In Chile, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the coup that toppled President Salvador Allende has reignited the national conversation about the legacies of both Allende and his successor, General Augusto Pinochet. This event has also sparked renewed calls for greater transparency regarding the United States’ role in the lead-up to and during the coup. Peter Kornbluth, a Senior Analyst at the National Security Archive, has released a Chilean edition of his 2003 book, “The Pinochet File,” in which he outlines both old and new information. This includes details such as the White House meeting between Henry Kissinger and Augustin Edwards, the owner of El Mercurio, Chile’s main newspaper at the time. The meeting took place 11 days after Salvador Allende’s election victory.

Fast forward fifty years, and the United States’ role in Chile still casts a long shadow. The 1973 coup reshaped the nation’s trajectory to the extent that the country’s current constitutional debates essentially revolve around how much of Pinochet’s 1980 constitution (which has been amended hundreds of times since) should be retained.

However, the landscape has transformed significantly. The United States, once a central player in Chilean affairs, now navigates a changed world. This transformation is not solely due to the end of the Cold War a generation ago. The influence of the United States has been recalibrated by global and domestic shifts, as well as evolving foreign policy doctrines. The anniversary of the coup thus prompts a probing analysis of how America’s evolving stance towards Chile mirrors greater changes in its foreign policy approach on the global stage.

The focal point lies in examining the transition from the once audacious involvement of the United States in Chile’s domestic politics to its contemporary position in a world marked by a more diversified geopolitical landscape. The essence of this exploration resides not only in understanding why the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has purportedly retreated from past methods but also in grasping how the very nature of projecting influence has transformed. 

This narrative unfolds within a broader reality: while the U.S. may not have relinquished its power, perhaps it has moderated its willingness to employ it. Consider Ukraine, where the U.S. has actively opposed Russian aggression, typically through its NATO allies, and has been careful to strike a balance that avoids prompting a Russian escalation.

In the current post-Cold War and post-Iraq era, there is an acknowledgment that blunt force tactics undermine global credibility and moral standing such as supporting coups or invasions. The intention of the United States to refrain from interference in domestic affairs reflects domestic disinterest and a different global order, one in which meddling in the national politics of other countries is unpopular and less effective. As a result, the narrative of the CIA engaging in covert operations has shifted towards diplomatic engagement and economic collaboration.

Chile itself has undergone transformative changes that have shaped U.S. influence. The nation’s diversified economy, burgeoning trade partnerships, and diplomatic engagements have paved the way for a more self-confident country. The U.S. remains a crucial partner in areas like defense, education, and trade. Bilateral trade with Chile was around USD 3 billion in the years immediately following the authoritarian era. By 2021, this figure had surged to over USD 38 billion. In comparison, however, China’s trade figure was almost USD 58 billion, highlighting the shifting market dynamics of the 21st century.

In this sense, the United States’ adjusted ability to steer Chile’s course is a testament to the new global reality, which demands a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. This approach involves subtle yet consistent diplomacy and cooperation, which may prove more valuable than the tactics of the past.

This paradigm shift necessitates, among other things, a reevaluation of the role of public opinion. Today’s interconnected world, saturated with real-time information, requires greater transparency and accountability at a faster pace. An engaged populace means that any perceived impropriety would trigger a swift and vigorous backlash. The era of covert operations veiled in secrecy has given way to a public that demands a more selective and principled foreign (and often domestic) policy. Climate change and gender issues represent just a few of the challenges faced by the Global South, where the U.S. maintains a moral standing compared to most international rivals. The conflict in Ukraine, where Chile has been one of the few Latin American countries steadfastly defending a liberal international system, demonstrates that space remains for the U.S. to cultivate a values-based foreign policy in the region to counter the often clientelist approaches of its competitors.

Therefore, the highlights of today’s bilateral relationship are a far cry from the approach that prompted the U.S. to resort to covert actions half a century ago. For instance, a Chilean company, Cencosud, now holds a majority share in a significant U.S. supermarket chain, and Shake Shack, an American fast casual restaurant chain, offers vegan products developed by the Chilean firm NotCo. Beyond trade, a Chile-California agreement presents numerous avenues for cooperation in agriculture, energy, and education. The recently approved tax treaty in the U.S. Congress (after a 13-year wait) will facilitate investment by eliminating double taxation. Furthermore, after rigorous negotiations, Chile remains the sole Latin American country to enjoy visa waiver status with the U.S., promoting tourism and business travel.

Consequently, the evolving role of the United States in Chile underscores a broader narrative of shifting foreign policy dynamics. The shift from the past to engaging in mutually beneficial collaboration mirrors the global trend in diplomacy. The capacity for U.S. influence endures, although political realities have curtailed the audacious use of that influence. Chile, likewise, stands as a testament to the resilience of nations in shaping their destinies while struggling against external pressures. This reflection on the past fifty years serves as a poignant reminder that foreign policy, like the world it shapes, is constantly in flux, driven by often unpredictable prevailing winds. Successful navigation requires flexible adaptation while maintaining a clear sense of direction toward the desired destination.

Carl Meacham spent over a decade as Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-IN) senior professional staffer for Latin America on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). He is currently a Managing Director at FTI Consulting.

Robert Funk is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chile and a partner in Andes Risk Group, a consulting firm.

The post Chile: 50 Years On appeared first on Global Americans.

According to United Nations data, 26 percent of the world’s migrant population lives in the Americas, which means that migrants make up 7 percent of the region’s total population as of 2020. Of this total, 58.7 million are in North America, and 14.8 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to UNHCR’s 2022 Global Trends in Forced Displacement Report, by the end of 2022, at least 108.4 million people had been forcibly displaced globally. In the Americas, 9.2 million people moved across international borders. This figure represents an increase of 950 percent in the last ten years. Why do people move across the Americas?

The push factors are multiple and observe variations from country to country. However, in general terms, people migrate or are forcibly displaced due to increasing levels of violence and citizen insecurity, the forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime activities. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence are also important factors which particularly affect women and children. Added to this are persistent economic and structural causes, such as a weak rule of law, corruption, high poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities (especially for women, young people, and other vulnerable groups), food insecurity, and more recently the effects of climate change. This increase in human mobility across cities of the Americas poses opportunities for receiving countries but also challenges, and it is often local governments the ones responsible for providing the first response.

A recent study published by the Organization of American States and other partners entitled “The Role of Local Governments in the Reception and Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Cities of the Americas” confirms these trends. It proposes that there are opportunities for the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, and it shows that local actors can play a key role in the reception and integration of this population. Despite numerous challenges, the cases presented in the study demonstrate that with political will, innovative ideas, respect for human rights, and the support of international organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and the media, progress can be made at the local level to ensure a successful reception and integration of migrants and refugees in the region.

Based on the results of 231 interviews in 109 localities in 25 countries, the study proposes at least four lessons to capitalize on the work being done by the local governments facing these arrivals. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that local governments do not operate in a vacuum when working on the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, but there is an important influence of national governments on local actions—both in positive and negative ways. Migration policies are usually established at the national level, and local governments must respond with these in mind. It is, therefore, no surprise that for most local governments, coordination with national policies represents one of their main challenges. Another factor that also influences their work (and often supports it) is that of civil society and international organizations. They play a key role in most of the localities studied, and fill institutional gaps to meet the needs of migrants and refugees.

A second lesson from the study refers to the variation in local structures and capacities across cities in the Americas. Indeed, the study confirms that there is significant diversity in the structures and capacities of the 109 localities studied in the report. On one side of the spectrum, there are localities with a long migratory history and with resources which have stable structures designed to provide services to migrants and refugees. As documented in the study, some examples include the Mayor’s Office for Migration Affairs in New York City in the United States and the Coordination of Policies for Immigrants and Promotion of Decent Employment of São Paulo in Brazil. Other cities are facing new migratory dynamics, which has pressured their governments and have had to rely on international organizations as they develop local response initiatives, such as seen in several non-border localities in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

At the other end of the spectrum are border localities that are generally isolated and have few resources to respond comprehensively to the needs of migrants and refugees. These include border or rural cities that are in people’s migratory trajectories. One example is the locality of Darien in the border between Colombia and Panama. Lastly, in terms of capacities, although there are still significant gaps, training programs for local officials on issues of reception and integration of migrants were reported in 47 percent of the localities assessed. It is important to emphasize, however, that 42 percent of these programs are based on normative and rights issues, and do not focus on practical aspects of policy design and implementation.

Thirdly, the report also indicates that most local government actors prioritize socio-economic integration, followed by reception, although needs and priorities vary by type of locality. This suggests that upon arrival, cities really need to provide access for migrants and refugees to goods and services—including employment—to meet their basic needs and those of their families. The pre-condition for this access is providing them with regularization options or legal pathways. It is worth highlighting that for border localities in particular, the priority was reception, although this was often understood as the rapid processing of people and not as the comprehensive provision of services for the population. Lastly, in some of the newer destinations, in the absence of sufficient social networks that can provide support to migrants and refugees in host communities, there is greater awareness, urgency, and need for local actors to provide adequate reception and socio-economic integration services. One common challenge for cities evaluated in the report is counting on disaggregated and updated information on migrants at the local level to facilitate the creation and access to appropriate reception and integration services.

One last lesson the study points to refers to political integration and the often-ignored aspect of migrant and refugee integration. In this regard, the study confirms that there is still a long way to go to achieve political integration. In most of the localities studied in the report, there are almost no mechanisms for the political participation of migrants and refugees. Access to identity documents was identified as the main hurdle in this area. Concerning identity documents, it is important to highlight very innovative practices coming from cities to provide identification to these arrivals, who may not always carry a passport or ID with them. The study shows different models of municipal identification that have been adopted in Mexico City and in localities across the United States. Regarding political participation, in cities such as Bogota and São Paulo, permanent spaces for political participation have been developed for migrants and refugees. However, there is a long way to go and a pressing need to adopt an official narrative that presents migrants and refugees as neighbors, newcomers, and citizens and also to encourage social cohesion not only within migrant spaces but in other broader community spaces.

Although the focus on the local level is not entirely new, this report provides one of the first regional perspectives at a continental scale on migration and protection institutions and policies in the Americas, thanks to its comprehensive and diverse voices. What is novel is that it covers a wide variety of localities in a region that is profoundly diverse in terms of structures, institutional frameworks, and capacities, It reflects the perspectives of individuals on the ground who are directly involved in the challenges and opportunities posed by the reception and integration of migrants and refugees. The common denominator that emerges from the analysis is that these cities have been creating positive innovations to provide protection and better opportunities for the populations settled in their territories. It is precisely these positive innovations of receiving, protecting, and integrating that should be replicated and promoted at the hemispheric level.

The opinions in this article are personal. They do not represent those of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian is the Director of the Department of Social Inclusion at the Secretariat for Access to Rights and Equity within the Organization of American States (OAS). As Director, she oversees the OAS’s efforts to promote social inclusion and access to human rights, with a particular focus on vulnerable populations. Additionally, Betilde is a founding member and coordinator of the Network of Latin American Female Political Scientists, known as #NoSinMujeres. This project aims to promote and empower women’s work in Latin American Political Science. Betilde holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University.

The post Migrant and Refugee Integration in Cities across the Americas appeared first on Global Americans.

Former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce are amid one of the risky examples of political infighting in recent Latin American history. Morales—who is back in Bolivia thanks to Arce—has accused his successor of a variety of misdeeds, including (but not limited to): economic mismanagement, knowingly facilitating international cocaine shipments, hiding information about the suspicious suicide of financial investigator Luis Alberto Colodro, and treason.

Although Arce has been less overt in his criticism of his predecessor, he has openly criticized Evo’s tenure as president. Arce has distanced himself from Morales, the founder and current president of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), carving out a substantial bloc of congressional allies who often clash with those still loyal to Morales.

Despite the animosity between the two, their public interactions have been amicable and uneventful. They regularly make appearances together, hugging and referring to one other as hermano Evo and hermano Lucho (though sometimes in the context of subtle insults). Evo smiles with Arce at sporting events, Arce’s allies accuse Evo of orchestrating the 2019 political crisis that ousted him from power.

Why are these powerful men covering their mudslinging with staged events and awkward smiles? Because both are jockeying to run for president in 2025. And the longer their competition drags on, the greater the opportunity for MAS’ opposition on the right.

One Party, Two Leaders

One cannot understand modern Bolivia without understanding Evo Morales. First, Morales is MAS, Bolivia’s ruling party which he founded in 1997 and led to three (arguably four) consecutive presidential victories. His election in 2005 was an undeniably momentous accomplishment for Bolivia’s indigenous community, which makes up at least 40 percent of the country. As president, Evo spearheaded a new constitution, ratified in 2009, which established Bolivia as a plurinational state (guaranteeing rights and autonomy for indigenous groups) and coincided with a dramatic expansion of the state’s control over natural resources including natural gas and lithium. Morales’ administration capitalized on resource booms to redistribute resources to the poor, drastically reducing inequality and extreme poverty. Morales was an immensely popular and powerful president, winning reelection twice in 2009 and 2014.

After some questionable legal maneuvering, Morales tried to run for a fourth term in 2019, leading to the infamous series of events that caused his ouster (which may or may not have amounted to a coup d’état, depending on whom you ask). Evo Morales returned to Bolivia after a year of exile as a diminished, yet still influential force in MAS. Today, he still speaks to the public daily, giving endorsements and orders to the dozens of deputies who still owe their careers to him. He also has the voter base and knowledge of Bolivia’s political machine necessary to be a major force in the 2025 election, and he possesses an irrevocable importance to the country’s indigenous communities (MAS’ core voting bloc) that cannot be matched by any political rival. His legacy is immensely important in Bolivia, but it has been tarnished by recent events. At 63 years old, Morales believes that he has a chance to redeem himself and write another chapter of his story with another presidential term, and so do his many supporters.

On the other hand, Arce has proven himself to be far more than a placeholder president. Winning over 50 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2020 election, Arce has slowly but surely formed an independent modus operandi and accumulated a sizeable group of allies in a political party historically dominated by the actions and personality of Evo Morales. Despite a banking scare, a poor corruption record and a shaky economic outlook, the Arce administration has managed to achieve modest economic growth under difficult global circumstances and install a sense of calm relative to recent years marked by crisis.

The chances of Morales’ return to the presidency have changed after Arce’s two years in office. Arce has recast the appeal of Morales’ populist resource nationalism from a more technocratic, less personalistic, standpoint. In the event of a contentious MAS primary, Arce can message his candidacy as a proven alternative to the drama that defined Evo Morales’ presidency. In addition, Arce currently holds the reins of power in Bolivia, offering unparalleled quasi-authoritarian advantages on the campaign trail. All signs seem to point to Arce’s 2025 nomination.

What Could Happen Next?

Both Morales and Arce appear to have viable paths to securing MAS’ nomination for the 2025 election. So far, neither man appears willing to back down from their aspirations—even travelling to Havana to hash things out with Miguel Díaz Canel couldn’t smooth things over. MAS appears to have already descended into a civil war between evistas and arcistas, one which might not be resolved until the party primaries in mid-2025.

As long as Arce and Morales both run for president, their conflict will continue to escalate. Any pretense of unity will likely be dropped; Arce could move to invalidate Morales’ candidacy (as seems to be the norm lately); Morales could threaten to formally break from Arce’s coalition and take his congressional allies with him. Corruption allegations will continue to fly in both directions.

The effects of the Arce-Morales feud could have dire implications for Bolivia’s left: The longer it continues, the more it benefits the conservative opposition. The idea of MAS’ two leading political figures damaging each other’s images and possibly splitting the party’s vote is a very attractive prospect for Bolivia’s right. Though MAS would nonetheless be difficult to defeat in a runoff, competition between Arce and Morales will lessen the degree of difficulty for either’s second round opponent, creating a tighter race.

While Morales and Arce have been busy disparaging one another, they have forgotten about the real threat to Bolivia’s long-dominant leftist party: the well-entrenched elites with deep ties to the country’s conservative and right-wing parties. If MAS is defeated in 2025, Morales and Arce can expect to face retribution from a conservative administration equal to or greater than that which was doled out to Jeanine Áñez and Luis Fernando Camacho. Bolivia has certainly been no exception to the regional trend of former presidents finding themselves in prison. The risks of MAS losing the next general election extend far beyond mundane policy disagreements—especially for Evo Morales. This is all to say that MAS would be wise to settle on a 2025 presidential candidate sooner rather than later.

Jack Quinn is an Editorial Assistant at Americas Quarterly. He is based in New York.

The post The Feud Between Arce and Morales Could Spell Danger for Bolivia’s Left appeared first on Global Americans.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell’s all-powerful ruling party lives by the slogan, “He who controls the past controls the future.” While today’s democratic Chile is far from Orwell’s totalitarian dystopia, it is seeing a political struggle over the meaning of its recent past, as September 11 will mark fifty years since the leftist government of President Salvador Allende was overthrown by the country’s armed forces, ushering in seventeen years of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet before the return to civilian rule in 1990. 

Processing Memories

How Chile will mark this anniversary has become a front-burner political issue in a country where memories of the coup can still provoke intense reactions. With Gabriel Boric’s election, Chile is now governed by an unabashedly leftist president for the first time since Allende, and the management of the commemoration of this anniversary is proving to be one among many headaches he is facing.

While for many Chileans of the generation which has grown up under democratic rule, the Allende government, the coup, and the Pinochet years are a subject of at best distant memory or of stories told by their parents, for others, they still excite strong emotions. On the right, the human rights violations of the Pinochet era are (often reluctantly) recognized. At the same time, the chaos and ideological extremism of Allende’s presidency are stressed, as is the modernization of the economy on free market lines and the gradual reduction of poverty which took place during the years of military rule.

On the left, of course, there is little room for recognizing any achievements of the military years and ample desire to remember the deaths, tortures, and exiles that occurred. By contrast, Allende is remembered as the paladin of Chile’s dispossessed who chose suicide rather than surrender when the presidential palace was attacked, and whose promise in his final broadcast that one day Chileans would again walk down “the broad avenues through which the free man passes to build a better society” is viewed as prophetic.

Comments Provoke a Reaction

The remarkable sensitivity which the discussion of Allende’s presidency excites was demonstrated by the political furor which arose from remarks made recently by Patricio Fernández, whom Boric had named as coordinator for the Chilean government’s commemoration of the events marking the fiftieth anniversary of the coup. A man of the left and founder of a semi-satirical weekly publication focused on politics and culture, he had the difficult task of developing ways to recognize the traumatic nature of the coup without turning it into a partisan exercise.

However, he stepped on a political landmine in a radio interview when he was asked how a minimum of common ground for the commemoration could be found given that there is a “a not small percentage of the population that says [the coup] was necessary.” Fernández responded, saying that while “historians and political scientists will be able to debate why and how it came to that, we can try to agree that the events after the coup are unacceptable.”

This response was sharply criticized by human rights groups and political figures from the parties forming Boric’s coalition in Congress, particularly from the Communist Party. Emblematic was a letter to Boric’s chief of staff from a group of human rights organizations which asserted that Fernández had “evaded condemning the seditious coup d’état… that put an end to democratic institutions in our country.”

Fernández had his defenders, who challenged this as a simplistic reading of the events leading up to the coup and a refusal to engage in self-criticism. Indeed, they argued that it was an effort on the part of the Communist Party to “cancel” alternative interpretations of history. However, ultimately Fernández found his position untenable and resigned. 

Boric, who is close to Fernández personally, expressed appreciation for his work, but in the middle of other troubles, notably an unfolding scandal over no-bid contracts given to non-governmental organizations which were close to one of the parties in his coalition, he did not seek to reverse Fernández’s decision.

A Critical Book Sparks Controversy

Ironically, there is reason to believe that Boric himself shares Fernández’s view that there is more to be said about Allende’s fall than a simple effort to overthrow democracy. He has praised a controversial recent book by Chilean political scientist Daniel Mansuy entitled Salvador Allende: La izquierda chilena y la Unidad Popular (Salvador Allende: The Chilean Left and Popular Unity), for which he too has received criticism from within his own ranks.

Mansuy tracks the deep contradictions which characterized Allende’s period in office.  He notes that Allende insisted that he was leading a uniquely democratic “Chilean way to socialism,”  but his end point clearly was not mere social democracy but something closer to what had been installed following Cuba’s revolution, which was then only eleven years old and an object of fascination within the Latin American left. 

He recounts how Allende quickly lost the support of Chile’s middle class and with it the political center, arguing that his refusal to disavow his more radical supporters, who engaged in occupations of factories and farms, together with his administration’s use of legal loopholes to undertake massive nationalizations, paved the way for his downfall well before the military acted.

Boric and Allende: Similarities and Differences

Why is it that fifty years on, the debate over the Allende era remains so intense that it cost Fernández his position? While most of those who were politically active on the left during that time are gone from the political scene, in many cases, their children—who were engaged in the struggle against the Pinochet regime—are now figures of importance in the parties which make up the governing coalition. To them, anything less than a wholehearted embrace of Allende’s legacy is unacceptable.

There are also parallels between Boric’s presidency and Allende’s that make the analysis of the latter a subject of more than historical interest. Like Allende, Boric somewhat unexpectedly came to power when he led the ticket for a group of “new left” formations together with the same Communist Party which had lent its support to Allende. 

Plus, although the context is different in many ways, Boric, like Allende, went from a short political honeymoon to a period of deep public disillusionment. His situation was worsened by a failed effort to rewrite Chile’s constitution, something which Allende contemplated but never actually attempted. The proposed constitution, which entailed much greater state control of the economy, together with strong environmental and indigenous rights provisions, was a blueprint for the permanent transformations for which the leftist coalition hoped and indeed tracked much of Boric’s campaign platform.

Like Allende, Boric has had to face a Congress in which he lacks a majority, preventing him from moving much of his political program. Where Allende refused to abandon his transformational ambitions, however, Boric has reached out to Chile’s center-left, bringing members into his cabinet and his congressional coalition. His near-term political agenda has been reduced to seeking a revenue-enhancing tax reform, as well as pension and health reforms which would entail a significantly greater state role in these sectors. And success for these efforts is by no means assured.

Unsurprisingly, this has led to restlessness in Chile’s political ranks. The Communists have stayed loyal to Boric, but have stressed the importance of the more comprehensive program on which he ran, as opposed to his stripped-down current agenda. Meanwhile, the “new left” parties have watched unhappily as their seats in the cabinet have been reduced in favor of figures from the center-leftist parties which they had opposed in the last election. 

In fairness to all, no one among Boric’s supporters is talking about armed struggle as an alternative to democratic politics, a major difference from the left in the Allende era.  With that said, however, Boric came to power in the aftermath of the “social explosion” of 2019, a multi-month series of protests marked by violence, which showed Chile’s social fabric to be more fragile than previously thought.

Boric, it appears, is prepared to do what Allende would not, and accept the reality that he lacks the political space to take the country very far in the direction in which he had hoped. Thus far, he has been able to keep his coalition together. In this context, though, the acrimony within Chile’s left over Salvador Allende’s heritage looks less like a purely historical debate and more like a surrogate for one, not yet joined, about the future of Gabriel Boric’s government.

Richard M. Sanders is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Fellow of the Center for the National Interest. Formerly a member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served at embassies throughout Latin America and in Washington.

The post The Fiftieth Anniversary of Chile’s Coup Touches a Sore Nerve appeared first on Global Americans.

The perceived tension between environmental sustainability and economic development lies at the heart of many domestic and international climate disputes. Brazil, the world’s sixth most populous country and the twelfth largest economy, is no exception. However, one of its “national champions,” the state-owned oil company Petrobras, can forge a path forward reconciling the two interests.

Today, Petrobras might be a confusing choice to spearhead the transition to a low-carbon economy. The company has recently been under increasing environmental scrutiny and embodies physical and transition climate risk dilemmas. Last month, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the country’s environmental agency, denied Petrobras’ petition to drill at the mouth of the Amazon River. Facing only 12 years left of known oil reserves, the Brazilian oil company has appealed the decision.

The governmental back and forth generated a political crisis between the country’s political branches. The uncertainty has also cast doubt on President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s promises to strengthen Brazil’s environmental record, even as he promised at a Paris climate meeting in June to reach zero deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by 2030. In the 2015 Paris Accords, through its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Brazil committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 43 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. Reports suggest Lula could increase the country’s NDC to 50 percent.

Lula has a justified sense of urgency given Brazil’s exposure to physical and transition climate risk. Adverse impacts such as droughts and water level changes could devastate the country, which relies on climate-sensitive sectors. Agribusiness represents 27.5 percent of its GDP and hydropower powers 55 percent of Brazil’s energy. However, Brazil has excellent renewable potential. The Brazilian Northeast has installed 21.03GW of energy in more than 750 wind farms. The region has more than quadrupled solar capacity in 10 years with projections doubling again by 2030.

If Lula intends to meet this more ambitious commitment while reconciling the environmental and labor-focused parts of his base, Petrobras will need to pivot from new drilling exploration to deepening its evolving initiatives to a green transition, such as evaluating possible joint ventures with Norway’s Equinor and China Energy International. Petrobras needs to move faster.

Mauricio Tolmasquim, Petrobras’ energy transition director, mentioned publicly that the company is already late for the energy transition. Petrobras moving to renewables would greatly aid the transition. According to Europar, the sector emissions went from 6.7 percent to 8.9 percent from 2005 to 2019. When assessing carbon emissions by economic sectors, energy, and heat increased the most. The second highest increase came from transport. Both are core parts of Petrobras’ activities.

Petrobras would transition at a time when international investors are increasingly bullish on renewable energy in Brazil. Solving this problem, Brazil and its energy sector stand to lead the region forward in this evolution. Such a transition, however, comes with serious risks. The company must rethink its capital investments while maintaining its social commitments, which rely on oil reserves projected to decrease quickly.

Petrobras’ 2023-2027 strategic plan aligns with recommendations from the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and seeks to increase investment in renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. However, in said plan, the company allocates just six percent (USD 4.4 billion) to low-carbon energy and 83 percent (USD 65 billion) to its oil and gas exploration endeavors. In 2012, Brazil’s Congress implemented a Royalties Law mandating Petrobras to contribute Pre-Salt exploration royalties to health and education, firmly establishing that the company has a defined role within Brazilian society.

In addition to engaging in an energy transition, Petrobras also has economic incentives to abandon business as usual. Brazil currently retains just 12 years of known oil and gas reserves, and according to data from S&P Capital IQ, Petrobras’ profitability is expected to drop 33 percent between 2022 and 2025. The price of Brent crude oil is predicted to decline by 18 percent from August 2023 to July 2028. Brazil’s oil and gas consumption growth rate is anticipated to decrease from 4.9 percent to 1.1 percent between 2023 and 2032. Therefore, Petrobras’ current and upcoming strategic plans should focus more on renewable energy, which has an upside growth potential and helps Brazil meet its Paris Agreement commitments.

Meanwhile, reports by Fitch indicate a surge of agreements with Chinese, French, and Spanish renewable energy corporations and Brazilian state-owned and private companies in the Brazilian states of Minas Gerais and Ceará. Non-hydroelectric renewable energy generation is projected to grow by 5.9 percent, beating the projection of the larger energy market, which sits at 2.5 percent.

Experts acknowledge that Petrobras has a “fundamental role” in supporting a green transition by focusing on biodiesel fuels, sharing energy infrastructure with renewables, carbon capture, and research investments in low-carbon energy. These expectations are in line with the company’s history. In the 1970s, Petrobras helped lead projects in Brazil that laid the groundwork for biofuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel. The company must take center stage in this latest transformation or risk alienating its environmentally conscious domestic and international investors that range from Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES) to Black Rock and Norges Bank.

Petrobras has taken significant steps. Between 2015 and 2022, the company reduced its CO2 emissions by 39 percent and issued a USD 1.25 billion green bond in 2022. This was followed by a statement from Petrobras President Jean-Paul Prates this year that renewables and wind power are company priorities—as seen in the recent creation of a new director position for energy transition and sustainability.

Yet, most of its emissions decline came from reducing power generation, while emissions from exploration and production fell only 19 percent. Petrobras would need to overhaul its strategy to cut its emissions sustainably, but leaning into the energy transition will put the company in a position to command this emerging field. In May, it proposed a revision to the strategic plan that would allocate as much as 15 percent of its capital expenditures to low-carbon projects. Petrobras should increase by raising that amount annually and incrementally to at least 40 percent by 2030. This new plan and allotment will be voted on in November.

Brazil’s government also has a role to play. Brazil’s Congress revised the Royalties Law in 2013 to provide socially oriented royalty money to non-petroleum-producing states. Combining the spirit of that revision with the need to incentivize social buy-in for the transition, Congress should again revise the law to create a new royalty category for the social distribution of royalties from green energy production.

Given Petrobras’ high profile in the energy sector with proven expertise in low-carbon emission technologies, such as hydropower and biofuel, taking the discussed steps could secure Brazil as a hemispheric leader in green energy and the decarbonization transitions. These activities will establish Petrobras as a vital energy and environmental agent and will maintain the company’s role as a contributor to social good while assisting the country in achieving its NDC commitments.

Fernanda Barbosa is a strategic consultant for SMEs and was formerly an asset manager in private equity real estate. She earned her MBA at the Bayes Business School in London, finished a specialization in Sustainable Finance at the University of Cambridge, and has her civil engineering degree from Unicamp. Fernanda is based in São Paulo, Brazil.

Steven Hyland Jr. teaches Latin American history and sustainable finance courses at Wingate University and researches capital markets and sustainability. He is also a Senior Consultant at Responsible Alpha.

Travis Knoll teaches religion, social movements, and Latin America at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and Wingate University. He is also a Senior Consultant at Responsible Alpha.

The post Petrobras – An Agent of Transformation in Meeting Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contributions? appeared first on Global Americans.

The world is undergoing major geopolitical transformations. The rise of Asia, particularly China, has presented unprecedented challenges to the Western-centric liberal order of the postwar era. These changes have become even more apparent with the onset of a major military conflict in Ukraine, which further polarized political alliances along East-West lines. It was to be expected that these trends would provoke confusion and international analysts need to take special care in order to make sense of the complex dynamics unfolding in the world. This is particularly true when examining countries that have traditionally had less influence in the international arena, but whose fates have often depended upon their ability to navigate the challenges and opportunities presented by evolving global power trends.

Brazil is one such example. Latin America’s largest economy has recently seen its share of turbulence. In fact, after a stable period of democratic consolidation that lasted between 1985 and 2015, Brazil saw a rapid erosion in its democratic institutions. This process culminated in the 2018 election of Jair Bolsonaro, a divisive political figure whose authoritarian rhetoric and administrative mismanagement gave voice to an extreme right-wing nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship. Although Bolsonaro is no longer in power and is presently battling multiple lawsuits, Brazil continues to face the challenge of rebuilding not only democratic procedures but also democratic values to ensure that democracy survives.

This task is now mainly in the hands of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former president who despite becoming a more polarizing figure in recent years, served two extremely successful terms in the early 2000s. Bringing the country together will require not only major political skills, which Lula has already demonstrated to have, but a feasible economic plan. In a global economy shaped by inflationary trends, energy shortages, and market instability, Lula’s domestic success will depend to a significant degree on his international achievements. While Bolsonaro obscured the relevance of the country in the global arena, Lula expanded Brazil’s presence in the early 2000s by enlarging the list of economic partners and diversifying strategic partnerships, particularly in the Global South. Notably, this was done without jeopardizing traditional relations with the United States or the European Union.

Since taking office, Brazil’s returning president has sought to promote a bold revival of his highly effective ‘active and assertive’ foreign policy. However, it will be much more difficult to reproduce Brazil’s achievements of twenty years ago given today’s challenging and changing world. Lula has made sure to start his international pilgrimages by visiting traditional and central partners, including neighboring nations and the United States. During his first month in office, he attended a meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC) in Argentina, where he emphasized a desire to strengthen Brazil’s relations throughout Latin America. Soon after, Lula visited U.S. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. in Washington. During their meeting, both leaders professed their mutual desire to promote democracy and a more environmentally-sound developmental path—particularly in Brazil’s Amazon. Following his trip to the United States, Lula visited China with the objective of deepening trade relations and leading a peace effort for the war in Ukraine. After his visit to China, he again met with traditional Brazilian allies, including Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France.

All things considered, this “many friends” approach is not so different from what he implemented 20 years ago. Back then, Brazil was largely welcomed as a rising diplomatic force in the developing world. During a 2009 meeting, President Barack Obama made special note of Lula’s “forward-looking leadership in Latin America and throughout the world.” However, the domestic and global contexts in which Lula now operates have changed. Within this context, what was once seen as a progressive pursuit of an autonomous and assertive foreign policy is now interpreted by many in Brazil and the West as divisive, inappropriate, or even a betrayal of Brazil’s traditional alignments. These views ignore Lula’s earlier international record and lack a wider, historical perspective.

For more than a century, Brazil’s diplomatic efforts have focused on promoting multilateralism and pushing for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. While it drew closer to Western allies throughout the 20^th century, successive governments in Brazil—be they progressive, conservative, democratic, or authoritarian—pursued a policy of self-determination. Shaped by those dynamics, Brazil’s foreign policy has served the country well as an instrument of national development.

It is concerning to see that even qualified analyses about Lula’s attempt to reposition Brazil in the world tend to be biased, particularly by taking parts for the whole. Some see Lula’s visit to China and his repeated calls for peace talks in Ukraine as a sign that Lula was espousing an anti-Western approach to international affairs. This is clearly not the case. Similarly, fears that Lula may be trying to create an anti-U.S. Latin American alliance with China are unfounded. Yes, Lula gave more than advisable attention to Nicolas Maduro during a recent visit to Brasilia for a meeting of South American nations. However, this does not mean that Lula is in alignment with Venezuela, nor does it diminish the role that Lula actually played in helping calm things down following the 2002 coup attempt in that country—largely with the approval of the Bush administration. Likewise, Lula’s recent attempt to revive UNASUR does indeed face important challenges. However, that does not diminish the fact that regional collaboration—a goal pursued by Lula’s predecessor, as well—has proven to be a challenging yet promising project. The purpose of the project is to provide economic and political stability, an objective that should be worthy of U.S. support.

The Lula administration will not risk the country’s future by picking sides on rising international conflicts or disputes. Rather, the president’s main task is the reconstruction of his own country’s democracy. He will need all the help he can get—especially from Brazil’s main historical partner, the United States, who recently played an important role in providing support to the country’s democratic processes. Accurately understanding the context behind Lula’s international overtures is critical if one is to avoid previous analytical traps that are detrimental to understanding Brazil and its relations with the United States and the broader international community.

Rafael Ioris is a Professor of Latin American History and Politics at the University of Denver. He is originally from Brazil and currently resides in Denver, Colorado.

The post Much Ado About Nothing: Accurately Assessing Lula’s Recent International Overtures appeared first on Global Americans.

With inflation and poverty rising, the acute state of currency reserves, open confrontation between government officials, and a vice president that constantly questions the president’s legitimacy, we may be witnessing the end of Kirchnerism’s 20-year-long hegemony over Peronism. President Alberto Fernández has confirmed that he will not run for president. For her part, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner–the Peronist leader currently performing best in polls–also announced that she will not run. Polls show a close race and no one can be sure who will win, but one thing is certain: Peronism is not a clear contender, a shock given it has been the central political party in the country since Argentina’s return of democracy in 1983. However, while the Kirchner wing of the party may be in trouble, this does not mean that Peronism is at risk of disappearing. The movement will endure, mutate, and return to power… as it always has.

Peronism is an almost invincible force in the Argentine political landscape. The Peronist movement has survived decades of proscription and repression, won eight out of eleven presidential elections since the return of democracy, and has been at least the second-biggest political force in every presidential election in Argentine history. To comprehend this strength, it is crucial to understand that Peronism is not a traditional political party with a coherent ideology. Trying to categorize it as a left or right-wing, conservative, or liberal party is pointless because Peronism has easily transformed without losing its political strength. This is because the political movement rests on two crucial pillars: its status as an “empty signifier” and its personalistic nature.

The Pillars of Peronism

As an empty signifier, “Peronism” does not designate any specific political opinion or ideology. Peronism can be applied to everything and anything: anyone can provide their own definition of Peronism. This allows the movement to encompass all of Argentine society. However, its personalistic nature makes the leadership of a powerful figure crucial to its success and its very existence. Without such, the movement would be a melting pot of divergent ideas and individuals without any coherent stance. This quality allows for a leader to endow the movement with their own definition of Peronism. Among competing interpretations, the leader will be the one that provides the understanding that resonates best within the heterogeneous composition of Peronism.

The two pillars of being empty signifier and personalistic cannot survive without each other. When both are met, the power of Peronism comes alive, allowing it to change its ideology without losing its identity. However, this also makes it essential for a leader that gives coherence to the movement by providing a triumphant understanding of Peronism. It is the very absence of a strong personalistic leader that is at the core of the current crisis of the movement under Kirchnerism.

Peronism emerged in the 1940s around the figure of Colonel Juan Domingo Perón. As the Secretary of Labor and Prevision, he encouraged union leaders to organize and met their demands such as collective contracts, retirement benefits, paid vacations, and workplace accident compensation. This position led to his growing popularity across the country. As President, he promoted the expansion of the industrial sector—an interventionist role of the State in the economy—the redistribution of wealth, and unionization of workers. In the foreign policy realm, Perón pursued the third position ideology, rejecting both capitalism and communism during the Cold War. Since then, Peronism has been reinvented by his successors to meet the needs of their times and policy preferences.

For instance, under Carlos Menem’s leadership in the 1990s, the Peronist movement underwent one of its most radical transformations. Menem privatized most of the state-owned companies and services, deregulated the labor market, and adopted an open international trade policy. At the same time, he sought close relations with the United States. Under Menem, the Peronist movement became a neoliberal right-wing party that profoundly contrasted with the movement under Perón’s leadership. The Menem experience showcased the logic of the empty signifier and the personalistic nature of Peronism to the extreme.

The Kirchnerist Hegemony Over Peronism

Menem’s version of Peronism was not compatible with Néstor Kirchner’s project. When Néstor assumed the presidency in 2003, he confronted 58.2 percent of the population under the poverty line, a rampaging unemployment rate, a defaulted external debt, and low popular support—only winning the presidency with 22.25 percent of the vote. However, he took on these challenges by transforming the Argentine economy and reinventing politics by reformulating Peronism. In doing so, Néstor Kirchner attained the much-needed legitimacy of the Peronist movement and became its undisputable leader. Peronism became a left-leaning and progressive movement that propelled regional integration with South America, leaving neoliberalism behind.

Kirchner altered the power dynamics inside the Peronist party by providing a key role to progressive and popular Peronist and non-Peronist actors compatible with his government plan. In parallel and benefitting from the commodities boom, Kirchner increased the minimum wage, supported the reunification of Argentina’s main union confederation, and implemented social policies focused on vulnerable and informal sectors. All of this ushered in an era of steady economic growth and poverty reduction. Kirchner’s understanding of Peronism triumphed.

However, Kirchnerism cannot be understood by looking at Néstor alone. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was a vital part of the rise of Kircherism. Her rising popularity was key in Néstor’s decision not to run for reelection in 2007. While a strong leader is critical to allowing Peronism to function as an empty signifier, the Kirchners found a way to maintain their power over the party without relying on a singular figure—an action reminiscent of Juan Perón himself and his wife, Evita. Unable to run after his second term, Néstor Kirchner would need another leader to continue Kirchnerism’s hegemony over Peronism beyond his figure. This leader was Cristina, who swiftly won the 2007 elections and established her leadership.

The gambit worked. Nevertheless, on October 27, 2010, Néstor Kirchner died, eliminating the ability for the couple to alternate power again. If Kirchnerism could not find a new leader to carry on after Cristina Kirchner’s second term, the hegemony would start to crack and the Kirchnerist wing would fall without a central leader.

The Fracture of the Kirchnerist Hegemony

Cristina’s main failure was not finding a new leader to continue her legacy and to secure hegemony over the Peronist movement. In the 2015 elections, her hand-picked candidate Daniel Scioli lost to opposition leader Mauricio Macri, ending 12 years of Kirchnerist governments. Cristina had chosen a candidate, but the election results proved that he was not the required leader for the Kirchner reign over Peronism to continue. She tried to maintain her authority by creating a separate party within Peronism with her as the leader for the 2017 mid-term elections. Instead, Macri’s party continued to gain ground.

With the collapse of the Kirchner hegemony seeming inescapable, Cristina announced that Alberto Fernández would be the Peronist presidential candidate with her joining the ticket as vice president. If no one could be Peronism’s central leader to continue the Kirchnerist hegemony, then she would have to return to power and do it herself. However, the government of Alberto Fernández turned out to be catastrophic for the Peronist movement under Kirchner’s hegemony. With the highest inflation figures since 1991, the loss of control over the Senate due to infighting, and government scandals during the pandemic, the administration’s image quickly plummeted.

The Kirchner hegemony over Peronism continues to weaken. Not only is the electoral defeat of Peronism a plausible scenario, but the most popular candidate from the Kirchnerist wing of Peronism is none other than Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The Kirchner wing still does not have a successor to become an undisputable leader and align the movement. Some may argue that Peronism will shift away from Kirchnerism, but the non-Kirchner wing inside Peronism barely polls at 5 percent. Without a clear leader, the forces of the empty signifier have been unleashed. Cristina remains, for now, the only Peronist that can successfully define Peronism and win elections.

With several possible presidential candidates competing to define the Peronist movement with their own understanding and become its leader, the next form of Peronism remains impossible to predict. This is the fascinating aspect of the most important political movement in Argentine politics: its unpredictability. This uncertainty begs the question: what will Peronism mutate into this time?

Salvador Lescano is a former intern with Global Americans. He holds a bachelor’s degree in International Studies from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and lives in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

The post Kirchnerism is in Crisis, But Peronism Will Survive appeared first on Global Americans.

During World War II, Brazil contributed to the security of allied trans-Atlantic shipping routes and sent a division-sized expeditionary force to Italy to help liberate Europe from Hitler and Mussolini’s murderous dictatorships. In 1985, Brazilians rallied around Tancredo Neves and José Sarney to end undemocratic military rule. However, there has been a disturbing shift in Brazil’s view of democracy.

In May 2023, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva rolled out the red carpet for Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro—a man wanted internationally on a wide range of criminal charges. Lula, however, dismissed these charges as “exaggerated” and just a “narrative.” This in spite of the well-established records of Maduro’s violations of democratic constitutional order, the law, and the more than 7 million Venezuelans his regime’s abuses and mismanagement of the country. While Maduro previously avoided attending the December 2022 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) meeting in Buenos Aires out of fear that the independent Argentine judiciary would serve an international arrest warrant against him, he apparently did not have similar fears from Lula’s judiciary.

Lula’s embrace of Maduro was only the opening salvo of the Brazilian populist leftist’s convocation of 12 South American leaders in a gambit to resurrect the failed, fundamentally anti-U.S. alliance UNASUR. Lula’s agenda was implicitly, if not explicitly anti-U.S.—he railed against the United States and others for their sanctions and other efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela, but more importantly, called for UNASUR to establish its own currency to liberate the region from dependence on the U.S. dollar.

Frighteningly, Lula’s UNASUR gambit is only the tip of the iceberg of his dangerously radicalized orientation. Lula is also collaborating with China and Russia to expand BRICS to include his neighbors, the illiberal Peronist government in Argentina the anti-U.S. Maduro dictatorship, as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The latter would be particularly flush with oil money to bankroll anti-Western causes, even as it deepens its economic collaboration with the PRC. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is increasingly resentful of Washington questioning its record on Human Rights and Democracy.

Lula’s attempt to rally the region against U.S. policy and a dollar-based financial system also comes on the heels of his permission for Iranian warships to dock in the port of Rio de Janeiro. It also shortly after his 240-person delegation trip to the PRC. While in China, Lula went far beyond talking business, signing 15 MOUs including commitments to a new USD $100 million jointly developed satellite as well as media and military collaboration. Indeed, literally the day after Lula embraced Maduro in Brasilia, his government hosted a delegation of 20 generals and other officers from the People’s Liberation Army.

Beyond such collaboration, Lula’s embrace of the PRC also includes coordination on the expansion of the explicitly political Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) alliance. Additionally Lula is attempting to insert his government and the PRC in a “peace initiative” in Ukraine that does not explicitly include Russian withdrawal from Ukraine. Indeed, Lula brought Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Brasilia to warmly talk of expanded Russia-Brazil trade at a time when most of the democratic world is sanctioning Russia in an effort to stop the conflict. Ironically, at the same time, Lula has criticized the West for helping Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression as “prolonging the war.”

Although the United States and Brazil have not always seen eye-to-eye, it is hard to remember a time when the South American giant so unequivocally embraced criminal dictatorships or so forcibly sought to leverage extra-hemispheric U.S. rivals and rally the region against U.S. interests. Nor has there been a time in recent memory when so many of the region’s leaders were politically receptive to such a call. This all comes at a time when many are indirectly bankrolled by the PRC, whose economic might eclipses that of Russia during the height of the Cold War, and whose collaboration with Russia, Iran, and other illiberal U.S. rivals continues to expand.

Lula’s work to create a de facto anti-U.S. illiberal alliance of Latin American leftist regimes and extra-hemispheric U.S. rivals further comes at a time in which those countries geographically closest to the United States—including Mexico, the Northern Triangle, and parts of the Caribbean—are moving away from political and security cooperation with the US, and toward a deepen embrace of the PRC.

While the United States must respect Brazil’s democratically elected leadership and sovereign right to make its own foreign policy, Washington must demonstrate that it will not give the Lula regime a pass on embracing internationally wanted dictators, extra-hemispheric rivals. That it will not stand idly by while Brazil actively rallies sympathetic leftist regimes to work against U.S. interests, simply because Lula cooperates with the United States and Europe on climate and social justice issues. Washington should increase coordination with the European Union and like-minded democratic actors on the long-term risks played by Lula’s posture, both despite and because of the positive image he enjoys in Europe.

Washington must make its case more clearly to the Brazilian people and elsewhere in the region. It must explain why embracing criminals, dictators, and extra-hemispheric threats is beneath the dignity of the democracy and respect for human rights Brazil has long espoused. In U.S.-Brazil bilateral discourse, Washington must make it clear that Lula’s behavior puts the good faith, commerce, investment, and other collaboration between the two nations at risk. Yet, Washington must also plan for the worst. Brazil is a great nation and friend of the United States. The tragedy of the path it is now on is avoidable, but only if Washington shows it cares.

Evan Ellis is a Featured Contributor with Global Americans and Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views contained herein are his own.

The post Brazil and the Illiberal Anti-U.S. Alliance appeared first on Global Americans.

The following article is an extended version of comments presented virtually by the author, in Spanish on June 7, 2023, to a forum on the topic in Madrid, Spain, put on by the Geopolitical Observatory for Latin America (OGAL).

Since the time of the first European explorers, Latin America’s political, social, and economic dynamics have been strongly influenced by European developments. Contemporary Latin American social structures, institutions, religion, and political culture continue to bear the legacy of colonial systems. The timing and outcome of 19^th Century independence movements—including the heritage of Brazil as the host of the region’s first European empire—was shaped by Napoleon’s invasion of Europe.

However, Latin America has generally been more of an object of influence than an agent. With the exception of Brazil’s support to maritime security in the Atlantic and its contribution to efforts to liberate Italy from fascist control, Latin America remained mostly on the sidelines during World War II—even though the region was profoundly impacted by the war. During the Cold War period, Latin America became a battleground for the Soviet Union’s attempts to advance a global Communist order.

The greatly expanded connectivity of the post-Cold War world arguably strengthened the interdependence between events in Europe and Latin America, but has not significantly increased Latin American agency in the relationship. European companies expanded their presence in the region almost eight-fold during the second half of the 1990s alone. Europe has long played a role in projects and the discourse in the region on development, human rights, and the environment. For instance, Europe has increasingly become a destination for the region’s drug supply and Europe-based organizations increasingly play a role in the region’s criminal dynamics.

Today, the impact of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and its ongoing military activities against Ukraine’s population and infrastructure to occupy the country is consistent with the relationship Latin America has had with Europe historically. The effects flowing from that interdependence have been significant and multifaceted against a backdrop of a region-making an effort to distance itself from them.

Economic Impacts

In the economic domain, Russia’s invasion disrupted global supply chains and caused price spikes for a range of products, including fertilizers, basic foodstuffs, and fuels. The difficulties in accessing fertilizer and the food and fuel price spikes came on the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic, which not only hit the region with the highest per capita mortality rates in the world but also decimated businesses and wiped out personal savings. The pandemic also left governments with grave fiscal imbalances, impeding their ability to effectively protect their residents from the new price spikes and supply shocks. Further compounding such pressures, fertilizer shortages and price increases in the Southern Cone countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, came at the same time as record droughts which decimated crops and related earnings from agriculture.

Western sanctions on Russia, even when not fully embraced by the countries of the region, further complicated the economic picture in Latin America. Some countries lost significant export earnings. Ecuador, for instance, exported a substantial portion of its shrimp to Russia prior to the invasion. Similarly, Russia was a major purchaser of Paraguayan beef. Similarly, many armed forces across the region use a significant amount of Russian military equipment, including Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. As a result, they had difficulty servicing that equipment and keeping it operating within the international sanctions regime.

More broadly, Russia’s invasion also damaged Latin America by increasing uncertainty in financial markets. This contributed to a depressed investment environment and sustained high-interest rates in the region, as apprehension drove investors to projects and assets in developed markets perceived as less risky. Overall, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has truncated the region’s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Latin America’s GDP, which grew 5.2 percent in 2021 as the region bounced back from the pandemic, is expected to grow at a rate of only 1.3 percent in 2023.

Not all of the impact of the Russian invasion has been negative for Latin America. By contributing to the inflation of commodity prices, Russia’s war has helped bolster export earnings for select commodities in some countries. Still, such windfalls were reduced by the moderation of commodity prices caused by China’s weaker-than-expected recovery and agricultural producers, such as Brazil and Argentina, losing potentially valuable export earnings due to record drought.

Political Impacts

Beyond the explicit economic effects, Russia’s invasion has arguably contributed to a region that is less politically stable and with a weakened democratic foundation. The price shocks helped fuel protests and unrest in Peru, Panama, and Ecuador, among other countries. More broadly, the deepening of such economic stresses has helped to deepen longstanding dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic systems, already evident in the fall of 2019 with severe nationwide protests in Ecuador and Chile.

According to the polling organization Latinobarometer, the number of people in the region who agreed that democracy was the preferable form of government fell from 63 percent in 2010 to 49 percent by 2021. In the context of eroding faith in the ability of democracy to deliver, the stresses from the Ukraine invasion—on top of those from COVID-19—have while undercut the ability of democratic regimes to govern. This in turn has brought more populist leaders to power across the region and increased the risk of further turns to non-democratic alternatives in the future.

It would be an exaggeration to say that the economic, and by extension, political effects of Russia’s war played the decisive role in the December 2022 fall of Pedro Castillo in Peru, the political weakening of Guillermo Lasso in the context of the corruption scandal that forced him to invoke “Muerte Cruzada,” or the possibility that Ricardo Martinelli, just nominated by his “realizando metas” party in Panama will return to power in May 2024 as a populist leader. Yet the inflation and fiscal dilemmas fueled by Russia’s invasion have arguably been one important element in each, as well as other difficult political dynamics playing out across the region.

Despite these concerns, there are some sources of hope. In the context of a region already controlled by an unprecedented number of left-oriented regimes as well as the war’s bad publicity for anti-U.S. authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and its adverse economic effects, could contribute in some cases to bringing right-oriented leaders back to power. The most significant near-term possibility is in Argentina’s October 2023 elections, where in the face of inflation of more than 100 percent and growing risks of a new fiscal default, both the Peronist President and Vice-President have said they will not run and the current front-runner, Javier Milei is a politically non-traditional libertarian.

Security Thinking and International Relations

Beyond its economic and political effects, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also had a significant, wide-ranging, if uneven impact on thinking about international relations in the region, particularly on security and other matters. For a Latin America which has not seen a full inter-state military conflict since the 1995 Cenepa War between Peru and Ecuador, Russia’s invasion reminded the region that armed aggression by one state against another is still possible. Thus, highlighting the persistence of the traditional role of armed forces to defend state sovereignty and its population.

The war also had a significant, if diverse, impact on thinking in the region about the character of Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia. For states of the more “principled, democratic” left in the region—such as Gabriel Boric’s government in Chile—Putin’s invasion and associated human rights abuses made it difficult to continue the casual relations that many had maintained with Russia before the invasion.

Defying the broader trend, however, the embrace of Russia by a handful of authoritarian populist regimes in the region—including Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, the Ortegas in Nicaragua, and Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba—highlighted the ongoing strategic risks that those regimes pose to the U.S. and the region. Indeed, those populists have also begun forging alliances with Russia’s allies—such as Belarus’ Alexandr Lukashenko—in an attempt to demonstrate to domestic audiences that they have not become international pariahs. Instead, they are able to cooperate, albeit in limited ways, against the liberal order. The recent agreement to send Cuban military personnel to Belarus, supposedly for training activities but possibly to fight for Russia, is the most recent illustration of this broadening collaboration between illiberal regimes in both regions.

Beyond such political dynamics, the military developments of the war have arguably impacted thinking in Latin America about military training and doctrine. Although not excessively outspoken about the conflict, Latin American militaries are following developments in Ukraine closely. They are capturing lessons about mechanized warfare, the use of drones, missiles, air defense systems, and other matters. In addition, it demonstrated Russian deficiencies in training and logistics. Indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets and power and water infrastructure and Russia’s use of its own soldiers as “cannon fodder” have arguably had a chilling effect on the receptivity to Russian doctrine across Latin America.

Despite such far-ranging impacts, and consistent with its posture historically, neither Pro-Putin regimes nor democrats in Latin America have gotten involved in the conflict in meaningful ways. With the exception of Putin’s friends—defiant Central America regimes such as Xiomara Castro in Honduras and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and more opportunistic actors such as Lula in Brazil—the majority of the region has generally voted to condemn Russia at the United Nations. Most Latin American states have also generally respected the international sanctions regime against Russia. Still, given the global reach of the U.S. financial system and its legal liabilities, respect for sanctions is arguably a reflection of economic self-interest and not an affirmation of the region’s condemnation of Russian aggression.

Indeed, the region has notably avoided imposing its own sanctions on Russia. Moreover, it has notably not sent military aid and has lagged behind Europe and other parts of the world in sending other forms of assistance to the Ukrainian people. Not even those countries most politically aligned with the U.S. in the region have embraced an initiative suggested by the head of U.S. Southern Command General Laura Richardson to donate their difficult-to-service Russian equipment to Ukraine and replace it with U.S. equipment. On the other hand, the new leftist regime of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil has criticized the U.S. for “prolonging” the war by helping Ukraine defend itself. Additionally, in the name of “peace,” Brazil welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the region and discussed expanded trade with the sanctioned country.

Conclusion

In the United States, I have been moved by the number of Ukrainian flags spontaneously hung by ordinary Americans in their homes in solidarity with the Ukrainian people in an otherwise deeply divided country. In Latin America, the region to which the U.S. is intimately connected by ties of geography, commerce, and family, I worry that the lessons of Ukraine about the fundamental importance of a rules-based international order and the need to sacrifice to defend its principles has been obscured by the region’s own troubles and deepened its cynicism about democracy, the protection of fundamental rights, and the rule of law.

This past week Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva welcomed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to Brasilia with an embrace, dismissing as a mere “narrative” the numerous outstanding criminal cases against him as well as the more than seven million Venezuelans forced to flee his regime. The same Lula criticized the West for helping Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s invasion as “prolonging the war.” What a contrast to Lula’s iconic predecessor Getúlio Vargas, who contributed a division of Brazilian forces to the campaign to liberate Italy in 1944. It is hard to imagine Vargas criticizing Allied efforts to defend Europe against the aggression of Hitler and Mussolini.

While the economic effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are grave, the truly worrisome development has been to deepen the wounds of a region whose pain from COVID-19, corruption, insecurity, and government performance has eroded the already fragile consensus on the importance of principle. The challenge ahead is to do better in making the case for why democracy and individual rights are not just eloquent words but meaningful concepts worth the price of defending. For those words to resonate, the United States must not only keep faith with Ukraine, but also with this hemisphere. It must give its people reason to believe that values can have meaning. It must show that democratic systems coupled with the location of economic value principally in the private sector, for all of its imperfections, is still the best way to generate value for a society and protect individual liberties.

Evan Ellis is a featured contributor with Global Americans and a Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed herein are strictly his own.

The post <strong>The Impact of Russia’s Ukraine Invasion on Latin America</strong> appeared first on Global Americans.

On May 17, Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso’s invocation of muerte cruzada (“crossed death”) shook the political system. Lasso faced fierce opposition and an impeachment trial that would mean his near certain removal on charges of embezzlement. In this context, Lasso dissolved the legislative branch and his own presidency and called for snap elections. These actions are more consistent with parliamentary politics than presidentialism. Despite its novelty, the act did not plunge the country into crisis as some critics warned, nor did it mark a death knell for Ecuadorian democracy, as others argued. To the contrary, muerte cruzada acted as a constitutional release valve, helping dissipate popular discontent and providing a democratic exit for an unpopular president who was facing his second impeachment trial and third motion for impeachment in two years.

Lasso faced political threats to his survival almost immediately after taking office in May 2021. In December 2021, he comfortably faced down an impeachment motion related to offshore accounts revealed in the Pandora Papers. In June 2022, amid countrywide protests and a general strike— spearheaded by Leonidas Iza and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and supported by ex-president Rafael Correa’s Union for Hope (UNES) coalition— the National Assembly debated another impeachment motion. After negotiations, Lasso escaped with 12 votes to spare. However, with corruption scandals enveloping both his family and government ministers, Lasso’s most recent impeachment trial has been more fraught and he could not garner the necessary votes to survive. Instead, Lasso turned to this peculiar constitutional tool.

Following article 148 of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution, muerte cruzada is a mechanism that allows the president or the National Assembly to dissolve the other power and call for snap elections for both branches within 90 days. The president can use it only once and only in the first three years of his term. The president can do so for any of three circumstances: 1) if he considers that the Assembly has carried out functions that do not correspond to it, 2) if the Assembly obstructs the National Development Plan, or 3) if there is a serious political crisis and internal commotion. There is nothing else like it in any other presidential democracy—albeit the Peruvian constitution allows the president to dissolve Congress and call for new elections if two cabinets cannot secure the confidence of Congress, but the presidency is not dissolved in the Peruvian case.

Paradoxically, muerte cruzada exists as a response to the country’s history of extreme presidential instability. Until Rafael Correa (2007-2017), no president in the country’s history had served two full terms consecutively. Remarkably, José María Velasco Ibarra, perhaps the country’s most important twentieth-century politician, completed only one of the five presidential terms he served between 1934 and 1972. In the tumultuous period from 1931 to 1948, there were 20 different heads of state, with only Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Río finishing his four-year period. In more recent times, none of the three presidents elected between 1997 and 2005 completed their mandates. Jamil Mahuad fell to a military coup while two others, Abdalá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez, were removed through drummed up legislative processes. While muerte cruzada does not eliminate the country’s political instability, it does modulate it by providing an instrument to resolve executive-legislative deadlock.

It is worth recognizing that muerte cruzada provides a constitutional exit to the type of presidential crisis that often ends unconstitutionally. Just look at Martín Vizcarra’s constitutionally-dubious dissolution of the Peruvian Congress, the military-aided removal of Evo Morales in Bolivia, or several other unconstitutional or otherwise controversial resolutions to executive-legislative crises. Instead of inflaming tensions, Lasso’s Constitutional Court-supported dissolution of the government has decreased political tension and mollified erstwhile opponents. Iza, one of Lasso’s fiercest critics, called on CONAIE member groups to maintain assemblies, but notably, without calling for protests. There is also a democratic justification for the muerte cruzada, insofar as it puts the president’s fate in the hands of the president as well as voters. In this case, an astounding 91% of Ecuadorians supported the dissolution of the National Assembly and early general elections.

Defenders of presidentialism may suggest that snap elections set a dangerous precedent in a place like Ecuador, loosening the fixed legislative and presidential terms that provide stability and predictability to the political game. Undeniably, it would be better if every Ecuadorian president completed his or her four-year term with high popular approval and ample legislative support. However, that has been historically difficult to achieve in a country with one of the world’s most fragmented party systems. Muerte cruzada recognizes this reality.

Without a doubt, the inclusion of this constitutional article under the popular Correa was the product of the president’s desire to avoid the same fate as his predecessors. Of course, Lasso did not enjoy Correa’s popularity. Never broadly popular to begin with, Lasso had the misfortune of governing during a period in which security has deteriorated dramatically and in which the cost of living has risen considerably. As a result, he opted to rule for six more months—the period until the next government—rather than face the certainty of immediate removal via impeachment. Until then, Lasso can rule by decree on economic matters with the Constitutional Court acting as a horizontal check on his policies.

This parliamentarization of presidentialism is not without its flaws. It weakens the ability of the legislature to hold presidents accountable for truly impeachable offenses and gives presidents six months in which they can rule by decree with limited oversight. However, by providing a constitutional mechanism to diffuse presidential crises and an alternative to unconstitutional removals, muerte cruzada serves a pragmatic purpose. It may not make Ecuadorian democracy better, but does not make it worse.

John Polga-Hecimovich is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. The views expressed here are his alone and do not represent the views of or endorsement by the United States Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.

The post <strong><em>Muerte Cruzada</em> and Ecuadorian Democracy</strong> appeared first on Global Americans.