On October 29, 2023, Colombians will go to the polls. Seats for 32 governors, 418 state representatives, 1102 mayors, and more than 12,000 city council members are up for election. With so much at stake and amid a growing dissatisfied and skeptical electorate concerned about the country’s future, the elections will become an unofficial referendum on President Gustavo Petro’s first year in office. Indeed, President Petro is keenly aware that the electoral results will not only impact his political standing but also set the course of Colombia’s political trajectory during the rest of his term as well as a bellwether for the outcome of the 2026 presidential election.

The elections will take place in a context of increasing political violence, lack of information due to poor polling and media coverage in rural areas, and growing political disarray over Colombia’s fragmented party system. Indeed, most Colombians are becoming increasingly pessimistic about the general direction of the country. According to a poll conducted by Invamer in August, 69 percent of Colombians believe the nation is heading in the wrong direction. The same poll revealed that, a large majority of Colombians are concerned about the country’s deteriorating security, the rising cost of living, the escalation of corruption, and the government’s failure to address poverty.

One of the main issues facing President Petro is that he set such huge expectations for his administration during the campaign that now he is grappling with the challenge of meeting those ambitious and difficult-to-attain goals. As he enters his second year, his government’s achievements are largely symbolic, lacking any substantial legislative successes (beyond the 2022 Tax Reform or the approval of his National Development Plan) or tangible enhancements to the lives of Colombians. As a result, his approval ratings have dropped from 64 percent at the outset to 31 percent by August. The unfulfilled campaign promises, ongoing scandals, and a fragile Pacto Histórico have left the administration wrestling with a range of pressing issues, making these elections even more crucial.

For instance, Petro’s government leading “Total Peace” policy exhibits mixed results, advancing talks with the ELN guerrilla group while persistent violence from Clan del Golfo and FARC’s dissidents fuels insecurity concerns. The increase in political violence obeys both the struggle for territorial control between armed groups, and groups currently in negotiations looking to establish a better negotiating position with the government during the peace talks. Despite progress, complexities in the simultaneous engagement of all armed factions and hurdles in implementing the 2016 Peace Accord with FARC dissidents persist.

President Petro’s relationship with traditional political parties (Partido Liberal, Partido Conservador and, Partido de la U)  has reached a critical juncture as he has effectively dissolved the political coalition that held on to majorities in Congress. An unwillingness from both the government and traditional political parties to make significant concessions on key reforms such as healthcare, pensions, and labor reforms has led to a stalemate in Congress awaiting the results of the local elections in October to determine if the government or traditional parties will have more advantage as the political balance shifts. This situation has been made more complicated considering that Colombia’s political landscape is experiencing a notable transformation with the proliferation of over 35 political parties, many of which are relatively new entities. Around 20 of these parties, active in the current electoral competition, have been established in recent years.

These factors have strained the government’s ability to deliver on its promises and maintain widespread support among the population. Consequently, the regional elections will serve as a litmus test of public approval for President Petro’s policies and leadership, and the outcome will significantly shape the political landscape moving forward. These elections will hurt the government as they are most likely to favor candidates not aligned with Petro. While the local elections will not predict the outcome of the 2026 presidential elections, and it remains premature to say whether President Petro will become a lame duck after losing the elections, should his party lose the elections, there is a high likelihood of growing tensions between the president and local administrations affecting the government’s ability to deliver.

In sum:

1. The 2023 local elections will become a referendum on President Gustavo Petro. Voters will likely use this unique opportunity to react to the government’s handling of the country. If the elections were today, Petro and his coalition parties would stand to lose key cities, such as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena.
2. Lack of voter intention polls will likely affect voter preferences. The scarcity of accurate and comprehensive polling data and media coverage, particularly in rural areas, is likely to lead to a skewed understanding of voting preferences and the electorate’s priorities, creating a vacuum that is likely to be used by malicious actors to mislead and misinform the public. It will also allow candidates to label legitimate polls as “fake,” further misleading the public.
3. The erosion of the political party system will likely continue. Political fragmentation may occur after the election as more political parties sprout. The growing number of political parties has made it harder to conduct a clear and concise analysis of the election and its implications. In addition, political fragmentation and first-past-the-poll voting structures make it challenging for any candidate to secure a clear majority, potentially resulting in a less representative government.
4. Political Violence is likely to increase as Colombia gets closer to election day. The increase in violence will affect democracy as it hampers candidates’ freedom to campaign and voter turnout, compromising local mayors in some regions. The relationships between candidates and armed groups will taint the legitimacy of some local leaders or constrain their actions.

A potential electoral defeat of the Petro administration will likely lead to an escalation in disputes between the executive and local governments over the next three years. The national government will probably resort to a strategic maneuver of halting, delaying, or conditioning project financing to gain leverage with local governance. This tactic could exert control and minimize the potential fallout from elections that are unlikely to favor them. Such a move will likely cast a cloud of uncertainty over the economy, potentially hampering economic growth and deterring investor confidence. Additionally, introducing such delays will likely erode the nation’s reputation as a reliable investment destination.

In this intricate tapestry of challenges and uncertainties, the outcome of the Colombian regional elections remains a crucial turning point for and the entire nation. Safeguarding the integrity of the democratic process and ensuring fair representation will be imperative to navigate these complex dynamics and sustain the foundation of a strong and vibrant democracy.

Sergio Guzmán is the Director of Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consulting firm based in Bogotá. Follow him on X, previously known as Twitter @SergioGuzmanE and @ColombiaRisk.

Enrique Reyes Dominguez is a MA Student at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He was a summer intern at Colombia Risk Analysis. Follow him on X, previously known as Twitter @Enrique_ReDo21.

This piece was adapted from Colombia Risk Analysis’ most recent “Special Report on the Local Elections“

All opinions and content are solely the opinions of the authors and do not represent the viewpoints of Global Americans.

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According to United Nations data, 26 percent of the world’s migrant population lives in the Americas, which means that migrants make up 7 percent of the region’s total population as of 2020. Of this total, 58.7 million are in North America, and 14.8 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to UNHCR’s 2022 Global Trends in Forced Displacement Report, by the end of 2022, at least 108.4 million people had been forcibly displaced globally. In the Americas, 9.2 million people moved across international borders. This figure represents an increase of 950 percent in the last ten years. Why do people move across the Americas?

The push factors are multiple and observe variations from country to country. However, in general terms, people migrate or are forcibly displaced due to increasing levels of violence and citizen insecurity, the forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime activities. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence are also important factors which particularly affect women and children. Added to this are persistent economic and structural causes, such as a weak rule of law, corruption, high poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities (especially for women, young people, and other vulnerable groups), food insecurity, and more recently the effects of climate change. This increase in human mobility across cities of the Americas poses opportunities for receiving countries but also challenges, and it is often local governments the ones responsible for providing the first response.

A recent study published by the Organization of American States and other partners entitled “The Role of Local Governments in the Reception and Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Cities of the Americas” confirms these trends. It proposes that there are opportunities for the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, and it shows that local actors can play a key role in the reception and integration of this population. Despite numerous challenges, the cases presented in the study demonstrate that with political will, innovative ideas, respect for human rights, and the support of international organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and the media, progress can be made at the local level to ensure a successful reception and integration of migrants and refugees in the region.

Based on the results of 231 interviews in 109 localities in 25 countries, the study proposes at least four lessons to capitalize on the work being done by the local governments facing these arrivals. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that local governments do not operate in a vacuum when working on the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, but there is an important influence of national governments on local actions—both in positive and negative ways. Migration policies are usually established at the national level, and local governments must respond with these in mind. It is, therefore, no surprise that for most local governments, coordination with national policies represents one of their main challenges. Another factor that also influences their work (and often supports it) is that of civil society and international organizations. They play a key role in most of the localities studied, and fill institutional gaps to meet the needs of migrants and refugees.

A second lesson from the study refers to the variation in local structures and capacities across cities in the Americas. Indeed, the study confirms that there is significant diversity in the structures and capacities of the 109 localities studied in the report. On one side of the spectrum, there are localities with a long migratory history and with resources which have stable structures designed to provide services to migrants and refugees. As documented in the study, some examples include the Mayor’s Office for Migration Affairs in New York City in the United States and the Coordination of Policies for Immigrants and Promotion of Decent Employment of São Paulo in Brazil. Other cities are facing new migratory dynamics, which has pressured their governments and have had to rely on international organizations as they develop local response initiatives, such as seen in several non-border localities in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

At the other end of the spectrum are border localities that are generally isolated and have few resources to respond comprehensively to the needs of migrants and refugees. These include border or rural cities that are in people’s migratory trajectories. One example is the locality of Darien in the border between Colombia and Panama. Lastly, in terms of capacities, although there are still significant gaps, training programs for local officials on issues of reception and integration of migrants were reported in 47 percent of the localities assessed. It is important to emphasize, however, that 42 percent of these programs are based on normative and rights issues, and do not focus on practical aspects of policy design and implementation.

Thirdly, the report also indicates that most local government actors prioritize socio-economic integration, followed by reception, although needs and priorities vary by type of locality. This suggests that upon arrival, cities really need to provide access for migrants and refugees to goods and services—including employment—to meet their basic needs and those of their families. The pre-condition for this access is providing them with regularization options or legal pathways. It is worth highlighting that for border localities in particular, the priority was reception, although this was often understood as the rapid processing of people and not as the comprehensive provision of services for the population. Lastly, in some of the newer destinations, in the absence of sufficient social networks that can provide support to migrants and refugees in host communities, there is greater awareness, urgency, and need for local actors to provide adequate reception and socio-economic integration services. One common challenge for cities evaluated in the report is counting on disaggregated and updated information on migrants at the local level to facilitate the creation and access to appropriate reception and integration services.

One last lesson the study points to refers to political integration and the often-ignored aspect of migrant and refugee integration. In this regard, the study confirms that there is still a long way to go to achieve political integration. In most of the localities studied in the report, there are almost no mechanisms for the political participation of migrants and refugees. Access to identity documents was identified as the main hurdle in this area. Concerning identity documents, it is important to highlight very innovative practices coming from cities to provide identification to these arrivals, who may not always carry a passport or ID with them. The study shows different models of municipal identification that have been adopted in Mexico City and in localities across the United States. Regarding political participation, in cities such as Bogota and São Paulo, permanent spaces for political participation have been developed for migrants and refugees. However, there is a long way to go and a pressing need to adopt an official narrative that presents migrants and refugees as neighbors, newcomers, and citizens and also to encourage social cohesion not only within migrant spaces but in other broader community spaces.

Although the focus on the local level is not entirely new, this report provides one of the first regional perspectives at a continental scale on migration and protection institutions and policies in the Americas, thanks to its comprehensive and diverse voices. What is novel is that it covers a wide variety of localities in a region that is profoundly diverse in terms of structures, institutional frameworks, and capacities, It reflects the perspectives of individuals on the ground who are directly involved in the challenges and opportunities posed by the reception and integration of migrants and refugees. The common denominator that emerges from the analysis is that these cities have been creating positive innovations to provide protection and better opportunities for the populations settled in their territories. It is precisely these positive innovations of receiving, protecting, and integrating that should be replicated and promoted at the hemispheric level.

The opinions in this article are personal. They do not represent those of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian is the Director of the Department of Social Inclusion at the Secretariat for Access to Rights and Equity within the Organization of American States (OAS). As Director, she oversees the OAS’s efforts to promote social inclusion and access to human rights, with a particular focus on vulnerable populations. Additionally, Betilde is a founding member and coordinator of the Network of Latin American Female Political Scientists, known as #NoSinMujeres. This project aims to promote and empower women’s work in Latin American Political Science. Betilde holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University.

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On August 13th, libertarian Javier Milei became the most-voted candidate in the primary elections in Argentina, with his political party La Libertad Avanza also securing the highest number of votes. In this manner, he outperformed both the Juntos coalition candidates (formed and led by former President Mauricio Macri) and Kirchnerist candidate Sergio Massa, current Minister of Economy. The far-right candidate surprised everyone by emerging victorious in an election that was anticipated to be more closely contested, securing 30 percent of the votes. This outcome was unexpected as most polls had placed him in third position. Consequently, Milei may be Argentina’s next president for the 2023-2027 term.

What would a Javier Milei presidency look like? Most of the analyses attempting to address this question refer to the candidate’s ambitious and controversial proposals. These include a profound State reform aimed at reducing public expenditure, the elimination of the Central Bank, and the dollarization of the economy, which stand out as some of his most popular ideas. Nonetheless, significantly less attention has been paid to Milei’s foreign policy views, how he sees the world, and Argentina’s position. Of course, foreign policy is seldom among the top issues on a presidential candidate’s agenda in Argentina, as well as voters’ interest. This is arguably reasonable in a country with enormous macroeconomic problems, including over 120 percent annual inflation.

Consequently, this article aims to dissect some elements embedded within Milei and some of his key team members that could offer insights into how Argentina’s foreign policy might unfold under a Milei administration. In pursuit of this goal, we will closely examine Milei’s stance towards Argentina’s most crucial international partners: the U.S. and the Western world, China and its South American partners, as well as the Mercosur trade bloc. 

The “Trump of the Pampas” and Argentina’s Main Partners

In a recent interview, Milei expressed that his key international allies would be the United States and Israel, also mentioning his intention to relocate Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It’s hard not to draw parallels between this statement and the striking similarities to Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right former president of Brazil often referred to as “the Trump of the tropics.”

If that comparison holds true for Bolsonaro, a similar case could be made for Milei as the “Trump of the Pampas.” There are several resemblances between these three leaders, including their employment of populist rhetoric, their articulation of societal dissatisfaction with established politicians, and their conservative outlook on social issues. They also share the identification of socialism, currently manifested as “cultural Marxism” as their central adversary. Remarkably, the announcement regarding the embassy’s move to Jerusalem mirrors the actions of these former presidents (though it’s worth noting that Bolsonaro never successfully executed this move).

While it appears evident that Milei will strive for alignment with the West, it’s equally pertinent to acknowledge that neither Trump nor Bolsonaro currently holds power. As he navigates the international stage, Milei will encounter Western leaders who, for the most part, stand as political adversaries to them (such as Joe Biden) or, at the very least, have displayed substantial divergences. Notably, G7 leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau fall into this category due to their differing perspectives.

However, according to Diana Mondino–a Senior Economic Advisor to Milei and potentially his future Minister of Foreign Relations–Argentina’s approach will be establishing friendly relations with the U.S. and all democratic nations while reconsidering connections and agreements with “autocratic” counterparts. Thereby, Milei seems to be fully aligned with what some have called ‘The Biden Doctrine,’ which identifies the contest between democracies and autocracies as the “center clash of our time.” What remains to be seen, though, is how the Biden administration would receive Javier Milei.

If this approach was implemented, it could trigger highly disruptive consequences for Argentina. This is because China plays an essential role as both a critical trading partner and a significant source of financial aid for Argentina, a country grappling with an exceedingly challenging fiscal predicament due to its International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt. Despite the stern stance Milei might take towards China, practical limitations would significantly curb his ability to execute such actions. The precarious financial situation makes the Chinese Swaps indispensable for Argentina’s survival in the midst of a severe shortage of foreign currency. Additionally, the influential agribusiness sector is unlikely to permit such measures, as China constitutes Argentina’s most paramount export market. Nonetheless, Milei could potentially succeed in creating political distance from China, such as withdrawing Argentina’s candidacy from the BRICS group.

Returning to the matter of relations with the U.S., it remains uncertain how the Biden administration would perceive Javier Milei. On the one hand, there are indications of the administration’s readiness to align with the U.S.’s crucial interests. Conversely, Milei’s strong association with Trump might complicate bilateral relations. Thus, Milei would need to strive to avoid cultivating a Bolsonaro-like dynamic with the White House.

Concerning relations with neighboring countries, Milei has not extensively commented on this matter. One might anticipate challenges in the relationship with Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, given Milei’s affinity with Bolsonaro, whose politically prominent son Eduardo recently rallied support for him after his victory. Regarding the Mercosur trade bloc, Milei had previously advocated for its dissolution a few years back, akin to Trump’s approach towards NAFTA upon assuming office. However, Mondino has conveyed a notably more moderate stance, suggesting that it should be revitalized, potentially aligning with Uruguay’s viewpoint of flexibilization. Regarding Uruguay, the libertarian candidate has expressed a measured level of criticism towards President Lacalle Pou, asserting that he is “far from being a liberal” while acknowledging him as a “genuine Keynesian.” Last but not least, Milei maintains a strong ally in Chile’s far-right candidate José Antonio Kast, who is considered one of the frontrunners for the 2025 presidential elections.

Conclusions

Only two months separate us from Argentina’s general election. Despite the brevity of this timeframe, it can feel like a lifetime in a country like Argentina. Within the week following the primary elections, the government already devalued the official Peso-to-Dollar exchange rate by nearly 18 percent, and economic prices have surged considerably since August 14. In such a complex nation, anything can transpire within 60 days.

Nevertheless, Milei’s position appears, at the very least, formidable. In a country where circumstances are likely to worsen leading up to the October general elections, he holds the advantage of symbolizing the “real” change for the nation, given his lack of prior public office. Consequently, closely monitoring his campaign and proposals will be pivotal. Foreign policy is often marginalized in such analyses, despite its significance for a country that offers numerous opportunities due to its abundance of natural resources, such as food, critical minerals, and renewable energies.

Despite the Trump-like “hawkish” narrative that Milei presents concerning foreign policy, he will face a challenging landscape that might constrain his intentions. The absence of like-minded governments in the region could potentially leave Argentina isolated within the area, at least until Chile’s 2025 elections, where Kast might emerge victorious. However, if Milei were to secure the presidency, the most pivotal geopolitical factor he would need to monitor would be the U.S. elections, particularly if Trump emerges as the GOP nominee. An ideal scenario for the international position Milei envisions for Argentina would involve him as president this year alongside a Trump win in the United States.

A Milei presidency holds the promise of ushering in substantial and disruptive changes to Argentina’s political and economic landscape. Its disruptive nature is already evident in its ability to challenge the dominance of the polarizing Juntos and Kirchnerist coalitions, which have controlled the political spectrum for the past decade. However, as we have previously explored in the context of foreign policy, it remains imperative to closely scrutinize the constraints that would shape his pursuit of the significant transformations he aims to enact.

Fernando Prats is a Senior Analyst at London Politca’s Latin America Desk. He also serves as a research and teaching assistant at Rosario National University in Argentina.

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Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first leftist president, entered office in August 2022, touting a “second chance” in the country’s ongoing efforts to fight crippling poverty and the constant specter of violence that stems from conflict between rebels, drug trafficking organizations, and the government. However, a series of scandals have tanked his approval ratings to the low 30s, putting his ambitious reform agenda at severe risk. With his internal political struggles becoming more prominent, the opposition Congress he faces creates a layer of obstacles that might be too much to overcome.

Despite his victory, Petro’s political party controls not even a quarter of the country’s congressional seats, only one governorship, and relatively few other leadership positions within the state—either at the federal or sub-national level. The coalition he created that led to him winning the presidency began to unravel almost as quickly as they cobbled it together. The center-right and right politicians Petro had convinced to create his support base quickly jumped ship even though some were given cabinet positions in return for their backing. The dissolution of his coalition is a prime example of how large groups are often prone to fragmentation, especially one including politicians from opposing ideological positions. 

Lawmakers that would push back on Petro’s agenda knew he would have to make concessions to turn any significant reforms into reality, putting an opposition Congress in the driver’s seat. The current political environment in Colombia’s executive-legislative relations exemplifies how such systems have evolved in the region. Throughout the course of Latin American history, political dissent and challenges to the status quo have been omnipresent features of its political landscape.

As distinct bodies or movements that counter the prevailing political powers, opposition congresses have often played pivotal roles in the evolution of Latin American democracies. They can also create new challenges that must be handled. The existence of strong opposition blocs within a legislative body can lead to deep-seated political polarization as well as mistrust from the public if corruption takes hold. Polarization can result in legislative gridlock, where essential bills and reforms stall because of political disagreements, preventing smooth governance. A legislative logjam might also encourage someone in Petro’s position, for example, to lean toward democratic backsliding to advance his agenda rather than operating within the constraints of the existing system. These relationships have lasting effects on coalition politics, executive-level objectives, and international relations.

The 20th Century: Opposition in the Shadow of Authoritarianism

Throughout the 20^th century, Latin America faced a recurring cycle of democratically elected governments being overthrown by military coups or authoritarian rulers. In many cases, these regimes dissolved or strictly controlled existing legislative bodies. This repression spurred the creation of alternative congresses or opposition bodies in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

In 1976, for instance, Argentina’s military junta dissolved the National Congress, leading opposition leaders and exiled politicians to create informal platforms for political dissent. Similarly, during Pinochet’s regime in Chile, the opposition formed clandestine assemblies to challenge the dictatorship. Opposition congresses in 20^th-century Latin America were adaptive entities, evolving in response to the region’s shifting political landscapes. While their forms varied, their consistent objective was to challenge, balance, or reform the prevailing powers, with a notable emphasis on championing democratic values and human rights.

The Turn of the Century: A Revitalized Commitment to Democracy?

In the 21st century, Latin America’s political landscape experienced significant changes, marked by the rise of left-leaning governments, a reassertion of democracy in some regions, and persistent challenges to democratic institutions in others. Opposition congresses, reflecting these dynamics, have evolved in behavior, approach, and significance. The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a significant shift in the Latin American political paradigm. With the decline of Cold War-era geopolitics, many countries embarked on a process of democratic transition. Opposition congresses in this period often transitioned from clandestine operations to legitimate political parties and movements.

Yet, challenges persisted. In Venezuela, the early 21st century saw significant political polarization, with the National Assembly at times in direct opposition to President Hugo Chávez and later Nicolás Maduro. This led to the creation of parallel legislative bodies, highlighting the region’s continued relevance of opposition congresses. Some countries have witnessed more collaborative dynamics between the government and opposition, with congresses playing a constructive role. For instance, in Uruguay and Chile, despite ideological differences, there have been instances of legislative collaboration on key national issues.

The 21^st century has been a period of significant dynamism for Latin American politics. Opposition congresses, reflecting the broader socio-political currents, have showcased a spectrum of effectiveness. Their roles have been pivotal in shaping the political discourse, with both positive and negative outcomes. They’ve shown adaptive qualities, navigating challenges, and seizing opportunities to play a crucial role in the region’s evolving democratic tapestry. At times, their behavior underscores the resilience of democratic aspirations, even in the face of formidable challenges.

Nevertheless, while they have played instrumental roles in holding governments accountable and ensuring democratic checks and balances, there have also been instances where their actions have led to political instability and weakened democratic processes. Peru, for example, has witnessed a series of confrontations between the executive and legislative branches, with both sides at times using their powers in ways that led to accusations of overreach.

Latin America’s turbulent political history has seen the rise and fall of numerous opposition congresses. Whether challenging colonial rule, authoritarian regimes, or democratically elected governments, these bodies have consistently played a critical role in advocating for political change and representing dissenting voices. As Latin America continues its democratic journey, understanding the legacy of these opposition bodies offers crucial insights into the region’s quest for genuine democracy.

Committing to the Democratic Process

In Latin America, as in other regions, an opposition congress can create a multi-faceted legitimacy tribulation within the government. An opposition-majority congress may question the legitimacy of an election, especially if there are allegations of fraud or misconduct. The 2019 Bolivian general elections serve as a case. Accusations of electoral fraud led to civil unrest and eventually to a political crisis that culminated in the resignation of then-President Evo Morales. Opposition congresses can contest amendments or reforms introduced by the executive branch, framing them as undemocratic or as power grabs. In various countries like Venezuela and Ecuador, attempts by leaders to change constitutional term limits or concentrate powers were criticized and challenged by opposition factions.

Opposition congresses can set up investigative commissions into alleged government corruption, human rights abuses, or other misconducts. If they uncover wrongdoing, these investigations can seriously undermine a country’s Executive branch’s legitimacy. Brazil’s Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato) scandal, which started as a money laundering investigation, eventually implicated various government officials and business leaders, undermining the legitimacy of multiple administrations. A similar situation could develop for Petro and the ongoing scandal involving his son and corruption charges. Using its platform in Congress, Colombia’s opposition can rally public support against the government, leading to protests, strikes, and other forms of civil unrest. Protests in countries like Venezuela, Chile and Ecuador have seen opposition factions in Congress play supportive or even leading roles in mobilizing public sentiment against ruling administrations. Recent protests against Petro’s reform plans could also lead in this direction.

While opposition congresses play a crucial role in ensuring checks and balances in Latin American democracies, the complexities they introduce are far-reaching and multifaceted. These challenges underscore the need for mature political behavior, open dialogue, and a steadfast commitment to democratic norms from all political actors. Across various countries, opposition parties have not only served as vital counterweights to ruling parties but also as a catalyst for essential political reforms. Yet, the very nature of opposition can lead to political polarization, gridlock, or even instability if not managed with sagacity and restraint. Mature political behavior requires a willingness to compromise and recognize the legitimacy of differing viewpoints rather than resorting to obstruction or confrontation. Open dialogue fosters a culture of respect and understanding, encouraging collaboration even amidst ideological differences. Finally, unwavering adherence to democratic norms ensures that these differences do not undermine the foundational principles of governance but rather strengthen the resilience and integrity of the political system. Together, these elements shape a political environment where opposition does not equate to antagonism—especially the violent form—and where critical voices contribute to, rather than detract from, a flourishing democratic landscape.

Jeffery Allen Tobin is a researcher for the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy specializing in democratization, corruption, and migration. He is a political science doctoral candidate at Florida International University. He was a journalist for more than 20 years.

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I knew Fernando Villavicencio Valencia, a crusader against corruption and candidate in Ecuador’s August 20 presidential elections, who was assassinated on August 9 as he was leaving a political rally in the auditorium of a high school in the northern suburbs of Quito. Although for some the magnitude and complexity of Villavicencio’s accusations could strain credibility, for me, he was a good man, driven by a passion to call out endemic high-level corruption in Ecuador, no matter who he offended or how many enemies he made in the process.

I first met him in Washington, D.C. in July 2013, where he was promoting his new book Ecuador: Made in China. Fernando’s book provided detailed data on how elites tied to the populist anti-U.S. regime of Rafael Correa in Ecuador had made millions of dollars in bribes and illicit earnings from shady deals with Chinese companies in the country’s petroleum and energy sectors. My interactions with him in the years that followed, and his later work on China-linked corruption in Ecuador, The Petroleum Holiday, profoundly shaped my thinking about the tragic results when well-resourced PRC-based companies, open to conferring “personalistic benefits,” engage in non-transparent business with corrupt politicized governments whose policies have eliminated more attractive options. 

The Correa regime persecuted Fernando for what he exposed. In 2014, an Ecuadoran court sentenced him to 18 months in jail for insulting the president, forcing him into hiding in the Ecuadoran Amazon. In 2016, another incarceration order for publicly revealing Correa emails he had secretly obtained obliged him to flee to Peru until Correa departed from the presidency in 2017. Once Correa was out of office, evidence vindicating Fernando’s crusade poured forth for years. In 2020, Correa was sentenced to eight years in prison for corruption in a wide-ranging case involving his Vice President Jorge Glas and 19 of the former president’s other government and business associates.

With respect to public works projects, the Sinohydro-built Coca Coda Dam arguably came to stand as a pharaonic monument to shady deals that Fernando had decried, benefitting Correa and his cronies but a disastrous waste of money for the nation. China’s Coca Coda Sinclair, which ultimately led to the prosecution of Correa’s then Vice President and later successor Lenin Moreno for bribery, was so poorly designed and built that it was diagnosed by an independent audit with thousands of structural cracks, preventing it from generating at full capacity. Meanwhile, the hydrological pressures from the water the dam retained caused massive erosion leading the Coca River to reroute itself. They led to the rupture of the country’s main oil export pipeline, which traversed the affected area.

For me, following his persecution by Correa, it was fitting that Villavicencio was elected to the National Assembly in May 2021 following Correa’s departure and came to serve as the head of its anti-corruption commission. Ironically, the enemies that Fernando made in his anti-corruption crusade make it difficult to establish who killed him.

Villavicencio pushed “rooting out the mafias” that had come to dominate the Ecuadoran political system and economy at the center of his presidential campaign. In the immediate aftermath of his murder, six Colombians and a Venezuelan were arrested for suspected involvement, suggesting a link to the Colombia-based narco-groups who, in conjunction with the Mexican Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) cartels, had exported their cocaine through Ecuador’s Pacific ports. In the days prior to his murder, Fernando had received death threats from the Choneros, one of the local gangs working with Colombian and Mexican narcos which have terrorized Ecuador. Individuals supposedly representing the Chonero’s rival, the Lobos, also claimed responsibility for Villavicencio’s deaths—although others, also claiming to represent the Lobos, denied the claim.

Fernando’s anti-corruption crusade had led him to accuse 21 candidates in Ecuador’s February 2023 local elections of ties to narco-trafficking. Just days before his assassination, Villavicencio made public photos associating Raisa Vulgarin, legislative candidate for Rafael Correa’s Revolution Ciudadano party, with Nicolas Petro, the son of Colombia’s president, who is cooperating with Colombian authorities after being caught taking money from narco-traffickers. Fernando had also denounced the alleged involvement of radical leftist Colombian Senator Piedad Cordoba and criminally convicted Venezuelan Chavista Tarek William Saab in money laundering involving narco-trafficking groups in Ecuador.

In the days before his assassination, a poll put Fernando number two in the race with 13 percent of the vote, behind Luisa Gonzalez with 27 percent. He thus had a significant chance to make it to the second round, where Villavicencio’s focus on Correa administration corruption and Gonzalez’s ties to the former president would likely have given Villavicencio a real chance of winning, rallying Ecuadorans fed up with the scourge of narco money and narco violence in their country, similar to what has occurred in Guatemala with previously unknown anti-corruption candidate Bernardo Arevalo, now leading in the polls there.

Fernando thus had a plausible path to the Ecuadoran presidency, creating a risk of him working from a position of authority to dismantle webs of corruption involving not only Rafael Correa, his cronies, and the Chinese companies he built his presidential administration around but also the broader penetration of the Ecuadoran economy and political system by international criminal organizations.

Fernando Villavicencio’s murder will likely significantly impact the outcome of Ecuador’s election in a country already traumatized by an explosion of violence as local gangs, backed by foreign narco-trafficking organizations, have gone to war against each other and launched a campaign of terror against the Ecuadoran state. President Lasso’s declaration of a 60-day state of emergency, and the suspension by many of the presidential contenders of their campaigns just 11 days before the election, has already affected its dynamics. 

Ecuadoran Senator Luisa Gonzalez, closely tied to Rafael Correa, stands to benefit from Fernando’s “absence” and his drumbeat of declarations of the corruption and malfeasance of the exiled populist Godfather, who he called “the fugitive” for his flight to Belgium to avoid incarceration in Ecuador, and whose legacy Gonzalez wishes to continue. Law and order candidate Jan Topic, who has built his campaign around social media calls for a heavy-handed approach to gangs, similar to that adopted by immensely popular El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, also stands to benefit from Ecuadoran outrage over Fernando’s assassination and the focus it puts on violence in the country. Yet the implications of a victory by Topic are also troubling. The Topic family businesses Telconet and Netlife are tied to documented bribes paid by the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht through Chinese banks, possibly also linking Topic financially to Correa’s Vice President George Glas.

The outcome of Ecuador’s presidential election will be strategically significant for the region. The country is one of only three remaining in South America with center-right governments disposed to collaborate with the United States on major strategic issues. The return to power of Correa’s “Citizen Revolution” movement, or candidates financially or ideologically tied to him, would complement the consolidation of power by anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Cuba. It would also turn to more radical, China-friendly policies by regimes in Brazil, Honduras, El Salvador, and others to profoundly erode U.S. influence in the region to which we are intimately connected by bonds of geography, commerce, and family.

As I have watched the unfolding tragedy of Latin America these past years, the bad news has seldom been so personal as Fernando’s assassination. He was a colleague who profoundly shaped my thinking on the corruption and disastrous results when populist regimes such as Rafael Correa embrace business with China in non-transparent, politicized deals which are “win-win” only for the populist elites who sign the deals and their Chinese counterparts. For me, that tragedy would turn to farce if Fernando’s murder paved the way for the return to influence of the very malevolent figures he spent his career and repeatedly risked his liberty and life seeking to expose.

Evan Ellis is Latin Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed by the author are his own and do not necessarily represent his institution or the U.S. government. The author would like to thank Santiago Najera, among others, for their input to this work.

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On August 13, Argentina holds the first of three rounds of elections, which will determine who will assume office as the country’s next president on December 10. The primary is formally a preparatory contest to decide who will be the presidential candidate of every party or alliance in the general election. However, the August 13 primary also will reveal the true support among Argentine voters enjoyed by the principal candidates and alliances in a way the country’s contradictory and oft-questioned public opinion surveys do not.

Argentina’s 2023 federal election calendar includes the August 13 primary election, the October 22 presidential and legislative elections, and a likely November 19 presidential runoff election. The Argentine primary election process is relatively unique in that participation is compulsory for all voters ages 18 to 69 (it is optional for those 16 and 17, and 70 and older), mandatory for all parties and alliances (even if they have only one presidential candidate), and simultaneous (all held on the same day and organized by the Argentine government). The August 13 results will provide five valuable pieces of information as we move toward the October general election. 

The Juntos por el Cambio Presidential Primary

This primary will determine whether Patricia Bullrich or Horacio Rodríguez Larreta will be the presidential candidate of the principal opposition Juntos por el Cambio alliance (JxC). Both candidates belong to Propuesta Federal (PRO), the senior member of the JxC alliance, which also includes the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and several smaller parties. Bullrich served as the Minister of Security for the JxC’s Mauricio Macri when he was president from 2015 to 2019, and Macri is informally backing her in the primary.  Rodríguez Larreta has been the Chief Executive of the City of Buenos Aires (CABA) for the past eight years. Bullrich is widely perceived to be more conservative, more enthusiastic about dramatically changing the status quo in Argentina, and less open to negotiating and working with Peronists than Rodríguez Larreta. Whoever wins the JxC primary will be favored to become Argentina’s next president.

The Unión por la Patria Presidential Primary

This primary will determine the margin by which the current Minister of Economy, Sergio Massa, captures the nomination of the governing Peronist Unión por la Patria (UP). The incumbent president, Alberto Fernández, is not seeking re-election, and former president (2007-2015) and current Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who also opted not to run, tapped Massa to be the UP’s standard bearer. 

Massa assumed office as the “Super” Minister of Economy in August of 2022 and was able to prevent the country from experiencing a meltdown that could have resulted in hyperinflation, civil unrest, and political instability. While Massa stabilized the situation, he has been unable to resolve some of Argentina’s most pressing problems. These include inflation (currently at an annual rate of over 100 percent), sluggish economic growth (projected to be between 1 and -1 percent in 2023), and a currency crisis where the country’s reserves are nearly exhausted, imports are being heavily restricted, and the Argentine Peso’s official exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. Dollar is approximately half that in the informal market.

Massa will face off in the UP primary with a candidate from the Peronist Movement’s left wing, Juan Grabois, a social activist with close ties to Pope Francis from the Pope’s time working with impoverished communities in the Buenos Aires metro region. Massa will defeat Grabois, with the only question being his margin of victory.

A Voter Census of Individual Candidates and Alliance Support

The primaries together will reveal the overall level of voter support for the leading individual presidential candidates as well as for their alliances. There is a general public and elite distrust in Argentine polls due to the range of contradictory vote projections that have been released this cycle by different firms, the increasing difficulty faced by Argentine pollsters in getting people to respond to surveys (a global phenomenon), and the practice of some pollsters of publishing false results to aid or hurt a candidate.

The overall proportion of the vote won by three individual candidates will be especially important to gauge their core support heading into the general election campaign. First is the proportion won by the victor of the JxC primary (Bullrich or Rodríguez Larreta). Second is the proportion won by Massa. Third is the proportion won by the populist, right-wing, and anti-system candidate Javier Milei of Libertad Avanza. Also important will be the comparative vote proportions won by the two JxC candidates combined, the two UP candidates combined and Milei, which will provide an important baseline for what the October 22 results would look like assuming the victorious JxC and UP candidates are able to retain the lion’s share of their primary rival’s vote in October.

Minor Presidential Candidates and The Primary Threshold

In addition to the five mentioned top-tier candidates, there are an additional 21 presidential candidates from 12 alliances competing on August 13. Two-thirds (14) are competing within an alliance with multiple presidential candidates, while the other seven are their party or alliance’s sole candidate. In order to qualify to participate in the October 22 presidential election, a party or alliance must win at least 1.5 percent of the valid presidential vote on August 13. 

Only three of these 12 other parties and alliances have a realistic prospect of crossing the 1.5 percent threshold. The most likely to cross is Hacemos por Nuestro País, whose presidential candidate is the Peronist governor of the Province of Córdoba, Juan Schiaretti. Next is the far-left Frente de Izquierda y los Trabajadores-Unidad (FIT-U), which has two candidates competing in its primary, national deputy Myriam Bregman and CABA legislator Gabriel Solano, with Bregman strongly favored to win. The alliance most at risk of not crossing the threshold is Principios y Valores, whose main presidential candidate (there are four other minor candidates) is Peronist Guillermo Moreno. Moreno was in charge of price controls during the Fernández de Kirchner administration. None of these candidates have any hope of victory, and the main impact of their presence on the October ballot would be to increase the already high probability of a November runoff.

Post-Primary Campaign Strategy

The outcome of the JxC primary will be highly consequential for the campaign strategies of both Massa and Milei. In Argentina, if no candidate in the first-round wins either 45 percent plus one of the vote or 40 percent of the vote with the second-place candidate trailing by 10 percent or more of the vote, then a runoff is held between the top two finishers. Unless the JxC, UP, or Milei craters between now and October, a runoff is a virtual certainty.

If the more moderate and consensual Rodríguez Larreta is the JxC standard bearer, both Massa and Milei will likely adopt a strategy of trying to push as many Bullrich primary voters as possible to vote for the more conservative Milei rather than, the more moderate Rodríguez Larreta, with the goal of keeping Rodríguez Larreta out of the November runoff. Massa would have a very difficult time defeating Rodríguez Larreta in a runoff but would be favored to defeat the extreme and erratic Milei in a second round. For Milei, his only route to the runoff and the presidency under this scenario would involve peeling off a substantial number of JxC voters who cast a ballot for Bullrich on August 13.

If the more hawkish and confrontational Bullrich is the JxC standard bearer, then Massa will likely adopt a strategy of contrasting his more centrist and flexible position on a wide range of issues with the more conservative and rigid positions of Bullrich, with the goal of trying to convince a majority of Argentines that Bullrich is “too extreme” for Argentina. A Bullrich primary victory would close the door on any hope Milei might have of making it to a runoff unless economic and social conditions deteriorate dramatically over the subsequent two months such that Massa’s candidacy becomes untenable—which is unlikely.

Politics and Government in 2024 and Beyond

Whoever is sworn in as Argentina’s next president on December 10 will face the herculean challenge of addressing the country’s myriad economic, political, and societal problems. It is a challenge that many Argentine presidents have faced but which none have successfully overcome. However, as hope springs eternal, it is always possible that a future presidency of Patricia Bullrich, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, or Sergio Massa will be the one to succeed where all others have failed. For Argentina’s sake, let’s pray that this is the case.

Mark P. Jones is the Joseph D. Jamail Chair in Latin American Studies at Rice University.  He also directs the Argentina Program and Master of Global Affairs Program and co-directs the Presidential Elections Program at Rice’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy.  Jones has conducted research in Argentina since 1990 and has published more than 50 articles and book chapters on Argentine politics, government, and society. 

The post The Opening of the 2023 Presidential Election Season in Argentina: the August 13 Primaries appeared first on Global Americans.

Despite being a federalist country, Buenos Aires’ prevalence against the rest of the country’s provinces has been tangible, and its political realm is no exception. Since the return of democracy in 1983, at least one member in each winning presidential ticket has been from Buenos Aires. What’s more, according to polls for the 2023 election, the presidential candidates that performed best were all from Buenos Aires. While most people are currently focused on the presidential race that has once again become a competition between inhabitants of the city and province of Buenos Aires, in recent weeks, the region has witnessed and staged events that will significantly impact the upcoming general elections. The unfortunate electoral performances of Javier Milei-aligned candidates in several provinces, the disappearance of Cecilia Strzyzowski in Chaco, and the recent social uprising in Jujuy all suggest a necessity to pay greater attention to local political scenarios.

Javier Milei’s Strikes of Defeat

Javier Milei, a far-right candidate, has transformed Argentina’s political landscape in recent years. Back in 2021, Milei became the third largest force in the city of Buenos Aires elections upon attaining an impressive 17 percent of votes during his first run for office in the Chamber of Deputies. Since then, the Milei phenomenon only continued to grow. More recently, several polls have shown that Milei has transformed the Argentine political landscape from bipartisanship to an “elección de tercios” (election of thirds, i.e., three parties with similar figures of voting intention) between the governing coalition Frente de Todos (now Union por la Patria), the opposition coalition Juntos por el Cambio, and La Libertad Avanza. This new scenario has created expectations for Milei’s possible high electoral performance in the upcoming presidential elections.  

However, Milei has yet to be able to replicate his success in the provincial elections. The candidates from his political party have all shown poor electoral results, and in some elections, Milei’s party did not have any candidates running at all. This series of disappointing outcomes in the provinces have already started to sow doubts regarding the feasibility of Milei’s presidency. These defeats showcased the failure of Milei’s party to establish itself beyond Buenos Aires and its absence of a strong national strategy. Moreover, these results demonstrated that the party is struggling to find alternative figures to Milei that can track votes.

The stark contrast between Milei’s great numbers in the electoral polls and the provincial results puts into question the feasibility of the far-right candidate’s presidential aspirations. In a scenario where Milei wins the elections, these local outcomes question the governability during his hypothetical presidency. Governors, deputies, and senators are veto actors that may be insurmountable obstacles to the enactment of the president’s government program. How would Milei govern without majorities in the Legislative chambers, nor any provincial governors from his party?

Chaco: The Case of Cecilia Strzyzowski

Days before the primary elections in June, members of the Sena family—César Sena, Emerenciano Sena, and Marcela Acuña—were arrested for the disappearance of 28-year-old Cecilia Strzyzowski. National outlets quickly picked up the event as the Sena’s enjoy great influence in the province of Chaco’s political scene, and deep connections with current Governor Capitanich. In addition, both Emerenciano and Marcela are precandidates in the Frente Chaqueño, the governor’s party. Thousands took to the streets of Resistencia (Chaco’s capital) to protest, while the opposition criticized the government’s silence. Eventually, Governor Capitanich expressed his support for the victim’s family and distanced himself from the Sena’s.

The involvement of the Sena family in Cecilia’s disappearance created an enormous dilemma for the national governing party. On the one hand, Capitanich’s relationship with Kirchnerism is very strategic given the political capital and influence that the governor enjoys in the province. Notedly, Capitanich’s win in the upcoming September elections is the only hope that the government has of maintaining control over Chaco. Additionally, Governor Capitanich has been a historic ally of Kirchnerism, and one of the strongest voices of support within Peronism for Cristina Kirchner’s presidential candidacy. On the other hand, some media outlets increasingly suggest that Capitanich gave millions in public funds to the Sena’s foundation up until their arrests, and that the family even communicated with the governor after the crime. Despite Capitanich’s public denials of these allegations, the profound controversy surrounding the case makes it nearly impossible for the governing party to maintain public ties with him.

Apart from the support of the outgoing President Fernández –whose positive image has fallen to historic lows and has been isolated within his coalition–, no significant Kirchnerist figure has expressed any comment regarding the case, which seems as though the government’s strategy has been to remain silent. However, this may change in the upcoming party congress in Chaco as the main Peronist presidential candidate Sergio Massa will be present alongside Governor Capitanich. Lingering questions therefore remain surrounding the party’s future. For instance, how long can the silence last without hurting the strategic relationship with Capitanich? Will the government abandon one of its key political figures and risk losing any chance of governing Chaco for the next four years? Or will the party support him and risk negatively affecting its performance in the upcoming national elections?

Jujuy: Constitutional Reform and Social Uprising

On May 22, 2023, a popularly-elected Constitutional Convention began working to reform the provincial constitution, with some aspects causing great controversy. Amongst some of the proposals, the reforms would eliminate mid-term elections and establish that the winning party would obtain half plus one of the legislators in the provincial Chamber of Deputies. The proposal also includes the prohibition of any disturbance to the right to free circulation and the modification of the right to private property, which could potentially hurt the indigenous people’s rights as the majority of the population lack property titles over their lands. However, this measure would be of great interest to the government of Jujuy since some indigenous territories sit next to salt flats, which have great potential for lithium extraction.

The Constitutional Convention quickly approved the constitutional reform on June 15, which erupted massive protests throughout the province and beyond, becoming a matter of national scope. Responding police repression has since left 170 injured and 68 detained and has been criticized by several human rights organizations.

The conflict became a dispute between Argentina’s main political parties. Governor Morales quickly took to Twitter to accuse President Fernández, Vice President Cristina Kirchner, Kirchnerism, and “the left” of instigating violence in his province. Moreover, the main figures of Juntos por el Cambio gathered to publicly support Morales and assign the responsibility for the situation to the national government, showing a unified front after weeks of explosive fights within the coalition. Peronism also closed ranks in the face of the situation. President Fernández and Cristina Kirchner took to Twitter to condemn the ongoing situation in Jujuy and to criticize Governor Morales. Several Peronist figures joined the condemnation, calming down the existing tensions within the movement.

The ongoing situation in Jujuy is another example of a provincial stage impacting the national reality and the upcoming elections. Both the governing and opposition coalitions have been immersed in increasing public confrontations that have threatened the unity of the coalitions. However, the situation in Jujuy gave them an occasion to reach a consensus and show the electorate a strong position of unity that had been absent for some time. Moreover, the events gave Gerardo Morales massive support across the spectrum of his coalition. This will increase Morales’ public acknowledgment within the electorate and potentially strengthen his presidential formula alongside Horacio Rodríguez Larreta.

The Importance of Looking at Provincial Stages

The developing events in the provinces demonstrate the importance of looking at local scenarios to analyze Argentina’s national politics. Javier Milei’s presidential aspirations are being questioned after his poor electoral results in several provinces. In Chaco, Kirchnerism is at risk of losing one of its strongest and long-lasting political allies, in addition to control over the region. In Jujuy, Governor Morales has gained enormous public notoriety and strong support from his coalition, and both the government and the opposition have shown previously unimaginable images of unity. It is still impossible to assess the true impact of these provincial situations. Still, it calls for reconsidering how we approach analyzing upcoming elections in Argentina and national politics. The political analysis ought to understand that only focusing on the presidential race in Buenos Aires means losing a fundamental unit of scrutiny: the provincial stages.   

Salvador Lescano is a former intern of Global Americans and holds a bachelor’s degree in International Studies with a minor in Government from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. He currently works as an Assistant to the General Project Coordination in Consultancy for biomass projects at LIGNIS.

The post It Is Time to Look Beyond Buenos Aires appeared first on Global Americans.

Leaders of the world’s democracies, convening a few months ago in South Korea, pitched the tagline “Democracy Delivers…opportunities, digital freedom, prosperity, free elections.” etc.  However well-intentioned, the messaging missed the mark. By touting the benefits of democracy, the leaders directed their message to those in failing democracies, not to lose hope and fall for the siren song of rising populist autocrats. In doing so, these democratic leaders fundamentally failed to understand the modern autocrat’s appeal. This failure continues to result in the autocrats winning at the ballot box. In 2022 Freedom House found that autocracy is making gains against democracy and encouraging emergent leaders to abandon the democratic path. Countries that suffered democratic declines in 2022 outnumbered those that improved by two to one.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in our own Western Hemisphere. In 2000, thirty-four of thirty-five countries in our Hemisphere were nominal electoral democracies.  Since then, these democratic governments have simply not delivered for their people.  As a region, Latin America has the greatest income inequality in the world.  Access to education, health, and social services remains at some of the lowest levels in the world. Official corruption in too many of these countries is endemic. Covid put all of this in stark relief as unemployment (30% in some countries) eviscerated the then-growing middle class. It is no surprise that political instability has risen dramatically.  Even the now-faded promise of Free Trade Agreements between the U.S. and a dozen or so countries in the region has failed to provide enough opportunities for burgeoning young Latin populations, as reflected in migrant caravans headed for the U.S. Southern Border.

Democracy summiteers have correctly cited the foregoing as threats to democracy. However, where they have been tone-deaf is on the one issue that is having the most profound effect on instability, out-migration, and the embrace of populist autocrats in the region…the withering of state-provided public, or citizen, security. Democratic governments and leaders have failed to recognize that the provision of public security is THE primordial responsibility of government and that all too many governments in failing democracies have not delivered this essential condition. 

Latin America, in the absence of armed conflict, has the highest rates of crime and violence in the world. The region has ten times more homicides than Europe. In poll after poll, increasing numbers of Latin Americans are citing the degradation of public security as their biggest concern. A recent poll in Ecuador cited a whopping 85% of the respondents claiming that spiking violence is their chief concern. In Ecuador, and neighboring Andean states, drug cartels, organized crime groups, vigilantes, and gangs have taken over the traditional role of the state in providing security. These Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have evolved into criminal corporations, moving well beyond their “traditional” pursuits of extortion and drug trafficking into human smuggling (Mexican cartels earned an estimated $7 billion last year by moving people across our border). The Department of Homeland Security estimated that TCO “enterprises” reached over $100 billion in gross profits in 2022. In addition to people and drug smuggling, TCO growth businesses now include government procurement, all manner of services, pirating of intellectual property, real estate, and commercial supply chains.    

Salvadorans confronting decades of burgeoning homicides, violence, and general lawlessness elected a two-time mayor in 2019.  Enter Nayib Bukele, 41 years old, the brash President of El Salvador. – the self-described “coolest dictator in the world.”  He pledged to end the country’s endemic gang-induced violence. El Salvador had the ignominious moniker of the world’s “Homicide Capital.” In February 2020 Bukele sent the Army into the country’s unicameral Assembly to “encourage” the passage of a bill that provided critical U.S. government funds for the police and army. Surrounded by soldiers and sitting in the President of the Assembly’s chair, he announced, “It’s clear who is in control of the situation, and we’re going to put the decision in the hands of God. He also describes himself as “God’s Emissary”.  

Since 78 people were killed in a single weekend in March of 2022, he has imprisoned over 68,000 Salvadorans for suspected “gang affiliations”, suspended civil liberties under a rolling state of emergency, bypassed legislators, and packed the courts.  Bukele has gotten results. Homicides are down by over 52%. His approval ratings are north of 80% and his power grab, consolidating powers from the legislative, judicial, and electoral branches, is the envy of Latin American politicians running for elected office in crime-ridden countries in the region. His mastery of social media, combined with his “rule by spectacle” has made him the darling of those in the region seeking to escape from fear stalking their own neighborhoods.

Last month he announced his intention to seek another term, even though the constitution clearly does not permit successive terms and all his predecessors have honored the one-term rule. Notwithstanding, his hand-picked electoral council ruled that he can run. As a result of his popularity, an extraordinarily successful crackdown on gangs, and because of his control of all government institutions, Bukele is a hero to many in the Hemisphere’s political class. There is little doubt that he will win a second term. In Ecuador and Guatemala, both countries conducting general elections soon, several candidates have invoked the Bukele name as the gold standard for elected leadership and effective public security policies.

 Bukele’s success has come at great cost to essential democratic norms and standards. He removed the attorney general and replaced Supreme Court justices with loyalists. His state of emergency (extended 11 times) has enabled him to virtually eliminate due process. Tens of thousands are held incommunicado without charges. Family members are left with only vague assumptions of what may have happened to their loved ones. There is no legal due process in today’s El Salvador, where Bukele brooks no criticism nor dissent. To his critics he says, either embrace what I am doing or hand the country over to the gangs. Several noted journalists have departed the country, citing harassment from the government. Worse, Bukele has never talked about when and if he would ever return basic civil liberties.

While Bukele’s stock rises throughout the Hemisphere, the next country to succumb to “Bukelismo” and join the ranks of the autocrats may well be Ecuador, already on the endangered list as a U.S. ally in the region. Ecuador is one of the few countries in the Global South that has stood with the U.S. and other allies in imposing sanctions against Russia, but it has come at a great cost. Ecuador lost over $1.5 billion in exports that would have been sold to Russia in 2022.

Followers of Ecuador’s strongman, ex-President Rafael Correa, succeeded in assembling enough votes to impeach the sitting President. Before they could vote, President and staunch U.S. ally Guillermo Lasso moved to dissolve the Assembly. Under the constitution, the president must also resign. With surging crime and his popularity at a low ebb, Lasso decided not to run in the August elections. Long an island of tranquility in a tough neighborhood, sandwiched between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador has descended into rampant criminality at the hands of TCOs.

Ecuador recorded 4,539 murders in 2022, the highest murder rate in its history. Ecuador is now ranked 93^rd out of 140 countries in terms of the rule of law. It is listed at 105 out of 180 counties in the 2021 Corruption Index. The spark seemed to have come from prison massacres, over 600 prisoners have been killed inside prison walls since 2019. Prisons have become operating bases for the drug trade. Last year 210 tons of drugs were seized by the authorities. Reminiscent of the TCO violence in Mexico, children as young as 13 are recruited by the gangs, and grisly beheadings and bodies hanging from bridges are all too common along the country’s coastline.

How did Ecuador get there? While weak institutions and lax policy are the root causes. The demobilization of the Colombian guerrillas operating out of northern Ecuador set off a free-for-all to control the movement of drugs in that area, an uptick in European demand for cocaine and loose visa requirements allowed members of TCOs, including the Albanian Mafia, to enter the country unimpeded, making common cause with local gangs. The country’s ports have become lucrative transshipment points for drugs bound for Europe. In the port cities of Guayaquil and Esmeraldas, where violence is most intense, massacres, targeted assassinations of police and public officials, and car bombs have become weekly occurrences.

Ex-President Correa’s hands-off approach to narco-trafficking during his 10 years in office enabled the drug trade to flourish. His view was that drug trafficking was the exclusive responsibility of the governments of drug-consuming nations. As a result, the country’s navy and army have been compromised by organized crime at the highest levels. The US Ambassador recently referred to “Narco-Generals” in the security services.  The Ambassador also raised the threat level for intending American tourists, urging increased caution due to civil unrest, crime, and kidnapping. Several cities along the coast were deemed no travel zones. Ecuador is on a slippery slope. The next level of advisory will urge Americans not to travel to the country.

Sentenced to eight years for corruption, Correa has been living in Belgium. He is seeking to return to the country, and if a surrogate wins in August, he will receive a pardon. Whether in the presidential palace or simply pulling the strings from behind, the return of Correa would be disastrous for the country, portending a further descent into Venezuelan-style chaos, lawlessness, and autocracy. 

Turning this around will not be easy or quick. It is not simply a matter of sacking a few bad apples in the military and police. Any effective national campaign should begin with a well-articulated crime-fighting strategy, with the recognition that adjustments will continuously be made over time. Security force leadership in the coastal hotspots would need to be completely replaced. Intelligence and counterintelligence fusion centers to collect all-source information on bad actors would need to be created. A heavily vetted strike force should be stood up to act on fusion center intelligence and a robust corps of inspectors given the responsibility of continuously rooting out compromised officers.

Beyond these measures, the key to success will be community buy-in. This trust will only be achieved through sustained government actions to protect those in the affected communities. Only then will the government begin to turn the tide against the gangs. While vital to any success, there should be a recognition that trust will only be earned over time by deed, steady community policing, not just empty pledges of community support. Finally, the next President of Ecuador will have to maintain a laser focus on security. For him/her it must trump all other pressing priorities.

This can be done. Ecuador’s neighbor to the north eviscerated armed and criminal groups and eventually brought many of those to peace negotiations. Criticisms of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe aside, his “Democratic Security” plan did more than efforts by any president before or after him to bring peace to the country.  Only when the uncontrolled excesses of Uribe’s police and military went unchecked, did he suffer a loss of credibility and an immovable constitutional barrier in his attempt to stay in power. 

Uribe’s success was a direct result of hundreds of visits with the locals of villages and towns in the most violent areas of the country. Uribe would target those rural towns that had been plagued by insurgent, paramilitary, drug cartel, and gang violence for decades. After the town and its environs had been secured by the security forces, his initial meetings would begin by apologizing on behalf of his and previous Colombian governments to the assembled for not fulfilling the primordial obligation of the state…that is the provision of public security. This is as opposed to excoriating them for cooperating with bad actors. He vowed never to abandon the town again. Uribe would then conduct a town meeting to discuss public works that would be generated by the community itself. Project agendas were then drawn up, and subsequent visits by Uribe would review progress. The local police were instructed to hand out cell phones to those that would anonymously report the activities and movements of bad actors. With the continued protection of the security forces, local self-rule re-established, jobs created through public works, and ubiquitous cell phone reports, the bad actors had no place to hide.

He achieved all this, while at the same time, remaining within the constitutional parameters of due process and accountability. While the circumstances of Colombia and Ecuador’s criminal instability are not identical, much can be learned from Uribe’s phenomenally successful strategy and tactics to win hearts and minds and restore trust in the government.

Salvadoran President Bukele spares no effort to taunt the U.S., saying that our brand of democracy promotion is outmoded and sclerotic. He cites our plague of mass shootings as yet another reason why we are failing our own citizens. He repeatedly questions the U.S. standing to promote democracy or public security best practices. He is winning adherents in the region. But we can prove him wrong when effective measures to combat organized crime can be brought about under a democratic framework. Indeed, experience shows that when communities feel safe from criminal retribution, democracy can flourish, starting at the grassroots.

There is a strong consensus in the Senate for U.S. support to end the bloodletting in Ecuador. The Senate U.S.-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022, passed out of committee unanimously, seeks to strengthen ties between our two countries. It directs the Department of State to develop and implement strategies to increase the capacity of Ecuador’s beleaguered justice system and law enforcement agencies in an effort to combat crime, corruption, and “the harmful influence of malign foreign and domestic actors”.

For the U.S. and the other global democracies there must be a long-overdue recognition that, while citizens in failing states may abstractly value democracy, rampant criminality has set their houses on fire. And in the midst of the inferno, they will elect leaders who will put the fire out. The U.S. and other like-minded democracies have an obligation to assist Ecuador in combatting criminality while preserving essential civil liberties. Enduring democratic leadership in Ecuador and the world will have to bring both effective law enforcement and civil liberties to douse the fire. If in August Ecuador elects such a responsible and committed leader, one that can work with the U.S. and our democratic allies, we should respond with substantial security assistance, to include equipment and training. This is not just Ecuador’s fight. Democracy is at stake. 

Ambassador (Retired) John Feeley is the Executive Director of the Center for Media Integrity of the Americas. He is a former career U.S. diplomat who served as Ambassador to Panama, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Charge d’Affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission in Mexico, in addition to other postings in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a former Marine Corps Officer.

Ambassador (Retired) Peter F. Romero is currently the Producer and Co-host of the very popular podcast American Diplomat. He has been a consultant and advisor to several governments and private entities on community-based security strategies. As a career Foreign Service Officer, he was the Assistant Secretary of State, who initiated the successful Plan Colombia, US Ambassador to Ecuador, as well as several other assignments in Latin America over a career that spanned 25 years.  

The post Ecuador: The Next Domino to Fall to Autocracy? appeared first on Global Americans.

Last September, Chileans voted overwhelmingly to reject a draft constitution that would have turbocharged President Gabriel Boric’s progressive agenda. Boric’s leftist allies blamed “fake news” for misleading the electorate. Ahead of another constitutional referendum this December, the government quietly published a decree to establish an Advisory Commission Against Disinformation. The initiative has sparked deep unease among free speech advocates and an outcry from Boric’s political opponents.

Chile, like all pluralistic societies, is increasingly exposed to misinformation and disinformation. The tumultuous events of recent years—the late 2019 social uprising, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the constitutional referendum—offered fertile ground for the phenomenon at a time of diminishing trust in traditional news media. In a November 2022 report, Ciper investigative journalists showed how disinformation tainted the 2022 constitutional campaign. Some of this disinformation also comes from abroad. Global Americans illustrated how Russian and Chinese state-owned media “use the omission of data, the selective treatment of facts, and propaganda with political intentionality” in Chile, Peru and Argentina. Russian state media, in particular, “engages in a very direct fashion often to stir up social discontent and sow discord.”

Trying to tackle this phenomenon through a top-down commission that is beholden to the government will be at best ineffective and at worst abusive, say experts such as Claudio Alvarado, Director of the Instituto de Estudios de la Sociedad. Chile would be better served by fostering media literacy, multilateral cooperation, and independent research into the increasingly complex information landscape, with the goal of empowering its citizens from the ground up.

Hand-picked Commission

Issued on the eve of a national holiday with no accompanying public announcement, the controversial new decree was signed by Science Minister Aisén Etcheberry and Cabinet-level spokesperson Camila Vallejo. Etcheverry, in consultation with Vallejo, will designate the nine commission members. These will include two representatives of state-run universities, two from private universities, one from a university based outside of Santiago, three representatives from civil society, and one representative from a fact-checking organization. Etcheverry will convene and preside over the commission’s sessions in order to “orient” the debates and serve a tie-breaking role if required in the absence of one of the members.

The commission is tasked with advising the science minister and the government’s chief spokesperson on the “analysis of the global phenomenon of disinformation and its local manifestation in Chile.” It will cover the impact of disinformation on the quality of democracy, education and disinformation/digital literacy, disinformation on digital platforms, best international practices and comparative experience, and public policy and disinformation.

Critiques of the Commission

The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) warned that the government-appointed commission, however well-intentioned, “could fall into the temptation of establishing censorship mechanisms.” IAPA President Michael Greenspon stated that “Commissions, observatories or other forms of government surveillance tend to look at reality through ideological lenses, advising discriminatory public policies with adverse effects on the freedom of expression and of the press.”

José Miguel Vivanco, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations, told Ex-Ante that governments targeting fake news could “stifle any criticism by imposing a single and unquestionable official truth.”

Critics are especially suspicious of Vallejo, the commission’s intellectual architect. A former student activist like Boric, Vallejo is a prominent member of Chile’s Communist Party, a political affiliation associated with strict censorship in communist-run Cuba and China. The party is a core member of the far-left flank of Boric’s governing alliance.

“Is it not paradoxical, to say the least, that the main proponent of a Commission Against Disinformation is a member of one of the last Communist parties left in the world?” noted Chilean intellectual Cristián Warnken in an open letter to Vallejo. “Does someone who is a member of a party like that have any moral authority to denounce the misuse of information and toxic and lying propaganda?”

Vallejo’s official crusade against disinformation started shortly after Boric took office in March 2022. In July last year, she launched the “More Voices” campaign to expand Chile’s “media ecosystem” from what the left has long derided as a conservative media oligopoly. Speaking on a panel about disinformation at an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Leaders Forum last November, Vallejo said, “we can’t just approach this from the logic of technocracy, data and measurements. We need to approach this in the first place as a political decision.”

Such language primed the opposition response to the disinformation commission when it was decreed months later. As Senator Ximena Rincón of the center-left party, Demócratas noted, “Selecting a group of people at the whim of the government in power, to decide how to exercise these freedoms, is openly restrictive.” The center-right Evópoli and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) parties are challenging the initiative on constitutional grounds. Allied party Renovación Nacional congresswoman Camila Flores warned that “the government is looking for institutional mechanisms to try to decide what is true, what is a lie, what is the correct information, and what is disinformation.”

For her part, Vallejo denied these intentions. “This is not about censorship or the media, but rather how we approach this problem that is mainly present in digital platforms and which has affected different countries,” she said. In an interview with La Tercera newspaper, Etcheverry said the body would not assess content or create regulations, but rather help to understand the disinformation phenomenon in Chile.

Disinformation is becoming more prevalent in response to artificial intelligence, posing risks to political participation and democracy. Against this rising tide, Universidad Católica (UC) communications professor Eduardo Arriagada noted that there is little scope for direct government action against disinformation and more promise in multilateral efforts and academic research.

To that end, Chile is already part of the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub and the new Swiss-based International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE). Notably, the first chair of the IPIE’s methodology panel is UC Professor and Data Scientist Sebastián Valenzuela. In a recent study conducted in Chile, UC academic Ingrid Bachmann and Valenzuela show how fact-checking reduces people’s misconceptions, but at the cost of diminishing trust in the news media overall.

Such rigorous research together with educational programs, rather than a government-led commission, will help to better discern and diminish the toxic influence of misinformation and disinformation. “Any entity that seeks to replace the formation of independent judgment will be ineffective,” Alvarado of the Instituto de Estudios de la Sociedad told the author. “In the end, rational and independent judgment is the only thing that can save us from the problem of disinformation to the extent that this is possible.”

Patricia Garip is a freelance journalist based in Santiago, Chile.

The post Orwell’s Shadow? Chile’s Disinformation Commission Sparks Suspicion appeared first on Global Americans.

Originally published in Spanish in Diario Libre.

Following Latin America’s democratic transitions in the 1980s, confrontations between legislative and executive branches controlled by opposing political forces produced institutional crises in many countries that seriously affected governance. Presidents, rather than being in positions of strength faced the impossibility of implementing their government programs and necessary economic reforms to face financial and economic crises of indebtedness due to the obstruction by legislative bodies.

The most emblematic case of this institutional blockage was that of Peru in the early days of the Alberto Fujimori presidency. He found himself unable to pass legislation due to an opposing congressional majority. This led Fujimori to take the extreme step of committing a “self-coup,” dissolving the legislative body by decree, and holding irregular and unconstitutional elections to elect representatives to a constituent assembly that would write his own Constitution and allow him to obtain a congressional majority. Other countries experienced similar processes, albeit not as climactic as Peru’s political drama.

In this context, specialists in Latin American politics—most notably prominent political scientist Juan Linz—assessed that it would be better for Latin American countries to replace their presidential systems with parliamentary systems. They believed that this would eliminate the strong and intractable blocks between the legislative and executive branches. The central argument was—continues to be—that since parliamentarism allows the parliamentary majority to elect the prime minister, there is greater flexibility in case there is a need to replace the head of government before general elections are scheduled. However, despite multiple constitutional changes in Latin America throughout the 1990s, no country transitioned from presidentialism to parliamentarism.

Instead, some countries adopted institutional mechanisms from parliamentary regimes and grafted them into their presidential systems. This in turn created new institutional crises that affect stability and governability. Again, the case of Peru is notorious. The Peruvian Constitution allows Congress to pronounce a “presidential vacancy” for “permanent moral and physical incapacity”—rather imprecise, undefined, and manipulable condition. This has become nothing more than a mechanism that allows the removal of the president by the legislative body. Similarly, in certain circumstances, the Peruvian President has the authority to dissolve Congress, another feature typical in parliamentary systems. This creates challenges that are are exacerbated by the fact that these relatively simple—in terms of rationale, procedures, and types of majority to remove presidents—mechanisms have been combined with runoff elections. This is a highly risky combination as presidents elected through a runoff, particularly polarized electorates, do not always achieve sufficient congressional mandates. This in turn leads the opposing majority in Congress to seek to use impeachment mechanisms. This occurred in the case of leftist President Pedro Castillo of Peru.

A similar situation occurred in Ecuador, albeit this time with a center-right president. In the 2021 elections, Guillermo Lasso obtained 19.74 percent of the votes (1,830,172 votes) in the first round, while candidate left-wing Andrés Arauz obtained 39.6 percent of the votes (3,033,791 votes). As neither obtained the requisite votes, this forced a runoff election. The runoff changed radically: Lasso obtained 52.36 percent of the vote (4,656,426 votes), while Arauz obtained 47.64 percent of the vote (4,236,515 votes). This was due to the fact that multiple political and social forces converged in support of Lasso to prevent the Correaista candidate from winning. Despite a resounding victory for Lasso in the second round, his political party—Creado Opportunidades (CREO)—only obtained 12 of the 137 seats in the National Assembly. This put him in a position of extreme weakness.

As in Peru, the Ecuadorian Constitution incorporated features typical of parliamentarism that allow the legislative body to relatively easily dismiss the President, while allowing the latter to dissolve the National Assembly and call new elections. This latter process is known as a “muerte cruzada.” The opposition parties that controlled Congress decided to initiate a process to remove President Lasso, invoking rather vague rationale, including criminal cases that have not been prosecuted or proven in any court and have nothing to do with his presidential performance. Initiating this process only requires 88 votes. For the decisive vote to remove Lasso, the opposition only needed four more votes (92 in total). However, President Lasso decided to use his authority to dissolve Congress and ask the electoral body to call new elections. In the interim, the country will be ruled by decree and controlled by the Constitutional Court.

These features typical of parliamentarism have created a true constitutional challenge. As both the legislators and the President obtain their legitimacy directly through the popular vote, the Legislative branch should only impeach and remove the president in exceptional circumstances. However, in Ecuador, 92 votes would allow for the removal of a president who came to power two years prior with more than 4 million votes. This in turn resulted in President Lasso resorting to the old adage that “either we all carry the can or none of us does.”

Fortunately, the Dominican Republic has not implemented these types of institutional reforms. Although the formula for runoff elections was adopted in 1994, the Dominican Constitution does not have any of the elements of parliamentarian systems grafted to it that would incentive opposition-controlled congresses to try to remove presidents or for Presidents to dissolve Congress and call early elections. In addition to this institutional design, the restraint and maturity of Dominican political parties and leaders have been extremely important factors in maintaining the stability and governability of the Dominican Republic. Despite their deficiencies, preserving and strengthening political parties is fundamental to sustaining and consolidating democracy in the Dominican Republic.

Flavio Darío Espinal is a former Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to the United States of America and the Organization of American States (OAS), in which he also held the positions of Chair of the Permanent Council, Chair of the Committee on Legal and Political Issues, and Chair of the Committee on Hemispherical Security. He is also currently serving on Global Americans’ International advisory council, works as a managing partner of FDE Legal, and writes a regular column in Diario Libre.

The post Peru and Ecuador: Cases of Risky Institutional Designs appeared first on Global Americans.