military personnel from the region now receive training on cybersecurity and military doctrine in China. This has all accelerated risks for malign commercial activities, political and economic coercion, and asymmetric attacks on infrastructure. Furthermore, it has boosted China’s civilian-military fusion strategy, which seeks to make its military the most advanced in the world and able to defeat the U.S.

Last June, the Wall Street Journal reported that Cuba and China were jointly operating four electronic eavesdropping facilities in Cuba and negotiating to establish a military training facility there. Since the 1990s, China has reportedly sold military equipment and provided training to Cuba while jointly engaging in military and intelligence projects. The Chinese presence in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) stations in Cuba goes back to the 1990s—one defector reports it as far back as the 1980s. The terms of China’s involvement are unclear but it has been reported that China provides Cuba with equipment, supplies, and technical training in exchange for a presence on the island and the sharing of collected intelligence. The radioelectronic activities have been camouflaged in Radio China transmissions from Cuba and by China’s building of Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure.

Numerous defectors have long reported that Cuba’s Communist regime has always collected extensive intelligence on the U.S. and other countries, which it shares with allies for profit and to strengthen relations. According to a Cuban regime official interviewed confidentially, the country’s Radio-Electronic Brigade, a Division of the Military Intelligence (DIM), currently runs its SIGINT operations from an underground facility south of Havana. The brigade’s longstanding priority has been to intercept all U.S. military communications within reach into the mainland, Central America, the Caribbean, and northern South America. It has also systematically monitored the Cuban population and foreign targets in Cuba, and has used encrypted communications with its embassies, intelligence centers, and vast network of spies around the world.

With China’s help, Cuba has also used information technology to monitor Venezuela strategically and spread digital authoritarianism regionally. In particular, Cuba’s armies of trolls have helped to advance its interests in the cyber space. Its information warfare has even confused air traffic controllers in New York and jammed pro-democracy broadcasts to Iran. According to the U.S. government, China’s electronic espionage from Cuba was enhanced in 2019. Coincidentally, in the midst of an economic crisis, Cuba continued to order Chinese broadcasting equipment at remarkably high volumes. Between 2016 and 2021, this figure increased considerably to USD 276.6 million, surpassing food and medical imports from China as overall imports declined.

Another fundamental pillar of the Cuba-China relationship is the strategic alliance in biotechnology, in line with a Chinese government mandate for China’s biotech sector to expand and surpass that of the U.S. and the West. It has relied on Cuba’s know-how and technology transfers in at least 30 collaborative biotech projects. This is concerning because Cuba has had biowarfare capabilities since the 1980s. Into the early 2000s, several defectors also reported on a suspected biowarfare program.

Cuba and China also conduct joint research in neurotechnology and bioengineering and are developing five neuro-technological products. Cuba’s mind-control and neuroscience programs stem from the 1960s and have been used to torture political opponents and U.S. prisoners of war in Vietnam. Since the 1980s, it has developed novel neurological drugs and treatments by way of experimental practices of questionable safety, marred in ethical deficits and claims of atrocities.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government has been warning that China seeks to acquire technology to take over the biotechnology and neurosciences sectors. In December 2021, the U.S. imposed a ban on exports and transfers to China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences, along with eleven entities believed to be involved in creating brain-control weaponry to dominate Chinese citizens and repress minorities. Several reports by the People’s Liberation Army have detailed the brain warfare research underway in mind control technologies meant to subdue the enemy, as well as “neuro-defense” equipment and brain-implanted microchips meant to fend off similar attacks.

It is difficult to acquire evidence proving these illicit activities. Secrecy is intrinsic to military and intelligence operations, and biotech and neuroscience institutions are tightly guarded operations within the two authoritarian states of China and Cuba. Thus, a comprehensive examination of all potential threats is in order. The international community should demand expert inspection of Cuba’s biotechnology facilities, including their activities and exports, to verify compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as an independent review of neuroscience collaborations with dual-use capabilities.

The United States has laws and mandates in place that would, if fully enforced, better contain Cuba, hinder resources for the dictatorship, and aid the Cuban people in attaining their freedom. A thorough review should be undertaken to assure their full enforcement, starting with the State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, and the Trafficking in Persons Victims Act. If the Cuban economy and the regime’s hold on power continue to weaken, China would have to reevaluate its investments in the Caribbean Island. The region would then greatly benefit from a free and democratic Cuba.

Maria C. Werlau is co-founder and Director of the Free Society Project/Cuba Archive, a non-profit think tank defending human rights through information. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, and a Master’s degree in International Studies from Universidad de Chile. This article is based on a scholarly paper that will be published in an academic journal by year-end 2023.

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Please note: this article is part one of two articles covering Guatemala’s recent political developments.

When Guatemalans went to the polls on election day on June 25, 2023, the electoral process itself had been questioned nationally and internationally because of the exclusion of three presidential candidates. This was preceded by two years of democratic backsliding in the country, and many expected apathy. Nonetheless, 61 percent of Guatemalans turned out to vote— similar to previous Guatemala’s first-round election. However, turnout was not the biggest surprise on election day. More remarkable were the choices made by Guatemalan voters, which stunned the Guatemalan political establishment as well as domestic and international observers. 

The highest share went to the null vote (17.4 percent), which was the highest since the democratic opening in Guatemala in 1985. Only four percent of Guatemalans had cast null votes in the previous three elections. On June 25, the null votes jointly with blank votes (6.9 percent) meant that one out of four voters showed their rejection of the options presented by 23 political parties. The biggest surprise, however, were the votes for Bernardo Arévalo of the party SEMILLA, who became the second leading candidate with 11.8 percent of the total votes, propelling him into the runoff elections on August 20. Pre-election polls showed him with less than three percent of the votes. The leading candidate was Sandra Torres of the party UNE, who raised 15.8 percent of the votes. This was expected since she had the lead in all pre-election polls.

Arévalo’s unexpected position into the runoff elections was welcomed by many Guatemalans,  but not by Guatemala’s ruling and allied parties, which began an unprecedented process of contesting the results—something that had not occurred in almost 40 years of democratic elections in the country. These legal actions placed Guatemala in a political impasse for almost three weeks and brought the country to its most critical moment in recent decades. On July 12, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) confirmed that SEMILLA and UNE will compete in the runoff election on August 20, but legal uncertainties remain.  Alongside the legal challenges, extreme right groups who were unhappy with having two leftist candidates in the runoff elections cried fraud and began a relentless and ruthless campaign on social media, especially against Arévalo.

The Political Standoff

Despite the many shortcomings of democratic developments in Guatemala, the institutional design that tallies the votes is recognized as reliable, even by critics of the political system within the country. The vote counting relies on over 100,000 non-partisan volunteers who form the Voting Boards (Juntas Receptoras de Votos, or JRVs) and who spent election day sitting at electoral tables throughout the country, receiving the secret ballots cast by citizens. At the end of the day, the members of each JRV count the paper votes in the presence of appointees from all political parties who are able to corroborate that each vote goes to the party it is intended to go to. The certificate of electoral results (known as acta) is signed by the members of each JRV and appointees of the political parties, is then transmitted electronically to the headquarters of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and the physical certificates and ballots are afterwards moved to the TSE.

On June 25, this process took place under normal circumstances and was considered successful. Nearly 25,000 election certificates were submitted to the TSE by the JRVs. This detailed explanation is necessary to understand why the allegations of fraud are baseless. The electoral legislation contemplates challenges to the results, and in this election there were indeed minor challenges, which could have been handled by the TSE as in the previous nine elections since the country turned into a democracy. However, on July 5, at the request of the ruling party and others, the Constitutional Court intervened unprecedentedly, calling for the revision of electoral certificates and giving the TSE five days to comply (a physical recount of paper ballots is not considered in Guatemala’s electoral legislation. The Constitutional Court also transferred the jurisdiction of the process to the Supreme Court.

Despite criticism from diverse international and domestic actors towards the actions of the Constitutional Court, the electoral authorities complied with the revision of the election certificates, which yielded basically the same results as those announced on June 26: Sandra Torres of the UNE party obtained 15.8 percent of the votes, followed by Bernardo Arévalo of SEMILLA with 11.8 percent. Manuel Conde of the ruling party VAMOS was third with 7.8 percent. In addition to the vote count by Guatemalan electoral authorities, other instruments such as the rapid count and other parallel mechanisms of national and international observation of the elections all confirmed the same results.

On July 10, two weeks after the elections, the Supreme Court finally cleared the way and said that despite the outstanding legal appeals against the vote count, the TSE could move forward with the process. However, as the TSE was getting ready to certify the winners, on July 12 the Attorney General Office requested the suspension of the SEMILLA party (claiming fraudulent signatures when the party was created) and a judge ordered the TSE to proceed accordingly. Analysts saw this move as an attempt to move the ruling party candidate, Manuel Conde, to the runoff elections, even though the revision confirmed that there is a difference of over 200,000 votes between Arévalo and Conde.

The TSE refused to comply. This development brought the country to a standstill, especially because on the morning of July 13 the offices of the TSE were raided by the Attorney General Office. In a matter of hours, different sectors proceeded to protect democracy and strongly rejected this latest attempt to manipulate the electoral results. In the afternoon of July 13, the Constitutional Court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the suspension of SEMILLA. This meant that the runoff election scheduled for August 20 could proceed with the two top-runners, Arevalo and Torres.

As of July 19, however, the legal problems continued as the Attorney General Office and the judge behind it attempted to criminalize electoral officials who refused to proceed with their order. Prominent civic groups and constitutional lawyers in Guatemala made it clear that these orders are null ipso jure (“by the law itself”), as political parties cannot be suspended once an electoral process has gotten underway and because the TSE has constitutional rank and independence. The legal challenges are expected to continue, but legal experts believe that the runoff between Arévalo and Torres will take place as scheduled on August 20.

The unprecedented legal actions against the electoral process in Guatemala have raised red flags across the board. Statements defending democracy in Guatemala were issued by the United States government, bipartisan members of the U.S. Congress,  the European Union, several Latin American countries, and other international actors.  Likewise, numerous Guatemalan organizations and civil society groups published statements in national newspapers and social media, asking the authorities to proceed with the electoral process with the two parties that obtained the majority of the votes, and criticized the legal tricks to delay the runoff election. Remarkably, these organizations and groups range from the conservative business sector and its different associations to moderate groups and even leftist movements that had called for voting null in the first round. Despite their deep ideological differences, they seem to agree that salvaging this electoral process is the last chance to save democracy in the country. This apparent consensus could be, in and of itself, one of the silver linings for democracy at this critical moment. Citizens have also protested against the attempts to block the election results.

It may be inconceivable for those who are not familiar with Guatemalan politics to comprehend that a fair election was gridlocked for almost three weeks and continues to be under threat, unless one understands that the mere institutions involved in the entrapment process (the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General Office) were largely co-opted by the so called alliance of the corrupt (pacto de corruptos). This informal alliance has been the main source of democratic backsliding in the country and is formed by the incumbent president, the current dominant parties in Congress, some extreme right individuals linked to the counterinsurgency during the armed conflict in Guatemala (1960-1996), and some individual business leaders.

Their first move was to orchestrate the expulsion of the United Nations Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Their next step was to engineer the dismantling of the existing infrastructure that made progress in fighting impunity and corruption in recent years by placing their people in charge of key institutions. Their next step was the hyper judicialization of Guatemalan politics through lawsuits (many of them spurious) against former anti-corruption judges, prosecutors, journalists, and civil society organizers critical to the alliance or to the unpopular incumbent president, Alejandro Giammattei. This prompted the exile of dozens of them, while several have been landed in prison. The obscure alliance had expected a right-wing candidate to move to the runoff elections—either Zury Rios from VALOR or Manuel Conde from the ruling party VAMOS. They would have been less satisfied, but probably not as upset, with a moderate candidate like Edmond Mulet of CABAL in the runoff but were appalled by Arévalo’s unexpected win because he openly speaks against them. This explains why their latest move was the hyper judicialization of the electoral process itself when it did not produce their expected results. Their difficulty is that unlike the past two years, now the world is closely observing their latest attack on democracy.

The 2023 Guatemalan elections have been unprecedented in the country’s recent history in multiple ways, and as a result, Guatemala faces either a watershed moment for its fragile democracy or the end of formal democracy. Formidable international pressure and the convergence of different domestic sectors to defend the electoral process may succeed in avoiding the total overturning of a democratic election, which would be the last straw for democracy. Nevertheless, the upcoming four weeks between now and August 20 will be crucial. Part II of this article will examine the prospects for the runoff election and the long-term challenges for democracy in Guatemala.

Dinorah Azpuru is a Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University. She has published extensively about democracy in Latin America. She served as Director of Vanderbilt University Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for Guatemala for several years. She was Secretary General of the Commission for Electoral Reform derived from the Peace Accords in Guatemala.

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Media outlets and political commentators repeatedly highlight the concentration of personal power by Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Yet the current catastrophes of governance in the country cannot be understood by power alone, as these also stem from the lack thereof. Weak governments under powerful men create dangerous places. The paradox of personal power is that it exacerbates feebleness everywhere else.

The strongman and authoritarian explanation for Mexico’s democratic backsliding is insufficient, and even misleading, to understand the country’s governance debacle. The centralization of power and the threats to Mexico’s constitutional system are real, but power is a deceptive word to describe the daily life of most citizens. The causes and explanations of how Mexico has regressed to a far more dysfunctional country lie in the somewhat hidden, not-so-thrilling everyday representations of weakness and impotence—the day-to-day stories of stranded and neglected citizens trying to survive government corruption and incompetence. The challenge of being treated as citizens, not thanks to but despite the government, reveals Mexico’s dysfunction.

The centralization of power is a process well underway; nonetheless, what defines the reality of most Mexicans is the impossibility of obtaining permits, scholarships, and medicines, as well as the danger of using a highway, lower salaries, extortion of businesses, out-of-stock drugstores, harassed judges, and long power outages. No one questions that democracy and the rule of law are destroyed by the institutional dismantling that demagogues so vehemently pursue. However, the governance coup de grace also happens in government offices with lower budgets—without equipment or electricity in some cases, in public schools without teachers, and in the never-ending queues to access public hospitals. The distinctive feature of this ‘administration’ is weakness and chaos—the destruction of its bureaucracy has opened a vacuum which AMLO has filled with threats, promises, and the projection of personal power.

After his victory in 2018, AMLO immediately embarked on a trek to prove not just how powerful he was, but how powerful he thought he deserved to be. The first sign of the president’s disturbing pattern of dangerous grandstanding was his cancellation of the partially-built USD 13.3 billion international airport—the most significant infrastructure project Mexico had planned in decades—scaring off new investments and businesses. The president has the power to build a useless railroad across the Yucatan jungle in violation of environmental laws, yet he is incapable of seeing viable alternative development projects. He is powerful enough to cancel permits for private investments in clean energies but unable and unwilling to attract the much-needed benefits of nearshoring.

Concerning foreign policy, the president has the power to pursue and treat migrants as criminals, but he is incapable of establishing a mildly coherent foreign policy. Mexico’s international reputation has been diminished to a galling defender of authoritarian regimes. Most notably, in June 2022, AMLO boycotted the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles to protest the exclusion of the Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan dictatorships, adding another gesture of goodwill toward the Cuban regime. In May, AMLO was declared persona non grata by the Peruvian Congress for defending former president Pedro Castillo’s coup. He also criticized the European Parliament for supporting Volodymyr Zelensky for the Nobel Peace Prize and condemned sending weapons to help Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions against Russia. Under AMLO, Mexico has become a geopolitical lightweight with a derisory and often minuscule role in regional politics, let alone global trends and challenges.

Through unconstitutional executive agreements, AMLO attempted to hide the information related to how the armed forces are spending public budgets on his infrastructure projects. He has enough power to appoint military personnel to replace a professional civil bureaucracy. Still, he is unable and unwilling to build a single capable civil police organization or maintain the historically healthy dividing line between the armed forces and civilian politics. Mexican sociologist Fernando Escalante summed up what AMLO’s military policies mean best: “[t]he military deployments are not a sign of state capacity, but of weakness or an absent state.” In the ongoing vicious cycle, the president destroys institutions in exchange for personal power, gradually leaning himself into the informal power realm and further away from the institutional framework of the presidency.

The arrangements between the president and the Mexican army increasingly depart from the constitutional layout, debauching an institutional relationship into a marriage of convenience and an impunity alliance. Likewise, organized crime was a defining factor in the mid-term local elections, tilting several polls in favor of the president’s party. It is clear which party criminals support, but these illegal alliances do not represent true power.  How de facto and local powers will evolve, accommodate, and exploit these murky waters is unclear. For the time being, the swathe of gray zones between the state and illegality is broader than ever. For the time being, organized crime is living a long and merry spring as their ambitions and cruelty face so few and meek constraints.

Government weakness and ineptitude is a steep, slippery slope towards cruelty for those who need the state the most. We can continue to amaze ourselves with the accumulation of power by a single man, but Mexico’s tragedy is best characterized by the powerlessness and vulnerability of everyone else. Journalist David Frum recently noted how we “should fear that the ultimate winner in Mexico will be autocracy –or even worse, chaos.” Mexico’s grim future looks somewhat far from a textbook authoritarian model. What we have is an illiberal and incompetent center surrounded by a sea of chaos and anarchy.

Growing regions of Mexico have no government presence, while migrants in detention centers burn to death because guards simply do not bother to open the doors during a fire. We witness events like the construction of an expensive and useless airport, farmers dividing their working hours between farming and defending their lands from racketeering, and soldiers firing against civilian teenagers for driving through a checkpoint and then executing the survivors to hide their crime. Citizens must stand abuses and crimes such as the construction of an expensive refinery unable to refine oil; the collapse of the capital city’s subway, killing 27 passengers; the military being subdued and humiliated by a drug cartel after capturing one of its leaders, and then having to release him by orders of the president. These are no signs of power.

In one of his nineteenth-century stories, Alexandre Dumas wrote that “the pride of those who cannot edify lies in destruction.” The president’s talent is his capacity for demolition. This government is incapable of building anything—but, more importantly—it is unwilling and unfit to work with anything created in the past. We must speak of criminal self-assurance, disorder, violence, and less about power. In a country where the mothers of thousands of disappeared and missing persons search for their loved ones with sticks and shovels in mass graves, it is profoundly deceiving to make sense of this catastrophe in terms of sway and authority.

To understand Mexico’s tragedy, beware of the strongman theory. This decay is the result of a man with just enough power to make everything else frail. The national calamity is not the result of a powerful or overbearing government but that of the bleak and callous scheming of an erratic personality’s effort to shatter everything in his path toward nowhere. What we have are authoritarian strikes—in no man’s land.

Emiliano Polo is a graduate student of global affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His research focuses on applied history and Latin American politics. He currently works in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

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The following article is an extended version of comments presented virtually by the author, in Spanish on June 7, 2023, to a forum on the topic in Madrid, Spain, put on by the Geopolitical Observatory for Latin America (OGAL).

Since the time of the first European explorers, Latin America’s political, social, and economic dynamics have been strongly influenced by European developments. Contemporary Latin American social structures, institutions, religion, and political culture continue to bear the legacy of colonial systems. The timing and outcome of 19^th Century independence movements—including the heritage of Brazil as the host of the region’s first European empire—was shaped by Napoleon’s invasion of Europe.

However, Latin America has generally been more of an object of influence than an agent. With the exception of Brazil’s support to maritime security in the Atlantic and its contribution to efforts to liberate Italy from fascist control, Latin America remained mostly on the sidelines during World War II—even though the region was profoundly impacted by the war. During the Cold War period, Latin America became a battleground for the Soviet Union’s attempts to advance a global Communist order.

The greatly expanded connectivity of the post-Cold War world arguably strengthened the interdependence between events in Europe and Latin America, but has not significantly increased Latin American agency in the relationship. European companies expanded their presence in the region almost eight-fold during the second half of the 1990s alone. Europe has long played a role in projects and the discourse in the region on development, human rights, and the environment. For instance, Europe has increasingly become a destination for the region’s drug supply and Europe-based organizations increasingly play a role in the region’s criminal dynamics.

Today, the impact of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and its ongoing military activities against Ukraine’s population and infrastructure to occupy the country is consistent with the relationship Latin America has had with Europe historically. The effects flowing from that interdependence have been significant and multifaceted against a backdrop of a region-making an effort to distance itself from them.

Economic Impacts

In the economic domain, Russia’s invasion disrupted global supply chains and caused price spikes for a range of products, including fertilizers, basic foodstuffs, and fuels. The difficulties in accessing fertilizer and the food and fuel price spikes came on the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic, which not only hit the region with the highest per capita mortality rates in the world but also decimated businesses and wiped out personal savings. The pandemic also left governments with grave fiscal imbalances, impeding their ability to effectively protect their residents from the new price spikes and supply shocks. Further compounding such pressures, fertilizer shortages and price increases in the Southern Cone countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, came at the same time as record droughts which decimated crops and related earnings from agriculture.

Western sanctions on Russia, even when not fully embraced by the countries of the region, further complicated the economic picture in Latin America. Some countries lost significant export earnings. Ecuador, for instance, exported a substantial portion of its shrimp to Russia prior to the invasion. Similarly, Russia was a major purchaser of Paraguayan beef. Similarly, many armed forces across the region use a significant amount of Russian military equipment, including Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. As a result, they had difficulty servicing that equipment and keeping it operating within the international sanctions regime.

More broadly, Russia’s invasion also damaged Latin America by increasing uncertainty in financial markets. This contributed to a depressed investment environment and sustained high-interest rates in the region, as apprehension drove investors to projects and assets in developed markets perceived as less risky. Overall, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has truncated the region’s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Latin America’s GDP, which grew 5.2 percent in 2021 as the region bounced back from the pandemic, is expected to grow at a rate of only 1.3 percent in 2023.

Not all of the impact of the Russian invasion has been negative for Latin America. By contributing to the inflation of commodity prices, Russia’s war has helped bolster export earnings for select commodities in some countries. Still, such windfalls were reduced by the moderation of commodity prices caused by China’s weaker-than-expected recovery and agricultural producers, such as Brazil and Argentina, losing potentially valuable export earnings due to record drought.

Political Impacts

Beyond the explicit economic effects, Russia’s invasion has arguably contributed to a region that is less politically stable and with a weakened democratic foundation. The price shocks helped fuel protests and unrest in Peru, Panama, and Ecuador, among other countries. More broadly, the deepening of such economic stresses has helped to deepen longstanding dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic systems, already evident in the fall of 2019 with severe nationwide protests in Ecuador and Chile.

According to the polling organization Latinobarometer, the number of people in the region who agreed that democracy was the preferable form of government fell from 63 percent in 2010 to 49 percent by 2021. In the context of eroding faith in the ability of democracy to deliver, the stresses from the Ukraine invasion—on top of those from COVID-19—have while undercut the ability of democratic regimes to govern. This in turn has brought more populist leaders to power across the region and increased the risk of further turns to non-democratic alternatives in the future.

It would be an exaggeration to say that the economic, and by extension, political effects of Russia’s war played the decisive role in the December 2022 fall of Pedro Castillo in Peru, the political weakening of Guillermo Lasso in the context of the corruption scandal that forced him to invoke “Muerte Cruzada,” or the possibility that Ricardo Martinelli, just nominated by his “realizando metas” party in Panama will return to power in May 2024 as a populist leader. Yet the inflation and fiscal dilemmas fueled by Russia’s invasion have arguably been one important element in each, as well as other difficult political dynamics playing out across the region.

Despite these concerns, there are some sources of hope. In the context of a region already controlled by an unprecedented number of left-oriented regimes as well as the war’s bad publicity for anti-U.S. authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and its adverse economic effects, could contribute in some cases to bringing right-oriented leaders back to power. The most significant near-term possibility is in Argentina’s October 2023 elections, where in the face of inflation of more than 100 percent and growing risks of a new fiscal default, both the Peronist President and Vice-President have said they will not run and the current front-runner, Javier Milei is a politically non-traditional libertarian.

Security Thinking and International Relations

Beyond its economic and political effects, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also had a significant, wide-ranging, if uneven impact on thinking about international relations in the region, particularly on security and other matters. For a Latin America which has not seen a full inter-state military conflict since the 1995 Cenepa War between Peru and Ecuador, Russia’s invasion reminded the region that armed aggression by one state against another is still possible. Thus, highlighting the persistence of the traditional role of armed forces to defend state sovereignty and its population.

The war also had a significant, if diverse, impact on thinking in the region about the character of Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia. For states of the more “principled, democratic” left in the region—such as Gabriel Boric’s government in Chile—Putin’s invasion and associated human rights abuses made it difficult to continue the casual relations that many had maintained with Russia before the invasion.

Defying the broader trend, however, the embrace of Russia by a handful of authoritarian populist regimes in the region—including Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, the Ortegas in Nicaragua, and Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba—highlighted the ongoing strategic risks that those regimes pose to the U.S. and the region. Indeed, those populists have also begun forging alliances with Russia’s allies—such as Belarus’ Alexandr Lukashenko—in an attempt to demonstrate to domestic audiences that they have not become international pariahs. Instead, they are able to cooperate, albeit in limited ways, against the liberal order. The recent agreement to send Cuban military personnel to Belarus, supposedly for training activities but possibly to fight for Russia, is the most recent illustration of this broadening collaboration between illiberal regimes in both regions.

Beyond such political dynamics, the military developments of the war have arguably impacted thinking in Latin America about military training and doctrine. Although not excessively outspoken about the conflict, Latin American militaries are following developments in Ukraine closely. They are capturing lessons about mechanized warfare, the use of drones, missiles, air defense systems, and other matters. In addition, it demonstrated Russian deficiencies in training and logistics. Indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets and power and water infrastructure and Russia’s use of its own soldiers as “cannon fodder” have arguably had a chilling effect on the receptivity to Russian doctrine across Latin America.

Despite such far-ranging impacts, and consistent with its posture historically, neither Pro-Putin regimes nor democrats in Latin America have gotten involved in the conflict in meaningful ways. With the exception of Putin’s friends—defiant Central America regimes such as Xiomara Castro in Honduras and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and more opportunistic actors such as Lula in Brazil—the majority of the region has generally voted to condemn Russia at the United Nations. Most Latin American states have also generally respected the international sanctions regime against Russia. Still, given the global reach of the U.S. financial system and its legal liabilities, respect for sanctions is arguably a reflection of economic self-interest and not an affirmation of the region’s condemnation of Russian aggression.

Indeed, the region has notably avoided imposing its own sanctions on Russia. Moreover, it has notably not sent military aid and has lagged behind Europe and other parts of the world in sending other forms of assistance to the Ukrainian people. Not even those countries most politically aligned with the U.S. in the region have embraced an initiative suggested by the head of U.S. Southern Command General Laura Richardson to donate their difficult-to-service Russian equipment to Ukraine and replace it with U.S. equipment. On the other hand, the new leftist regime of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil has criticized the U.S. for “prolonging” the war by helping Ukraine defend itself. Additionally, in the name of “peace,” Brazil welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the region and discussed expanded trade with the sanctioned country.

Conclusion

In the United States, I have been moved by the number of Ukrainian flags spontaneously hung by ordinary Americans in their homes in solidarity with the Ukrainian people in an otherwise deeply divided country. In Latin America, the region to which the U.S. is intimately connected by ties of geography, commerce, and family, I worry that the lessons of Ukraine about the fundamental importance of a rules-based international order and the need to sacrifice to defend its principles has been obscured by the region’s own troubles and deepened its cynicism about democracy, the protection of fundamental rights, and the rule of law.

This past week Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva welcomed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to Brasilia with an embrace, dismissing as a mere “narrative” the numerous outstanding criminal cases against him as well as the more than seven million Venezuelans forced to flee his regime. The same Lula criticized the West for helping Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s invasion as “prolonging the war.” What a contrast to Lula’s iconic predecessor Getúlio Vargas, who contributed a division of Brazilian forces to the campaign to liberate Italy in 1944. It is hard to imagine Vargas criticizing Allied efforts to defend Europe against the aggression of Hitler and Mussolini.

While the economic effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are grave, the truly worrisome development has been to deepen the wounds of a region whose pain from COVID-19, corruption, insecurity, and government performance has eroded the already fragile consensus on the importance of principle. The challenge ahead is to do better in making the case for why democracy and individual rights are not just eloquent words but meaningful concepts worth the price of defending. For those words to resonate, the United States must not only keep faith with Ukraine, but also with this hemisphere. It must give its people reason to believe that values can have meaning. It must show that democratic systems coupled with the location of economic value principally in the private sector, for all of its imperfections, is still the best way to generate value for a society and protect individual liberties.

Evan Ellis is a featured contributor with Global Americans and a Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed herein are strictly his own.

The post <strong>The Impact of Russia’s Ukraine Invasion on Latin America</strong> appeared first on Global Americans.

In Latin America, it is strategically important that the United States distinguish between principled left-oriented democratic regimes versus those which seek to manage the alarm of Washington and Western investors as they pursue a fundamentally anti-democratic, anti-market, anti-U.S. course. It is time for Washington to recognize that the Honduran regime of Xiomara Castro, Mel Zelaya, and their Libre movement, are on the latter path. The Castro government has also opened the door to greater Chinese involvement in the Central American country.

Even as presidential candidate, Xiomara Castro called herself “democratic socialist.” Libre, whose original platform called for a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution and “re-found Honduras.” The party is also part of the radical Sao Paolo forum, in which authoritarian populist leaders Venezuela’s Nicholas Maduro, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and Cuba’s Miguel Diaz-Canel also play a role.

From the beginning, evidence suggested an outsized influence within Castro’s presidency of her husband Mel Zelaya—a populist leftist ally of Morales, Correa, and Hugo Chavez and part of the radical “Puebla Group.” Zelaya was remove from the presidency in June 2009 for an unconstitutional attempt to perpetuate himself in power. Castro’s own First Vice-President Salvador Nasralla says that Zelaya is the key decisionmaker within the Presidency. Honduras’ “First Husband” reportedly spends his days in the presidential palace receiving persons who ask for political favors and is said to have played a key role in a questionable government decision to commute the prison sentence of former First Lady Rosa Bonilla de Lobo.

The current Castro-headed government is filled with persons who used to work in her husband’s Administration. Zelaya’s advisor Enrique Reina, considered to be one of the most radical of the Libre leaders, is now Foreign Minister. Zelaya’s former Labor Minister Rixi Moncada, a radical Libre lawyer who also served on the electoral commission, is now Finance Minister. Zelaya’s former Minister to the Presidency Enrique Flores Lanza, who fled to Nicaragua after the former President’s ouster to avoid charges of embezzlement from Honduras’ Central Bank, is back as a special Presidential Advisor. Zelaya’s Defense Minister Edmundo Orellana is now “Secretary of Transparency.” Although one of the most respected members of Libre, Orellana recently suggested that a promised United Nations-led commission against corruption (CICIH) could not be implemented through the necessary congressional action until 2025 or 2026 because it did not have the required political support.

Questions of corruption and evidence of nepotism in the Libre government abound. Flores’ return was made possible by a questionable March 2022 Presidential Decree that granted amnesty to members of Mel Zelaya’s former regime. The decree also enabled the return of two former Libre congressional leaders and Zelaya’s Labor Secretary.

Additionally, Mel Zelaya’s and Xiomara Castro’s family members are everywhere in the new administration. The President’s son, Hector, is her “Private Secretary” and accompanies Castro in virtually all of her public appearances. Her other son, Jose, is similarly a “presidential advisor.” Mel Zelaya’s nephew, Jose Manuel, is Secretary of Defense. Castro’s daughter—also named Xiomara, but known as “La Pichu”—and Zelaya’s brother, Carlos, are both is a members of congress.

The Biden administration has sought to find common ground with Castro, including an invitation to President Biden’s December 2021 “Democracy Summit” and special attention from U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, who attended Castro’s inauguration. Despite these efforts, the Libre regime has quickly racked up a record of unhelpful and sometimes anti-U.S. positions. Castro almost immediately reestablished diplomatic ties with Venezuela. She promoted the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which excludes the United States, over the Organization of American States (OAS), which the government calls a “failure.” When Peru’s president Pedro Castillo was removed in December 2022 for an unconstitutional attempt to dissolve Congress, the Libre regime called Castillo’s removal a “coup.” The Libre government has also refused to join the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights and others in condemning the Ortega regime in Nicaragua for human rights violations and unconstitutional practices.

Despite such actions, the most troubling foreign policy initiative taken by the Libre regime was its abandonment of Taiwan in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in March 2023. The Libre regime reportedly attempted to extort Taiwan into doubling its USD $100 million in annual aid to the country, forgiving Honduras’s USD $600 million in past loans, and extending new aid totaling as much as USD $2.5 billion. When Taiwan did not meet its terms, the Libre regime switched diplomatic relations to the PRC and gave Taiwan 30 days to vacate its embassy in Tegucigalpa.

Since establishing relations with PRC, the Libre regime has quickly moved to embrace its new partner. It is reportedly negotiating for PRC-funding for a 150 megawatt hydroelectric project, Patuca II, complimenting the USD $300 million Patuca III facility funded and built by the PRC for Honduras in the pre-recognition period.

Just weeks after recognition, the Libre regime sent a delegation to seek benefits in the areas of trade and investment with the PRC. The regime is reportedly negotiating with the PRC to replace Honduran agricultural exports that had gone to Taiwan. The Libre regime also declared its intent to open up Honduras’ market and negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the PRC. It is expected to seek debt relief from the PRC and China has reportedly invited Honduras to join the Belt and Road Initiative. If it does, PRC infrastructure development of ports and rail lines along Honduras’ “dry canal” corridor connecting the Atlantic and Pacific, may be one attractive target. Additionally, Jose Morales, General Manager of the Honduran telecommunication organization Hondutel, is already tweeting about  Huawei coming to revamp and modernize the government entity.

In non-commercial matters, only 40 of the 129 Honduran students in Taiwan whose status was put in jeopardy by the government’s change in relations agreed to go to the PRC. The Libre regime also rapidly began collaborating with its Communist Chinese counterparts in media affairs. Within days of the diplomatic switch, PRC journalists were arriving in Honduras and the PRC sponsored 29 Honduran journalists for a 10-day trip to the country.

The country also faces an extreme gang and extortion problem, including Central America’s highest’s homicide rate (38.5 murders / 100,000). The Libre government has followed the lead of its dictatorial neighbor, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, in declaring a state of exception in November 2022—which it has subsequently been extended four times— allowing the government to crack down with military and police forces. Meanwhile, not unlike in Venezuela, Libre-aligned “collective” gangs occupy public institutions and intimidate the populace.

Overall, a Libre-led Honduras a strategic risk. This risk is the combination of a regime with radical intentions and high levels of corruption and nepotism. This is exacerbated by the fact that it is now backstopped by Chinese money and facing growing economic and criminal problems which could drive the government toward even more authoritarian solutions. 74% of Hondurans currently live in poverty, while 3.5 million Hondurans reportedly have employment problems. A deepening drought has forced the government to declare an emergency in 64 municipalities, warning of the displacement of people from hunger as livestock die and crops wither.

Honduras is a sovereign country and has the right to have commercial and diplomatic relations with whom it chooses. The United States has been a reliable security and development partner, but should also do more to facilitate the arrival and expansion of promised aid and private sector investment in Honduras and other Central American partners. As with Venezuela in the early 2000s, Honduras is on a dangerous path that if unchecked, may lead to a mutually reinforcing process of radicalization, corruption, economic self-destruction, and a turn to authoritarian solutions bankrolled by the PRC. Honduras’ continued cooperation with the United States on immigration, drugs, and other regional security matters is particularly important. The U.S. is correct to respectfully pursue areas where it can work together with the Libre regime, but it must not ignore when the Libre government engages in criminal conduct, efforts to undermine the democratic order, or activities in the region by subversive groups or extra-hemispheric rivals. The U.S. must respectfully, but firmly engage the regime and hold it to account, while simultaneously reaching out the Honduran diaspora and coordinating with like-minded democratic states in the region, Europe, and elsewhere to ensure that Honduras remains a reliable democratic partner.

Evan Ellis is a featured contributor with Global Americans and Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed herein are his own.

The post The Advance of China and Authoritarian Populism in Honduras appeared first on Global Americans.

The following piece is an adaptation of a special edition of the Americas Migration newsletter, available at www.migrationbrief.com.

While migration to the United States has traditionally been dominated by Mexicans and then Northern Central Americans, the last few years have seen new trends in increasing migration from South America, the Caribbean, and extracontinental migrants from Africa and Asia. This has both highlighted the regional—and global—nature of migration and increased the number of countries—and borders—between home countries and the United States. 

Despite the changes in migration dynamics over the years, the U.S. Congress has yet to pass any level of immigration reform for decades. Amid a stagnant legislative framework, the Executive Branch has had to be creative to develop policy and respond to migration. Recent years have seen a newfound regional approach to thinking about migration from Washington, with the Trump administration collaborating with partners across the Americas in an effort to restrict migration and asylum. In contrast, the Biden administration has sought to employ a dual approach focused on both deterrence and the expansion of legal pathways to the country for both labor and protection.

Excluding perhaps the Obama administration’s Alliance for Prosperity Plan for Northern Central America, the Trump administration implemented some of the first real regional migration policies from the U.S. government. Coordination with Mexico on border enforcement deployment and asylum-restricting policies such as metering and the Migrant Protection Protocols (often called the “Remain in Mexico” program) represented a greater collaboration with the next-door neighbors across the southern border. Moving further afield, the move to establish Safe Third Country Agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras was historic in terms of expanding to a more regional approach on migration, albeit squarely focused on deterrence and preventing would-be asylum seekers from reaching the U.S. border.

The Biden administration, by contrast, has broadened the scope of a regional migration policy from Washington and has even looked to set up regional processing centers across the region to facilitate access to migration pathways while reducing pressure at the U.S. border. New pathways for migration that help prevent dangerous and unregulated irregular migration include a humanitarian parole program for up to 30,000 total Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans per month; expanded temporary labor migration visas for Central Americans and Haitians; and expanded family reunification pathways for select nationalities. Finally, the refugee cap has increased significantly from the record lows set during the Trump administration.

This new way of approaching migration and thinking regionally has had many benefits, including increased coordination and information sharing between stakeholders, expanded regular migration for both those with protection needs and those seeking better job opportunities alike, stronger initiatives to promote integration in receiving countries across the hemisphere, and improved efforts to clamp down on human and sex trafficking. 

Even still, deterrence has remained the underlying status quo. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, signed in June 2022 under the leadership of the Biden administration, was a historic recognition of the regional and multifaceted nature of migration across the Americas. Since the declaration’s signing, however, the clearest follow-through at a regional level has been the expansion of hardening border enforcement measures and efforts to halt migrants in transit in their tracks, as highlighted in late May by reports of senior Biden administration officials looking to send U.S. troops to the infamous Darien Gap jungle that separates Colombia and Panama.

Nowhere is the deterrence-oriented approach to regional collaboration more evident than with the implementation of visa restrictions.

Thinking regionally has brought increased coordination on these border enforcement efforts. The four countries that have received the most attention of late for their migration to the United States are Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Using the tools available without congressional reform, the Biden administration has implemented an innovative humanitarian parole policy for these four countries and sought to expand their family reunification pathways; it has also pushed for countries along the route north to introduce visa restrictions in an effort to deter asylum seeking at the U.S.-Mexico border. Less than a decade ago, Venezuelans could enter Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama without a visa en route to the United States. Today, Venezuelans must go through laborious and expensive processes to enter those same countries. 

One example that slips under the radar but is emblematic of the policy approach is that of Belize, where new visa restrictions have been implemented for Haitians and debated for Jamaicans due to their use of the country as a landing point before continuing on by foot to head north. Per the Caribbean Community’s CSME and the Treaty of Chaguaramas, both Haitians and Jamaicans should generally have visa-free entry for up to six months in Belize.

These maps are available in closer detail and for download here.

Visa restrictions also act as a deterrent for extracontinental migrants. Migrants from Africa and Asia are increasingly looking to seek asylum at the U.S. border, but most are pushed to fly to South America—often Ecuador or Brazil—before taking off on foot heading north. The trend has grown since the COVID-19 pandemic but began as far back as 2013. 

Despite a proliferation of targeted visa restrictions, the reality is that migration has continued. As the option of flights and other regular travel further north has been taken off the board, this has only pushed migrants to take more dangerous paths to the U.S. border, most infamously through the Darien Gap. Over one hundred and twenty thousand migrants crossed the Darien Gap between January and April 2023—six times more than over the same period last year. And even though the Biden administration announced new deterrence measures following the expiration of Title 42 that have been labeled an “asylum transit ban,” migrants have continued to make the trek north. 

Relying solely on deterrence policies has consistently proven to be ineffective in preventing migration, whereas the opening of legal pathways has facilitated safe, orderly, and regular migration to the U.S. While the Trump administration focused solely on the former, the Biden administration’s dual approach has proven more constructive, albeit still prioritizing a deterring approach to regional collaboration. Washington is now thinking more regionally about migration, but the question becomes where its priorities lie and where they will head as we approach the 2024 presidential election and beyond.

Jordi Amaral is the author of the Americas Migration Brief newsletter and a freelance researcher and writer specializing in Latin America and the Caribbean, migration, and politics. He has worked with Hxagon, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), among others.

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