The Puerto Rico Status Act (H.R. 8393) opens with an acknowledgment of the island’s prolonged struggle as an unincorporated U.S. territory: “For far too long, the residents of Puerto Rico—over 3 million U.S. citizens—have been deprived of the opportunity to determine their own political future and have not received the full rights and benefits of their citizenship because they reside in a U.S. territory. H.R. 8393 would take a historic step towards righting this wrong by establishing a process to ascertain the will of the voters of Puerto Rico regarding three constitutional options for non-territorial status.”

Hoping to “put the future of Puerto Rico’s political status in the hands of Puerto Ricans, where it belongs,” Representative Raúl Grijalva of Arizona and 62 cosponsors introduced the bill in July 2022. In December 2022, the bill passed in the House and was received in the Senate. Although Democrats lack the votes to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, the Puerto Rico Status Act provides for a plebiscite to be held in November 2023 to resolve the territory’s political status, raising historical issues that have hindered Puerto Rico from addressing structural vulnerabilities and building resilience.

From natural disasters to food crises, Puerto Rico faces numerous issues—all of which are inextricably linked to each other and deeply rooted in the territory’s colonial history. One example of the territory’s inability to avoid certain catastrophes and build resilience can be found in the aftermath of Hurricane María in 2017, when residents went hungry as ships were unable to dock at the damaged ports. For context, the island imports about 85 percent of its food; worsening natural disasters, economic crises, and mismanagement have led to the island’s dependence. Furthermore, U.S. policies, like the Jones Act and Operation Bootstrap, have restrained local agriculture. For many, this catastrophe demonstrated the need for absolute change.

H.R. 8393 is historic in many ways. It is the first time the House passed a resolution requiring a binding referendum mandating the federal government to recognize the territory’s decision. The binding referendum would also be the first time that Puerto Rico’s current status as a U.S. commonwealth is not included as an option. Instead, the three options are independence, sovereignty in free association with the U.S., or statehood. The bill also promises to provide for a transition to and the implementation of Puerto Rico’s chosen status.

In June 2023, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization approved a draft resolution reaffirming Puerto Rico’s inalienable right to self-determination and independence. According to its press release, many spoke out in favor of autonomy, although it was pointed out that the foregoing was a minority opinion, with a majority of Puerto Ricans voting in favor of becoming the fifty-first state in the most recent referendum held in November 2022.

Among those who preferred statehood, Yadira Ofarrill, speaking for the Congressional Extended Delegation-Georgia Chapter, argued that statehood was a valid form of decolonization, and that Puerto Ricans deserved the same fundamental rights granted to U.S. citizens on the mainland. Xiomara Torres, on behalf of the Party for Socialism and Liberation, asserted that statehood would not “cut out the cancer that is colonialism.” The general consensus, however, seemed to be that the decision must be made by Puerto Ricans living on the island. Representative Grijalva, the sponsor of the bill, expressed similar sentiments: “It is crucial to me that any proposal in Congress to decolonize Puerto Rico be informed and led by Puerto Ricans.”

In her heartfelt piece on Puerto Rico’s fight for justice, Puerto Rican writer, journalist, and professor, Jaquira Díaz, also points to Hurricane María, arguing that it was not just a natural disaster, but a political event that provoked a historic shift. “Nine months after María, people still have no electricity. They stop waiting for FEMA. Instead, they look to their neighbors. They take care of one another. This is how it has always been […] There is no benevolent American savior coming to help Puerto Rico. Every day, people see that there is only them, doing everything for themselves. Every day, more of them come to understand that Puerto Rico has always stood on its own. This is why I believe that independence, not statehood, is the path we must pursue.”

Díaz acknowledges that the path to independence would be challenging. She argues, however, that the future of a free Puerto Rico does not need to be easy to be just. To reach that point, Díaz states that the U.S. has a responsibility to set a policy of reparations that acknowledges generations of environmental destruction, human rights violations, economic dislocation, and more. According to her, this process would be complex, imperfect, and messy, but “the point is that self-determination for Puerto Ricans necessitates not just cutting them loose, but also restoring what has been taken and otherwise making amends.”

Advocates of H.R. 8393 recognize Puerto Rico’s history of colonization and current political status as drivers of the island’s structural vulnerability. Disasters like Hurricane María revealed unsustainable practices and inequitable power relations, demonstrating the need for a change in status. What that change ends up being depends on the Puerto Rican vote. However, all three options listed on the bill require the U.S. to address the historic and modern injustices that Puerto Rico’s status has brought upon the island.

Rachel Lee is a former newsletter intern at Global Americans. She holds a bachelor’s degree in global studies with a minor in sustainability from Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. She is currently a master’s student pursuing a dual degree in international affairs and sustainable development at American University in Washington, D.C. and the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

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In Chile, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the coup that toppled President Salvador Allende has reignited the national conversation about the legacies of both Allende and his successor, General Augusto Pinochet. This event has also sparked renewed calls for greater transparency regarding the United States’ role in the lead-up to and during the coup. Peter Kornbluth, a Senior Analyst at the National Security Archive, has released a Chilean edition of his 2003 book, “The Pinochet File,” in which he outlines both old and new information. This includes details such as the White House meeting between Henry Kissinger and Augustin Edwards, the owner of El Mercurio, Chile’s main newspaper at the time. The meeting took place 11 days after Salvador Allende’s election victory.

Fast forward fifty years, and the United States’ role in Chile still casts a long shadow. The 1973 coup reshaped the nation’s trajectory to the extent that the country’s current constitutional debates essentially revolve around how much of Pinochet’s 1980 constitution (which has been amended hundreds of times since) should be retained.

However, the landscape has transformed significantly. The United States, once a central player in Chilean affairs, now navigates a changed world. This transformation is not solely due to the end of the Cold War a generation ago. The influence of the United States has been recalibrated by global and domestic shifts, as well as evolving foreign policy doctrines. The anniversary of the coup thus prompts a probing analysis of how America’s evolving stance towards Chile mirrors greater changes in its foreign policy approach on the global stage.

The focal point lies in examining the transition from the once audacious involvement of the United States in Chile’s domestic politics to its contemporary position in a world marked by a more diversified geopolitical landscape. The essence of this exploration resides not only in understanding why the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has purportedly retreated from past methods but also in grasping how the very nature of projecting influence has transformed. 

This narrative unfolds within a broader reality: while the U.S. may not have relinquished its power, perhaps it has moderated its willingness to employ it. Consider Ukraine, where the U.S. has actively opposed Russian aggression, typically through its NATO allies, and has been careful to strike a balance that avoids prompting a Russian escalation.

In the current post-Cold War and post-Iraq era, there is an acknowledgment that blunt force tactics undermine global credibility and moral standing such as supporting coups or invasions. The intention of the United States to refrain from interference in domestic affairs reflects domestic disinterest and a different global order, one in which meddling in the national politics of other countries is unpopular and less effective. As a result, the narrative of the CIA engaging in covert operations has shifted towards diplomatic engagement and economic collaboration.

Chile itself has undergone transformative changes that have shaped U.S. influence. The nation’s diversified economy, burgeoning trade partnerships, and diplomatic engagements have paved the way for a more self-confident country. The U.S. remains a crucial partner in areas like defense, education, and trade. Bilateral trade with Chile was around USD 3 billion in the years immediately following the authoritarian era. By 2021, this figure had surged to over USD 38 billion. In comparison, however, China’s trade figure was almost USD 58 billion, highlighting the shifting market dynamics of the 21st century.

In this sense, the United States’ adjusted ability to steer Chile’s course is a testament to the new global reality, which demands a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. This approach involves subtle yet consistent diplomacy and cooperation, which may prove more valuable than the tactics of the past.

This paradigm shift necessitates, among other things, a reevaluation of the role of public opinion. Today’s interconnected world, saturated with real-time information, requires greater transparency and accountability at a faster pace. An engaged populace means that any perceived impropriety would trigger a swift and vigorous backlash. The era of covert operations veiled in secrecy has given way to a public that demands a more selective and principled foreign (and often domestic) policy. Climate change and gender issues represent just a few of the challenges faced by the Global South, where the U.S. maintains a moral standing compared to most international rivals. The conflict in Ukraine, where Chile has been one of the few Latin American countries steadfastly defending a liberal international system, demonstrates that space remains for the U.S. to cultivate a values-based foreign policy in the region to counter the often clientelist approaches of its competitors.

Therefore, the highlights of today’s bilateral relationship are a far cry from the approach that prompted the U.S. to resort to covert actions half a century ago. For instance, a Chilean company, Cencosud, now holds a majority share in a significant U.S. supermarket chain, and Shake Shack, an American fast casual restaurant chain, offers vegan products developed by the Chilean firm NotCo. Beyond trade, a Chile-California agreement presents numerous avenues for cooperation in agriculture, energy, and education. The recently approved tax treaty in the U.S. Congress (after a 13-year wait) will facilitate investment by eliminating double taxation. Furthermore, after rigorous negotiations, Chile remains the sole Latin American country to enjoy visa waiver status with the U.S., promoting tourism and business travel.

Consequently, the evolving role of the United States in Chile underscores a broader narrative of shifting foreign policy dynamics. The shift from the past to engaging in mutually beneficial collaboration mirrors the global trend in diplomacy. The capacity for U.S. influence endures, although political realities have curtailed the audacious use of that influence. Chile, likewise, stands as a testament to the resilience of nations in shaping their destinies while struggling against external pressures. This reflection on the past fifty years serves as a poignant reminder that foreign policy, like the world it shapes, is constantly in flux, driven by often unpredictable prevailing winds. Successful navigation requires flexible adaptation while maintaining a clear sense of direction toward the desired destination.

Carl Meacham spent over a decade as Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-IN) senior professional staffer for Latin America on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). He is currently a Managing Director at FTI Consulting.

Robert Funk is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chile and a partner in Andes Risk Group, a consulting firm.

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According to United Nations data, 26 percent of the world’s migrant population lives in the Americas, which means that migrants make up 7 percent of the region’s total population as of 2020. Of this total, 58.7 million are in North America, and 14.8 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to UNHCR’s 2022 Global Trends in Forced Displacement Report, by the end of 2022, at least 108.4 million people had been forcibly displaced globally. In the Americas, 9.2 million people moved across international borders. This figure represents an increase of 950 percent in the last ten years. Why do people move across the Americas?

The push factors are multiple and observe variations from country to country. However, in general terms, people migrate or are forcibly displaced due to increasing levels of violence and citizen insecurity, the forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime activities. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence are also important factors which particularly affect women and children. Added to this are persistent economic and structural causes, such as a weak rule of law, corruption, high poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities (especially for women, young people, and other vulnerable groups), food insecurity, and more recently the effects of climate change. This increase in human mobility across cities of the Americas poses opportunities for receiving countries but also challenges, and it is often local governments the ones responsible for providing the first response.

A recent study published by the Organization of American States and other partners entitled “The Role of Local Governments in the Reception and Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Cities of the Americas” confirms these trends. It proposes that there are opportunities for the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, and it shows that local actors can play a key role in the reception and integration of this population. Despite numerous challenges, the cases presented in the study demonstrate that with political will, innovative ideas, respect for human rights, and the support of international organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and the media, progress can be made at the local level to ensure a successful reception and integration of migrants and refugees in the region.

Based on the results of 231 interviews in 109 localities in 25 countries, the study proposes at least four lessons to capitalize on the work being done by the local governments facing these arrivals. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that local governments do not operate in a vacuum when working on the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, but there is an important influence of national governments on local actions—both in positive and negative ways. Migration policies are usually established at the national level, and local governments must respond with these in mind. It is, therefore, no surprise that for most local governments, coordination with national policies represents one of their main challenges. Another factor that also influences their work (and often supports it) is that of civil society and international organizations. They play a key role in most of the localities studied, and fill institutional gaps to meet the needs of migrants and refugees.

A second lesson from the study refers to the variation in local structures and capacities across cities in the Americas. Indeed, the study confirms that there is significant diversity in the structures and capacities of the 109 localities studied in the report. On one side of the spectrum, there are localities with a long migratory history and with resources which have stable structures designed to provide services to migrants and refugees. As documented in the study, some examples include the Mayor’s Office for Migration Affairs in New York City in the United States and the Coordination of Policies for Immigrants and Promotion of Decent Employment of São Paulo in Brazil. Other cities are facing new migratory dynamics, which has pressured their governments and have had to rely on international organizations as they develop local response initiatives, such as seen in several non-border localities in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

At the other end of the spectrum are border localities that are generally isolated and have few resources to respond comprehensively to the needs of migrants and refugees. These include border or rural cities that are in people’s migratory trajectories. One example is the locality of Darien in the border between Colombia and Panama. Lastly, in terms of capacities, although there are still significant gaps, training programs for local officials on issues of reception and integration of migrants were reported in 47 percent of the localities assessed. It is important to emphasize, however, that 42 percent of these programs are based on normative and rights issues, and do not focus on practical aspects of policy design and implementation.

Thirdly, the report also indicates that most local government actors prioritize socio-economic integration, followed by reception, although needs and priorities vary by type of locality. This suggests that upon arrival, cities really need to provide access for migrants and refugees to goods and services—including employment—to meet their basic needs and those of their families. The pre-condition for this access is providing them with regularization options or legal pathways. It is worth highlighting that for border localities in particular, the priority was reception, although this was often understood as the rapid processing of people and not as the comprehensive provision of services for the population. Lastly, in some of the newer destinations, in the absence of sufficient social networks that can provide support to migrants and refugees in host communities, there is greater awareness, urgency, and need for local actors to provide adequate reception and socio-economic integration services. One common challenge for cities evaluated in the report is counting on disaggregated and updated information on migrants at the local level to facilitate the creation and access to appropriate reception and integration services.

One last lesson the study points to refers to political integration and the often-ignored aspect of migrant and refugee integration. In this regard, the study confirms that there is still a long way to go to achieve political integration. In most of the localities studied in the report, there are almost no mechanisms for the political participation of migrants and refugees. Access to identity documents was identified as the main hurdle in this area. Concerning identity documents, it is important to highlight very innovative practices coming from cities to provide identification to these arrivals, who may not always carry a passport or ID with them. The study shows different models of municipal identification that have been adopted in Mexico City and in localities across the United States. Regarding political participation, in cities such as Bogota and São Paulo, permanent spaces for political participation have been developed for migrants and refugees. However, there is a long way to go and a pressing need to adopt an official narrative that presents migrants and refugees as neighbors, newcomers, and citizens and also to encourage social cohesion not only within migrant spaces but in other broader community spaces.

Although the focus on the local level is not entirely new, this report provides one of the first regional perspectives at a continental scale on migration and protection institutions and policies in the Americas, thanks to its comprehensive and diverse voices. What is novel is that it covers a wide variety of localities in a region that is profoundly diverse in terms of structures, institutional frameworks, and capacities, It reflects the perspectives of individuals on the ground who are directly involved in the challenges and opportunities posed by the reception and integration of migrants and refugees. The common denominator that emerges from the analysis is that these cities have been creating positive innovations to provide protection and better opportunities for the populations settled in their territories. It is precisely these positive innovations of receiving, protecting, and integrating that should be replicated and promoted at the hemispheric level.

The opinions in this article are personal. They do not represent those of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian is the Director of the Department of Social Inclusion at the Secretariat for Access to Rights and Equity within the Organization of American States (OAS). As Director, she oversees the OAS’s efforts to promote social inclusion and access to human rights, with a particular focus on vulnerable populations. Additionally, Betilde is a founding member and coordinator of the Network of Latin American Female Political Scientists, known as #NoSinMujeres. This project aims to promote and empower women’s work in Latin American Political Science. Betilde holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University.

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In Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell’s all-powerful ruling party lives by the slogan, “He who controls the past controls the future.” While today’s democratic Chile is far from Orwell’s totalitarian dystopia, it is seeing a political struggle over the meaning of its recent past, as September 11 will mark fifty years since the leftist government of President Salvador Allende was overthrown by the country’s armed forces, ushering in seventeen years of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet before the return to civilian rule in 1990. 

Processing Memories

How Chile will mark this anniversary has become a front-burner political issue in a country where memories of the coup can still provoke intense reactions. With Gabriel Boric’s election, Chile is now governed by an unabashedly leftist president for the first time since Allende, and the management of the commemoration of this anniversary is proving to be one among many headaches he is facing.

While for many Chileans of the generation which has grown up under democratic rule, the Allende government, the coup, and the Pinochet years are a subject of at best distant memory or of stories told by their parents, for others, they still excite strong emotions. On the right, the human rights violations of the Pinochet era are (often reluctantly) recognized. At the same time, the chaos and ideological extremism of Allende’s presidency are stressed, as is the modernization of the economy on free market lines and the gradual reduction of poverty which took place during the years of military rule.

On the left, of course, there is little room for recognizing any achievements of the military years and ample desire to remember the deaths, tortures, and exiles that occurred. By contrast, Allende is remembered as the paladin of Chile’s dispossessed who chose suicide rather than surrender when the presidential palace was attacked, and whose promise in his final broadcast that one day Chileans would again walk down “the broad avenues through which the free man passes to build a better society” is viewed as prophetic.

Comments Provoke a Reaction

The remarkable sensitivity which the discussion of Allende’s presidency excites was demonstrated by the political furor which arose from remarks made recently by Patricio Fernández, whom Boric had named as coordinator for the Chilean government’s commemoration of the events marking the fiftieth anniversary of the coup. A man of the left and founder of a semi-satirical weekly publication focused on politics and culture, he had the difficult task of developing ways to recognize the traumatic nature of the coup without turning it into a partisan exercise.

However, he stepped on a political landmine in a radio interview when he was asked how a minimum of common ground for the commemoration could be found given that there is a “a not small percentage of the population that says [the coup] was necessary.” Fernández responded, saying that while “historians and political scientists will be able to debate why and how it came to that, we can try to agree that the events after the coup are unacceptable.”

This response was sharply criticized by human rights groups and political figures from the parties forming Boric’s coalition in Congress, particularly from the Communist Party. Emblematic was a letter to Boric’s chief of staff from a group of human rights organizations which asserted that Fernández had “evaded condemning the seditious coup d’état… that put an end to democratic institutions in our country.”

Fernández had his defenders, who challenged this as a simplistic reading of the events leading up to the coup and a refusal to engage in self-criticism. Indeed, they argued that it was an effort on the part of the Communist Party to “cancel” alternative interpretations of history. However, ultimately Fernández found his position untenable and resigned. 

Boric, who is close to Fernández personally, expressed appreciation for his work, but in the middle of other troubles, notably an unfolding scandal over no-bid contracts given to non-governmental organizations which were close to one of the parties in his coalition, he did not seek to reverse Fernández’s decision.

A Critical Book Sparks Controversy

Ironically, there is reason to believe that Boric himself shares Fernández’s view that there is more to be said about Allende’s fall than a simple effort to overthrow democracy. He has praised a controversial recent book by Chilean political scientist Daniel Mansuy entitled Salvador Allende: La izquierda chilena y la Unidad Popular (Salvador Allende: The Chilean Left and Popular Unity), for which he too has received criticism from within his own ranks.

Mansuy tracks the deep contradictions which characterized Allende’s period in office.  He notes that Allende insisted that he was leading a uniquely democratic “Chilean way to socialism,”  but his end point clearly was not mere social democracy but something closer to what had been installed following Cuba’s revolution, which was then only eleven years old and an object of fascination within the Latin American left. 

He recounts how Allende quickly lost the support of Chile’s middle class and with it the political center, arguing that his refusal to disavow his more radical supporters, who engaged in occupations of factories and farms, together with his administration’s use of legal loopholes to undertake massive nationalizations, paved the way for his downfall well before the military acted.

Boric and Allende: Similarities and Differences

Why is it that fifty years on, the debate over the Allende era remains so intense that it cost Fernández his position? While most of those who were politically active on the left during that time are gone from the political scene, in many cases, their children—who were engaged in the struggle against the Pinochet regime—are now figures of importance in the parties which make up the governing coalition. To them, anything less than a wholehearted embrace of Allende’s legacy is unacceptable.

There are also parallels between Boric’s presidency and Allende’s that make the analysis of the latter a subject of more than historical interest. Like Allende, Boric somewhat unexpectedly came to power when he led the ticket for a group of “new left” formations together with the same Communist Party which had lent its support to Allende. 

Plus, although the context is different in many ways, Boric, like Allende, went from a short political honeymoon to a period of deep public disillusionment. His situation was worsened by a failed effort to rewrite Chile’s constitution, something which Allende contemplated but never actually attempted. The proposed constitution, which entailed much greater state control of the economy, together with strong environmental and indigenous rights provisions, was a blueprint for the permanent transformations for which the leftist coalition hoped and indeed tracked much of Boric’s campaign platform.

Like Allende, Boric has had to face a Congress in which he lacks a majority, preventing him from moving much of his political program. Where Allende refused to abandon his transformational ambitions, however, Boric has reached out to Chile’s center-left, bringing members into his cabinet and his congressional coalition. His near-term political agenda has been reduced to seeking a revenue-enhancing tax reform, as well as pension and health reforms which would entail a significantly greater state role in these sectors. And success for these efforts is by no means assured.

Unsurprisingly, this has led to restlessness in Chile’s political ranks. The Communists have stayed loyal to Boric, but have stressed the importance of the more comprehensive program on which he ran, as opposed to his stripped-down current agenda. Meanwhile, the “new left” parties have watched unhappily as their seats in the cabinet have been reduced in favor of figures from the center-leftist parties which they had opposed in the last election. 

In fairness to all, no one among Boric’s supporters is talking about armed struggle as an alternative to democratic politics, a major difference from the left in the Allende era.  With that said, however, Boric came to power in the aftermath of the “social explosion” of 2019, a multi-month series of protests marked by violence, which showed Chile’s social fabric to be more fragile than previously thought.

Boric, it appears, is prepared to do what Allende would not, and accept the reality that he lacks the political space to take the country very far in the direction in which he had hoped. Thus far, he has been able to keep his coalition together. In this context, though, the acrimony within Chile’s left over Salvador Allende’s heritage looks less like a purely historical debate and more like a surrogate for one, not yet joined, about the future of Gabriel Boric’s government.

Richard M. Sanders is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Fellow of the Center for the National Interest. Formerly a member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served at embassies throughout Latin America and in Washington.

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Leaders of the world’s democracies, convening a few months ago in South Korea, pitched the tagline “Democracy Delivers…opportunities, digital freedom, prosperity, free elections.” etc.  However well-intentioned, the messaging missed the mark. By touting the benefits of democracy, the leaders directed their message to those in failing democracies, not to lose hope and fall for the siren song of rising populist autocrats. In doing so, these democratic leaders fundamentally failed to understand the modern autocrat’s appeal. This failure continues to result in the autocrats winning at the ballot box. In 2022 Freedom House found that autocracy is making gains against democracy and encouraging emergent leaders to abandon the democratic path. Countries that suffered democratic declines in 2022 outnumbered those that improved by two to one.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in our own Western Hemisphere. In 2000, thirty-four of thirty-five countries in our Hemisphere were nominal electoral democracies.  Since then, these democratic governments have simply not delivered for their people.  As a region, Latin America has the greatest income inequality in the world.  Access to education, health, and social services remains at some of the lowest levels in the world. Official corruption in too many of these countries is endemic. Covid put all of this in stark relief as unemployment (30% in some countries) eviscerated the then-growing middle class. It is no surprise that political instability has risen dramatically.  Even the now-faded promise of Free Trade Agreements between the U.S. and a dozen or so countries in the region has failed to provide enough opportunities for burgeoning young Latin populations, as reflected in migrant caravans headed for the U.S. Southern Border.

Democracy summiteers have correctly cited the foregoing as threats to democracy. However, where they have been tone-deaf is on the one issue that is having the most profound effect on instability, out-migration, and the embrace of populist autocrats in the region…the withering of state-provided public, or citizen, security. Democratic governments and leaders have failed to recognize that the provision of public security is THE primordial responsibility of government and that all too many governments in failing democracies have not delivered this essential condition. 

Latin America, in the absence of armed conflict, has the highest rates of crime and violence in the world. The region has ten times more homicides than Europe. In poll after poll, increasing numbers of Latin Americans are citing the degradation of public security as their biggest concern. A recent poll in Ecuador cited a whopping 85% of the respondents claiming that spiking violence is their chief concern. In Ecuador, and neighboring Andean states, drug cartels, organized crime groups, vigilantes, and gangs have taken over the traditional role of the state in providing security. These Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have evolved into criminal corporations, moving well beyond their “traditional” pursuits of extortion and drug trafficking into human smuggling (Mexican cartels earned an estimated $7 billion last year by moving people across our border). The Department of Homeland Security estimated that TCO “enterprises” reached over $100 billion in gross profits in 2022. In addition to people and drug smuggling, TCO growth businesses now include government procurement, all manner of services, pirating of intellectual property, real estate, and commercial supply chains.    

Salvadorans confronting decades of burgeoning homicides, violence, and general lawlessness elected a two-time mayor in 2019.  Enter Nayib Bukele, 41 years old, the brash President of El Salvador. – the self-described “coolest dictator in the world.”  He pledged to end the country’s endemic gang-induced violence. El Salvador had the ignominious moniker of the world’s “Homicide Capital.” In February 2020 Bukele sent the Army into the country’s unicameral Assembly to “encourage” the passage of a bill that provided critical U.S. government funds for the police and army. Surrounded by soldiers and sitting in the President of the Assembly’s chair, he announced, “It’s clear who is in control of the situation, and we’re going to put the decision in the hands of God. He also describes himself as “God’s Emissary”.  

Since 78 people were killed in a single weekend in March of 2022, he has imprisoned over 68,000 Salvadorans for suspected “gang affiliations”, suspended civil liberties under a rolling state of emergency, bypassed legislators, and packed the courts.  Bukele has gotten results. Homicides are down by over 52%. His approval ratings are north of 80% and his power grab, consolidating powers from the legislative, judicial, and electoral branches, is the envy of Latin American politicians running for elected office in crime-ridden countries in the region. His mastery of social media, combined with his “rule by spectacle” has made him the darling of those in the region seeking to escape from fear stalking their own neighborhoods.

Last month he announced his intention to seek another term, even though the constitution clearly does not permit successive terms and all his predecessors have honored the one-term rule. Notwithstanding, his hand-picked electoral council ruled that he can run. As a result of his popularity, an extraordinarily successful crackdown on gangs, and because of his control of all government institutions, Bukele is a hero to many in the Hemisphere’s political class. There is little doubt that he will win a second term. In Ecuador and Guatemala, both countries conducting general elections soon, several candidates have invoked the Bukele name as the gold standard for elected leadership and effective public security policies.

 Bukele’s success has come at great cost to essential democratic norms and standards. He removed the attorney general and replaced Supreme Court justices with loyalists. His state of emergency (extended 11 times) has enabled him to virtually eliminate due process. Tens of thousands are held incommunicado without charges. Family members are left with only vague assumptions of what may have happened to their loved ones. There is no legal due process in today’s El Salvador, where Bukele brooks no criticism nor dissent. To his critics he says, either embrace what I am doing or hand the country over to the gangs. Several noted journalists have departed the country, citing harassment from the government. Worse, Bukele has never talked about when and if he would ever return basic civil liberties.

While Bukele’s stock rises throughout the Hemisphere, the next country to succumb to “Bukelismo” and join the ranks of the autocrats may well be Ecuador, already on the endangered list as a U.S. ally in the region. Ecuador is one of the few countries in the Global South that has stood with the U.S. and other allies in imposing sanctions against Russia, but it has come at a great cost. Ecuador lost over $1.5 billion in exports that would have been sold to Russia in 2022.

Followers of Ecuador’s strongman, ex-President Rafael Correa, succeeded in assembling enough votes to impeach the sitting President. Before they could vote, President and staunch U.S. ally Guillermo Lasso moved to dissolve the Assembly. Under the constitution, the president must also resign. With surging crime and his popularity at a low ebb, Lasso decided not to run in the August elections. Long an island of tranquility in a tough neighborhood, sandwiched between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador has descended into rampant criminality at the hands of TCOs.

Ecuador recorded 4,539 murders in 2022, the highest murder rate in its history. Ecuador is now ranked 93^rd out of 140 countries in terms of the rule of law. It is listed at 105 out of 180 counties in the 2021 Corruption Index. The spark seemed to have come from prison massacres, over 600 prisoners have been killed inside prison walls since 2019. Prisons have become operating bases for the drug trade. Last year 210 tons of drugs were seized by the authorities. Reminiscent of the TCO violence in Mexico, children as young as 13 are recruited by the gangs, and grisly beheadings and bodies hanging from bridges are all too common along the country’s coastline.

How did Ecuador get there? While weak institutions and lax policy are the root causes. The demobilization of the Colombian guerrillas operating out of northern Ecuador set off a free-for-all to control the movement of drugs in that area, an uptick in European demand for cocaine and loose visa requirements allowed members of TCOs, including the Albanian Mafia, to enter the country unimpeded, making common cause with local gangs. The country’s ports have become lucrative transshipment points for drugs bound for Europe. In the port cities of Guayaquil and Esmeraldas, where violence is most intense, massacres, targeted assassinations of police and public officials, and car bombs have become weekly occurrences.

Ex-President Correa’s hands-off approach to narco-trafficking during his 10 years in office enabled the drug trade to flourish. His view was that drug trafficking was the exclusive responsibility of the governments of drug-consuming nations. As a result, the country’s navy and army have been compromised by organized crime at the highest levels. The US Ambassador recently referred to “Narco-Generals” in the security services.  The Ambassador also raised the threat level for intending American tourists, urging increased caution due to civil unrest, crime, and kidnapping. Several cities along the coast were deemed no travel zones. Ecuador is on a slippery slope. The next level of advisory will urge Americans not to travel to the country.

Sentenced to eight years for corruption, Correa has been living in Belgium. He is seeking to return to the country, and if a surrogate wins in August, he will receive a pardon. Whether in the presidential palace or simply pulling the strings from behind, the return of Correa would be disastrous for the country, portending a further descent into Venezuelan-style chaos, lawlessness, and autocracy. 

Turning this around will not be easy or quick. It is not simply a matter of sacking a few bad apples in the military and police. Any effective national campaign should begin with a well-articulated crime-fighting strategy, with the recognition that adjustments will continuously be made over time. Security force leadership in the coastal hotspots would need to be completely replaced. Intelligence and counterintelligence fusion centers to collect all-source information on bad actors would need to be created. A heavily vetted strike force should be stood up to act on fusion center intelligence and a robust corps of inspectors given the responsibility of continuously rooting out compromised officers.

Beyond these measures, the key to success will be community buy-in. This trust will only be achieved through sustained government actions to protect those in the affected communities. Only then will the government begin to turn the tide against the gangs. While vital to any success, there should be a recognition that trust will only be earned over time by deed, steady community policing, not just empty pledges of community support. Finally, the next President of Ecuador will have to maintain a laser focus on security. For him/her it must trump all other pressing priorities.

This can be done. Ecuador’s neighbor to the north eviscerated armed and criminal groups and eventually brought many of those to peace negotiations. Criticisms of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe aside, his “Democratic Security” plan did more than efforts by any president before or after him to bring peace to the country.  Only when the uncontrolled excesses of Uribe’s police and military went unchecked, did he suffer a loss of credibility and an immovable constitutional barrier in his attempt to stay in power. 

Uribe’s success was a direct result of hundreds of visits with the locals of villages and towns in the most violent areas of the country. Uribe would target those rural towns that had been plagued by insurgent, paramilitary, drug cartel, and gang violence for decades. After the town and its environs had been secured by the security forces, his initial meetings would begin by apologizing on behalf of his and previous Colombian governments to the assembled for not fulfilling the primordial obligation of the state…that is the provision of public security. This is as opposed to excoriating them for cooperating with bad actors. He vowed never to abandon the town again. Uribe would then conduct a town meeting to discuss public works that would be generated by the community itself. Project agendas were then drawn up, and subsequent visits by Uribe would review progress. The local police were instructed to hand out cell phones to those that would anonymously report the activities and movements of bad actors. With the continued protection of the security forces, local self-rule re-established, jobs created through public works, and ubiquitous cell phone reports, the bad actors had no place to hide.

He achieved all this, while at the same time, remaining within the constitutional parameters of due process and accountability. While the circumstances of Colombia and Ecuador’s criminal instability are not identical, much can be learned from Uribe’s phenomenally successful strategy and tactics to win hearts and minds and restore trust in the government.

Salvadoran President Bukele spares no effort to taunt the U.S., saying that our brand of democracy promotion is outmoded and sclerotic. He cites our plague of mass shootings as yet another reason why we are failing our own citizens. He repeatedly questions the U.S. standing to promote democracy or public security best practices. He is winning adherents in the region. But we can prove him wrong when effective measures to combat organized crime can be brought about under a democratic framework. Indeed, experience shows that when communities feel safe from criminal retribution, democracy can flourish, starting at the grassroots.

There is a strong consensus in the Senate for U.S. support to end the bloodletting in Ecuador. The Senate U.S.-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022, passed out of committee unanimously, seeks to strengthen ties between our two countries. It directs the Department of State to develop and implement strategies to increase the capacity of Ecuador’s beleaguered justice system and law enforcement agencies in an effort to combat crime, corruption, and “the harmful influence of malign foreign and domestic actors”.

For the U.S. and the other global democracies there must be a long-overdue recognition that, while citizens in failing states may abstractly value democracy, rampant criminality has set their houses on fire. And in the midst of the inferno, they will elect leaders who will put the fire out. The U.S. and other like-minded democracies have an obligation to assist Ecuador in combatting criminality while preserving essential civil liberties. Enduring democratic leadership in Ecuador and the world will have to bring both effective law enforcement and civil liberties to douse the fire. If in August Ecuador elects such a responsible and committed leader, one that can work with the U.S. and our democratic allies, we should respond with substantial security assistance, to include equipment and training. This is not just Ecuador’s fight. Democracy is at stake. 

Ambassador (Retired) John Feeley is the Executive Director of the Center for Media Integrity of the Americas. He is a former career U.S. diplomat who served as Ambassador to Panama, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Charge d’Affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission in Mexico, in addition to other postings in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a former Marine Corps Officer.

Ambassador (Retired) Peter F. Romero is currently the Producer and Co-host of the very popular podcast American Diplomat. He has been a consultant and advisor to several governments and private entities on community-based security strategies. As a career Foreign Service Officer, he was the Assistant Secretary of State, who initiated the successful Plan Colombia, US Ambassador to Ecuador, as well as several other assignments in Latin America over a career that spanned 25 years.  

The post Ecuador: The Next Domino to Fall to Autocracy? appeared first on Global Americans.

Despite some analysts claiming it has lost its middle power status and foreign policy relevance, Canada has been at the forefront of significant international peacemaking efforts in recent decades. Canada’s sustained efforts to support peace in Colombia—though not as glamourized as efforts made by the U.S., the Organization of American States (OAS), or other countries and organizations—are significant.

With Canada reaching its 70th year of formal diplomatic relations with Colombia, it is important to recognize its quiet contributions to the Andean country’s long peace and justice process. As stated in a public memo from Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s foreign policy goals in Colombia mainly relate to its security and political future, all strengthened through international assistance and commercial diplomacy. Canada’s efforts toward peace, justice, and democracy in Colombia have not changed. The country has provided direct and indirect foreign assistance to Colombia over the last five decades, hoping that such efforts, as put by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion said in a 2016 meeting in Cartagena, will “make peace stick.”

Canada has aimed to promote “growing mobility between [the] two countries,” through increasing bilateral ties since the start of Colombia’s civil conflict in the mid-1960s.  Under Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau—who governed from 1968 to 1979 and from 1980 to 1984—Canada’s focus on diplomatic engagement contrasted with that of its U.S. counterparts. While the United States supported anti-communist activities, paramilitary groups, and governments against democratic regimes hostile to American commercial interests, Trudeau engaged with actors across the political-ideological spectrum. He created the Latin American Task Force, founded the Bureau of Western-Hemispheric Affairs, and joined the Organization of American States (OAS) as a permanent observer in 1972.

Beginning in 2004, the Canadian government, under both Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, mirrored former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s diplomatic approach to managing relations with Colombia. This was done through the organization of several official trips, the creation of bureaucratic structures, and the establishment of communication channels to support peace, justice, and engagement with Colombia. These institutions helped promote dialogue and diplomatic engagement with Colombia, advancing Canada’s role in the 2016 Peace Accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Another central objective was the cooperation on regional and multilateral issues, including within institutions and gatherings that facilitated cooperation and dialogue with partners.

As part of this effort, Canada became one of the main financiers, along with the United States, of the Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS). The MAPP/OAS is tasked with “[fostering] peaceful coexistence, recognizing victims’ rights, and creating spaces conducive to reconciliation.” Additionally, Canada has provided various grants to MAPP/OAS, as well as to the United Nations (UN) Verification Mission in Colombia, and organized visits to their offices in Bogota. The MAPP/OAS and UN Verification Mission are essential to promoting multilateral dialogue within Colombia and to building lasting peace that includes all relevant actors and sectors of society. Relatedly, Canada’s Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP) provides financial support to these two institutions, reaching up to USD 4.4 million annually.

Canada has been actively working towards including human rights in Colombia’s peace process by raising the issue in every phase of the negotiation and reintegration process, including business, security, and political capacity-building. One example of that is Canada’s engagement with the non-governmental sector to work toward peace and justice and “creating economic opportunities for vulnerable populations” and “responding to humanitarian needs.” Canadian NGOs like Oxfam Québec, SOCODEVI, and Cuso International are working with the government to support civil society initiatives in conflict-affected regions of Colombia. Desjardins Bank has also granted loans to small business owners in conflict-affected areas of Colombia to promote economic growth.

The Canadian government, working with the Colombian Mine Action Authority (DAICMA), has cleared out over 57,000m² of minefields, provided 26 cleared minefields to local communities, and helped with the identification and mapping of another 21 minefields. With Colombia as the second most-affected country by anti-personnel mines, at least 27,000 people have directly benefitted from the mine clearance, and another 60,000 are looking to be re-integrated into their communities after the demining is completed.

Another foreign policy goal of Canada in Colombia is built around promoting gender equality and integration within the peace process. Women are a key part of the structure of many criminal armed groups in Colombia, most particularly the FARC. In partnership with ProFamilia, a Colombian NGO, the Canadian government has provided services for 9,069 girls and their families who were victims of gender-based violence. Colombia was also put as a “priority country” within Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. This fits within Canada’s stated desire to pursue peace through civil society engagement, as well as “advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.”

Finally, Canada has looked to advance the peace process to foster democracy in Colombia by supporting peacebuilding efforts. To combat disenfranchisement, Canada has rhetorically and financially supported free and fair politics in Colombia. To do so, the Canadian government sent electoral observers in partnership with the OAS to Colombia and provide grants for public diplomacy and peacebuilding organizations through Global Affairs Canada. Additionally, Canada provided grants to NGOs, media organizations, academic institutions, and small businesses in Colombia. Moreover, Canada has built a Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP) that, since 2006, has “provided $40 million in funding to support peacebuilding efforts, with a focus on supporting the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC.” The program is specifically focused on implementing the promises of the deal, including transitional justice and fighter reintegration. As a result of these efforts, Colombians have felt more included in the democratic process, and the demobilization of criminal armed forces became less costly and more efficient.

In conclusion, Canada has pursued an effective approach to peace and justice in Colombia, centered on advancing mutual security, as well as diplomatic, political, humanitarian, and commercial goals. Governments across the region should abandon power politics in Colombia in favor of government re-integration and mediation efforts. To help guarantee a successful transition to peace and a delivery of justice to millions of Colombians, the Canadian model in Colombia should be emulated by neighbors and partners, while efforts from the Canadian government continue to shape the peaceful relations between the two countries.

Joseph Bouchard is a journalist and analyst covering geopolitics, crime, and energy in Latin America. His articles have appeared in The Diplomat, The Brazilian Report, Mongabay, and London Politica. He is an MIA candidate at Carleton University in Ottawa.

The post Canada, The Modest Advocate for Peace in Colombia appeared first on Global Americans.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to China has once again brought attention to the increasingly complex dynamic between the two countries. While China emphasizes the importance of stable relations, the United States has expressed concerns regarding China’s actions in areas such as the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and East China Sea, as well as human rights. While these broader concerns are significant, it seems that the administration’s bandwidth is stretched thin. This has meant that a proactive approach is reserved for large-scale foreign policy priorities only. It is important not to overlook smaller, but still crucial, aspects of the global power struggle, for example, what is happening in the Americas. It is not enough to simply “let it be” as the Beatles would sing. While a great song, this approach is not an effective foreign policy, and the United States cannot ignore regions or issues that are not perceived as full-blown crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly engaged in the hemisphere, “letting it be” has become the thrust of the U.S. foreign policy approach toward Latin America. This approach risks developing an increasingly disadvantageous environment for the United States.

The United States faces growing challenges and competitors in the Americas. Despite positive steps, the United States has not developed a holistic, strategic approach to the region. China’s rapid growth and subsequent demand have driven the region’s commodities boom. Roughly twenty years ago, China accounted for less than 2 percent of Latin America’s exports. Over the following decade, trade grew at an average annual rate of 31 percent, reaching around USD $180 billion in 2010. The growth continued, and last year, trade amounted to approximately USD $450 billion. China currently ranks as Latin America’s second-largest commercial trading partner, and there are no signs of this growth in trade slowing. It is projected that over the next 12 years, trade between Latin America and China could reach USD $700 billion.

China’s expanding presence, particularly in South America, raises concerns as China strengthens ties and influence through financial dependence, investments in critical minerals, vaccine diplomacy (especially during the COVID-19 pandemic), and cultural propaganda. By strategically increasing its involvement, China could hinder the United States’ ability to project influence in the region. Growing extra-hemispheric influence is not limited to China. For instance, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s recent tour of Latin America highlighted the potential exploitation of the region by emerging global powers. This pressing issue requires the attention of the United States, as China, Russia, and Iran all pose challenges to America’s influence in Latin America.

Given Latin America’s significance in great power competition and the risks it poses to U.S. national security, clear objectives, prioritization, sustained attention, and targeted engagement are crucial. Inaction, as suggested by “Let it be,” is inadequate—the United States must prioritize its engagement. Not doing so could strengthen rival powers and lead to detrimental outcomes. To effectively manage risks and seize opportunities in Latin America, the United States must adopt a comprehensive “whole-of-government approach” (WGA), coordinating efforts across various government agencies. Mexico, due to its proximity and strategic importance, requires particular attention, risk mitigation, and contingency planning.

Despite the U.S. government’s limited approach, there have been some positive developments. The June 13 meeting between President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou aimed to strengthen trade ties in the region. However, “one-off” meetings alone are insufficient to effectively counter China’s activities in the Americas. These meetings need to be accompanied by clear and substantive “next steps.” It would have been a timely action for the Biden administration to explicitly endorse the bipartisan “United States-Uruguay Economic Partnership Act” as this bill is designed to promote bilateral trade by reducing U.S. tariffs on certain Uruguayan exports and facilitating visas for trade and investment. An endorsement would have provided much-needed clarity and served as a demonstration of the administration’s commitment to economic growth in the region. This is especially important considering that the bill aligns with the principles of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), which is a priority for the Biden administration. Implementing these measures would not only solidify the partnership with Uruguay but also help address the challenges posed by China’s growing commercial influence.

The importance of the region for the United States requires a more expansive engagement from across the U.S. government. In addition to the broader WGA effort, there is a need for additional reforms to engagement, including enterprise funds, project financing, debt forbearance, and new lending. A more pragmatic, targeted, consistent, and contemporary approach is essential to provide policymakers with a diverse toolkit for advancing U.S. interests in the region. To effectively coordinate responses, a standing WGA effort should be in place, allocating adequate resources, attention, and staffing for Latin America. The United States cannot afford to simply ignore these challenges. The United States cannot simply “Let it be.”

Carl Meacham is a Managing Director at FTI Consulting, where he specializes in political risk management and government affairs. Prior to joining FTI, Mr. Meacham led PhRMA’s advocacy efforts for Latin America, Canada, and Europe. Prior he held the position of Senior Manager for Public Policy and Government Relations for Uber in South America and served as the Director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Mr. Meacham spent over a decade as Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-IN) senior professional staffer for Latin America on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). He has also worked for Senate Majority Leaders Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Harry Reid (D-NV) and held a political appointee position in the Clinton administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Though born in the United States, Mr. Meacham was raised in Chile, his mother’s country of origin.

The post Let It Be: A Great Song, but an Ineffective Policy Approach appeared first on Global Americans.

In Latin America, it is strategically important that the United States distinguish between principled left-oriented democratic regimes versus those which seek to manage the alarm of Washington and Western investors as they pursue a fundamentally anti-democratic, anti-market, anti-U.S. course. It is time for Washington to recognize that the Honduran regime of Xiomara Castro, Mel Zelaya, and their Libre movement, are on the latter path. The Castro government has also opened the door to greater Chinese involvement in the Central American country.

Even as presidential candidate, Xiomara Castro called herself “democratic socialist.” Libre, whose original platform called for a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution and “re-found Honduras.” The party is also part of the radical Sao Paolo forum, in which authoritarian populist leaders Venezuela’s Nicholas Maduro, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and Cuba’s Miguel Diaz-Canel also play a role.

From the beginning, evidence suggested an outsized influence within Castro’s presidency of her husband Mel Zelaya—a populist leftist ally of Morales, Correa, and Hugo Chavez and part of the radical “Puebla Group.” Zelaya was remove from the presidency in June 2009 for an unconstitutional attempt to perpetuate himself in power. Castro’s own First Vice-President Salvador Nasralla says that Zelaya is the key decisionmaker within the Presidency. Honduras’ “First Husband” reportedly spends his days in the presidential palace receiving persons who ask for political favors and is said to have played a key role in a questionable government decision to commute the prison sentence of former First Lady Rosa Bonilla de Lobo.

The current Castro-headed government is filled with persons who used to work in her husband’s Administration. Zelaya’s advisor Enrique Reina, considered to be one of the most radical of the Libre leaders, is now Foreign Minister. Zelaya’s former Labor Minister Rixi Moncada, a radical Libre lawyer who also served on the electoral commission, is now Finance Minister. Zelaya’s former Minister to the Presidency Enrique Flores Lanza, who fled to Nicaragua after the former President’s ouster to avoid charges of embezzlement from Honduras’ Central Bank, is back as a special Presidential Advisor. Zelaya’s Defense Minister Edmundo Orellana is now “Secretary of Transparency.” Although one of the most respected members of Libre, Orellana recently suggested that a promised United Nations-led commission against corruption (CICIH) could not be implemented through the necessary congressional action until 2025 or 2026 because it did not have the required political support.

Questions of corruption and evidence of nepotism in the Libre government abound. Flores’ return was made possible by a questionable March 2022 Presidential Decree that granted amnesty to members of Mel Zelaya’s former regime. The decree also enabled the return of two former Libre congressional leaders and Zelaya’s Labor Secretary.

Additionally, Mel Zelaya’s and Xiomara Castro’s family members are everywhere in the new administration. The President’s son, Hector, is her “Private Secretary” and accompanies Castro in virtually all of her public appearances. Her other son, Jose, is similarly a “presidential advisor.” Mel Zelaya’s nephew, Jose Manuel, is Secretary of Defense. Castro’s daughter—also named Xiomara, but known as “La Pichu”—and Zelaya’s brother, Carlos, are both is a members of congress.

The Biden administration has sought to find common ground with Castro, including an invitation to President Biden’s December 2021 “Democracy Summit” and special attention from U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, who attended Castro’s inauguration. Despite these efforts, the Libre regime has quickly racked up a record of unhelpful and sometimes anti-U.S. positions. Castro almost immediately reestablished diplomatic ties with Venezuela. She promoted the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which excludes the United States, over the Organization of American States (OAS), which the government calls a “failure.” When Peru’s president Pedro Castillo was removed in December 2022 for an unconstitutional attempt to dissolve Congress, the Libre regime called Castillo’s removal a “coup.” The Libre government has also refused to join the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights and others in condemning the Ortega regime in Nicaragua for human rights violations and unconstitutional practices.

Despite such actions, the most troubling foreign policy initiative taken by the Libre regime was its abandonment of Taiwan in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in March 2023. The Libre regime reportedly attempted to extort Taiwan into doubling its USD $100 million in annual aid to the country, forgiving Honduras’s USD $600 million in past loans, and extending new aid totaling as much as USD $2.5 billion. When Taiwan did not meet its terms, the Libre regime switched diplomatic relations to the PRC and gave Taiwan 30 days to vacate its embassy in Tegucigalpa.

Since establishing relations with PRC, the Libre regime has quickly moved to embrace its new partner. It is reportedly negotiating for PRC-funding for a 150 megawatt hydroelectric project, Patuca II, complimenting the USD $300 million Patuca III facility funded and built by the PRC for Honduras in the pre-recognition period.

Just weeks after recognition, the Libre regime sent a delegation to seek benefits in the areas of trade and investment with the PRC. The regime is reportedly negotiating with the PRC to replace Honduran agricultural exports that had gone to Taiwan. The Libre regime also declared its intent to open up Honduras’ market and negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the PRC. It is expected to seek debt relief from the PRC and China has reportedly invited Honduras to join the Belt and Road Initiative. If it does, PRC infrastructure development of ports and rail lines along Honduras’ “dry canal” corridor connecting the Atlantic and Pacific, may be one attractive target. Additionally, Jose Morales, General Manager of the Honduran telecommunication organization Hondutel, is already tweeting about  Huawei coming to revamp and modernize the government entity.

In non-commercial matters, only 40 of the 129 Honduran students in Taiwan whose status was put in jeopardy by the government’s change in relations agreed to go to the PRC. The Libre regime also rapidly began collaborating with its Communist Chinese counterparts in media affairs. Within days of the diplomatic switch, PRC journalists were arriving in Honduras and the PRC sponsored 29 Honduran journalists for a 10-day trip to the country.

The country also faces an extreme gang and extortion problem, including Central America’s highest’s homicide rate (38.5 murders / 100,000). The Libre government has followed the lead of its dictatorial neighbor, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, in declaring a state of exception in November 2022—which it has subsequently been extended four times— allowing the government to crack down with military and police forces. Meanwhile, not unlike in Venezuela, Libre-aligned “collective” gangs occupy public institutions and intimidate the populace.

Overall, a Libre-led Honduras a strategic risk. This risk is the combination of a regime with radical intentions and high levels of corruption and nepotism. This is exacerbated by the fact that it is now backstopped by Chinese money and facing growing economic and criminal problems which could drive the government toward even more authoritarian solutions. 74% of Hondurans currently live in poverty, while 3.5 million Hondurans reportedly have employment problems. A deepening drought has forced the government to declare an emergency in 64 municipalities, warning of the displacement of people from hunger as livestock die and crops wither.

Honduras is a sovereign country and has the right to have commercial and diplomatic relations with whom it chooses. The United States has been a reliable security and development partner, but should also do more to facilitate the arrival and expansion of promised aid and private sector investment in Honduras and other Central American partners. As with Venezuela in the early 2000s, Honduras is on a dangerous path that if unchecked, may lead to a mutually reinforcing process of radicalization, corruption, economic self-destruction, and a turn to authoritarian solutions bankrolled by the PRC. Honduras’ continued cooperation with the United States on immigration, drugs, and other regional security matters is particularly important. The U.S. is correct to respectfully pursue areas where it can work together with the Libre regime, but it must not ignore when the Libre government engages in criminal conduct, efforts to undermine the democratic order, or activities in the region by subversive groups or extra-hemispheric rivals. The U.S. must respectfully, but firmly engage the regime and hold it to account, while simultaneously reaching out the Honduran diaspora and coordinating with like-minded democratic states in the region, Europe, and elsewhere to ensure that Honduras remains a reliable democratic partner.

Evan Ellis is a featured contributor with Global Americans and Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed herein are his own.

The post The Advance of China and Authoritarian Populism in Honduras appeared first on Global Americans.

De grandes metrópoles como o Rio de Janeiro, no Brasil, e a Cidade do México, no México, a municípios menores como Peñalolén, no Chile, e Upala, na Costa Rica, as cidades têm a chave para resolver algumas das maiores ameaças que enfrentamos atualmente nas Américas e em todo o mundo. Essa foi a mensagem central que enquadrou dezenas de painéis e discussões na primeira Cúpula das Cidades das Américas, realizada de 26 a 28 de abril em Denver, Colorado, Estados Unidos. Como Editor Associado da Global Americans—e residente de Denver—tive a oportunidade de participar da conferência e ouvir de mais de 200 prefeitos de 35 países da América Latina, bem como de vários líderes de instituições multilaterais, organizações sem fins lucrativos, sociedade civil e do setor privado. Estas são as minhas quatro principais conclusões ao participar da primeira Cúpula das Cidades:

1. Cidades São Essenciais na Luta Contra as Mudanças Climáticas

A região da América Latina e do Caribe abriga mais de 40% da biodiversidade do mundo e quase um terço de seus recursos de água doce. As Américas também possuem alguns dos países com maior biodiversidade do mundo, como o Brasil, a Colômbia, o Equador, o México, o Peru, a Venezuela e os Estados Unidos. Conforme destacado durante a Cúpula, esse amplo estoque de capital natural deve oferecer à região uma oportunidade sem precedentes para enfrentar as mudanças climáticas e se envolver com os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS) da ONU. 

Muitas discussões se concentraram em como financiar adequadamente projetos climáticos, especialmente quando questões como crime, saúde e educação geralmente têm prioridade em cidades e municípios com recursos limitados. De acordo com um painel do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID), cidades de médio e pequeno porte nas Américas enfrentam desafios para financiar e garantir recursos para projetos climáticos. Ao mesmo tempo, pesquisas de outros acadêmicos demonstraram que prefeitos devem integrar o planejamento emergente e implementar esquemas como as Soluções Urbanas Baseadas na Natureza (NbS), que contribuem de forma crítica para a resiliência e a conservação dos ecossistemas naturais.

Uma das sessões mais ativas da Cúpula tratou de outra abordagem que cidades podem adotar para lidar com as mudanças climáticas: o engajamento em uma economia circular. De acordo com o Secretário Geral do ICLEI-Governos Locais pela Sustentabilidade, a adoção de uma estratégia de “Desenvolvimento Circular” pode ajudar cidades a atingir metas climáticas, melhorar sua biodiversidade, aumentar os benefícios sociais para seus cidadãos, proteger seus materiais críticos e estimular suas economias locais. Prefeitos de Niterói, no Brasil, Renca, no Chile, e Monterrey, no México, compartilharam exemplos de como suas cidades empregaram tais princípios recentemente. Todos concordaram unanimemente que os municípios são essenciais na implementação dos ODSs.

2. Governos Municipais São Vitais na Recepção e Integração de Migrantes e Refugiados

A América Latina é uma região de origem, trânsito e destino de migrantes há séculos. Atualmente, muitos países enfrentam grandes desafios com relação ao movimento de pessoas através de suas fronteiras. Embora a migração possa contribuir enormemente para o desenvolvimento econômico e introduzir um grande fluxo de habilidades e conhecimentos, também pode gerar tensões sociais e políticas, uma vez que muitas cidades e municípios normalmente não se encontram preparados para acomodar grandes fluxos de migrantes e refugiados.

A abordagem da migração foi outro tema central durante a Cúpula das Cidades, na qual múltiplos prefeitos, líderes da sociedade civil e chefes de organizações multilaterais compartilharam suas experiências com os efeitos da migração na América Latina e seus sucessos e fracassos com programas e políticas correspondentes. A Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA), por exemplo, organizou um painel sobre o papel das cidades na recepção e integração de refugiados em suas comunidades locais. Foi inspirador ouvir que cidades como Montevidéu, no Uruguai, trabalham ativamente no desenvolvimento de políticas de capacitação para refugiados e migrantes, enquanto cidades como Boston, nos Estados Unidos, abrigam mais de 200 mil imigrantes (de um total de 690 mil cidadãos). No entanto, a conversa também destacou o desafio que muitas regiões enfrentam. Embora muitos países da América Latina e do Caribe tenham oficialmente leis para proteger os refugiados, muitas vezes tais regulamentações não chegam a ser aplicadas na prática—seja porque os governos não têm a capacidade de aplicá-las integralmente ou porque foram criadas apenas para fins simbólicos. Em alguns países, no entanto, há muito poucas ou nenhuma política nacional estabelecida para a migração, o que pressiona os governos locais a encontrarem suas próprias soluções.

O painel da OEA (assim como vários outros durante a Cúpula das Cidades) serviu como um espaço em que os líderes puderam se envolver em conversas sobre as melhores maneiras de criar estruturas abrangentes para a integração dos migrantes na sociedade, entre elas o acesso à educação, à saúde e às oportunidades de emprego. Embora a Declaração de Los Angeles sobre Migração e Proteção tenha embasado muitas destas discussões, houve um alto nível de inovação e objetividade compartilhado pelos líderes locais ao abordarem questões abrangentes de migração na América Latina.

3. A Transparência Paga Dividendos

A promoção de transparência em governos municipais é um princípio fundamental da boa governança e essencial para a geração de confiança com cidadãos e eleitores. Transparência governamental pode ter vários significados para muitas pessoas, mas para os líderes que participaram da Cúpula das Cidades, ela envolve fornecer aos cidadãos informações necessárias para que tomem decisões bem informadas sobre suas vidas, comunidades e governos. Em um painel organizado pela Open Government Partnership, prefeitos de cidades como Peñalolén, no Chile, e Santo Domingo de Los Tsáchilas, no Equador, deram ilustrações vívidas de como seus governos contribuem para melhorar a transparência em seus municípios. Exemplos incluem sites do governo que mostram aos residentes todas as obras de construção em andamento em suas cidades, plataformas que retratam os efeitos da mudança climática em seus municípios e a criação de iniciativas para ouvir as necessidades dos cidadãos com relação a emergências de saúde pública.

A conclusão dos líderes municipais e da sociedade civil presentes no painel foi que quanto maior a transparência, melhores serão as políticas públicas em suas cidades. Eles explicaram que iniciativas municipais semelhantes ajudam a evitar a disseminação de informações falsas e geram confiança no governo da cidade. Elas também oferecem o benefício adicional de promover programas de educação cívica para aumentar a conscientização e a participação política entre as comunidades marginalizadas. No entanto, uma dimensão em que os líderes poderiam ter se aprofundado é sobre os mecanismos necessários para desenvolver a capacidade técnica de implementar tais práticas transparentes em suas cidades. Conforme argumentado durante os painéis, fatores culturais, como a falta de confiança entre cidadãos e suas autoridades, podem se revelar um grande desafio para os municípios. Portanto, a expansão de uma lente técnica e programática sobre como prefeitos conseguiram implementar programas bem-sucedidos em suas cidades poderia ter sido ainda mais benéfica para todos os participantes da Cúpula.

4. Estruturas Municipais Devem Priorizar Grupos de Minorias
   

Um dos resultados mais significativos da Cúpula das Cidades foi o anúncio da Rede de Cidades Antirracistas e do Pacto de Cidades Antirracistas. Lançadas pelo prefeito do Rio de Janeiro, no Brasil, as iniciativas avançam o trabalho de diversas cidades brasileiras que se uniram para colaborar em planos antirracistas. De acordo com o prefeito, o objetivo é promover a inclusão na governança e no planejamento municipal e, ao mesmo tempo, compartilhar as melhores práticas para combater o racismo com todas as outras cidades membros que assinaram o Pacto.

As Américas abrigam uma grande variedade de grupos de minorias – como migrantes, afro-latinos, mestiços, mulatos e comunidades indígenas—que frequentemente enfrentam níveis mais altos de discriminação, marginalização, violência e falta de acesso a recursos e oportunidades. A Cúpula fez um bom trabalho não apenas representando os líderes dessas comunidades, mas também reconhecendo e celebrando as contribuições desses grupos de minorias para a cultura e a sociedade latino-americanas por meio de painéis múltiplos e diversificados. A conferência foi uma prova clara do compromisso incansável dos organizadores com a promoção de diversidade. De líderes indígenas a autoridades afrodescendentes, a Cúpula das Cidades escolheu meticulosamente uma gama diversificada de palestrantes para cada painel e discussão, deixando uma marca permanente em seus participantes.

Conclusão 

Prefeitos desempenham um papel crucial na conexão com seus cidadãos e nas respostas às preocupações de suas comunidades em tempo hábil. Um governo municipal eficaz promove a confiança e a credibilidade dentro das comunidades e, de acordo com diversos prefeitos que discursaram durante a Cúpula, são geralmente a principal forma de interação das pessoas com o governo nas Américas. Em suas considerações finais durante um painel sobre participação e inclusão do cidadão, uma líder da sociedade civil representando a cidade de Los Angeles resumiu admiravelmente o que muitos outros líderes vinham deliberando desde os primeiros pronunciamentos da conferência: “O serviço público não deve ser um exercício teórico. Os menos favorecidos precisam sentar-se à mesa. Suas necessidades não podem ser assumidas por políticos que estão distantes do problema”. A primeira Cúpula das Cidades das Américas provou ser mais do que apenas um exercício teórico – líderes de cidades grandes e pequenas de todas as Américas puderam absorver as práticas mais eficientes em questões como migração, mudança climática e inclusão social e levar essas lições para suas comunidades. Daqui para frente, a esperança é que estes debates não se percam simplesmente no caminho, mas se transformem em ações efetivas e transformadoras para os cidadãos das Américas.

Caio Pereira é Editor Associado da Global Americans. Anteriormente, ele trabalhou ou estagiou em organizações como a Brookings Institution, o Programa de Desenvolvimento da ONU e o Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures. É mestre em Desenvolvimento Internacional pela Josef Korbel School of International Studies da Universidade de Denver e bacharel em Ciência Política e Desenvolvimento Internacional pela Universidade do Estado do Colorado.

The post <strong>Quatro Lições da Primeira Cúpula das Cidades das Américas</strong> appeared first on Global Americans.

The dire human rights situation under the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has prompted a search for pressure points, sets of sanctions, and diplomatic actions that can induce behavior change or, barring that, at least drain the regime’s machinery of repression. Persistent human rights abuses and a police state have led the United Nations Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua to recently accuse the Ortega-Murillo regime of committing crimes against humanity. The “crimes against humanity” label is unique—reserved for widespread, systematic abuses of the gravest nature. Indeed, this category puts Nicaragua in rare company occupied by only a handful of countries.

Despite the obvious need to curtail its revenue sources, squeezing the Ortega-Murillo regime has proven more difficult than anticipated because it has been able to access funds in institutions where funding should be blocked. For instance, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the region’s international financial institution tasked with pursuing development and economic links, has been the single largest source of financial support for the Ortega-Murillo regime at USD $3.5 billion in projects since 2017. Nicaragua’s population is smaller than that of Guatemala and Honduras, but has received nearly 26 percent of CABEI’s lending portfolio. Moreover, during CABEI’s strongest years of lending to Nicaragua, the budget for the National Police grew every year, sometimes doubling, demonstrating how CABEI helps to provide offsets that Ortega leverages to fund his repressive apparatus. For this reason, CABEI’s Executive President, Dante Mossi, has earned the moniker “banker to dictators.”

Mossi has justified his lending to the Ortega-Murillo regime by hiding behind technicalities—i.e., the technical board approves the projects—and declaring that CABEI is “not a human rights body.” Never mind that all projects that come before the technical board have been approved by Mossi beforehand. We must move beyond the excuses of ‘just following orders.’ Furthermore, paragraph 127 of the report by the U.N. Group of Experts addresses the need for CABEI and other banks to consider human rights when lending to Nicaragua: “When negotiating development cooperation and investment projects in Nicaragua, governments and multilateral organizations should include human rights guarantees and prioritize actions aimed at improving the situation in Nicaragua.” Mossi has abused the discretionary power vested in him as Executive President to evade restrictions and lend to Nicaragua despite the risk of complicity in human rights abuses.

At a recent event with Mossi, held at the Washington think tank Inter-American Dialogue—prompted by Mossi’s own debate challenge to the author, following an article that placed CABEI’s support for the Ortega-Murillo regime in an unflattering light—the Executive President showed neither signs of regret nor a disposition to change tack. Significant pieces of U.S. legislation, such as the Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act (NICA Act), which seek to curtail international financial institution lending to the regime, do not apply in CABEI’s case. The U.S. has no director at the bank to vote against funds going to Ortega, which has allowed Mossi to remain a steadfast supporter of the Ortega-Murillo regime.

In an attempt to assuage some of these concerns, Mossi promised at the Inter-American Dialogue event to seek consultation on the bank’s shortcomings and to build greater transparency and anticorruption safeguards. But unfortunately, I have not been consulted by Mossi or his subordinates.

Beyond Mossi’s problematic ties to the Ortega-Murillo regime, under his leadership, abuses, privileges, and management issues abound at CABEI. Insiders who spoke to me in preparation for the event at the Inter-American Dialogue described Mossi akin to the ruler of a provincial fiefdom, running the bank to suit his personal interests and benefit those closest to him, all while eroding important internal checks and balances. Top leaders enjoy exorbitant salaries, lavish trips, and other privileges—all in a region comprised of some of the poorest countries in the world. Mossi’s case for a capital increase at the bank should be seen within this context of patronage networks.

Transparency is a major issue at CABEI. Perusing CABEI’s website is like taking a time machine back to the earliest days of the internet. Minutes of the Board of Directors meetings are unavailable. The status of the loans granted by the institution and updates on those loans through their execution, monitoring, and evaluation periods are not readily available. When the Board of Directors recently moved to impose greater transparency by ordering an internal audit of expenses and demanding greater information, Mossi threatened to resign (putting at risk the privileges many at the bank enjoy under his leadership). Mossi’s leadership style has landed CABEI in hot water over its funding of a bio-clima project in Nicaragua that contributes to violence and lack of prior consent with indigenous communities.

Additionally, Mossi has proven a poor steward of the bank’s resources. Standard & Poor’s has warned of liquidity management challenges, and Mossi disbursed more than 80 percent of the annual operating plan in the first three months of 2023, totaling $1.5 billion in the first quarter. In addition, key budget indicators increased, despite a negative budget recommendation from the budget committee. Administrative costs have skyrocketed at the bank, and the institution’s operational efficiency has worsened. These actions put CABEI’s credit rating in doubt, which in turn risks its ability to operate effectively by offering affordable loans (in many cases, with lower interest rates than countries receive on their own). This is to say nothing of the risky loan portfolio CABEI maintains with Nicaragua, or the very real prospect that a democratically elected government in Managua would refuse to pay back loans incurred by such an obviously illegitimate regime.

Lastly, the bank has become untethered from its primary goal—i.e., fomenting development projects to integrate Central America as a region. Instead, the bank’s current modus operandi is to sync with national development plans and fund country leaders’ political projects. In other words, CABEI has become an embedded part of the region’s clientelist politics. Fortunately, there is an opportunity to correct CABEI’s wayward path and elect a leader who will take real responsibility. Mossi will seek reelection at a Board of Governors meeting in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, on May 12, 2023. If CABEI as an institution desires accountability, it should reject Mossi’s bid for a second term. A change at the top is the only way to ensure CABEI reverts to its founding mission and reaches its full potential.

CABEI can and should do better—but it will fail to do so if it sticks with the current leadership. The Board of Governors has an important choice to make on May 12. It should vote to return to CABEI’s original mission, reduce funding to regimes accused of crimes against humanity, and do so all within a framework of greater transparency. If recent years have taught us anything, none of that appears achievable under Dante Mossi’s leadership.

Ryan C. Berg is the Director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

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