The Puerto Rico Status Act (H.R. 8393) opens with an acknowledgment of the island’s prolonged struggle as an unincorporated U.S. territory: “For far too long, the residents of Puerto Rico—over 3 million U.S. citizens—have been deprived of the opportunity to determine their own political future and have not received the full rights and benefits of their citizenship because they reside in a U.S. territory. H.R. 8393 would take a historic step towards righting this wrong by establishing a process to ascertain the will of the voters of Puerto Rico regarding three constitutional options for non-territorial status.”

Hoping to “put the future of Puerto Rico’s political status in the hands of Puerto Ricans, where it belongs,” Representative Raúl Grijalva of Arizona and 62 cosponsors introduced the bill in July 2022. In December 2022, the bill passed in the House and was received in the Senate. Although Democrats lack the votes to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, the Puerto Rico Status Act provides for a plebiscite to be held in November 2023 to resolve the territory’s political status, raising historical issues that have hindered Puerto Rico from addressing structural vulnerabilities and building resilience.

From natural disasters to food crises, Puerto Rico faces numerous issues—all of which are inextricably linked to each other and deeply rooted in the territory’s colonial history. One example of the territory’s inability to avoid certain catastrophes and build resilience can be found in the aftermath of Hurricane María in 2017, when residents went hungry as ships were unable to dock at the damaged ports. For context, the island imports about 85 percent of its food; worsening natural disasters, economic crises, and mismanagement have led to the island’s dependence. Furthermore, U.S. policies, like the Jones Act and Operation Bootstrap, have restrained local agriculture. For many, this catastrophe demonstrated the need for absolute change.

H.R. 8393 is historic in many ways. It is the first time the House passed a resolution requiring a binding referendum mandating the federal government to recognize the territory’s decision. The binding referendum would also be the first time that Puerto Rico’s current status as a U.S. commonwealth is not included as an option. Instead, the three options are independence, sovereignty in free association with the U.S., or statehood. The bill also promises to provide for a transition to and the implementation of Puerto Rico’s chosen status.

In June 2023, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization approved a draft resolution reaffirming Puerto Rico’s inalienable right to self-determination and independence. According to its press release, many spoke out in favor of autonomy, although it was pointed out that the foregoing was a minority opinion, with a majority of Puerto Ricans voting in favor of becoming the fifty-first state in the most recent referendum held in November 2022.

Among those who preferred statehood, Yadira Ofarrill, speaking for the Congressional Extended Delegation-Georgia Chapter, argued that statehood was a valid form of decolonization, and that Puerto Ricans deserved the same fundamental rights granted to U.S. citizens on the mainland. Xiomara Torres, on behalf of the Party for Socialism and Liberation, asserted that statehood would not “cut out the cancer that is colonialism.” The general consensus, however, seemed to be that the decision must be made by Puerto Ricans living on the island. Representative Grijalva, the sponsor of the bill, expressed similar sentiments: “It is crucial to me that any proposal in Congress to decolonize Puerto Rico be informed and led by Puerto Ricans.”

In her heartfelt piece on Puerto Rico’s fight for justice, Puerto Rican writer, journalist, and professor, Jaquira Díaz, also points to Hurricane María, arguing that it was not just a natural disaster, but a political event that provoked a historic shift. “Nine months after María, people still have no electricity. They stop waiting for FEMA. Instead, they look to their neighbors. They take care of one another. This is how it has always been […] There is no benevolent American savior coming to help Puerto Rico. Every day, people see that there is only them, doing everything for themselves. Every day, more of them come to understand that Puerto Rico has always stood on its own. This is why I believe that independence, not statehood, is the path we must pursue.”

Díaz acknowledges that the path to independence would be challenging. She argues, however, that the future of a free Puerto Rico does not need to be easy to be just. To reach that point, Díaz states that the U.S. has a responsibility to set a policy of reparations that acknowledges generations of environmental destruction, human rights violations, economic dislocation, and more. According to her, this process would be complex, imperfect, and messy, but “the point is that self-determination for Puerto Ricans necessitates not just cutting them loose, but also restoring what has been taken and otherwise making amends.”

Advocates of H.R. 8393 recognize Puerto Rico’s history of colonization and current political status as drivers of the island’s structural vulnerability. Disasters like Hurricane María revealed unsustainable practices and inequitable power relations, demonstrating the need for a change in status. What that change ends up being depends on the Puerto Rican vote. However, all three options listed on the bill require the U.S. to address the historic and modern injustices that Puerto Rico’s status has brought upon the island.

Rachel Lee is a former newsletter intern at Global Americans. She holds a bachelor’s degree in global studies with a minor in sustainability from Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. She is currently a master’s student pursuing a dual degree in international affairs and sustainable development at American University in Washington, D.C. and the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

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The Caribbean is one of the world’s premier biodiversity hotspots. Coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangrove swamps, and tropical rainforests play a crucial role in the region’s cultural, economic, and ecological fabric. Not only do these ecosystems protect Caribbean coastlines from tropical storms and erosion, as well as provide an important source of food and jobs for local communities, but they also help mitigate climate change. Unfortunately, in the Caribbean, like in much of the world, these precious ecosystems are under immediate threat. A cascade of interconnected crises, from the excessive use of land and sea to climate change, is accelerating biodiversity loss at an alarming rate. Without drastic international, regional, and national efforts, entire ecosystems will collapse, posing a significant risk to the Caribbean region’s economy, security, and bio-natural heritage.

As a result of its insularity, the Caribbean islands possess unique ecosystems with high levels of endemic species. From the Greater and the Lesser Antilles to the Lucayan Archipelago and the Cayman Islands, coral reefs, mangrove swamps, as well as seagrass beds are the habitat of over 12,000 marine species, including mollusks, crustaceans, and fish. In addition, terrestrial habitats contain 12,847 native and introduced flora species. Belize, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana are also gifted with highly biodiverse landscapes. The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS), found off the coasts of Belize, is the largest unbroken barrier reef in the Western Hemisphere and the world’s second-largest, following the Great Barrier Reef of Australia. It is estimated that 500 fish species, 60 coral species, 350 mollusk and marine mammals, algae, and seagrasses live in the MBRS. Guyana and Suriname, located in what is known as the Guiana Shield—a vast ecoregion that lies in the northern part of the Amazon—remain one of the best-preserved reservoirs of biodiversity, carbon, and freshwater in the world. 

Biodiversity is fundamental to the region’s economy as well as to mitigate climate change. A 2016 World Bank study estimated that Caribbean coastal and marine ecosystems are valued at USD 54.55 billion. According to the Resilient Islands Initiative, mangroves and coral reefs are estimated to provide the Caribbean with USD 15 billion annually in fisheries, tourism, and carbon sequestration. Similar studies have shown that coral reef-related tourism alone provides the Caribbean with an estimated annual revenue of USD 7.9 billion—a figure equivalent to more than 10 percent of the region’s Gross Domestic Product. In terms of carbon sequestration, the region plays an major role. The Guiana Shield sequesters approximately 500 million tons of carbon dioxide per year—equivalent to the carbon emissions of nearly 89 million households in one year.

Moreover, the Caribbean’s endemic species are also vital for novel drug treatment developments, including drugs for cancer, cardiovascular diseases, immunological and central nervous system disorders, diabetes, as well as bacterial, viral, and parasitic infections. For instance, Trabectedin—an alkylating agent used as a chemotherapy drug to treat advanced soft tissue sarcoma and relapsed ovarian cancer—was first isolated from a colonial tunicate found in Caribbean mangroves and seagrass blades called Esteinascidia turbinate.

Flora and fauna are also deeply rooted in the region’s social fabric. For Caribbean Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, nature represents a means of livelihood and an essential element of their belief systems. In Dominica, the Kalinago people—the last Indigenous Peoples in the Eastern Caribbean—not only rely heavily on forests for subsistence agriculture, yet maintain a belief system that is also deeply connected to nature. The Kalinago people’s traditional ecological knowledge plays a fundamental role in the Dominican government’s current efforts to achieve its goal of becoming the world’s first country to be resilient to the multiple effects of climate change. In other parts of the Caribbean, local species have become modern symbols of national identity and an essential part of bio-cultural heritage. In Barbados, the flying fish—a tropical and temperate marine species often found in coral reefs in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans—is not only the national dish, but it is also considered a symbol of identity and pride.

Nonetheless, the rapid increase of economic activities, such as fishing, tourism, agriculture, and mining, is contributing to the region’s environmental degradation, inflicting long-term costs. In addition, as human-induced climate change exacerbates, its multiple impacts—such as rising sea temperatures, changing rain patterns, ocean acidification, and sea level rise—pose an everlasting threat. Data from across the region points to the same situation: biodiversity is declining at a fast rate. According to the latest report from the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network on the status and trends of Caribbean coral reefs, “Caribbean coral reefs and their associated resources will virtually disappear within just a few decades.” Related studies show that Caribbean mangrove forests have declined 24 percent in the past quarter-century, tropical rainforests are degrading, and seagrass bed ecosystems are collapsing.

A 2018 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) report on the state of biodiversity in the region highlighted that in connection to the rapid growth of populations and economic activities, the Caribbean’s main threats to its biodiversity include “increasing urbanization, conversion of lands for tourism and commercial development, and the expansion of agriculture. The report also exposes the threats from “invasive species, pollution, and overexploitation of living resources.” In addition, with projections showing an increase in the global temperature by 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100—well above the 2015 Paris Agreement goal to hold the rise of temperatures below 1.5 degrees—scientists expect that climate change will likely become the main driver of biodiversity loss, posing long-lasting and irreversible changes to the ecosystem.

Indeed, according to a 2020 report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s International Institute of Tropical Forestry, climate change is already heavily impacting the Caribbean’s biodiversity. Rising sea surface temperatures and sea levels, changing rain patterns, acidifying oceans, and intensifying extreme weather events such as hurricanes and droughts are among the main climate change parameters affecting biodiversity in the region. Coral bleaching—the process in which corals, driven by changes in conditions such as temperature or nutrients expel the symbiotic algae living in their tissues, turning them completely white and leaving them subject to mortality—is among the most notable and well-documented effects of climate change on marine ecosystems and poses a significant threat to Caribbean reefs. 

With the alarming increase in the temperature of the Caribbean Sea at a rate of 0.24 degrees Celsius per decade, increasingly frequent marine heat waves, and rising sea levels as a result of climate change in combination with local factors associated with changes in land and sea use, projections show a dire future for strategic Caribbean marine and terrestrial ecosystems. Addressing the drivers of biodiversity loss requires practical solutions that will invariably touch upon politically and economically sensitive issues. This may include questioning the region’s developmental strategy and exploitation of natural resources, acknowledging the responsibility of high-emitting countries for warming temperatures, and tackling regional structural problems. Protecting the environment requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses local drivers of biodiversity loss, such as pollution and exploitation caused by the expansion of economic activities in the region, as well as the global threat of climate change.

For more information and recommendations, as well as an analysis of the impacts of climate change on the Caribbean’s biodiversity, read Global Americans’ full report, “Safeguarding Caribbean Biodiversity.”

 Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

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July 2023 was considered the Earth’s hottest month on record, and possibly the hottest single month in roughly 120,000 years, according to a report published by the European Union’s Copernicus Climate Change Service and the World Meteorological Organization. One of the catastrophic impacts of these high temperatures has been the widespread devastation of coral reefs, especially in the Florida Keys, where water temperatures are at record-high levels.

As a teenager, those reefs mesmerized me with their colorful, teeming life and profound beauty. I knew from that young age that I would become a marine scientist. It is deeply heartbreaking to see those reefs—which have been in rapid decline for more than 50 years—estimated to be 80 to 90 percent dead. Making an already dire situation worse, the remaining corals are now bleaching in record-breaking ocean temperatures, facing a “disastrous bleaching event.” Climate change is a significant contributor to the death of coral reefs, which are being pushed beyond their thermal tolerance. This is resulting in the disturbing images we currently see in the media of bleached corals, a weakened state that often leads to their death.

Since 1970, the Caribbean has tragically lost half its coral reefs. It is estimated that the world will lose between 70 and 90 percent of its reefs by the end of the century. Coral reefs are essential to countless marine species that depend upon them—perhaps up to 9 million different species. Humans also depend greatly upon coral reefs, which help bring billions of dollars to the global economy from fishing, tourism, and coastal protection. For instance, coral reefs can absorb an astonishing 97 percent of wave energy. In the medical realm, more than half of new cancer drug research is focused on marine life, and much of that is on coral reef ecosystems.

While the media and public focus on climate change as the underlying cause of bleached coral reefs, research shows that a host of other factors are just as crucial to the health of coral reefs as the changing climate. For decades, these factors have slowly contributed to an underwater disaster, of which the public is largely unaware. Nutrient pollution, primarily from fertilizers used for agriculture and our lawns, fuels the rampant growth of algae in the ocean, which can smother and kill coral reefs. Meanwhile, herbivorous reef fish—many of which graze upon algae and keep coral reefs “clean” and safe from being smothered—end up on our dinner plates. A growing number of lethal diseases threaten coral reefs, some originating from human waste leaking from septic tanks and ships. Sedimentation from deforestation and coastal development can also be fatal to coral reefs.

As dismal and overwhelming as all of this may seem, there remains a message of hope: many of these are factors we can control, meaning that there are actions that we can take now to buy more time for corals in rapidly warming seas. Recent studies demonstrate that local factors are as important as (and perhaps even more important than) global factors (i.e., climate change) in ensuring the health of coral reefs. Despite the ravages of climate change, there are examples of remarkably healthy corals in parts of Cuba, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil.

While the past 60 years have seen the worst decline in ocean health in human history, Cuba’s coral reefs in particular remain remarkably healthy. I have spent more than two decades working in Cuba and will never forget the joy and disbelief of coming face-to-face with stunning, healthy coral reefs. I bore witness to an extraordinary part of a 30-mile-long barrier reef along the southern waters of Cuba, largely comprised of elkhorn coral, one of the most important reef-building corals in the Caribbean. The stands of beautiful, mustard-colored elkhorn coral I saw were impossibly packed with grunt, snapper, goatfish, and many other spectacular reef species. In contrast, elkhorn coral is now nearly gone from the Florida Keys, and is listed as a “Threatened” species throughout its range under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. It is also listed as a “Critically Endangered” species on the IUCN Red List, just one category away from being classified as “Extinct in the Wild.”

This begs the question: “Why are Cuba’s ocean waters so healthy?” The answer is deeply entwined with the country’s extraordinary and unique history, from its dramatic political past to its world-class environmental protections influenced by an unlikely partner, Jacques Cousteau, who had a profound influence on Fidel Castro after they met in 1985. Following their meeting, Cuba implemented a set of exceptionally strong environmental laws. The collapse of the Soviet Union largely resulted in a large loss of financial and agricultural support in Cuba. Subsequently, Cuban agriculture became, and continues to be, largely organic. Without industrial fertilizers, there is little nutrient pollution to fuel the harmful growth of algae on coral reefs. Additionally, the country has not overfished its coral reefs, related to the establishment of enormous marine-protected areas that restrict fishing.  

All these local actions have helped Cuba’s corals become more resilient (though not immune) to warming ocean temperatures. A recent study finds that coral reefs in Cuban waters represent 10 percent of the planet’s reefs most likely to survive by the end of the century. This, in part, has motivated strong collaboration between Cuban and U.S. scientists, considered to be one of the best examples of collaboration between the two countries despite political differences. As I observe in my new book, The Remarkable Reefs of Cuba, “… marine scientists…quietly and steadfastly built strong relationships between our countries where official diplomats and politicians had for decades fallen short.”

Examples of our collaborative activities include research expeditions, ecosystem mapping, research on sharks, sea turtles, manatees, coral reefs, environmental economics, and tourism impacts. We have also developed joint education programs and exchanges. Dozens of scientific publications have resulted from this work.

Cuba is a striking example of how, if we properly manage the local factors that impact coral reefs, we can build coral reef resilience worldwide, and along with it, hope for a brighter future for the ocean in the face of a formidable global threat.

Dr. David E. Guggenheim is founder and president of Ocean Doctor, a non-profit dedicated to ocean conservation. He is also an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He has spent more than two decades leading collaborative research programs with Cuba and is author of the new book, “The Remarkable Reefs of Cuba: Hopeful Stories from the Ocean Doctor.” He holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Science and Public Policy from George Mason University; a Master’s Degree in Aquatic/Population Biology from the University of California, Santa Barbara; and a Bachelor’s Degree in Environmental Studies from University of Pennsylvania.

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After the Cold War, Cuba and China developed a strong and comprehensive alliance. Today, their collaboration is two-fold. Firstly, the economically-dependent Cuba helps China advance its myriad of interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. Secondly, the alliance meets China’s strategic needs in two broad areas: military-intelligence and biotechnology/neurosciences.

Cuba is a poor investment and trade partner, has failed to repay China billions of dollars in loans, and requires major support and humanitarian aid. However, the country has enabled China’s enormously successful economic, political, and geostrategic offensive into the region.

China has become South America’s first trading partner and the region’s second-largest after the United States. With trade growing from USD 12 billion in 2000 to USD 445 billion in 2021, China has secured new markets and privileged access to raw materials. The roughly USD 150 billion in loans from China have given it control over critical infrastructure projects, including 56 ports and telecommunications in 29 countries. Military personnel from the region now receive training on cybersecurity and military doctrine in China. This has all accelerated risks for malign commercial activities, political and economic coercion, and asymmetric attacks on infrastructure. Furthermore, it has boosted China’s civilian-military fusion strategy, which seeks to make its military the most advanced in the world and able to defeat the U.S.

Last June, the Wall Street Journal reported that Cuba and China were jointly operating four electronic eavesdropping facilities in Cuba and negotiating to establish a military training facility there. Since the 1990s, China has reportedly sold military equipment and provided training to Cuba while jointly engaging in military and intelligence projects. The Chinese presence in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) stations in Cuba goes back to the 1990s—one defector reports it as far back as the 1980s. The terms of China’s involvement are unclear but it has been reported that China provides Cuba with equipment, supplies, and technical training in exchange for a presence on the island and the sharing of collected intelligence. The radioelectronic activities have been camouflaged in Radio China transmissions from Cuba and by China’s building of Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure.

Numerous defectors have long reported that Cuba’s Communist regime has always collected extensive intelligence on the U.S. and other countries, which it shares with allies for profit and to strengthen relations. According to a Cuban regime official interviewed confidentially, the country’s Radio-Electronic Brigade, a Division of the Military Intelligence (DIM), currently runs its SIGINT operations from an underground facility south of Havana. The brigade’s longstanding priority has been to intercept all U.S. military communications within reach into the mainland, Central America, the Caribbean, and northern South America. It has also systematically monitored the Cuban population and foreign targets in Cuba, and has used encrypted communications with its embassies, intelligence centers, and vast network of spies around the world.

With China’s help, Cuba has also used information technology to monitor Venezuela strategically and spread digital authoritarianism regionally. In particular, Cuba’s armies of trolls have helped to advance its interests in the cyber space. Its information warfare has even confused air traffic controllers in New York and jammed pro-democracy broadcasts to Iran. According to the U.S. government, China’s electronic espionage from Cuba was enhanced in 2019. Coincidentally, in the midst of an economic crisis, Cuba continued to order Chinese broadcasting equipment at remarkably high volumes. Between 2016 and 2021, this figure increased considerably to USD 276.6 million, surpassing food and medical imports from China as overall imports declined.

Another fundamental pillar of the Cuba-China relationship is the strategic alliance in biotechnology, in line with a Chinese government mandate for China’s biotech sector to expand and surpass that of the U.S. and the West. It has relied on Cuba’s know-how and technology transfers in at least 30 collaborative biotech projects. This is concerning because Cuba has had biowarfare capabilities since the 1980s. Into the early 2000s, several defectors also reported on a suspected biowarfare program.

Cuba and China also conduct joint research in neurotechnology and bioengineering and are developing five neuro-technological products. Cuba’s mind-control and neuroscience programs stem from the 1960s and have been used to torture political opponents and U.S. prisoners of war in Vietnam. Since the 1980s, it has developed novel neurological drugs and treatments by way of experimental practices of questionable safety, marred in ethical deficits and claims of atrocities.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government has been warning that China seeks to acquire technology to take over the biotechnology and neurosciences sectors. In December 2021, the U.S. imposed a ban on exports and transfers to China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences, along with eleven entities believed to be involved in creating brain-control weaponry to dominate Chinese citizens and repress minorities. Several reports by the People’s Liberation Army have detailed the brain warfare research underway in mind control technologies meant to subdue the enemy, as well as “neuro-defense” equipment and brain-implanted microchips meant to fend off similar attacks.

It is difficult to acquire evidence proving these illicit activities. Secrecy is intrinsic to military and intelligence operations, and biotech and neuroscience institutions are tightly guarded operations within the two authoritarian states of China and Cuba. Thus, a comprehensive examination of all potential threats is in order. The international community should demand expert inspection of Cuba’s biotechnology facilities, including their activities and exports, to verify compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as an independent review of neuroscience collaborations with dual-use capabilities.

The United States has laws and mandates in place that would, if fully enforced, better contain Cuba, hinder resources for the dictatorship, and aid the Cuban people in attaining their freedom. A thorough review should be undertaken to assure their full enforcement, starting with the State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, and the Trafficking in Persons Victims Act. If the Cuban economy and the regime’s hold on power continue to weaken, China would have to reevaluate its investments in the Caribbean Island. The region would then greatly benefit from a free and democratic Cuba.

Maria C. Werlau is co-founder and Director of the Free Society Project/Cuba Archive, a non-profit think tank defending human rights through information. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, and a Master’s degree in International Studies from Universidad de Chile. This article is based on a scholarly paper that will be published in an academic journal by year-end 2023.

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DeLisle Worrell, Development Stabilization in Small Open Economies: Theories and Evidence from Caribbean Experience. Routledge. 2023.

Price: USD $54.95 | 442 pages

DeLisle Worrell’s Development and Stabilization in Small Economies: Theories and Evidence from Caribbean Experience is a work of love by one of the masters of Caribbean economics. Armed with a Ph.D. in Economics from McGill University, Worrell has had a long and distinguished career, including working at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), fellowships at Princeton and Yale Universities and the Peterson Institute, and a long connection to the Central Bank of Barbados—where he served as Governor from 2009 to 2017. When he is not publishing, he is a member of the Bermuda Financial Policy Council, the Bretton Woods Committee, and the College of Central Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. His current work covers considerable ground on development economics of small open economies.

The main thrust of Development Stabilization in Small Open Economies “is about the implications of small size for the design, targets and implementation of macroeconomic policy, a topic which has not received the attention it deserves during the last four decades.” One of the key factors in impacting these calculations is foreign currency valuations. Worrell contends that part of the problem on the policymaking side—which extends to assessing financial assistance at multilateral lending institutions—is that models used by IMF staff and others to assess Caribbean policies “base their specifications on their experiences, which are of European and North American countries.” This includes factors such as the “dominant currency paradigm,” which encompasses the relationship between nominal exchange rate fluctuations and other nominal and real variables which depend on the currency in which prices can be rigid.

Another issue related to the currency issue faced by small open economies is that their international commerce operates, “in terminology which has become familiar in the context of small renewable energy production, on a buy all/sell all” basis.” This means that small open economies, like those in the Caribbean, face an economic landscape in which their small size and limited range of skills, resources, and productive capacity leave them with a handful of goods and services with which they can compete in international markets. As Worrell explains, “The stability of the small economy is secured by a balance between what they earn in foreign sales and prudent foreign borrowing, and what they spend on purchases from abroad. The growth of the economy depends on selling more abroad, through increased productivity and increased capacity to produce competitive products and services.”

In this context, small open economies are economically fueled by foreign currency. For example, many Caribbean economies have competitive tourist sectors and exports—such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Guyana—which earn foreign currency. This in turn helps attract foreign investment. The inward flow of external capital is converted into local currencies, which then go to public utilities, transportation, communications, banking and insurance services, and wholesale and retail activity. In turn, spending on these areas generates imports of fuels, vehicles, equipment, building materials, and consumer items. Any surpluses go into foreign reserves. In this sense, Worrell’s punchline is that, “The economy will grow only when the earnings of foreign currency increase; or when there is major foreign investment.”

Worrell adds that “Government spending on public utilities, health infrastructure or housing may be a national priority, but unless such spending is funded by borrowing from abroad it will be counterproductive, because the imports that would result from the additional activity will deplete the foreign reserves. From the point of view of both growth and stability, the conclusion that foreign currency is what animates the small open economy is inescapable.” This is something that needs to be taken into greater account in looking at small open economies from a model and policy standpoint.

Development and Stabilization in Small Open Economies is divided into four overarching sections. Section A describes the evidence on which the theory and model of Section B are founded. That evidence is not solely from the Caribbean, but is derived from 41 small open economies and considers indicators of human well-being and the changes that have occurred over the past three decades. Chapter 3 (part of Section A) includes case studies of Barbados, the economies of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Cuba, Iceland, and Mauritius. The parts on Barbados, Cuba, and Mauritius are particularly insightful.

Section C expands on the practice of economic policy-making, including the skills and knowledge needed and the proper use of the tools of the discipline. Section D rounds off the book, with chapters on institutions, the global context and changes, and a technical overview of the Human Development Index.

Chapter 19, Practical Guidance for Policy Makers in Small Open Economies, is among the most useful chapters. Here, Worrell ties together the many strands he touches upon throughout the book and underscores what he believes is the need for economists and policymakers to make better use of the Human Development Index (HDI) as the measure of economic success. In many ways, this points to the simple equation that a happy and healthy population is more productive. It also points to a policy framework that improves on the collection, analysis, and timely public distribution of HDI data, “so that the public could be kept abreast of improvements that might be expected as the economic strategy unfolds.”

Another key point is that for any economic program or strategy to succeed, it must be sold to the public. As Worrell notes, “The strategy needs to be sold to the local economy on its merits, with quantitative targets and deadlines with which everyone can mark its progress; and it has to be presented to the world in an informed, analytically sound and persuasive manner.”

In 2010, Worrell gave an address to the Barbados Economic Society in which he stated, “Back in the sixties, when I began my career in economics, we were all too aware of the limitations of the discipline: it was static where the world was dynamic, it assumed competitive markets where few existed, it assumed rationality when we knew full well that economic agents were not rational (at least not by the definition economists use), the choice of first principles was always arbitrary and culture bound, economics had no way of dealing with changing tastes and technology, and much else besides.”

Some time has passed since that speech and Worrell’s book does much to address many of those issues. Worrell’s Development Stabilization in Small Open Economies is highly recommended not only for Caribbeanists, but also those interested in challenges faced by small open economies, students, and policymakers—including those in multinational organizations.

Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Research Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium. His latest book, The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean, was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan.

The post A Global Americans Review of Development and Stabilization in Small Open Economies appeared first on Global Americans.

The following piece is an adaptation of a special edition of the Americas Migration newsletter, available at www.migrationbrief.com.

While migration to the United States has traditionally been dominated by Mexicans and then Northern Central Americans, the last few years have seen new trends in increasing migration from South America, the Caribbean, and extracontinental migrants from Africa and Asia. This has both highlighted the regional—and global—nature of migration and increased the number of countries—and borders—between home countries and the United States. 

Despite the changes in migration dynamics over the years, the U.S. Congress has yet to pass any level of immigration reform for decades. Amid a stagnant legislative framework, the Executive Branch has had to be creative to develop policy and respond to migration. Recent years have seen a newfound regional approach to thinking about migration from Washington, with the Trump administration collaborating with partners across the Americas in an effort to restrict migration and asylum. In contrast, the Biden administration has sought to employ a dual approach focused on both deterrence and the expansion of legal pathways to the country for both labor and protection.

Excluding perhaps the Obama administration’s Alliance for Prosperity Plan for Northern Central America, the Trump administration implemented some of the first real regional migration policies from the U.S. government. Coordination with Mexico on border enforcement deployment and asylum-restricting policies such as metering and the Migrant Protection Protocols (often called the “Remain in Mexico” program) represented a greater collaboration with the next-door neighbors across the southern border. Moving further afield, the move to establish Safe Third Country Agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras was historic in terms of expanding to a more regional approach on migration, albeit squarely focused on deterrence and preventing would-be asylum seekers from reaching the U.S. border.

The Biden administration, by contrast, has broadened the scope of a regional migration policy from Washington and has even looked to set up regional processing centers across the region to facilitate access to migration pathways while reducing pressure at the U.S. border. New pathways for migration that help prevent dangerous and unregulated irregular migration include a humanitarian parole program for up to 30,000 total Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans per month; expanded temporary labor migration visas for Central Americans and Haitians; and expanded family reunification pathways for select nationalities. Finally, the refugee cap has increased significantly from the record lows set during the Trump administration.

This new way of approaching migration and thinking regionally has had many benefits, including increased coordination and information sharing between stakeholders, expanded regular migration for both those with protection needs and those seeking better job opportunities alike, stronger initiatives to promote integration in receiving countries across the hemisphere, and improved efforts to clamp down on human and sex trafficking. 

Even still, deterrence has remained the underlying status quo. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, signed in June 2022 under the leadership of the Biden administration, was a historic recognition of the regional and multifaceted nature of migration across the Americas. Since the declaration’s signing, however, the clearest follow-through at a regional level has been the expansion of hardening border enforcement measures and efforts to halt migrants in transit in their tracks, as highlighted in late May by reports of senior Biden administration officials looking to send U.S. troops to the infamous Darien Gap jungle that separates Colombia and Panama.

Nowhere is the deterrence-oriented approach to regional collaboration more evident than with the implementation of visa restrictions.

Thinking regionally has brought increased coordination on these border enforcement efforts. The four countries that have received the most attention of late for their migration to the United States are Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Using the tools available without congressional reform, the Biden administration has implemented an innovative humanitarian parole policy for these four countries and sought to expand their family reunification pathways; it has also pushed for countries along the route north to introduce visa restrictions in an effort to deter asylum seeking at the U.S.-Mexico border. Less than a decade ago, Venezuelans could enter Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama without a visa en route to the United States. Today, Venezuelans must go through laborious and expensive processes to enter those same countries. 

One example that slips under the radar but is emblematic of the policy approach is that of Belize, where new visa restrictions have been implemented for Haitians and debated for Jamaicans due to their use of the country as a landing point before continuing on by foot to head north. Per the Caribbean Community’s CSME and the Treaty of Chaguaramas, both Haitians and Jamaicans should generally have visa-free entry for up to six months in Belize.

These maps are available in closer detail and for download here.

Visa restrictions also act as a deterrent for extracontinental migrants. Migrants from Africa and Asia are increasingly looking to seek asylum at the U.S. border, but most are pushed to fly to South America—often Ecuador or Brazil—before taking off on foot heading north. The trend has grown since the COVID-19 pandemic but began as far back as 2013. 

Despite a proliferation of targeted visa restrictions, the reality is that migration has continued. As the option of flights and other regular travel further north has been taken off the board, this has only pushed migrants to take more dangerous paths to the U.S. border, most infamously through the Darien Gap. Over one hundred and twenty thousand migrants crossed the Darien Gap between January and April 2023—six times more than over the same period last year. And even though the Biden administration announced new deterrence measures following the expiration of Title 42 that have been labeled an “asylum transit ban,” migrants have continued to make the trek north. 

Relying solely on deterrence policies has consistently proven to be ineffective in preventing migration, whereas the opening of legal pathways has facilitated safe, orderly, and regular migration to the U.S. While the Trump administration focused solely on the former, the Biden administration’s dual approach has proven more constructive, albeit still prioritizing a deterring approach to regional collaboration. Washington is now thinking more regionally about migration, but the question becomes where its priorities lie and where they will head as we approach the 2024 presidential election and beyond.

Jordi Amaral is the author of the Americas Migration Brief newsletter and a freelance researcher and writer specializing in Latin America and the Caribbean, migration, and politics. He has worked with Hxagon, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), among others.

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Climate change and the global energy transition place Latin America and the Caribbean at a crossroads: it can either take a leap forward to become a more prosperous and relevant region, or it can fail and see our human and economic development stagnate. To address this dilemma and seize opportunities while avoiding impending risks, the region must follow the path of the three “Ds”—Decarbonize, Diversify, and Depolarize.

Decarbonize

Scientific evidence tells us that decarbonization must happen if we want to have a planet for the next generation. When Costa Rica launched its decarbonization plan in 2019, it was the first of its kind to propose the transformation of the entire economic and social operation of the country by 2050. While this was a brave and visionary effort, it was also an isolated one.

Today the scenario is very different. This path is rapidly advancing in key public and private sectors worldwide, with strong steps being taken to reduce demand for fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas. The United States, for example, recently passed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which invests USD $370 billion in U.S. industries specifically working in the energy transition and the fight against climate change. Similar actions are being taken in major economies such as the European Union, India, and China. Germany’s Mercedes-Benz will stop selling vehicles with internal combustion engines by 2030. Similarly, both the state of California and the European Union will require all cars and light trucks sold to be zero-emission vehicles by 2035.

While these big economies are making important strides, Latin America and the Caribbean remain highly dependent on fossil fuels. A study by the World Resources Institute showed that fossil fuels account for 55% of exports in Colombia, 39% in Ecuador, 32% in Bolivia, and 14% in Brazil. Fiscal revenues from fossil fuels are also very high in the cases of Trinidad and Tobago (35%), Suriname (28%), Ecuador (19%), and Mexico (18%). If this scenario is not changed in the coming years, opportunities will be missed and risks will materialize.

In the United States, the IRA and other policies are likely to be environmentally and economically successful, but this national success could occur in the midst of a regional failure to enact similar policies. If so, the entire Hemisphere could be at a competitive disadvantage relative to the European and Asian trading blocs that are moving more coherently toward such goals. Faced with this scenario, the worst thing that can happen to Latin America and the Caribbean is to ignore or resist the reality of the need to invest in decarbonization. We must embrace the process and ride the wave it represents, so as not to be swept away by it. We must break our addiction to fossil fuels.

Diversify 

The second strategic pillar must therefore be production diversification. Today, the Latin American and Caribbean region participates in the global economy mainly through extractive activities such as fuels or materials, the agri-food production, and some services. Electrification resulting from decarbonization will increase demand for metals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, as well as the so-called rare earths—some of which are found in the region.

However, to take advantage of new opportunities, individual countries and the region as a whole should strive to design, explore, and conquer more sophisticated niches in the international economy. These could serve as launching pads to build prosperity with social inclusion, political stability, and sustainability at the center of development in the region.

Defining where to direct our education, training, financing, research, and industrial policies to take advantage of these new employment opportunities must be a shared task. We need a concerted effort of foresight, analysis, and creativity from the best minds in the region—from universities, multilateral banks, the private sector, and civil society at all levels and with the highest degree of inclusion. Without a concerted effort, we will repeat the mistakes of the past and fall again into the traps that resource extraction can bring. Innovative initiatives such as BOGA (Beyond Oil and Gas), launched by Denmark and Costa Rica, are bringing urgent attention to this crucial discussion.

Depolarize 

Of course, efforts to decarbonize and diversify the economy do not happen overnight. Rather, they are deliberate commitments by societies that must be sustained over time and across administrations. This is an extremely complex task given the high levels of political and social polarization in the region.

Populism, post-truth, and polarization, to use Moisés Naim’s term, are hindering progress. Each administration—whether from the left or the right side of the political spectrum—have their own nuances and incorporate their own priorities. However, the region must make a conscious effort to overcome extremely polarized debates to understand that there is more at stake and that there are constructive ways to improve the lives of our peoples.

By suppressing pluralism, autocracies can maintain a constant direction over time. However, this apparent advantage comes at an enormous and unacceptable cost in terms of human rights, freedom, and sustainability. Aware of this, intelligent political leaders with strong democratic convictions must undertake extraordinary efforts to reach agreements on the basic tenets of effective public policies. While maintaining their differences and criticisms, ruling parties and the political opposition, must be able and willing to find common ground.            

Embracing decarbonization to give the next generation a livable future, diversifying our economies to reap the benefits of this global transformation, and depolarizing politics to have the democratic tools to make good change possible are the necessary paths forward for the Latin American and Caribbean region and the Western Hemisphere as a whole.

Carlos Alvarado-Quesada is a former President of Costa Rica (2018-2022) and currently a Professor of Practice of Diplomacy at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and President of the Climate, Democracy and Inclusion Institute.

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In July 2022, UN Secretary General António Guterres warned the world about the growing set of challenges climate change poses to the Caribbean—describing the region as “ground zero” for the climate emergency. Despite having a minuscule carbon footprint compared to large industrialized nations, Caribbean countries—like most small island developing states (SIDS)—are disproportionately impacted by climate change. These climate change impacts include the increasing intensity of extreme weather events like tropical cyclones, droughts, floods, and landslides. These extreme events represent major humanitarian and economic challenges for the Caribbean. To respond to these challenges, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) has led regional efforts to prepare for growing climactic dangers and has built an impressive network of regional institutions. However, many Caribbean countries still remain far behind the curve. Thus, national governments, regional institutions, and the region’s partners must build upon existing advancements to ensure the wide adoption of resilience measures and protection of all communities.

Tropical cyclones or hurricanes historically represent the most dramatic and devastating extreme weather phenomenon in the region. Hurricanes have caused 18,000 deaths and over $163 billion in damages since 1950. Worryingly, scientists like Global Americans Working Group Member Kevin Reed, have highlighted how climate change makes hurricanes more powerful and destructive than in previous decades. In 2017, the losses and damages associated with Category 5 Hurricane Maria cost the island nation of Dominica approximately 226 percent of the country’s 2016 GDP. Unfortunately, as the impacts of climate change worsen, what happened to Dominica is likely to happen again. Emerging data suggest that the percentage of storms that reach Categories 4 or 5 will continue to increase. Such predictions have led the Inter-American Development Bank to estimate that by 2050 annual losses related to extreme weather events will cost the region $22 billion—a figure representing 10 percent of the current regional economy.  

To ensure their continued economic and social survival, Caribbean countries have no option but to take effective action to build resilience. In recent years, several governments have intensified their efforts to anticipate, absorb, and recover from the effects of extreme weather events. To date, most Caribbean countries have designed national strategies to bolster resilience. International and regional organizations and partners have also increased their cooperation with these nations to improve emergency preparedness and response. However—as in much of the developing world—these efforts remain insufficient and highly unequal. Luckily, the region has built an important network of institutions to implement international mechanisms and set a common regional policy that serves countries and territories to respond to the extreme impacts of climate change. 

To anticipate, accommodate, and recover from natural disasters, CARICOM and its member states have established institutions such as the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH), the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC), and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). In addition, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Central America and Dominican Republic Center for Coordination and Disaster Prevention (CEPREDENAC, per its Spanish acronym) are advancing climate resilience throughout the Caribbean basin. For their part, international organizations—such as the United Nations—as well as international partners—like the United States and the European Union—are also playing an important role in helping these organizations by providing resources to fund projects aimed at enhancing climate resilience across the region. Despite these initiatives and the significant progress made at the regional level, there are still multiple challenges to be addressed. According to the 2023 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration—signed at the VIII Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americans and the Caribbean (RP23)—current investment in disaster risk reduction is insufficient to address existing needs. The Declaration also warned of significant challenges associated with the implantation, monitoring, and reporting of the targets set by the Sendai Framework. 

Despite these efforts and various multilateral agreements urging developed countries to cut global greenhouse emissions and provide financial and logistical assistance to SIDS, the extent of the region’s challenges remain unclear at best and existential at worst. In addition, the lack of a supranational institution responsible for implementing climate regulation has left nation-states as the main actors responsible for taking climate action. 

Given the Caribbean region’s diverse set of political, economic, and social realities, it is important to look at a variety of countries and contexts to identify best practices for resilience building. Understanding the challenges the governments of Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Dominica, and Barbados face in building climate resilience allows for tailored policy recommendations as well as identifiable regional trends. These countries and territories not only represent some of the most climate-affected in the world but also have different levels of economic development, corruption, government effectiveness, as well as political leadership. These are important factors that better position nations to build resilience than those that lack these governance-related characteristics.

On the national level, governments should also look to promote resilience building and disaster risk reduction measures as central components in infrastructure-project planning, implementation, operation, and maintenance. In doing so, they must use a multidisciplinary approach to disaster risk governance and management that includes hard and soft sciences. Both perspectives are indispensable to a comprehensive understanding of the needs and concerns of diverse, impacted communities. At the regional level, Caricom must enhance capacity building through the existing network of regional institutions such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), and the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH).

On the extra-regional level, multilateral institutions and the region’s partners must coordinate their efforts to build resilience subject to the needs as defined by the recipient countries. Resilience-boosting efforts, whether from organizations like the UN or partners like the U.S., must aim to strengthen the capacities of the local and national institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction and promote the transfer of information, knowledge, and technology on voluntary and mutually-agreed upon terms. Crucially, multilateral development banks need to expand concessional loads to upper-middle and high-income SIDS regardless of country-specific income classifications. In all collaborative cases, partners should implement frameworks with the understanding that the nature of the Caribbean’s climate challenge necessitates funding and timelines that recognize the dire threats therein.     

With or without climate change, extreme weather events will exist and regrettably affect people in the Caribbean and worldwide. However, as global average temperatures warm, the Caribbean stands out as particularly vulnerable to the catastrophic, compounding effects of climate change in the form of extreme weather events. Contending with tropical cyclones, droughts, heat waves, and heavy rains require practical solutions which will invariably touch upon politically sensitive issues—ranging from questioning the rationale of the current international financial architecture, acknowledging the responsibility of high-emitting countries for warming temperatures, and tackling regional structural problems such as corruption and government mismanagement. Given this reality, there is a pressing need to strengthen international and regional mechanisms, as well as improve national and regional governance to bolster climate resilience.

For more information and recommendations, as well as an analysis of the impact of climate change on extreme weather events in the Caribbean, read Global Americans’ full report, “Extreme Weather Events and Resilience in the Caribbean.”

Jackson Mihm is an Associate Editor at Global Americans and the Project Lead for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

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In an article published by Amigoe di Curaçao on July 3, 1973, the director of the Netherlands Antilles Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), J. Hans van Leusden sounded the alarm. According to his calculations, Curaçao’s population would balloon from 149,000 in 1973 to 267,000 in 2000. He predicted that if nothing were done, the island’s population would grow exponentially for 100 years before finally tapering off in 2073. According to van Leusden, interventions by the Planned Family Foundation of Curaçao represented the island’s only hope to ease population pressures.

Yet, according to the most recent statistics, the population of Curaçao as of January 1, 2023, stood at 148,925 people—almost exactly what the population was in 1973 when the CBS director offered his dire warning. While the population figures are similar, significant structural differences exist today compared to half a century ago, which undoubtedly have consequences for our society. Unfortunately, the media, decisionmakers, and politicians have not sufficiently examined the statistics nor determined what they mean.

Curaçao’s population has been on a downward trend for the last six years, decreasing by 7 percent, meaning there are approximately 11,087 fewer Curaçaoans than in 2017. The population pyramid of Curaçao is perhaps the most telling demographic statistic—shedding light on fertility, mortality, and distribution of various age groups for men and women. CBS does not produce all of these statistics, but fortunately, the U.S. Census Bureau does.

The population pyramid shows Curaçao’s low fertility, high life expectancies, and an increasingly aging and dwindling population—taken together, these figures tell a story. The total fertility rate has plummeted from 2.9 in 1973 to only 1.72 in 2022. In developed countries, for populations to remain constant, the total fertility rate must average 2.1, also referred to as the replacement fertility rate. A fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 is referred to as “sub-replacement fertility,” which means that with other conditions remaining the same, the population will shrink and age. That said, projections for population growth rely on fertility rates as well as mortality and migration rates.  

Table 1: Curaçao’s Population Pyramid

The largest population in Curaçao is currently in the age bracket 50-65, while the young population, 0-14, is drastically decreasing. The base of Curaçao’s population pyramid is becoming smaller, which in turn, puts more pressure on those younger people to support social systems as their parent’s age. Life expectancy in Curaçao is on the rise for women and men—on average, newborns could expect today to reach age 79.41, whilst this was only 69.91 in 1973. Though Curaçaoans should celebrate these gains, in the longer term, the decline in fertility could lead to a decrease in major revenue streams, putting public services in a precarious spot.

Many of these population pressures circle back to migration, which in turn, circle back to the island’s economic situation. According to CBS, in 2022, about 20 percent more people have emigrated from Curaçao than in 2011. Immigration into the country during the same period has decreased by 30 percent, creating a net-negative flow of migrants. The closure of the island’s oil refinery in 2018 and the decline in tourism due to the pandemic all play a part in the struggling economic situation. Making matters worse, Curaçao is suffering from a significant brain drain, with many of the island’s most promising students electing to study in the Netherlands or United States.

What does all this mean? The above-mentioned demographic shifts will strain Curaçao’s public finances as age-related spending—such as healthcare and pensions—rises while the tax base shrinks. It also means less consumption of goods, closure of businesses, an increase of empty houses, schools, and buildings, decreased demand for credit, and raised risks for the financial health of commercial banks and the typical household. Labor productivity, competitiveness, and innovation, among others, will suffer. The repercussions will be wide-ranging. The island is currently standing on the verge of whether it can continue to function as a society.

Yet, these demographic shifts could also open doors to reform if and when the political decisionmakers demonstrate the requisite will. Curaçao should have a comprehensive demographic policy which, if memory serves me well, we have never had before. In 2007, I made the case for providing incentives to grow the population to 300,000. Still, the idea never took off because of our aversion to long-term planning and a predisposition to immediately bog down in details instead of first looking at the big picture.

Curaçao has to make it more attractive for people to have children by reducing the opportunity costs of getting married and raising kids. More flexibility is needed in the workforce, allowing couples to split the maternity and paternity leave between them and more employees to work flexibly, even at home. A balanced immigration policy to attract our diaspora back to the island and supplement their ranks with foreign migrant workers, according to local needs. Future immigration policy must be tightly coupled with infrastructure development, urban planning, proactive management of migrant integration, and social cohesion. 

Economic growth is virtually impossible with a shrinking population. Yet, population policy is not just about economics—it also affects society and politics. What we put off today as “too distant in the future” will return to our doorsteps sooner than expected. It is time more people sound the alarm, but this time to encourage population growth.

Alex Rosaria is from Curaçao. He has a BBA in Accounting and an MBA in International Trade Relations from the Tippie College of Business of the University of Iowa. He was a Member of Parliament, Minister of Economic Affairs, State Secretary of Finance, and United Nations Development Programme Officer in Chad and Nicaragua. He is a freelancer in Asia and the Pacific, a member of the Global Americans Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean, and a fellow of the Caribbean Policy Consortium.

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Originally published in Spanish in Diario Libre.

For almost thirty years, the international community has been involved in Haiti, albeit the results have been far from satisfactory. This began in October 1994, when a military intervention led by the United States, with a mandate from the UN Security Council, restored President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide had been overthrown by a military coup on September 30, 1991, just seven months after entering office as the first democratically elected president in Haitian political history. The coup itself occurred just four months after the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted Resolution 1080, which established the basis for the collective defense of democracy when there was an abrupt interruption in the democratic process of any country in the region.

Against this backdrop, Haitian political life experienced a precarious normalization with the election of René Préval the following year and the peaceful transfer of power on February 7, 1996. At the end of Préval’s term, Aristide was reelected and returned to power in February 2001, although the opposition parties boycotted the election. This time his presidency lasted three years instead of four, as political and military forces overthrew him again on February 29, 2004.

On April 30, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1542 (2004), which established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, by its French acronym), replacing the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the Security Council immediately after Aristide’s overthrow. MINUSTAH, initially created for a period of nine months, had both a civilian and military component. This reflected the UN’s intention to assist the Haitian government in the normalization of government institutions and the consolidation of a police force to increase order and security. The Armed Forces had been dismantled following Aristide’s return to power in 1994, creating significant security problems that persist to this day.

MINUSTAH’s mandate was renewed several times and the mission remained in Haiti until October 17, 2017. It was then replaced by the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH, by its French acronym), created by the Security Council through Resolution 2350 (2017) on April 13, 2017. This mission’s general mandate was to support the Haitian government in developing the rule of law in the country by supporting the National Police, the judiciary, prisons, and the protection of human rights.

During this time, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake in January 2010 as well as other natural disasters, further deteriorating the precarious living conditions of the Haitian people. These events shifted international aid toward humanitarian assistance rather than addressing the long-standing structural problems affecting the nation.

MINUJUSTH concluded its operations on October 15, 2019, and was replaced the following day by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH, by its French acronym), created by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2476 (2019) on June 25, 2019. BINUH’s mandate focuses on promoting political stability, good governance, preserving and fostering a peaceful and stable environment, promoting human rights, and supporting national dialogue among different sectors of Haitian society. This mission, originally conceived to last twelve months, has been successively extended until July 15, 2023, through Resolution 2645 (2022) on July 15, 2022.

Despite the United Nations’ successive missions in Haiti, the Haitian crisis deepens. The country’s political system has become disoriented and more unstable, and the conflict has become practically unmanageable. On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated, further exacerbating the political and institutional crisis in the country. This also led to the proliferation of criminal gangs that are gaining increasingly broad control of the territory and making further weakening the state.

It would be presumptuous to give advice on what to do in a crisis of this magnitude after so many failed attempts to resolve it. However, it seems evident that these UN missions and other initiatives to support Haiti have lacked a vision of state-building as a basic premise to articulate society, the economic system, and the governmental structure. In his report to French President Jacques Chirac in 2004, Regis Debray pointed out that Haiti was the country with the most NGOs per square kilometer in the world. This indicates that a tremendous amount of international aid resources has been diluted in projects contributing little or nothing to the (re)construction of state institutions in key areas such as security, fiscal and customs administration, economic planning, environmental management, public works, education, public health, and the justice system. In other words, what Haiti needs is more state, not less.

Thinking afresh about these issues could be useful in the difficult task of assisting the Haitian people in their search for order, stability, and governance. This was the objective expressed in the resolution that created BINUH. Promoting dialogue among all social sectors can be very promising if carried out with a strategic, incremental, and sustained vision over time, particularly with the support of national or international actors who have the capacity to convene. This dialogue could be the starting point for gradually piecing together the Haitian state and its system of government. Of course, the ultimate responsibility for the country’s destiny lies with the Haitian people themselves. Without an active and conscious commitment from Haiti’s political, business, ecclesiastical, and social leaders, there will be no possibility of steering Haiti toward stability, governance, and development, regardless of international support.

Flavio Darío Espinal is a former Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to the United States of America and the Organization of American States (OAS), in which he also held the positions of Chair of the Permanent Council, Chair of the Committee on Legal and Political Issues, and Chair of the Committee on Hemispherical Security. He is also currently serving on Global Americans’ International advisory council, works as a managing partner of FDE Legal, and writes a regular column in Diario Libre.

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