On August 13th, libertarian Javier Milei became the most-voted candidate in the primary elections in Argentina, with his political party La Libertad Avanza also securing the highest number of votes. In this manner, he outperformed both the Juntos coalition candidates (formed and led by former President Mauricio Macri) and Kirchnerist candidate Sergio Massa, current Minister of Economy. The far-right candidate surprised everyone by emerging victorious in an election that was anticipated to be more closely contested, securing 30 percent of the votes. This outcome was unexpected as most polls had placed him in third position. Consequently, Milei may be Argentina’s next president for the 2023-2027 term.

What would a Javier Milei presidency look like? Most of the analyses attempting to address this question refer to the candidate’s ambitious and controversial proposals. These include a profound State reform aimed at reducing public expenditure, the elimination of the Central Bank, and the dollarization of the economy, which stand out as some of his most popular ideas. Nonetheless, significantly less attention has been paid to Milei’s foreign policy views, how he sees the world, and Argentina’s position. Of course, foreign policy is seldom among the top issues on a presidential candidate’s agenda in Argentina, as well as voters’ interest. This is arguably reasonable in a country with enormous macroeconomic problems, including over 120 percent annual inflation.

Consequently, this article aims to dissect some elements embedded within Milei and some of his key team members that could offer insights into how Argentina’s foreign policy might unfold under a Milei administration. In pursuit of this goal, we will closely examine Milei’s stance towards Argentina’s most crucial international partners: the U.S. and the Western world, China and its South American partners, as well as the Mercosur trade bloc. 

The “Trump of the Pampas” and Argentina’s Main Partners

In a recent interview, Milei expressed that his key international allies would be the United States and Israel, also mentioning his intention to relocate Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It’s hard not to draw parallels between this statement and the striking similarities to Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right former president of Brazil often referred to as “the Trump of the tropics.”

If that comparison holds true for Bolsonaro, a similar case could be made for Milei as the “Trump of the Pampas.” There are several resemblances between these three leaders, including their employment of populist rhetoric, their articulation of societal dissatisfaction with established politicians, and their conservative outlook on social issues. They also share the identification of socialism, currently manifested as “cultural Marxism” as their central adversary. Remarkably, the announcement regarding the embassy’s move to Jerusalem mirrors the actions of these former presidents (though it’s worth noting that Bolsonaro never successfully executed this move).

While it appears evident that Milei will strive for alignment with the West, it’s equally pertinent to acknowledge that neither Trump nor Bolsonaro currently holds power. As he navigates the international stage, Milei will encounter Western leaders who, for the most part, stand as political adversaries to them (such as Joe Biden) or, at the very least, have displayed substantial divergences. Notably, G7 leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau fall into this category due to their differing perspectives.

However, according to Diana Mondino–a Senior Economic Advisor to Milei and potentially his future Minister of Foreign Relations–Argentina’s approach will be establishing friendly relations with the U.S. and all democratic nations while reconsidering connections and agreements with “autocratic” counterparts. Thereby, Milei seems to be fully aligned with what some have called ‘The Biden Doctrine,’ which identifies the contest between democracies and autocracies as the “center clash of our time.” What remains to be seen, though, is how the Biden administration would receive Javier Milei.

If this approach was implemented, it could trigger highly disruptive consequences for Argentina. This is because China plays an essential role as both a critical trading partner and a significant source of financial aid for Argentina, a country grappling with an exceedingly challenging fiscal predicament due to its International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt. Despite the stern stance Milei might take towards China, practical limitations would significantly curb his ability to execute such actions. The precarious financial situation makes the Chinese Swaps indispensable for Argentina’s survival in the midst of a severe shortage of foreign currency. Additionally, the influential agribusiness sector is unlikely to permit such measures, as China constitutes Argentina’s most paramount export market. Nonetheless, Milei could potentially succeed in creating political distance from China, such as withdrawing Argentina’s candidacy from the BRICS group.

Returning to the matter of relations with the U.S., it remains uncertain how the Biden administration would perceive Javier Milei. On the one hand, there are indications of the administration’s readiness to align with the U.S.’s crucial interests. Conversely, Milei’s strong association with Trump might complicate bilateral relations. Thus, Milei would need to strive to avoid cultivating a Bolsonaro-like dynamic with the White House.

Concerning relations with neighboring countries, Milei has not extensively commented on this matter. One might anticipate challenges in the relationship with Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, given Milei’s affinity with Bolsonaro, whose politically prominent son Eduardo recently rallied support for him after his victory. Regarding the Mercosur trade bloc, Milei had previously advocated for its dissolution a few years back, akin to Trump’s approach towards NAFTA upon assuming office. However, Mondino has conveyed a notably more moderate stance, suggesting that it should be revitalized, potentially aligning with Uruguay’s viewpoint of flexibilization. Regarding Uruguay, the libertarian candidate has expressed a measured level of criticism towards President Lacalle Pou, asserting that he is “far from being a liberal” while acknowledging him as a “genuine Keynesian.” Last but not least, Milei maintains a strong ally in Chile’s far-right candidate José Antonio Kast, who is considered one of the frontrunners for the 2025 presidential elections.

Conclusions

Only two months separate us from Argentina’s general election. Despite the brevity of this timeframe, it can feel like a lifetime in a country like Argentina. Within the week following the primary elections, the government already devalued the official Peso-to-Dollar exchange rate by nearly 18 percent, and economic prices have surged considerably since August 14. In such a complex nation, anything can transpire within 60 days.

Nevertheless, Milei’s position appears, at the very least, formidable. In a country where circumstances are likely to worsen leading up to the October general elections, he holds the advantage of symbolizing the “real” change for the nation, given his lack of prior public office. Consequently, closely monitoring his campaign and proposals will be pivotal. Foreign policy is often marginalized in such analyses, despite its significance for a country that offers numerous opportunities due to its abundance of natural resources, such as food, critical minerals, and renewable energies.

Despite the Trump-like “hawkish” narrative that Milei presents concerning foreign policy, he will face a challenging landscape that might constrain his intentions. The absence of like-minded governments in the region could potentially leave Argentina isolated within the area, at least until Chile’s 2025 elections, where Kast might emerge victorious. However, if Milei were to secure the presidency, the most pivotal geopolitical factor he would need to monitor would be the U.S. elections, particularly if Trump emerges as the GOP nominee. An ideal scenario for the international position Milei envisions for Argentina would involve him as president this year alongside a Trump win in the United States.

A Milei presidency holds the promise of ushering in substantial and disruptive changes to Argentina’s political and economic landscape. Its disruptive nature is already evident in its ability to challenge the dominance of the polarizing Juntos and Kirchnerist coalitions, which have controlled the political spectrum for the past decade. However, as we have previously explored in the context of foreign policy, it remains imperative to closely scrutinize the constraints that would shape his pursuit of the significant transformations he aims to enact.

Fernando Prats is a Senior Analyst at London Politca’s Latin America Desk. He also serves as a research and teaching assistant at Rosario National University in Argentina.

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July 2023 was considered the Earth’s hottest month on record, and possibly the hottest single month in roughly 120,000 years, according to a report published by the European Union’s Copernicus Climate Change Service and the World Meteorological Organization. One of the catastrophic impacts of these high temperatures has been the widespread devastation of coral reefs, especially in the Florida Keys, where water temperatures are at record-high levels.

As a teenager, those reefs mesmerized me with their colorful, teeming life and profound beauty. I knew from that young age that I would become a marine scientist. It is deeply heartbreaking to see those reefs—which have been in rapid decline for more than 50 years—estimated to be 80 to 90 percent dead. Making an already dire situation worse, the remaining corals are now bleaching in record-breaking ocean temperatures, facing a “disastrous bleaching event.” Climate change is a significant contributor to the death of coral reefs, which are being pushed beyond their thermal tolerance. This is resulting in the disturbing images we currently see in the media of bleached corals, a weakened state that often leads to their death.

Since 1970, the Caribbean has tragically lost half its coral reefs. It is estimated that the world will lose between 70 and 90 percent of its reefs by the end of the century. Coral reefs are essential to countless marine species that depend upon them—perhaps up to 9 million different species. Humans also depend greatly upon coral reefs, which help bring billions of dollars to the global economy from fishing, tourism, and coastal protection. For instance, coral reefs can absorb an astonishing 97 percent of wave energy. In the medical realm, more than half of new cancer drug research is focused on marine life, and much of that is on coral reef ecosystems.

While the media and public focus on climate change as the underlying cause of bleached coral reefs, research shows that a host of other factors are just as crucial to the health of coral reefs as the changing climate. For decades, these factors have slowly contributed to an underwater disaster, of which the public is largely unaware. Nutrient pollution, primarily from fertilizers used for agriculture and our lawns, fuels the rampant growth of algae in the ocean, which can smother and kill coral reefs. Meanwhile, herbivorous reef fish—many of which graze upon algae and keep coral reefs “clean” and safe from being smothered—end up on our dinner plates. A growing number of lethal diseases threaten coral reefs, some originating from human waste leaking from septic tanks and ships. Sedimentation from deforestation and coastal development can also be fatal to coral reefs.

As dismal and overwhelming as all of this may seem, there remains a message of hope: many of these are factors we can control, meaning that there are actions that we can take now to buy more time for corals in rapidly warming seas. Recent studies demonstrate that local factors are as important as (and perhaps even more important than) global factors (i.e., climate change) in ensuring the health of coral reefs. Despite the ravages of climate change, there are examples of remarkably healthy corals in parts of Cuba, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil.

While the past 60 years have seen the worst decline in ocean health in human history, Cuba’s coral reefs in particular remain remarkably healthy. I have spent more than two decades working in Cuba and will never forget the joy and disbelief of coming face-to-face with stunning, healthy coral reefs. I bore witness to an extraordinary part of a 30-mile-long barrier reef along the southern waters of Cuba, largely comprised of elkhorn coral, one of the most important reef-building corals in the Caribbean. The stands of beautiful, mustard-colored elkhorn coral I saw were impossibly packed with grunt, snapper, goatfish, and many other spectacular reef species. In contrast, elkhorn coral is now nearly gone from the Florida Keys, and is listed as a “Threatened” species throughout its range under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. It is also listed as a “Critically Endangered” species on the IUCN Red List, just one category away from being classified as “Extinct in the Wild.”

This begs the question: “Why are Cuba’s ocean waters so healthy?” The answer is deeply entwined with the country’s extraordinary and unique history, from its dramatic political past to its world-class environmental protections influenced by an unlikely partner, Jacques Cousteau, who had a profound influence on Fidel Castro after they met in 1985. Following their meeting, Cuba implemented a set of exceptionally strong environmental laws. The collapse of the Soviet Union largely resulted in a large loss of financial and agricultural support in Cuba. Subsequently, Cuban agriculture became, and continues to be, largely organic. Without industrial fertilizers, there is little nutrient pollution to fuel the harmful growth of algae on coral reefs. Additionally, the country has not overfished its coral reefs, related to the establishment of enormous marine-protected areas that restrict fishing.  

All these local actions have helped Cuba’s corals become more resilient (though not immune) to warming ocean temperatures. A recent study finds that coral reefs in Cuban waters represent 10 percent of the planet’s reefs most likely to survive by the end of the century. This, in part, has motivated strong collaboration between Cuban and U.S. scientists, considered to be one of the best examples of collaboration between the two countries despite political differences. As I observe in my new book, The Remarkable Reefs of Cuba, “… marine scientists…quietly and steadfastly built strong relationships between our countries where official diplomats and politicians had for decades fallen short.”

Examples of our collaborative activities include research expeditions, ecosystem mapping, research on sharks, sea turtles, manatees, coral reefs, environmental economics, and tourism impacts. We have also developed joint education programs and exchanges. Dozens of scientific publications have resulted from this work.

Cuba is a striking example of how, if we properly manage the local factors that impact coral reefs, we can build coral reef resilience worldwide, and along with it, hope for a brighter future for the ocean in the face of a formidable global threat.

Dr. David E. Guggenheim is founder and president of Ocean Doctor, a non-profit dedicated to ocean conservation. He is also an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He has spent more than two decades leading collaborative research programs with Cuba and is author of the new book, “The Remarkable Reefs of Cuba: Hopeful Stories from the Ocean Doctor.” He holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Science and Public Policy from George Mason University; a Master’s Degree in Aquatic/Population Biology from the University of California, Santa Barbara; and a Bachelor’s Degree in Environmental Studies from University of Pennsylvania.

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Leaders of the world’s democracies, convening a few months ago in South Korea, pitched the tagline “Democracy Delivers…opportunities, digital freedom, prosperity, free elections.” etc.  However well-intentioned, the messaging missed the mark. By touting the benefits of democracy, the leaders directed their message to those in failing democracies, not to lose hope and fall for the siren song of rising populist autocrats. In doing so, these democratic leaders fundamentally failed to understand the modern autocrat’s appeal. This failure continues to result in the autocrats winning at the ballot box. In 2022 Freedom House found that autocracy is making gains against democracy and encouraging emergent leaders to abandon the democratic path. Countries that suffered democratic declines in 2022 outnumbered those that improved by two to one.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in our own Western Hemisphere. In 2000, thirty-four of thirty-five countries in our Hemisphere were nominal electoral democracies.  Since then, these democratic governments have simply not delivered for their people.  As a region, Latin America has the greatest income inequality in the world.  Access to education, health, and social services remains at some of the lowest levels in the world. Official corruption in too many of these countries is endemic. Covid put all of this in stark relief as unemployment (30% in some countries) eviscerated the then-growing middle class. It is no surprise that political instability has risen dramatically.  Even the now-faded promise of Free Trade Agreements between the U.S. and a dozen or so countries in the region has failed to provide enough opportunities for burgeoning young Latin populations, as reflected in migrant caravans headed for the U.S. Southern Border.

Democracy summiteers have correctly cited the foregoing as threats to democracy. However, where they have been tone-deaf is on the one issue that is having the most profound effect on instability, out-migration, and the embrace of populist autocrats in the region…the withering of state-provided public, or citizen, security. Democratic governments and leaders have failed to recognize that the provision of public security is THE primordial responsibility of government and that all too many governments in failing democracies have not delivered this essential condition. 

Latin America, in the absence of armed conflict, has the highest rates of crime and violence in the world. The region has ten times more homicides than Europe. In poll after poll, increasing numbers of Latin Americans are citing the degradation of public security as their biggest concern. A recent poll in Ecuador cited a whopping 85% of the respondents claiming that spiking violence is their chief concern. In Ecuador, and neighboring Andean states, drug cartels, organized crime groups, vigilantes, and gangs have taken over the traditional role of the state in providing security. These Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have evolved into criminal corporations, moving well beyond their “traditional” pursuits of extortion and drug trafficking into human smuggling (Mexican cartels earned an estimated $7 billion last year by moving people across our border). The Department of Homeland Security estimated that TCO “enterprises” reached over $100 billion in gross profits in 2022. In addition to people and drug smuggling, TCO growth businesses now include government procurement, all manner of services, pirating of intellectual property, real estate, and commercial supply chains.    

Salvadorans confronting decades of burgeoning homicides, violence, and general lawlessness elected a two-time mayor in 2019.  Enter Nayib Bukele, 41 years old, the brash President of El Salvador. – the self-described “coolest dictator in the world.”  He pledged to end the country’s endemic gang-induced violence. El Salvador had the ignominious moniker of the world’s “Homicide Capital.” In February 2020 Bukele sent the Army into the country’s unicameral Assembly to “encourage” the passage of a bill that provided critical U.S. government funds for the police and army. Surrounded by soldiers and sitting in the President of the Assembly’s chair, he announced, “It’s clear who is in control of the situation, and we’re going to put the decision in the hands of God. He also describes himself as “God’s Emissary”.  

Since 78 people were killed in a single weekend in March of 2022, he has imprisoned over 68,000 Salvadorans for suspected “gang affiliations”, suspended civil liberties under a rolling state of emergency, bypassed legislators, and packed the courts.  Bukele has gotten results. Homicides are down by over 52%. His approval ratings are north of 80% and his power grab, consolidating powers from the legislative, judicial, and electoral branches, is the envy of Latin American politicians running for elected office in crime-ridden countries in the region. His mastery of social media, combined with his “rule by spectacle” has made him the darling of those in the region seeking to escape from fear stalking their own neighborhoods.

Last month he announced his intention to seek another term, even though the constitution clearly does not permit successive terms and all his predecessors have honored the one-term rule. Notwithstanding, his hand-picked electoral council ruled that he can run. As a result of his popularity, an extraordinarily successful crackdown on gangs, and because of his control of all government institutions, Bukele is a hero to many in the Hemisphere’s political class. There is little doubt that he will win a second term. In Ecuador and Guatemala, both countries conducting general elections soon, several candidates have invoked the Bukele name as the gold standard for elected leadership and effective public security policies.

 Bukele’s success has come at great cost to essential democratic norms and standards. He removed the attorney general and replaced Supreme Court justices with loyalists. His state of emergency (extended 11 times) has enabled him to virtually eliminate due process. Tens of thousands are held incommunicado without charges. Family members are left with only vague assumptions of what may have happened to their loved ones. There is no legal due process in today’s El Salvador, where Bukele brooks no criticism nor dissent. To his critics he says, either embrace what I am doing or hand the country over to the gangs. Several noted journalists have departed the country, citing harassment from the government. Worse, Bukele has never talked about when and if he would ever return basic civil liberties.

While Bukele’s stock rises throughout the Hemisphere, the next country to succumb to “Bukelismo” and join the ranks of the autocrats may well be Ecuador, already on the endangered list as a U.S. ally in the region. Ecuador is one of the few countries in the Global South that has stood with the U.S. and other allies in imposing sanctions against Russia, but it has come at a great cost. Ecuador lost over $1.5 billion in exports that would have been sold to Russia in 2022.

Followers of Ecuador’s strongman, ex-President Rafael Correa, succeeded in assembling enough votes to impeach the sitting President. Before they could vote, President and staunch U.S. ally Guillermo Lasso moved to dissolve the Assembly. Under the constitution, the president must also resign. With surging crime and his popularity at a low ebb, Lasso decided not to run in the August elections. Long an island of tranquility in a tough neighborhood, sandwiched between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador has descended into rampant criminality at the hands of TCOs.

Ecuador recorded 4,539 murders in 2022, the highest murder rate in its history. Ecuador is now ranked 93^rd out of 140 countries in terms of the rule of law. It is listed at 105 out of 180 counties in the 2021 Corruption Index. The spark seemed to have come from prison massacres, over 600 prisoners have been killed inside prison walls since 2019. Prisons have become operating bases for the drug trade. Last year 210 tons of drugs were seized by the authorities. Reminiscent of the TCO violence in Mexico, children as young as 13 are recruited by the gangs, and grisly beheadings and bodies hanging from bridges are all too common along the country’s coastline.

How did Ecuador get there? While weak institutions and lax policy are the root causes. The demobilization of the Colombian guerrillas operating out of northern Ecuador set off a free-for-all to control the movement of drugs in that area, an uptick in European demand for cocaine and loose visa requirements allowed members of TCOs, including the Albanian Mafia, to enter the country unimpeded, making common cause with local gangs. The country’s ports have become lucrative transshipment points for drugs bound for Europe. In the port cities of Guayaquil and Esmeraldas, where violence is most intense, massacres, targeted assassinations of police and public officials, and car bombs have become weekly occurrences.

Ex-President Correa’s hands-off approach to narco-trafficking during his 10 years in office enabled the drug trade to flourish. His view was that drug trafficking was the exclusive responsibility of the governments of drug-consuming nations. As a result, the country’s navy and army have been compromised by organized crime at the highest levels. The US Ambassador recently referred to “Narco-Generals” in the security services.  The Ambassador also raised the threat level for intending American tourists, urging increased caution due to civil unrest, crime, and kidnapping. Several cities along the coast were deemed no travel zones. Ecuador is on a slippery slope. The next level of advisory will urge Americans not to travel to the country.

Sentenced to eight years for corruption, Correa has been living in Belgium. He is seeking to return to the country, and if a surrogate wins in August, he will receive a pardon. Whether in the presidential palace or simply pulling the strings from behind, the return of Correa would be disastrous for the country, portending a further descent into Venezuelan-style chaos, lawlessness, and autocracy. 

Turning this around will not be easy or quick. It is not simply a matter of sacking a few bad apples in the military and police. Any effective national campaign should begin with a well-articulated crime-fighting strategy, with the recognition that adjustments will continuously be made over time. Security force leadership in the coastal hotspots would need to be completely replaced. Intelligence and counterintelligence fusion centers to collect all-source information on bad actors would need to be created. A heavily vetted strike force should be stood up to act on fusion center intelligence and a robust corps of inspectors given the responsibility of continuously rooting out compromised officers.

Beyond these measures, the key to success will be community buy-in. This trust will only be achieved through sustained government actions to protect those in the affected communities. Only then will the government begin to turn the tide against the gangs. While vital to any success, there should be a recognition that trust will only be earned over time by deed, steady community policing, not just empty pledges of community support. Finally, the next President of Ecuador will have to maintain a laser focus on security. For him/her it must trump all other pressing priorities.

This can be done. Ecuador’s neighbor to the north eviscerated armed and criminal groups and eventually brought many of those to peace negotiations. Criticisms of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe aside, his “Democratic Security” plan did more than efforts by any president before or after him to bring peace to the country.  Only when the uncontrolled excesses of Uribe’s police and military went unchecked, did he suffer a loss of credibility and an immovable constitutional barrier in his attempt to stay in power. 

Uribe’s success was a direct result of hundreds of visits with the locals of villages and towns in the most violent areas of the country. Uribe would target those rural towns that had been plagued by insurgent, paramilitary, drug cartel, and gang violence for decades. After the town and its environs had been secured by the security forces, his initial meetings would begin by apologizing on behalf of his and previous Colombian governments to the assembled for not fulfilling the primordial obligation of the state…that is the provision of public security. This is as opposed to excoriating them for cooperating with bad actors. He vowed never to abandon the town again. Uribe would then conduct a town meeting to discuss public works that would be generated by the community itself. Project agendas were then drawn up, and subsequent visits by Uribe would review progress. The local police were instructed to hand out cell phones to those that would anonymously report the activities and movements of bad actors. With the continued protection of the security forces, local self-rule re-established, jobs created through public works, and ubiquitous cell phone reports, the bad actors had no place to hide.

He achieved all this, while at the same time, remaining within the constitutional parameters of due process and accountability. While the circumstances of Colombia and Ecuador’s criminal instability are not identical, much can be learned from Uribe’s phenomenally successful strategy and tactics to win hearts and minds and restore trust in the government.

Salvadoran President Bukele spares no effort to taunt the U.S., saying that our brand of democracy promotion is outmoded and sclerotic. He cites our plague of mass shootings as yet another reason why we are failing our own citizens. He repeatedly questions the U.S. standing to promote democracy or public security best practices. He is winning adherents in the region. But we can prove him wrong when effective measures to combat organized crime can be brought about under a democratic framework. Indeed, experience shows that when communities feel safe from criminal retribution, democracy can flourish, starting at the grassroots.

There is a strong consensus in the Senate for U.S. support to end the bloodletting in Ecuador. The Senate U.S.-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022, passed out of committee unanimously, seeks to strengthen ties between our two countries. It directs the Department of State to develop and implement strategies to increase the capacity of Ecuador’s beleaguered justice system and law enforcement agencies in an effort to combat crime, corruption, and “the harmful influence of malign foreign and domestic actors”.

For the U.S. and the other global democracies there must be a long-overdue recognition that, while citizens in failing states may abstractly value democracy, rampant criminality has set their houses on fire. And in the midst of the inferno, they will elect leaders who will put the fire out. The U.S. and other like-minded democracies have an obligation to assist Ecuador in combatting criminality while preserving essential civil liberties. Enduring democratic leadership in Ecuador and the world will have to bring both effective law enforcement and civil liberties to douse the fire. If in August Ecuador elects such a responsible and committed leader, one that can work with the U.S. and our democratic allies, we should respond with substantial security assistance, to include equipment and training. This is not just Ecuador’s fight. Democracy is at stake. 

Ambassador (Retired) John Feeley is the Executive Director of the Center for Media Integrity of the Americas. He is a former career U.S. diplomat who served as Ambassador to Panama, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Charge d’Affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission in Mexico, in addition to other postings in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a former Marine Corps Officer.

Ambassador (Retired) Peter F. Romero is currently the Producer and Co-host of the very popular podcast American Diplomat. He has been a consultant and advisor to several governments and private entities on community-based security strategies. As a career Foreign Service Officer, he was the Assistant Secretary of State, who initiated the successful Plan Colombia, US Ambassador to Ecuador, as well as several other assignments in Latin America over a career that spanned 25 years.  

The post Ecuador: The Next Domino to Fall to Autocracy? appeared first on Global Americans.

Russia underwent considerable political upheaval in late June 2023 as the Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group briefly threatened President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power. While the rebellion failed, the future trajectory of Russian politics and Putin’s role suddenly looked less certain. That has implications for Russian foreign policy. In the case of Latin America, the rebellion is not likely to change Moscow’s policy direction, but it does raise questions over the long-term reliability of Russian policymakers to focus on the region, which has grown in importance since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. In many regards, Russian relations between Russia and Latin America are a marriage of convenience. Both sides need and want a diversified set of trade relations, share an interest in advancing some type of multipolar global order, and have a complicated relationship with the United States.

One of the central narratives in Latin American geopolitics is Russia’s return to Latin America. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the major rival of the United States, focusing on keeping Cuba’s Castro regime in power, providing assistance to Central America’s revolutionary movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and opportunistically poking at Washington’s “near abroad,” similar to Russia’s near abroad in the Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, Moscow made a rapid retreat from Latin America, a transition that was particularly brutal in Cuba.  

The geopolitical landscape changed in 2007 when Putin made a sharp foreign policy turn. Speaking in Munich, Germany, he served notice that Russia was back as a great power, that U.S. global hegemony was bad, and the new world order should be multipolar. Indeed, the Russian leader accused the United States of creating a unipolar world “in which there is one master, one sovereign.” To emphasize the change in foreign policy direction, in 2008 the Russian military intervened in Georgia in a brief war to punish the small Caucasus nation for becoming too close with the West and in 2014 annexed Crimea from Ukraine as well as carved out two satrapies in eastern Ukraine.

In the face of the U.S. and European economic sanctions, Russia paid closer attention to Latin America. While Russia maintained a core set of relations with leftwing authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, it gradually broadened its trade relations with other states, including Argentina and Brazil, both of which became dependent on Russian fertilizer needed for their economically important agricultural sectors. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022 only heightened Latin America’s attractiveness.  

Russia also became active in Latin America seeking to cultivate a positive image while undermining U.S. interests. In this, significant resources were poured into strategic communications through media platforms such as RT and Sputnik, which cast themselves as alternative sources of information. This is part of an active campaign of using misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda to undermine the role of the United States in the region and target its regional allies. Russia’s strategic design vis-à-vis Latin America also includes the sale of weapons, providing advisors and technicians, and visits by high-level military and top policymakers.

Many of the above themes were evident during the April 2023 visit of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the region. In Cuba, Lavrov asserted, “We cannot agree that the world should continue to live permanently according to these American ‘rules.’ Tensions are being escalated in the international arena, and the West’s attempts to dictate its will and ignore the legitimate positions of others not only persist, but are growing.” A few days after the June 2023 rebellion, Lavrov accused the West of putting “brazen pressure” on countries in Africa and Latin America to comply with measures taken against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s Latin America diplomacy since its invasion of Ukraine has been relatively successful. Although most countries condemned the invasion, the majority have not followed the West in imposing economic sanctions. Russia’s growing regional role would not be possible without a relatively positive response from local governments, most of which prefer nonalignment as a means of hedging against U.S. hegemony. Moreover, many Latin American countries are uncomfortable with the idea that the international system is increasingly defined by two blocs of countries: one that is liberal democratic and rule of law-based; and the other that is authoritarian and gaining influence by state-driven economic statecraft. Russia has more recently been stressing that unlike the United States and Europe, it was never a colonial power in Latin America—a claim which has had a positive response, especially on the local left. This, of course, overlooks Russia’s own often brutal imperial history in Eastern Europe and Asia.

The economic factor is also important. Although Russia’s economic relationship with Latin America lags well behind that of the United States, Europe and China, it has been more targeted to places which need what Russia can produce, which broadly defines its relationships with Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, Russian companies, like Gazprom and Rosneft, are active in the energy sector in Cuba, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Considering that many Latin American countries are struggling economically, picking a side in the West-versus-Russia competition or for that matter in the “new” Cold War between China and the U.S. would put them in a difficult position.  

Like many other countries, Russia is also pushing into Latin America’s critical metals sector. While the world was transfixed by the Wagner rebellion, Bolivia quietly announced that had granted Russia’s state-owned Rosatom an opening in its lithium sector, which could see an investment of USD 600 million in the Andean country.

Latin America’s relationship with Russia is not without complications. This was recently evident in the flap over Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s support for a multipolar world order with more emphasis of the Global South. This, among other items, included visiting President Xi Jinping in China, advancing a peace plan for the Russo-Ukrainian War, announcing that Ukraine and Russia equally shared the blame for Russia’s invasion, advocating the dethronement of the U.S. dollar, permitting Iranian warships to stop in Brazil, and giving a well-publicized and loving embrace of Venezuela’s dictator and Russian ally Nicolás Maduro on his visit to a Latin American leaders summit in Brazil.

Sensitive to Russian inroads in Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. has indicated its displeasure with Latin America’s seeming ambiguity over the war and picking a side in the struggle between liberalism and autocracy. Indeed, the Biden administration’s response to Lula’s comments that suggested that the West had been “encouraging” war by arming Ukraine accused the Brazilian leader of “parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda without looking at the facts.” At the same time, the U.S. has increased its visits of top diplomats to the region, including Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s June 2023 meeting with CARICOM leaders in Trinidad and Tobago and Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Green to Brazil in May.

Although the June 2023 Wagner Group rebellion was dramatic and underscored Putin’s tenuous hold on power, Moscow will likely continue to push ahead with targeted economic engagement, aggressive propaganda, and closer ties with its regional allies, like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Russia will also calculate which other countries could be susceptible to strategic communication disruptions with an eye to maneuvering more pro-Russian candidates into office. Latin America remains attractive as a place to strike at the U.S. in its strategic underbelly, and how this unfolds will depend on the United States’ response. Despite efforts to be more proactive in Latin America, Washington is finding that most Latin American governments do not see their national interests served in abandoning nonalignment, preferring to keep their options open. Barring a major reversal on the battlefield in Ukraine or a successful rebellion, Russia, along with China, India, Iran, and Turkey, offers Latin America another option from the traditional choices of the U.S. and Europe.

Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Research Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium. His latest book, The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean, was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan.

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Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to China has once again brought attention to the increasingly complex dynamic between the two countries. While China emphasizes the importance of stable relations, the United States has expressed concerns regarding China’s actions in areas such as the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and East China Sea, as well as human rights. While these broader concerns are significant, it seems that the administration’s bandwidth is stretched thin. This has meant that a proactive approach is reserved for large-scale foreign policy priorities only. It is important not to overlook smaller, but still crucial, aspects of the global power struggle, for example, what is happening in the Americas. It is not enough to simply “let it be” as the Beatles would sing. While a great song, this approach is not an effective foreign policy, and the United States cannot ignore regions or issues that are not perceived as full-blown crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly engaged in the hemisphere, “letting it be” has become the thrust of the U.S. foreign policy approach toward Latin America. This approach risks developing an increasingly disadvantageous environment for the United States.

The United States faces growing challenges and competitors in the Americas. Despite positive steps, the United States has not developed a holistic, strategic approach to the region. China’s rapid growth and subsequent demand have driven the region’s commodities boom. Roughly twenty years ago, China accounted for less than 2 percent of Latin America’s exports. Over the following decade, trade grew at an average annual rate of 31 percent, reaching around USD $180 billion in 2010. The growth continued, and last year, trade amounted to approximately USD $450 billion. China currently ranks as Latin America’s second-largest commercial trading partner, and there are no signs of this growth in trade slowing. It is projected that over the next 12 years, trade between Latin America and China could reach USD $700 billion.

China’s expanding presence, particularly in South America, raises concerns as China strengthens ties and influence through financial dependence, investments in critical minerals, vaccine diplomacy (especially during the COVID-19 pandemic), and cultural propaganda. By strategically increasing its involvement, China could hinder the United States’ ability to project influence in the region. Growing extra-hemispheric influence is not limited to China. For instance, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s recent tour of Latin America highlighted the potential exploitation of the region by emerging global powers. This pressing issue requires the attention of the United States, as China, Russia, and Iran all pose challenges to America’s influence in Latin America.

Given Latin America’s significance in great power competition and the risks it poses to U.S. national security, clear objectives, prioritization, sustained attention, and targeted engagement are crucial. Inaction, as suggested by “Let it be,” is inadequate—the United States must prioritize its engagement. Not doing so could strengthen rival powers and lead to detrimental outcomes. To effectively manage risks and seize opportunities in Latin America, the United States must adopt a comprehensive “whole-of-government approach” (WGA), coordinating efforts across various government agencies. Mexico, due to its proximity and strategic importance, requires particular attention, risk mitigation, and contingency planning.

Despite the U.S. government’s limited approach, there have been some positive developments. The June 13 meeting between President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou aimed to strengthen trade ties in the region. However, “one-off” meetings alone are insufficient to effectively counter China’s activities in the Americas. These meetings need to be accompanied by clear and substantive “next steps.” It would have been a timely action for the Biden administration to explicitly endorse the bipartisan “United States-Uruguay Economic Partnership Act” as this bill is designed to promote bilateral trade by reducing U.S. tariffs on certain Uruguayan exports and facilitating visas for trade and investment. An endorsement would have provided much-needed clarity and served as a demonstration of the administration’s commitment to economic growth in the region. This is especially important considering that the bill aligns with the principles of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), which is a priority for the Biden administration. Implementing these measures would not only solidify the partnership with Uruguay but also help address the challenges posed by China’s growing commercial influence.

The importance of the region for the United States requires a more expansive engagement from across the U.S. government. In addition to the broader WGA effort, there is a need for additional reforms to engagement, including enterprise funds, project financing, debt forbearance, and new lending. A more pragmatic, targeted, consistent, and contemporary approach is essential to provide policymakers with a diverse toolkit for advancing U.S. interests in the region. To effectively coordinate responses, a standing WGA effort should be in place, allocating adequate resources, attention, and staffing for Latin America. The United States cannot afford to simply ignore these challenges. The United States cannot simply “Let it be.”

Carl Meacham is a Managing Director at FTI Consulting, where he specializes in political risk management and government affairs. Prior to joining FTI, Mr. Meacham led PhRMA’s advocacy efforts for Latin America, Canada, and Europe. Prior he held the position of Senior Manager for Public Policy and Government Relations for Uber in South America and served as the Director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Mr. Meacham spent over a decade as Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-IN) senior professional staffer for Latin America on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). He has also worked for Senate Majority Leaders Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Harry Reid (D-NV) and held a political appointee position in the Clinton administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Though born in the United States, Mr. Meacham was raised in Chile, his mother’s country of origin.

The post Let It Be: A Great Song, but an Ineffective Policy Approach appeared first on Global Americans.

Originally published in Spanish in Diario Libre.

For almost thirty years, the international community has been involved in Haiti, albeit the results have been far from satisfactory. This began in October 1994, when a military intervention led by the United States, with a mandate from the UN Security Council, restored President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide had been overthrown by a military coup on September 30, 1991, just seven months after entering office as the first democratically elected president in Haitian political history. The coup itself occurred just four months after the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted Resolution 1080, which established the basis for the collective defense of democracy when there was an abrupt interruption in the democratic process of any country in the region.

Against this backdrop, Haitian political life experienced a precarious normalization with the election of René Préval the following year and the peaceful transfer of power on February 7, 1996. At the end of Préval’s term, Aristide was reelected and returned to power in February 2001, although the opposition parties boycotted the election. This time his presidency lasted three years instead of four, as political and military forces overthrew him again on February 29, 2004.

On April 30, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1542 (2004), which established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, by its French acronym), replacing the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the Security Council immediately after Aristide’s overthrow. MINUSTAH, initially created for a period of nine months, had both a civilian and military component. This reflected the UN’s intention to assist the Haitian government in the normalization of government institutions and the consolidation of a police force to increase order and security. The Armed Forces had been dismantled following Aristide’s return to power in 1994, creating significant security problems that persist to this day.

MINUSTAH’s mandate was renewed several times and the mission remained in Haiti until October 17, 2017. It was then replaced by the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH, by its French acronym), created by the Security Council through Resolution 2350 (2017) on April 13, 2017. This mission’s general mandate was to support the Haitian government in developing the rule of law in the country by supporting the National Police, the judiciary, prisons, and the protection of human rights.

During this time, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake in January 2010 as well as other natural disasters, further deteriorating the precarious living conditions of the Haitian people. These events shifted international aid toward humanitarian assistance rather than addressing the long-standing structural problems affecting the nation.

MINUJUSTH concluded its operations on October 15, 2019, and was replaced the following day by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH, by its French acronym), created by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2476 (2019) on June 25, 2019. BINUH’s mandate focuses on promoting political stability, good governance, preserving and fostering a peaceful and stable environment, promoting human rights, and supporting national dialogue among different sectors of Haitian society. This mission, originally conceived to last twelve months, has been successively extended until July 15, 2023, through Resolution 2645 (2022) on July 15, 2022.

Despite the United Nations’ successive missions in Haiti, the Haitian crisis deepens. The country’s political system has become disoriented and more unstable, and the conflict has become practically unmanageable. On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated, further exacerbating the political and institutional crisis in the country. This also led to the proliferation of criminal gangs that are gaining increasingly broad control of the territory and making further weakening the state.

It would be presumptuous to give advice on what to do in a crisis of this magnitude after so many failed attempts to resolve it. However, it seems evident that these UN missions and other initiatives to support Haiti have lacked a vision of state-building as a basic premise to articulate society, the economic system, and the governmental structure. In his report to French President Jacques Chirac in 2004, Regis Debray pointed out that Haiti was the country with the most NGOs per square kilometer in the world. This indicates that a tremendous amount of international aid resources has been diluted in projects contributing little or nothing to the (re)construction of state institutions in key areas such as security, fiscal and customs administration, economic planning, environmental management, public works, education, public health, and the justice system. In other words, what Haiti needs is more state, not less.

Thinking afresh about these issues could be useful in the difficult task of assisting the Haitian people in their search for order, stability, and governance. This was the objective expressed in the resolution that created BINUH. Promoting dialogue among all social sectors can be very promising if carried out with a strategic, incremental, and sustained vision over time, particularly with the support of national or international actors who have the capacity to convene. This dialogue could be the starting point for gradually piecing together the Haitian state and its system of government. Of course, the ultimate responsibility for the country’s destiny lies with the Haitian people themselves. Without an active and conscious commitment from Haiti’s political, business, ecclesiastical, and social leaders, there will be no possibility of steering Haiti toward stability, governance, and development, regardless of international support.

Flavio Darío Espinal is a former Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to the United States of America and the Organization of American States (OAS), in which he also held the positions of Chair of the Permanent Council, Chair of the Committee on Legal and Political Issues, and Chair of the Committee on Hemispherical Security. He is also currently serving on Global Americans’ International advisory council, works as a managing partner of FDE Legal, and writes a regular column in Diario Libre.

The post The United Nations and Haiti appeared first on Global Americans.

With Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, returning from his recent visit to China, much buzz has been generated about his and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s successes at dealmaking. In early April, Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) similarly threw a friendly sign to China under the backdrop of rapidly growing bilateral trade and investment ties. He made the unusual move of sending a letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping asking him for help to tackle Mexico’s fentanyl crisis, ruffling feathers in the United States. 

With distinct objectives, Brazil and Mexico are increasingly open to engagement with China, which is happy to oblige in partnership with both economies. The last few years have seen China come out of its COVID-19 cocoon and re-assert its influence in the region beyond pandemic-era vaccine diplomacy. With Lula’s ambitious foreign policy and Mexico’s blossoming ties with China, 2023 promises to be a big year for China’s influence in Latin America. U.S. policy would benefit from staying alert to the latest developments and crafting attractive alternatives to dealmaking with China.

Is Brazil Back?

Lula is a man with a bold vision. “Brazil is back,” he said in his victory speech after winning last year’s presidential election. With China, this vision seems to be coming to fruition—Beijing and Brasilia signed 15 deals covering topics ranging from satellite technology to the digital economy to the automotive industry at Lula’s April visit. At that event, Lula called for BRICS countries to use their own alternative currency instead of the U.S. dollar in trade. Lula and Xi also committed to China and Brazil staying in active communication about the Russia-Ukraine war. In a clear rebuke, Lula called on the U.S. to stop “encouraging” war in Ukraine.

While analysts predicted that Lula would cozy up to China and adopt a stance on the war that leaned pro-Russia, Lula’s critical rhetoric towards the U.S. was unexpected. Analysts anticipated that Lula would chart a middling path between the two great powers to secure a friendly arena for Brazil’s own foreign policy vision. Last month’s visit to China makes clear that Brazil continues to see China as a crucial partner in advancing a multipolar world with weakened dominance from the United States.

Brazil’s trade with China is booming, hitting a record USD 150 billion last year. Brazil also accounts for 47 percent of China’s foreign direct investment in Latin America. Before Lula’s visit, China had also lifted a suspension on imports of Brazilian beef, one of Brazil’s largest exports to China. In late March, a Brazilian bank controlled by a Chinese parent became the first financial institution in Latin America to be part of China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, which settles trade deals in Renminbi (RMB)—the People’s Republic of China official currency.

While Lula did visit the U.S. in February and bonded with President Biden over their commitment to preserving democracy and fighting climate change, the results of that visit were underwhelming. The most visible U.S. commitment from that visit was an initial USD 50 million donation to the Amazon Fund, a billion-dollar fund to reduce deforestation in the Amazon Rainforest—which is minuscule compared to the billion-dollar deals Brazil received from Chinese policy banks in the late 2000s and early 2010s. By contrast, Brazil’s agenda with China is more “concrete, wide-ranging and far-reaching,” according to Sergio Amaral, Brazil’s former ambassador to the United States.

Seeing how Lula navigates his renewed commitments with China without angering the United States will be a crucial development in China-Latin America relations this year. Additionally, how Lula exercises regional leadership closer to home to broker a China-Mercosur trade deal—which he’s come out in favor of—will be crucial to the region’s growing, formalized trade ties with China. Under a very different context with distinct goals, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO)—Lula’s counterpart in the region’s second-largest economy—has a similar task of bending towards China while not irking the United States.

Mexico Hangs in the Balance

In April, AMLO called upon China to help solve Mexico’s fentanyl crisis, caused largely by demand from the United States. This strange yet compelling move by AMLO speaks to a more significant trend in China’s role in Latin America and the Caribbean. China has increasingly filled in, economically, where the U.S. had previously dominated. Twenty-two Latin American and Caribbean countries have officially signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s flagship global infrastructure initiative. Additionally, China has completed or is negotiating free trade agreements with five Latin American countries, including three of Brazil’s commodity-exporting neighbors–Chile, Peru, and as of December last year, Ecuador.

China’s commercial penetration in South America and increasing influence in Central America is not debatable and has been a long time coming. Mexico’s decided turn towards China represents the “nail in the coffin” for U.S. policy in the region. Mexico is the U.S.’s strongest ally in the region. The country is the U.S.’s largest goods trading partner, and it shares a border, an automobile manufacturing supply chain, and a significant trade agreement, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA). Mexico has not participated in major regional efforts to court China to the same extent as Brazil. But now, Mexico has asked China for help.

In response to these developments, the United States slapped sanctions on Chinese chemical suppliers whose products are used to make fentanyl. Instead of engaging directly with Mexico and acknowledging the systemic failures in U.S. domestic policy that keep fentanyl demand high, the U.S. resorted immediately to a “beat China” response. However, the U.S. can’t strike China out of Mexico, with trade war and COVID-fueled ties between the two countries at all-time highs. China’s exports to Mexico increased by nearly 30 percent in 2022, on top of a 50 percent increase the previous year. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Mexico hit a record high of USD 400 million in 2021. Chinese companies are responding to trade-war-era restrictions by nearshoring to Mexico, reducing freight costs while evading thorny tariffs.

With AMLO’s reactionary and inflammatory rhetoric towards the U.S., Mexico’s China ties are one to watch this year. AMLO has threatened to meddle in U.S. elections with an “information campaign” in the face of Republican intentions to use military intervention to curb drug cartel activity in Mexico. He has also accused the Pentagon of spying on Mexico and railed against the State Department’s reporting of human rights in Mexico. Earlier this month, he sent a letter to the Biden administration complaining of U.S. support of Mexican opposition groups. The Mexican president is responding to U.S. interference and criticism with more antagonism and affinity to China, while Brazil is cozying up to China in hopes of building a global order that decenters U.S. hegemony. 

What Should the United States Do?

As Lula and AMLO each navigate the tightrope of courting China while not angering the U.S., the U.S. must offer these regional behemoths deals and partnerships with more heft on equal ground. The United States must consider its unique value propositions to Mexico and Brazil, but more broadly to the region. Could it be the center of a Latin American production sharing network, as it already has in autos with Mexico and Canada? Could it clean up its immigration policy so it doesn’t shift the blame and responsibility squarely on the countries sending migrants? Could it rebuild trust and recognize harm, to be a credible, capable alternative to China?

As the U.S.’s key partners are leaning on China, the question remains on how the U.S. can too be a source of support to these countries. The U.S. has taken leadership in climate change by committing USD 500 million to the Amazon Fund, following up on an initial USD 50 million commitment. However, funding approval from a GOP-controlled House may prove challenging. Rebuilding U.S. legitimacy in climate action after disastrous years under President Trump is also difficult. Currently, Chinese and European firms are funding Latin America’s energy transition due to classification issues in the United States, which predominantly does not fund middle and upper-middle income countries like those in Latin America. The U.S. can leverage the International Development Finance Corporation to make additional deals and support Latin America’s existing renewable energy initiatives. 

Another avenue is to foment existing economic advantages and ties. For Mexico, the U.S. could also encourage its firms to nearshore there and shift supply chains away from China. However, this solution will likely be politically costly as nativism and nationalist, anti-Mexico attitudes are on the rise. For Brazil, the U.S. is already far outstripping China on FDI, so continuing to encourage FDI is key. The U.S. faces complicated choices ahead to deepen ties with these two regional behemoths. Some degree of Chinese influence displacing U.S. initiatives is unavoidable, but the United States can leverage individual strength points to collaborate with both Brazil and Mexico.

Genevieve Slosberg is a Junior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on China’s trade and economic involvement in third countries, with a particular focus on Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post The Balancing Act: Brazil and Mexico Court Beijing While Managing Their Relationship to Washington appeared first on Global Americans.

The rise and fall of world powers has been a focus of intense scholarly interest. From the fall of the Roman Empire to the dawn of U.S. hegemony in the second half of the twentieth century, scholars of multiple disciplines have tried to assess whether the replacement of an established power by a rising one needs to involve major military conflicts. No agreement exists, but, in most cases, wars have expedited this type of transition, especially when the declining and rising powers do not share historical paths of cultural traditions. Regardless of the case, the world is witnessing today a crisis of the Western-centric domination of the last 400 years, with a likely return to an Asia-centered economic dominance. It is unclear how the process will unfold, but it is certain that nations historically tied to the European-U.S. center of power—particularly those in the so-called “The Other-West” like in Latin America—will face a challenging course in trying to (re)positioning themselves amidst this changing world order.

Of special relevance in the Latin American context, Brazil, the largest nation and economy of the continent, and a country that historically managed well to sustain a course of largely autonomous but close relations with the hemispheric hegemon, finds itself today in an especially challenging position. China has become the most significant economic player for Brazil, surpassing the United States. Within the BRICS—a loosely defined but nonetheless effective multilateral block that has helped reshape the economic and geopolitical balance of the world in the last two decades—both countries have come to pursue aligned projects to reshape the global context. Examples include the creation of the BRICS Bank, a multilateral funding agency for developmental projects in the Global South that could overshadow the traditional role played by the World Bank.

In the early 2000s, Lula managed to become Brazil’s first president with a working-class background. In power, he deepened the course of erecting a social welfare state in one of the world’s most unequal economies and innovated with ambitious foreign policy initiatives. Brazil seemed to be emerging on the world stage as the most promising democracy and diplomatic actor in the developing world. Tragically, this auspicious path was not sustained. Now, in his third mandate as president, Lula has the challenging tasks of rebuilding the country’s democratic institutions and repositioning his country in the world after the tragic years of the troubling administration of Jair Bolsonaro.

The timing for delivering on both fronts could not be worse, though. The domestic and global contexts are very different from the one when Lula became president for the first time, and what was then seen as the pursuit of an autonomous and assertive line of foreign policy—which fits well into the diplomatic history of the country—is now interpreted by many in Brazil’s and international communities as divisive, inappropriate, or even a betrayal of Brazil’s traditional Western alignments.

Interestingly, all Lula has tried to do in his foreign policy actions in his first months as president has been to try to revive the impressive achievements of his first administrations, when Brazil managed to sustain good relations with its traditional allies and trading partners, such as the United States and the European Union, while also expanding economic, diplomatic, and strategic projects with countries around the world, particularly among other rising powers, such as India and China.

To promote his most recent goals, Lula attended a Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC) meeting in Buenos Aires, where Brazil declared its interest in strengthening its ties with the region. Soon after, he visited Biden in Washington, DC, where both leaders professed their mutual defense for democracy and shared interests in more environmentally sound patterns of development, particularly in the Amazon region. After this trip, Lula visited China, where commercial agreements were signed, and then went to Europe to meet with traditional allies.

Besides not acknowledging that the Brazilian leader visited both old and new allies, Lula’s treatment from Brazilian and international media outlets lacks the necessary historical perspective. For over a century, Brazilian diplomatic efforts have defended multilateralism, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and self-determination. Moreover, its foreign policy has been largely defined by the need to serve as an instrument of the country’s development. Therefore, Lula’s overtures to traditional and new trading partners and defense of the need to find ways to resolve the stalemate in Ukraine are not surprising. Perhaps some of his statements about the war could have been phrased in more diplomatic language. However, he is right in pointing out that Brazil can serve as an intermediary towards peace, which in fact can only be achieved with Russia brought into the negotiation table—an invitation that Brazil has a privileged position to present.

Speculations about Brazil’s shifting allegiances in the rising economic, geopolitical, and diplomatic rivalry between the U.S. and China notwithstanding, the fact is that Brazil can’t afford to pick a side in these disputes. If China now exerts tremendous economic influence in carrying over the bulk of Brazil’s impressive agribusiness exports, Brazil’s economic, cultural, diplomatic, and historical ties to the United States and Europe are not to fade any time soon.

It is unclear whether Lula can revive the balancing act that he conducted so well 20 years ago. Economic and geopolitical global disputes are ever more prone to include a military dimension, and the war in Eastern Europe has no end in sight. Although Brazil could indeed play a peace-making role, neither side of the conflict seem ready to talk peace. At the same time, soon after Lula’s visit to China, the U.S. government increased by tenfold its economic commitments to the Amazon Fund—demonstrating that in this ever more divided and conflictive world, Brazil still has a role to play and that automatic alignments with any country are not in the best interest of a complex and powerful nation like Brazil.

Rafael R. Ioris is a Professor of Latin American History at the University of Denver and a Research Fellow at the Washington Brazil Office.

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Haiti is headed toward a catastrophic humanitarian and political crash. With an estimated 90 percent of the Port-au-Prince region under the chaotic control of gangs, kidnappings remain a lucrative trade (389 recorded incidents in the 1^st quarter of 2023). Societal life—including the operation of schools—is essentially shut down. Haiti is halfway off the cliff. This is not a sudden development but the result of a dramatic deterioration of Haitian political governance since President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in July 2021. Yet the international community’s response has been strikingly messy. U.S. policy, historically the determining factor, appears at this stage to be boxed in by two factors. First, its continuing support of Haiti’s interim PM, Ariel Henry, anchored to the delusion that he could survive the deepening chaos. Second, the U.S.’s reluctance to help break the political stalemate in Haiti necessary for a coherent international response. In fact, the outcome of this policy paralysis is likely the kind of full-scale security intervention that the Biden administration wants to avoid.

This policy hesitancy may be shaped in part by the U.S. domestic political repercussions of the Afghan withdrawal. While the U.S. ability to shape events in Afghanistan was sharply reduced by the summer of 2021, the circumstances on the ground—let alone the geopolitical context—are different in the Haitian case. Yet, the void of substantive U.S. diplomacy toward Haiti over several years implies that partial remedies are unlikely to secure constructive outcomes.

This includes three components whose overall flaw is that each is dependent on the successful outcome of the other. First, strengthening the PNH (Haitian National Police), the most widely held component of U.S. and multinational responses so far, and now the most misaligned element with reality in the streets of Haiti. Second, energizing the Haut Conseil de Transition (HCT–High Transition Council), the operational heart of the December 21, 2022 political consensus cobbled together with encouragement from particularly the UN and nominally providing Henry with a transition gameplan. Third, encouraging some form of political harmony between enough elements of the December 21 agreement and its primary alternative anchored by the Montana Accord political and civil society constituency. This is not an easy task considering that both have suffered internal divisions, let alone defections over time.  

As a practical matter, the PNH is not only understaffed but weakened by street-level corruption, penetrated by gang elements, and tied to a regime lacking credibility in the eyes of too many Haitians. It is, by implication, faced with an operational security environment where it is unlikely to succeed. As for the HCT—a core element of the December 21 agreement architecture—it is not only not operational but undermined by a nearly fatal conceptual contradiction. A transition mission that implies that sooner or later, Henry fades from a leadership position when in practice, the interim Prime Minister has demonstrated little interest in doing so. Hence, the longer this impasse continues, the less likely the HCT can succeed in its mission. Overall, without strategic engagement from the international community, there is little incentive among key Haitian actors to work toward a political consensus. But without the latter, Washington and other key actors remain reticent to act. 

Critically, this might offer limited openings to alternative options. There are still behind-the-scenes Haiti-related discussions at the Organization of American States (OAS). However, it is unclear how it can achieve a consensus on thorny issues such as addressing Haiti’s security challenges. Also, one can conceive of a response built around a “coalition of the willing,” but without more engagement from the U.S. and Canada, how other hemispheric actors like Chile, Brazil, and Colombia could sustain such an option is not apparent. Finally, The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) remains an interested party in the above scenarios. However, since its Bahamas summit in February, it has backtracked somewhat from direct engagement to address Haiti’s violence. Nonetheless, a high-level delegation CARICOM to Haiti in late February led by the Jamaican Prime Minister and a follow-up session in Jamaica to gather Haiti’s political and civil society leaders in the near future retains some potential.

Despite repeated calls for action from the UN Secretary-General and the arrival of a new head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the big power dynamics of the Security Council don’t hold much promise. These uncertainties provide an opening for a third wheel of international diplomacy. In this case, a of British diplomat Jonathan Powell’s negotiating mission after a roughly two-month hiatus. It remains unclear how stalemated political dynamics in Haiti (whose ambassador in Washington was just recalled on corruption charges  ) can support this form of semi-private diplomacy without clearer signals from Washington and other key capitals. 

In the near-term, several potential scenarios should make policymakers pause. The most worrisome may be the collapse of the Henry regime, either violently or through internal political divisions. This is enhanced by the fact that there is little left of functioning state institutions. Secondly, the increasingly vocal frustrations of Dominican leaders demanding international action regarding their chaotic neighbor is an understandable policy posture but runs the danger of transitioning to potentially inflammatory rhetoric and mistakes as the country enters a presidential election cycle. A third catastrophic scenario has already emerged, in effect mayhem in the streets of Port-au-Prince, with gangs fighting among themselves and local communities taking matters into their hands against both the gangs and the government’s impotence. In effect, Haiti’s spiral toward a humanitarian and political crash is underway.

Georges A. Fauriol is a Fellow with Global Americans; he is also a co-chair of the Caribbean Policy Consortium (CPC), as well as a Think Tank Haiti (TTH) Steering Group member, a partnership of Université Quisqueya (Haiti) and the Inter-American Dialogue, and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).

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Soft power has become a significant tool in modern international relations, allowing nations to influence and attract other countries through non-coercive means. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States has historically relied heavily on its economic and military power to maintain influence. However, in recent years, the region has undergone significant political and social transformations, and the traditional power dynamics have shifted. Therefore, the United States needs to focus on strengthening its soft power capabilities in the region through deepening cooperation. The White House’s 2022 National Security Strategy attempts to balance the need for more cooperation with the clear challenges that have developed in the hemisphere over the  last two decades. The current state of U.S. soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean highlights the need for further investment in specific initiatives to enhance cooperation and improve diplomatic relations. 

Soft power, first coined by Joseph Nye in the 1980s, is the ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion or payment. It is a crucial element of modern foreign policy and plays a vital role in shaping relations between nations. People often see the United States as a major soft power in the world, with its cultural products, political values, and economic clout shaping the opinions and preferences of individuals across the globe. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some view U.S. soft power as on the decline, with negative perceptions of the United States increasing and alternative models of governance and development gaining traction. This article explores soft power from both the United States and Latin American perspectives, analyzing the perceptions of effectiveness for both regions and where they can go from here.

U.S. Soft Power in Latin America

There are several reasons why U.S. soft power is perceived to be in a state of decline in Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the main factors is the history of U.S. interventions in the region, often seen as paternalistic and imperialistic. From the Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century to the interventions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic in the 20th century to more recent interventions in Haiti and Venezuela, the United States has often been perceived by some as a bully that seeks to impose its will on weaker countries. Previous U.S. support for (or at the very least ambivalence toward) authoritarian regimes—such as Pinochet in Chile, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Batista in Cuba—has reinforced this perception.

Another factor that has eroded U.S. soft power in the region is the rise of alternative models of governance and development. In recent years, countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have successfully promoted their own development models, which emphasize social inclusion, environmental protection, and regional integration. These models have been popular, especially among left-leaning governments and social movements, and have provided an alternative to the neoliberal model that the United States and international financial institutions have promoted. The other side of that coin is represented by authoritarian regimes that have taken root in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and briefly in Brazil. A tilt toward illiberal democracy threatens the idea of soft power as an effective tool, but creating a uniting force through soft power’s core tenets remain viable. 

Soft power is an important tool for countries to project their values, culture, and ideals to others in a way that attracts admiration and cooperation. However, when a country’s internal policies and practices contradict those ideals, it can undermine its power. Despite this threat, promoting democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and economic development—all hallmarks of effective soft power—common ground and reciprocal influence could transcend individual leaders or political ideologies.

A third factor contributing to the decline of U.S. soft power in the region is the changing demographics of Latin America and the Caribbean. The region is becoming more diverse, with indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, and other marginalized groups demanding greater political representation and social justice. These groups often perceive the United States as a hegemonic power that is indifferent to their concerns and have therefore become more skeptical of U.S. influence.

Latin America’s Soft Power Abroad

While traditionally associated with major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, smaller and developing nations have also used soft power to achieve their goals. In Latin America and the Caribbean, soft power has significantly shaped regional dynamics and international perceptions of the area due to its rich cultural heritage. From the music of Brazil and Cuba to the literature of Colombia and Mexico, the region’s cultural output has been a key component in the projection of its soft power. 

Latin American and Caribbean countries have increasingly recognized the importance of soft power in their foreign policy. This is particularly relevant as they have historically been marginalized in the international system and face many challenges in promoting their interests and values globally. Without the leverage of hard power, the often more subtle nature of soft power provides these countries with a venue to project a positive image of the region and promote cultural diversity and values. They can harness soft power through specific assets: culture and arts, tourism, sports, diplomacy, and education. 

Strategies for Bolstering Soft Power

Despite these challenges, there are several strategies that the United States could use to strengthen its soft power in the region. One is to promote greater cultural exchange and understanding between the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean. This could involve supporting programs that encourage language learning, student exchanges, and cultural festivals and promoting the work of Latin American artists, writers, and musicians in the United States. By increasing cultural understanding, the United States could demonstrate that it values the diversity of the region and is interested in learning from its rich heritage.

Another strategy is to support democratic institutions and human rights in the region. This could involve providing technical assistance to governments and civil society organizations that promote democratic governance, freedom of expression, and the rule of law. By more aggressively supporting these institutions, the United States could demonstrate that it is committed to the values of democracy and human rights and is willing to work in partnership with countries in the region to achieve these goals.

Finally, the United States could promote greater economic integration and cooperation. This could involve expanding trade agreements, promoting investment in key sectors such as renewable energy and infrastructure, and supporting regional integration initiatives. This will require a sustained and comprehensive effort on the part of the United States. The United States can help build a more prosperous and integrated region by working with regional partners and supporting economic development initiatives.

Partners With Shared Goals

By understanding the factors that contribute to effective soft power in a modern context and by adopting new strategies that emphasize cultural exchange, democratic institutions, and economic cooperation, the United States can adjust to the external actors who have set their sights on the region. Over the past four months, China, Russia, and Iran have been strengthening their relationships throughout the region. Iran committed to a new shipping route with Venezuela to sidestep sanctions and announced plans to expand its naval presence in the Panama Canal zone. China began to approach the lending market in the region with a strategy that focuses on smaller amounts but highly targeted loans. China also continues to leverage its loans in the Americas to pressure countries to break off ties with Taiwan. Finally, leaked U.S. classified documents revealed that Russia, as well as China, have deepening footholds in Latin America and the Caribbean. These documents outlined several Russian plans to leverage regional relationships to strengthen its position and counter U.S. actions. 

The United States has a long and complex history with Latin America and the Caribbean, but working in partnership with countries can build a more equitable and sustainable future for all. It is worth noting that President Biden has already taken steps in this direction. His administration has pledged to support democratic institutions and human rights in the region and has emphasized the importance of multilateralism and diplomacy in its foreign policy approach. Additionally, Biden’s administration has expressed a commitment to addressing the root causes of migration from Central America by promoting economic development and social inclusion.

However, there is still much work to be done. The United States must be willing to listen to the concerns and perspectives that come from the people in the region and to work in partnership with them to address shared challenges. Ultimately, the success of U.S. soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean will depend on the ability of the United States to demonstrate that it is committed to the values of democracy, human rights, and shared prosperity, and that it is willing to work in partnership to achieve these goals.

Jeffery A. Tobin is a doctoral candidate in the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at Florida International University. He holds a master’s degree in Latin American and Caribbean Studies and was a journalist for more than 20 years.

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