The Puerto Rico Status Act (H.R. 8393) opens with an acknowledgment of the island’s prolonged struggle as an unincorporated U.S. territory: “For far too long, the residents of Puerto Rico—over 3 million U.S. citizens—have been deprived of the opportunity to determine their own political future and have not received the full rights and benefits of their citizenship because they reside in a U.S. territory. H.R. 8393 would take a historic step towards righting this wrong by establishing a process to ascertain the will of the voters of Puerto Rico regarding three constitutional options for non-territorial status.”

Hoping to “put the future of Puerto Rico’s political status in the hands of Puerto Ricans, where it belongs,” Representative Raúl Grijalva of Arizona and 62 cosponsors introduced the bill in July 2022. In December 2022, the bill passed in the House and was received in the Senate. Although Democrats lack the votes to overcome a filibuster in the Senate, the Puerto Rico Status Act provides for a plebiscite to be held in November 2023 to resolve the territory’s political status, raising historical issues that have hindered Puerto Rico from addressing structural vulnerabilities and building resilience.

From natural disasters to food crises, Puerto Rico faces numerous issues—all of which are inextricably linked to each other and deeply rooted in the territory’s colonial history. One example of the territory’s inability to avoid certain catastrophes and build resilience can be found in the aftermath of Hurricane María in 2017, when residents went hungry as ships were unable to dock at the damaged ports. For context, the island imports about 85 percent of its food; worsening natural disasters, economic crises, and mismanagement have led to the island’s dependence. Furthermore, U.S. policies, like the Jones Act and Operation Bootstrap, have restrained local agriculture. For many, this catastrophe demonstrated the need for absolute change.

H.R. 8393 is historic in many ways. It is the first time the House passed a resolution requiring a binding referendum mandating the federal government to recognize the territory’s decision. The binding referendum would also be the first time that Puerto Rico’s current status as a U.S. commonwealth is not included as an option. Instead, the three options are independence, sovereignty in free association with the U.S., or statehood. The bill also promises to provide for a transition to and the implementation of Puerto Rico’s chosen status.

In June 2023, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization approved a draft resolution reaffirming Puerto Rico’s inalienable right to self-determination and independence. According to its press release, many spoke out in favor of autonomy, although it was pointed out that the foregoing was a minority opinion, with a majority of Puerto Ricans voting in favor of becoming the fifty-first state in the most recent referendum held in November 2022.

Among those who preferred statehood, Yadira Ofarrill, speaking for the Congressional Extended Delegation-Georgia Chapter, argued that statehood was a valid form of decolonization, and that Puerto Ricans deserved the same fundamental rights granted to U.S. citizens on the mainland. Xiomara Torres, on behalf of the Party for Socialism and Liberation, asserted that statehood would not “cut out the cancer that is colonialism.” The general consensus, however, seemed to be that the decision must be made by Puerto Ricans living on the island. Representative Grijalva, the sponsor of the bill, expressed similar sentiments: “It is crucial to me that any proposal in Congress to decolonize Puerto Rico be informed and led by Puerto Ricans.”

In her heartfelt piece on Puerto Rico’s fight for justice, Puerto Rican writer, journalist, and professor, Jaquira Díaz, also points to Hurricane María, arguing that it was not just a natural disaster, but a political event that provoked a historic shift. “Nine months after María, people still have no electricity. They stop waiting for FEMA. Instead, they look to their neighbors. They take care of one another. This is how it has always been […] There is no benevolent American savior coming to help Puerto Rico. Every day, people see that there is only them, doing everything for themselves. Every day, more of them come to understand that Puerto Rico has always stood on its own. This is why I believe that independence, not statehood, is the path we must pursue.”

Díaz acknowledges that the path to independence would be challenging. She argues, however, that the future of a free Puerto Rico does not need to be easy to be just. To reach that point, Díaz states that the U.S. has a responsibility to set a policy of reparations that acknowledges generations of environmental destruction, human rights violations, economic dislocation, and more. According to her, this process would be complex, imperfect, and messy, but “the point is that self-determination for Puerto Ricans necessitates not just cutting them loose, but also restoring what has been taken and otherwise making amends.”

Advocates of H.R. 8393 recognize Puerto Rico’s history of colonization and current political status as drivers of the island’s structural vulnerability. Disasters like Hurricane María revealed unsustainable practices and inequitable power relations, demonstrating the need for a change in status. What that change ends up being depends on the Puerto Rican vote. However, all three options listed on the bill require the U.S. to address the historic and modern injustices that Puerto Rico’s status has brought upon the island.

Rachel Lee is a former newsletter intern at Global Americans. She holds a bachelor’s degree in global studies with a minor in sustainability from Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. She is currently a master’s student pursuing a dual degree in international affairs and sustainable development at American University in Washington, D.C. and the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

The post The Puerto Rico Status Act’s Historic Push Towards Self-Determination appeared first on Global Americans.

Following the first-round of presidential elections on June 25, 2023, the losing candidates, representing the ruling party and the Guatemalan political establishment, initiated a series of controversial judicial actions that essentially attempted a veiled coup d’état. Through the Public Ministry of the Attorney General’s Office, such candidates questioned the results and tried to prevent the certification of the second-place candidate, Bernardo Arévalo (Movimiento Semilla Party). Failing that, they sought to ban him from the second-round on August 20, 2023. The coup attempt continued after Arévalo won the runoff with approximately 60 percent of the votes.

The Guatemalan government and the political establishment fear Arévalo’s intention to eradicate corruption and impunity. Some even suspect that he wants to reinstate the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG). (In May 2023, the U.S. government designated Guatemala’s current Attorney General, María Consuelo Porras, for her involvement in corruption). His anti-corruption stance was his main campaign motto and appeal to marginalized groups and young voters. 

The new attempt at a veiled coup seeks to further harm Arévalo. A minimum of popular support (0.30 percent of registered voters) is mandated to participate in elections. Even though he obtained significantly more support than required in both ballots , a prosecutor from the Attorney General’s Office ordered the Voters’ Registry Office to suspend his party, also alleging irregularities in the registration of its members. The prosecutor had previously ordered the Registry to seize the party’s records and issued an arrest warrant for its director and two of its officials. Paradoxically, the day before the suspension, the Electoral Tribunal (TSE) validated the results of the ballotage and proclaimed Arévalo President-elect.

After the suspension, the Guatemalan Congress stopped recognizing the Movimiento Semilla Party as a congressional bloc and declared its members as independent legislators, barring them from participating in committees and essentially curtailing their influence. This was an attempt to force the President-elect to abandon his proposal against corruption.

Given the threats to the integrity of the electoral process, Member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States, and Uruguay convened a second meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on September 1, 2023 (the first one was held on July 26, 2023), to address the political situation in Guatemala. During that meeting, OAS’s Head of the Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), former Paraguayan Foreign Minister Eladio Loizaga, and the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) Tania Reneaum, expressed their concerns about the new attempts by Guatemala’s Public Ministry to interfere with the process and disqualify the legitimate election winner.

Most significantly, the Member States unanimously approved a stern declaration, which welcomed the TSE decision to certify the results of the presidential election and declare Arévalo as the winner. The document also poses concerns about the post-election judicial actions by partisan forces and the Attorney General aimed at subverting the popular will, suspending Arévalo’s party, and intimidating the candidate, his party officials, and electoral authorities. 

OAS’s declaration also appealed to all institutions and civil society to respect and guarantee “the civil and political rights of the Guatemalan people…” and called on them “to avoid interference in the presidential transition process” and to respect “the separation of powers.” However, the Member States also recognized Guatemala President Alejandro Giammattei’s measures to guarantee the personal safety of the President and Vice President-elect, as well as his “commitment to guarantee an orderly transition process,” while also noting his “invitation to the OAS secretary general, Luis Almagro, to observe the process.”

While President Giammattei has recognized Arévalo’s victory and appears to respect the electoral authorities’ decision, and has started the presidential transition, his Attorney General continues to interfere with the process. Moreover, the pro-government losing party UNE has yet to recognize Arévalo’s’ victory. This makes one wonder if there is a double game being played here.

Nevertheless, the concern expressed by the hemispheric democratic community appears to have had an impact: the TSE canceled the Registry’s decision, citing the fact that the electoral process does not officially end until October 31, 2023. Under Guatemalan Electoral Law, no party approved to participate in the process can be suspended while it is in effect. The transition process started with the presence of the OAS Secretary General, who has also called “for the cessation of actions that erode the rule of law and for adhering to democratic principles and respecting the will of the citizenry.” The Biden administration itself has dispatched an envoy to speak with President-elect Arévalo and President Giammattei. There is no guarantee, however, that the attempt to suspend the party will not continue until inauguration day on January 14, 2024.

The actions by the Permanent Council and the Secretary General demonstrate the continuing validity of the OAS and its Democratic Charter as the principal instruments for the defense of democracy in the Americas. They also confirm the collective commitment to ensuring electoral integrity in Member States through electoral observation missions (EOM). Despite the OAS’s actions in favor of democracy, what ultimately saves it from collapse is the commitment and respect for democratic values and institutions by its citizens and leaders.

Rubén M. Perina is a former OAS official and author of the book “The Organization of American States as the Advocate and Guardian of Democracy: An Insider’s Critical Assessment of its Role in Promoting and Defending Democracy.”

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La aplastante victoria de Bernardo Arévalo en la segunda vuelta de las recientes elecciones presidenciales de Guatemala ha sido la más clara señal de rechazo del pueblo guatemalteco hacia la actual clase política. El país, asolado por la corrupción, ocupa los últimos puestos en todos los índices relativos internacionales más citados. Según el último informe de percepción de la corrupción en el sector público de Transparency International, Guatemala ocupa el puesto 150 de 180 países.

Los tiempos de la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) representaron un breve periodo de esperanza. Desde el 2007 hasta su expulsión en 2019 por el expresidente Jimmy Morales, Guatemala parecía estar a la vanguardia de los esfuerzos regionales anticorrupción. Con la salida de la CICIG, la capacidad para combatir el Pacto de los Corruptos, como se denomina a las redes de corrupción que involucran a las élites políticas, económicas y judiciales, ha decaído abruptamente. Según el Índice de Capacidad para Combatir la Corrupción de Americas Quarterly (AQ), Guatemala sólo puntúa por encima de Venezuela y Bolivia, y sus valores han ido en negativo todos los años desde que se empezó a medir el índice.

Con Arévalo, Guatemala puede volver a ser el foco entre las cruzadas anticorrupción en América Latina, pero para eso necesitará aliados. La gran atención que la comunidad internacional le ha brindado a la persecución judicial contra Semilla, el partido de Arévalo, muestra que la situación del país no pasará desapercibida. Para Estados Unidos, esto implica tomar pasos concretos para fortalecer su relación con el gobierno guatemalteco más allá del tema migratorio.

El reto de gobernar en tiempos de persecución judicial

El plan de gobierno de Arévalo se centra en los principales problemas estructurales del país: falta de infraestructuras físicas y digitales, acceso desigual a la educación, seguridad fronteriza, sanidad ineficaz e ineficiencias de las instituciones públicas y del sistema político. Estos temas son de gran importancia para los guatemaltecos, cuyas condiciones de vida se ven directamente afectadas por la falta de oportunidades que los obliga a emigrar hacia Estados Unidos. A la base de todos estos problemas, la estrategia de Arévalo contempla la lucha contra la corrupción, piedra angular de estos y otros desafíos estructurales como el crimen organizado y el retroceso democrático. Por eso, la materialización de la primavera democrática prometida por Arévalo, aunque sea solo en sus primeros pasos, dependerá principalmente del éxito de sus esfuerzos anticorrupción.

Lograr gobernar y hacer reformas será un reto enorme para el gobierno de Arévalo. Por un lado, en el Congreso no cuenta con una bancada mayoritaria. Además, los esfuerzos para cancelar su partido pueden llevar a que sus diputados no participen en las discusiones para la definición del presupuesto y de la agenda legislativa. Por otro lado, tiene un sistema de justicia en su contra, con la elección de nuevos jueces y magistrados que lleva postergada casi cuatro años y, sobre todo, con los esfuerzos de la fiscalía general para judicializar a los miembros de su partido y socavar la voluntad popular. Sumado a esto, Arévalo deberá hacer alianzas claves con actores tan diversos como la comunidad internacional, empresarios, el ejército y el poder local.

El apoyo desde el exterior: EE. UU. y la comunidad internacional

Como nota positiva, hay que reconocer que el apoyo externo recibido por Arévalo ha sido contundente. El Secretario de Estado de EE.UU, Antony Blinken, se sintió obligado a felicitar a Arévalo por segunda vez tras la certificación de su victoria por el Tribunal Supremo Electoral. “Una segunda vuelta justa y pacífica“, dijo el presidente estadounidense Biden, en un contexto donde no todos los actores políticos reconocen la victoria de Arévalo. La Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) también ha estado muy pendiente de Guatemala:  la visita de Almagro al país y su canal de diálogo abierto con el presidente Giammattei han contribuido a mantener la presión sobre quienes se oponen a la toma de posesión de Arévalo el próximo 14 de enero.

La preocupación de la comunidad internacional sobre el futuro de la transición democrática en Guatemala se ha profundizado con la reciente denuncia de un posible golpe por parte del presidente electo. Aunque la investidura de Arévalo parece destinada a producirse como previsto, la suspensión del partido Semilla (temporáneamente revocada hasta el 31 de octubre) contribuye a la intensa incertidumbre sobre lo que podría significar para gobernar sin partido.

Si Guatemala logra una transición ordenada, se deberá a la resiliencia de las instituciones democráticas guatemaltecas y de la presión popular. A pesar de ello, el apoyo del cuerpo diplomático estadounidense y su continua visibilización desde el exterior será clave, como lo fue en las últimas elecciones de Brasil.

Una oportunidad de renovación

El compromiso de la administración de Biden con las elecciones de Guatemala es un avance bienvenido considerado el frágil estado de la relación bilateral. Al mismo tiempo, es una oportunidad única para re-equilibrar la relación en un tema que no sea únicamente controlar los flujos migratorios. Durante la administración de Trump, la relación descansó en la intimidación verbal y el agite del “ban” y las amenazas arancelarias, que presionaron al gobierno guatemalteco a firmar el acuerdo de “tercer país seguro” y aliviar la presión en la frontera.

La migración ha sido, y seguirá siendo, la principal preocupación relacionada con los países del Triángulo Norte. La región no ha sido prioritaria en el gobierno de Biden a pesar de la estrategia “Causas Raíces” y no ha contado con interlocutores fiables en la región. Pero ahora, después de las elecciones, Estados Unidos podría encontrar en Arévalo y Semilla el socio fiable y democrático que tanto tiempo llevaba buscando. Si bien Guatemala tiene una importancia relativa en la agenda de EE. UU. con respecto a otros socios estratégicos como Colombia y México, una profunda cooperación bilateral contra la corrupción es una oportunidad única para EE. UU. de mejorar sus relaciones con la región.

Hacia una nueva agenda anticorrupción

La lucha contra la corrupción es prioridad para el próximo gobierno de Arévalo y para ello ha definido una serie de 10 acciones concretas para combatirla. Aunque la mayoría dependan del Congreso, la identificación de actos de corrupción en el gobierno, el despido de funcionarios públicos corruptos y la cancelación de contratos acordados a través de prácticas corruptas son un gran avance para el país. Sin la CICIG, los esfuerzos anticorrupción solo pueden ser más modestos que a los que se aspiraba previamente. Al mismo tiempo, es necesario aprender de los errores del pasado que, en el afán de luchar contra la corrupción, provocaron fuertes reacciones no calculadas de las élites políticas y económicas que llevaron a la persecución judicial de los fiscales y jueces anticorrupción, así como al retroceso democrático.

La llegada al poder de Arévalo representa una oportunidad clave para tener un interlocutor estratégico en la región. Por ello, es clave que, dentro de la estrategia “Causas Raíces” se reconozca la lucha contra la corrupción y la recuperación de las instituciones, como una de las bases para crear mejores condiciones socioeconómicas, y así evitar la migración forzada. Esto permitirá la identificación de objetivos comunes y la definición de acciones concretas entre los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Guatemala.

Para apoyar a Guatemala en la lucha contra la corrupción, será de vital importancia el apoyo técnico para acciones a corto plazo que otorguen al gobierno de Arévalo un mayor respaldo social. Estas acciones pasan por la prevención de sobornos, detección de contratos sobrevalorados, identificación de tráfico de influencias, transparencia en las contrataciones públicas y una limpieza de las “plazas fantasmas” en el poder ejecutivo.

Este apoyo técnico del gobierno estadounidense sienta las bases para la posibilidad de un apoyo político en la recuperación de las instituciones del sistema de justicia. Esto será a través de sanciones a actores claves y presión internacional para recuperar el sistema democrático guatemalteco. Estados Unidos ya ha apoyado a administraciones anteriores de la fiscalía general en la identificación de redes criminales a través de recursos técnicos, financieros y tecnológicos. Hoy estos recursos se utilizan para perseguir fiscales, jueces, sociedad civil, periodistas y políticos de oposición que han denunciado y judicializado actos de corrupción. Por tanto, es del interés regional recuperar la institución de la fiscalía general de Guatemala, y el sistema de justicia en general.

Conclusión

Estados Unidos tiene la oportunidad de colaborar con el próximo gobierno de Arévalo y tener un aliado estratégico clave en la región centroamericana. Además, es una ocasión de redención histórica, ante el vergonzoso papel que Estados Unidos jugó en el golpe de Estado de 1954 que terminó con la “primavera democrática” en Guatemala.

Para ello, Estados Unidos necesitará adoptar estrategias conciliatorias antes que impositivas. El apoyo de los Estados Unidos es clave para que Arévalo resista el embate de los actores no democráticos. La relación bilateral EE.UU.-Guatemala podría recibir un nuevo impulso cooperando en la lucha contra la corrupción, y sentar las bases para abordar otros temas y construir relaciones más armónicas que bajo las administraciones anteriores de ambos países.

Andrea Colombo es estudiante del Máster Erasmus Mundus en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Salamanca, la Universidad de Estocolmo y la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III. Ha trabajado en Inter-American Dialogue, Insight Crime y actualmente dirige la sección América Latina de Lo Spiegone, un periódico italiano en línea. Ha publicado artículos en Inter-American Dialogue, LAA-Advisor, LSE Blog, ISPI and Affari Internazionali. Twitter: @AColomboLAC

Carlos Muñoz es estudiante del Máster Erasmus Mundus en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Salamanca, la Universidad de Estocolmo y la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III. Ha trabajado en el Instituto Nacional Demócrata de Guatemala, la Comisión Presidencial Contra la Corrupción, y fue pasante en la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Además fue asistente de investigación y profesor auxiliar en la Universidad Rafael Landívar.

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President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has opened yet another battlefront in Mexico’s belligerent political context. In violation of the constitution, the national education law, and the most basic sense of decency and morality, but with the usual levels of opacity and cynicism, AMLO’s government has drafted and published new textbooks for public schools nationwide through the Ministry of Education. The textbooks are fraught with manifold math, science, and history errors and reveal a total disregard for knowledge and education.

Rightly so, there has been a strong reaction and outrage by opposition parties, civil society, and parents for this assault against public education. Several local governments have refused to distribute the textbooks and have filed lawsuits before the Supreme Court. Some federal judges have already issued precautionary measures against their distribution, given the violations in the legally required drafting process, which was conducted opaquely and without the necessary consultations with the various actors within the education system. Regardless of the legal effects of these cases, the episode is a clear representation of the government’s nature and political intentions. If some doubts remained about AMLO’s political and ideological goals, the textbooks now expose it in black and white.

One of AMLO’s first actions as president was to eliminate the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE), an autonomous government agency in charge of evaluating the development and shortcomings of education nationwide. It made sense. If education is no longer a priority, why bother to measure it? Likewise, only a few months after the inauguration of his presidency, he capsized the educational reform made by the previous administration, yielding enormous influence to radical teachers’ unions in exchange for their political backing. The textbooks are just another stride in a hurried race to place public education in a place from where it will be hard to rebuild.

Mexico’s public education was already in crisis. Public schools have long lacked proper equipment and infrastructure, paired with the fact that results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA test have repetitively shown lower scores than the average of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries. To make matters worse, during the pandemic, the Ministry of Education was negligent enough to allow 1.4 million children to abandon school. But the current blatant destruction of anything resembling an education system is a new phenomenon; this is a political provocation to lower the standard below anything imagined in the past, an attempt to create apathy, cynicism, and a political climate in which barely anything astonishes anymore. It is a cruel plan to use children for a petty political project and perpetuate dogmatism into the future.

According to one of Mexico’s most renowned education experts, Gilberto Guevara, the textbooks are filled with “dogmas, fanatism, and are a pedagogic absurdity.” They destroy the national education policy to satisfy the interests of a single political movement, abandoning logical thinking and erasing the line between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. This should come as no surprise. The textbooks are a representation of the movement’s three basic hallmarks.

Firstly, the ideological nature. The textbooks are a reliable exemplification of an antiscientific government and its determination to politicize public life. Flooded with historical errors and vulgar manipulations of information, the textbooks disseminate a cognitive relativism in which any form of knowledge is equally valid and displaces the student’s individuality with “collective values.” The manipulations of history include, among many others, AMLO’s lie about the 2006 electoral fraud against him, a bigoted narrative for which no evidence has ever been presented. Based on the rancid ideology known as ‘epistemologies of the South,’ which attempts to repudiate Western values and to surpass “the rotten roots of neoliberalism,” math and sciences are portrayed as part of an oppressive model that corruptly promotes individualism and meritocracy.

Secondly, the textbooks are representative of the regime’s opacity. The government has reserved the information about the elaboration processes for five years, a clumsy admission of guilt. The Marxist firebrand and fanatic in charge of the textbooks, Marx Arriaga, with the help of a former public official of the Maduro regime and a small cohort of people with no expertise in education or pedagogy, were responsible for the elaboration process. Given their backgrounds, it is no surprise that they hid how they worked together.

Finally, the textbooks signal the government’s distinctive incompetence. In this case, ill intentions go in tandem with ineptitude. Some mistakes are also the result of carelessness, even for their propagandistic enterprise, i.e., errors in pictures of the solar system and the birthdates of former presidents.  

Sadly, even critics of this assault have fallen into a trap. By asking for the mistakes to be corrected, they overlook that AMLO’s party is a movement that nurtures itself through provocation and disruption and where conflict is inherent in every action. Correcting the mistakes is not a solution because it misses the purpose of the original intent: the textbooks are no longer tools to educate but to indoctrinate. In propaganda leaflets, mistakes become requirements. AMLO and his political movement are conscious that any personal achievement, aspiration, and personal development are kryptonite for a project that feeds itself from resentment and prides itself on anti-intellectualism.

Public education should be the guidepost of long-term policies that transcend government idiosyncrasies. The Mexican constitution forbids the ideology of incumbent governments to be translated into public education; the third article mandates that: “the criteria that will guide education will be based on scientific progress, the fight against ignorance […] fanaticisms and prejudices”. Not surprisingly, some of Mexico’s most brilliant and renowned intellectuals were appointed as ministers of Education and responsible for the drafting of public textbooks during the 20^th century. Yet, it would be naive to think that all previous governments have continually placed public education on an apolitical and unreachable shelf. In 1939, the opposition party, PAN, with the help of the catholic church, emerged with freedom of education as a political banner, given the inclusion of socialist ideas in the constitution during the 1930s. Spawning a political tug-of-war for the ideological content of education. But the flagrant destruction of any basic moral or pedagogical standard is new. The current petty debate in Mexico around how much communism in the textbooks is too much is irrelevant to the millions of children who will not care about the label we use for books that will harm their future.

AMLO’s books do not contain mistakes because he is not trying to educate.  This is another step in a broader scheme to propagate lies in the prevailing ambush to eliminate research centers, public universities, and scholarships. For a self-declared antiscientific government and a president who repetitively prides himself in having “other facts”, belittling science and knowledge is no mistake—it is the natural outcome of the disdain.

There is an old and common trap used by radicals against moderates and common sense: to avoid being called a bigot, one must always be willing and capable of finding the golden nuggets in the dirt. However, this is a set-up and a fallacy nonetheless. We mustn’t fall into the ploy of finding merits when something sprouts from a rotten core. If a whole model is corrupted and, more importantly, devised to corrupt, it must be rejected and condemned, regardless of the glitter to conceal it. Propaganda disguised as education is propaganda, not education with mistakes. Yes, Mexico’s education system was already in a ruinous situation, but the recent events are not the aggravation of an existing crisis but rather the upholding and propagation of disaster as a political aim. Destroying public education is not a mistake for someone who sustains his power in lies and political instability. The textbooks are a faithful projection of the political project.

Those who claim that AMLO should “fix” the mistake of not teaching children math, for example, are missing the point. They are scrutinizing a fantasy and a projection of what they would like to be analyzing. The existence of mistakes presupposes a basic concern for facts and the truth. Well-intentioned liberal critics have created their own veil, through which it is extremely difficult to comprehend a level of ignorance and irresponsibility that throws the public education of millions of children under the bus without any shame. But such is the case. AMLO has fooled his critics once again by making them believe and reiterate that his “textbooks have mistakes,” ignoring the most important fact: the books are made for his purposes, not theirs.

Emiliano Polo is a graduate student of global affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His research focuses on applied history and Latin American politics. He currently works in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

The post There Are No Mistakes in AMLO’s New Textbooks appeared first on Global Americans.

On October 29, 2023, Colombians will go to the polls. Seats for 32 governors, 418 state representatives, 1102 mayors, and more than 12,000 city council members are up for election. With so much at stake and amid a growing dissatisfied and skeptical electorate concerned about the country’s future, the elections will become an unofficial referendum on President Gustavo Petro’s first year in office. Indeed, President Petro is keenly aware that the electoral results will not only impact his political standing but also set the course of Colombia’s political trajectory during the rest of his term as well as a bellwether for the outcome of the 2026 presidential election.

The elections will take place in a context of increasing political violence, lack of information due to poor polling and media coverage in rural areas, and growing political disarray over Colombia’s fragmented party system. Indeed, most Colombians are becoming increasingly pessimistic about the general direction of the country. According to a poll conducted by Invamer in August, 69 percent of Colombians believe the nation is heading in the wrong direction. The same poll revealed that, a large majority of Colombians are concerned about the country’s deteriorating security, the rising cost of living, the escalation of corruption, and the government’s failure to address poverty.

One of the main issues facing President Petro is that he set such huge expectations for his administration during the campaign that now he is grappling with the challenge of meeting those ambitious and difficult-to-attain goals. As he enters his second year, his government’s achievements are largely symbolic, lacking any substantial legislative successes (beyond the 2022 Tax Reform or the approval of his National Development Plan) or tangible enhancements to the lives of Colombians. As a result, his approval ratings have dropped from 64 percent at the outset to 31 percent by August. The unfulfilled campaign promises, ongoing scandals, and a fragile Pacto Histórico have left the administration wrestling with a range of pressing issues, making these elections even more crucial.

For instance, Petro’s government leading “Total Peace” policy exhibits mixed results, advancing talks with the ELN guerrilla group while persistent violence from Clan del Golfo and FARC’s dissidents fuels insecurity concerns. The increase in political violence obeys both the struggle for territorial control between armed groups, and groups currently in negotiations looking to establish a better negotiating position with the government during the peace talks. Despite progress, complexities in the simultaneous engagement of all armed factions and hurdles in implementing the 2016 Peace Accord with FARC dissidents persist.

President Petro’s relationship with traditional political parties (Partido Liberal, Partido Conservador and, Partido de la U)  has reached a critical juncture as he has effectively dissolved the political coalition that held on to majorities in Congress. An unwillingness from both the government and traditional political parties to make significant concessions on key reforms such as healthcare, pensions, and labor reforms has led to a stalemate in Congress awaiting the results of the local elections in October to determine if the government or traditional parties will have more advantage as the political balance shifts. This situation has been made more complicated considering that Colombia’s political landscape is experiencing a notable transformation with the proliferation of over 35 political parties, many of which are relatively new entities. Around 20 of these parties, active in the current electoral competition, have been established in recent years.

These factors have strained the government’s ability to deliver on its promises and maintain widespread support among the population. Consequently, the regional elections will serve as a litmus test of public approval for President Petro’s policies and leadership, and the outcome will significantly shape the political landscape moving forward. These elections will hurt the government as they are most likely to favor candidates not aligned with Petro. While the local elections will not predict the outcome of the 2026 presidential elections, and it remains premature to say whether President Petro will become a lame duck after losing the elections, should his party lose the elections, there is a high likelihood of growing tensions between the president and local administrations affecting the government’s ability to deliver.

In sum:

1. The 2023 local elections will become a referendum on President Gustavo Petro. Voters will likely use this unique opportunity to react to the government’s handling of the country. If the elections were today, Petro and his coalition parties would stand to lose key cities, such as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena.
2. Lack of voter intention polls will likely affect voter preferences. The scarcity of accurate and comprehensive polling data and media coverage, particularly in rural areas, is likely to lead to a skewed understanding of voting preferences and the electorate’s priorities, creating a vacuum that is likely to be used by malicious actors to mislead and misinform the public. It will also allow candidates to label legitimate polls as “fake,” further misleading the public.
3. The erosion of the political party system will likely continue. Political fragmentation may occur after the election as more political parties sprout. The growing number of political parties has made it harder to conduct a clear and concise analysis of the election and its implications. In addition, political fragmentation and first-past-the-poll voting structures make it challenging for any candidate to secure a clear majority, potentially resulting in a less representative government.
4. Political Violence is likely to increase as Colombia gets closer to election day. The increase in violence will affect democracy as it hampers candidates’ freedom to campaign and voter turnout, compromising local mayors in some regions. The relationships between candidates and armed groups will taint the legitimacy of some local leaders or constrain their actions.

A potential electoral defeat of the Petro administration will likely lead to an escalation in disputes between the executive and local governments over the next three years. The national government will probably resort to a strategic maneuver of halting, delaying, or conditioning project financing to gain leverage with local governance. This tactic could exert control and minimize the potential fallout from elections that are unlikely to favor them. Such a move will likely cast a cloud of uncertainty over the economy, potentially hampering economic growth and deterring investor confidence. Additionally, introducing such delays will likely erode the nation’s reputation as a reliable investment destination.

In this intricate tapestry of challenges and uncertainties, the outcome of the Colombian regional elections remains a crucial turning point for and the entire nation. Safeguarding the integrity of the democratic process and ensuring fair representation will be imperative to navigate these complex dynamics and sustain the foundation of a strong and vibrant democracy.

Sergio Guzmán is the Director of Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consulting firm based in Bogotá. Follow him on X, previously known as Twitter @SergioGuzmanE and @ColombiaRisk.

Enrique Reyes Dominguez is a MA Student at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He was a summer intern at Colombia Risk Analysis. Follow him on X, previously known as Twitter @Enrique_ReDo21.

This piece was adapted from Colombia Risk Analysis’ most recent “Special Report on the Local Elections“

All opinions and content are solely the opinions of the authors and do not represent the viewpoints of Global Americans.

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In Chile, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the coup that toppled President Salvador Allende has reignited the national conversation about the legacies of both Allende and his successor, General Augusto Pinochet. This event has also sparked renewed calls for greater transparency regarding the United States’ role in the lead-up to and during the coup. Peter Kornbluth, a Senior Analyst at the National Security Archive, has released a Chilean edition of his 2003 book, “The Pinochet File,” in which he outlines both old and new information. This includes details such as the White House meeting between Henry Kissinger and Augustin Edwards, the owner of El Mercurio, Chile’s main newspaper at the time. The meeting took place 11 days after Salvador Allende’s election victory.

Fast forward fifty years, and the United States’ role in Chile still casts a long shadow. The 1973 coup reshaped the nation’s trajectory to the extent that the country’s current constitutional debates essentially revolve around how much of Pinochet’s 1980 constitution (which has been amended hundreds of times since) should be retained.

However, the landscape has transformed significantly. The United States, once a central player in Chilean affairs, now navigates a changed world. This transformation is not solely due to the end of the Cold War a generation ago. The influence of the United States has been recalibrated by global and domestic shifts, as well as evolving foreign policy doctrines. The anniversary of the coup thus prompts a probing analysis of how America’s evolving stance towards Chile mirrors greater changes in its foreign policy approach on the global stage.

The focal point lies in examining the transition from the once audacious involvement of the United States in Chile’s domestic politics to its contemporary position in a world marked by a more diversified geopolitical landscape. The essence of this exploration resides not only in understanding why the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has purportedly retreated from past methods but also in grasping how the very nature of projecting influence has transformed. 

This narrative unfolds within a broader reality: while the U.S. may not have relinquished its power, perhaps it has moderated its willingness to employ it. Consider Ukraine, where the U.S. has actively opposed Russian aggression, typically through its NATO allies, and has been careful to strike a balance that avoids prompting a Russian escalation.

In the current post-Cold War and post-Iraq era, there is an acknowledgment that blunt force tactics undermine global credibility and moral standing such as supporting coups or invasions. The intention of the United States to refrain from interference in domestic affairs reflects domestic disinterest and a different global order, one in which meddling in the national politics of other countries is unpopular and less effective. As a result, the narrative of the CIA engaging in covert operations has shifted towards diplomatic engagement and economic collaboration.

Chile itself has undergone transformative changes that have shaped U.S. influence. The nation’s diversified economy, burgeoning trade partnerships, and diplomatic engagements have paved the way for a more self-confident country. The U.S. remains a crucial partner in areas like defense, education, and trade. Bilateral trade with Chile was around USD 3 billion in the years immediately following the authoritarian era. By 2021, this figure had surged to over USD 38 billion. In comparison, however, China’s trade figure was almost USD 58 billion, highlighting the shifting market dynamics of the 21st century.

In this sense, the United States’ adjusted ability to steer Chile’s course is a testament to the new global reality, which demands a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. This approach involves subtle yet consistent diplomacy and cooperation, which may prove more valuable than the tactics of the past.

This paradigm shift necessitates, among other things, a reevaluation of the role of public opinion. Today’s interconnected world, saturated with real-time information, requires greater transparency and accountability at a faster pace. An engaged populace means that any perceived impropriety would trigger a swift and vigorous backlash. The era of covert operations veiled in secrecy has given way to a public that demands a more selective and principled foreign (and often domestic) policy. Climate change and gender issues represent just a few of the challenges faced by the Global South, where the U.S. maintains a moral standing compared to most international rivals. The conflict in Ukraine, where Chile has been one of the few Latin American countries steadfastly defending a liberal international system, demonstrates that space remains for the U.S. to cultivate a values-based foreign policy in the region to counter the often clientelist approaches of its competitors.

Therefore, the highlights of today’s bilateral relationship are a far cry from the approach that prompted the U.S. to resort to covert actions half a century ago. For instance, a Chilean company, Cencosud, now holds a majority share in a significant U.S. supermarket chain, and Shake Shack, an American fast casual restaurant chain, offers vegan products developed by the Chilean firm NotCo. Beyond trade, a Chile-California agreement presents numerous avenues for cooperation in agriculture, energy, and education. The recently approved tax treaty in the U.S. Congress (after a 13-year wait) will facilitate investment by eliminating double taxation. Furthermore, after rigorous negotiations, Chile remains the sole Latin American country to enjoy visa waiver status with the U.S., promoting tourism and business travel.

Consequently, the evolving role of the United States in Chile underscores a broader narrative of shifting foreign policy dynamics. The shift from the past to engaging in mutually beneficial collaboration mirrors the global trend in diplomacy. The capacity for U.S. influence endures, although political realities have curtailed the audacious use of that influence. Chile, likewise, stands as a testament to the resilience of nations in shaping their destinies while struggling against external pressures. This reflection on the past fifty years serves as a poignant reminder that foreign policy, like the world it shapes, is constantly in flux, driven by often unpredictable prevailing winds. Successful navigation requires flexible adaptation while maintaining a clear sense of direction toward the desired destination.

Carl Meacham spent over a decade as Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-IN) senior professional staffer for Latin America on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). He is currently a Managing Director at FTI Consulting.

Robert Funk is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chile and a partner in Andes Risk Group, a consulting firm.

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The Caribbean is one of the world’s premier biodiversity hotspots. Coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangrove swamps, and tropical rainforests play a crucial role in the region’s cultural, economic, and ecological fabric. Not only do these ecosystems protect Caribbean coastlines from tropical storms and erosion, as well as provide an important source of food and jobs for local communities, but they also help mitigate climate change. Unfortunately, in the Caribbean, like in much of the world, these precious ecosystems are under immediate threat. A cascade of interconnected crises, from the excessive use of land and sea to climate change, is accelerating biodiversity loss at an alarming rate. Without drastic international, regional, and national efforts, entire ecosystems will collapse, posing a significant risk to the Caribbean region’s economy, security, and bio-natural heritage.

As a result of its insularity, the Caribbean islands possess unique ecosystems with high levels of endemic species. From the Greater and the Lesser Antilles to the Lucayan Archipelago and the Cayman Islands, coral reefs, mangrove swamps, as well as seagrass beds are the habitat of over 12,000 marine species, including mollusks, crustaceans, and fish. In addition, terrestrial habitats contain 12,847 native and introduced flora species. Belize, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana are also gifted with highly biodiverse landscapes. The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS), found off the coasts of Belize, is the largest unbroken barrier reef in the Western Hemisphere and the world’s second-largest, following the Great Barrier Reef of Australia. It is estimated that 500 fish species, 60 coral species, 350 mollusk and marine mammals, algae, and seagrasses live in the MBRS. Guyana and Suriname, located in what is known as the Guiana Shield—a vast ecoregion that lies in the northern part of the Amazon—remain one of the best-preserved reservoirs of biodiversity, carbon, and freshwater in the world. 

Biodiversity is fundamental to the region’s economy as well as to mitigate climate change. A 2016 World Bank study estimated that Caribbean coastal and marine ecosystems are valued at USD 54.55 billion. According to the Resilient Islands Initiative, mangroves and coral reefs are estimated to provide the Caribbean with USD 15 billion annually in fisheries, tourism, and carbon sequestration. Similar studies have shown that coral reef-related tourism alone provides the Caribbean with an estimated annual revenue of USD 7.9 billion—a figure equivalent to more than 10 percent of the region’s Gross Domestic Product. In terms of carbon sequestration, the region plays an major role. The Guiana Shield sequesters approximately 500 million tons of carbon dioxide per year—equivalent to the carbon emissions of nearly 89 million households in one year.

Moreover, the Caribbean’s endemic species are also vital for novel drug treatment developments, including drugs for cancer, cardiovascular diseases, immunological and central nervous system disorders, diabetes, as well as bacterial, viral, and parasitic infections. For instance, Trabectedin—an alkylating agent used as a chemotherapy drug to treat advanced soft tissue sarcoma and relapsed ovarian cancer—was first isolated from a colonial tunicate found in Caribbean mangroves and seagrass blades called Esteinascidia turbinate.

Flora and fauna are also deeply rooted in the region’s social fabric. For Caribbean Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, nature represents a means of livelihood and an essential element of their belief systems. In Dominica, the Kalinago people—the last Indigenous Peoples in the Eastern Caribbean—not only rely heavily on forests for subsistence agriculture, yet maintain a belief system that is also deeply connected to nature. The Kalinago people’s traditional ecological knowledge plays a fundamental role in the Dominican government’s current efforts to achieve its goal of becoming the world’s first country to be resilient to the multiple effects of climate change. In other parts of the Caribbean, local species have become modern symbols of national identity and an essential part of bio-cultural heritage. In Barbados, the flying fish—a tropical and temperate marine species often found in coral reefs in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans—is not only the national dish, but it is also considered a symbol of identity and pride.

Nonetheless, the rapid increase of economic activities, such as fishing, tourism, agriculture, and mining, is contributing to the region’s environmental degradation, inflicting long-term costs. In addition, as human-induced climate change exacerbates, its multiple impacts—such as rising sea temperatures, changing rain patterns, ocean acidification, and sea level rise—pose an everlasting threat. Data from across the region points to the same situation: biodiversity is declining at a fast rate. According to the latest report from the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network on the status and trends of Caribbean coral reefs, “Caribbean coral reefs and their associated resources will virtually disappear within just a few decades.” Related studies show that Caribbean mangrove forests have declined 24 percent in the past quarter-century, tropical rainforests are degrading, and seagrass bed ecosystems are collapsing.

A 2018 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) report on the state of biodiversity in the region highlighted that in connection to the rapid growth of populations and economic activities, the Caribbean’s main threats to its biodiversity include “increasing urbanization, conversion of lands for tourism and commercial development, and the expansion of agriculture. The report also exposes the threats from “invasive species, pollution, and overexploitation of living resources.” In addition, with projections showing an increase in the global temperature by 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100—well above the 2015 Paris Agreement goal to hold the rise of temperatures below 1.5 degrees—scientists expect that climate change will likely become the main driver of biodiversity loss, posing long-lasting and irreversible changes to the ecosystem.

Indeed, according to a 2020 report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s International Institute of Tropical Forestry, climate change is already heavily impacting the Caribbean’s biodiversity. Rising sea surface temperatures and sea levels, changing rain patterns, acidifying oceans, and intensifying extreme weather events such as hurricanes and droughts are among the main climate change parameters affecting biodiversity in the region. Coral bleaching—the process in which corals, driven by changes in conditions such as temperature or nutrients expel the symbiotic algae living in their tissues, turning them completely white and leaving them subject to mortality—is among the most notable and well-documented effects of climate change on marine ecosystems and poses a significant threat to Caribbean reefs. 

With the alarming increase in the temperature of the Caribbean Sea at a rate of 0.24 degrees Celsius per decade, increasingly frequent marine heat waves, and rising sea levels as a result of climate change in combination with local factors associated with changes in land and sea use, projections show a dire future for strategic Caribbean marine and terrestrial ecosystems. Addressing the drivers of biodiversity loss requires practical solutions that will invariably touch upon politically and economically sensitive issues. This may include questioning the region’s developmental strategy and exploitation of natural resources, acknowledging the responsibility of high-emitting countries for warming temperatures, and tackling regional structural problems. Protecting the environment requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses local drivers of biodiversity loss, such as pollution and exploitation caused by the expansion of economic activities in the region, as well as the global threat of climate change.

For more information and recommendations, as well as an analysis of the impacts of climate change on the Caribbean’s biodiversity, read Global Americans’ full report, “Safeguarding Caribbean Biodiversity.”

 Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

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According to United Nations data, 26 percent of the world’s migrant population lives in the Americas, which means that migrants make up 7 percent of the region’s total population as of 2020. Of this total, 58.7 million are in North America, and 14.8 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to UNHCR’s 2022 Global Trends in Forced Displacement Report, by the end of 2022, at least 108.4 million people had been forcibly displaced globally. In the Americas, 9.2 million people moved across international borders. This figure represents an increase of 950 percent in the last ten years. Why do people move across the Americas?

The push factors are multiple and observe variations from country to country. However, in general terms, people migrate or are forcibly displaced due to increasing levels of violence and citizen insecurity, the forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime activities. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence are also important factors which particularly affect women and children. Added to this are persistent economic and structural causes, such as a weak rule of law, corruption, high poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities (especially for women, young people, and other vulnerable groups), food insecurity, and more recently the effects of climate change. This increase in human mobility across cities of the Americas poses opportunities for receiving countries but also challenges, and it is often local governments the ones responsible for providing the first response.

A recent study published by the Organization of American States and other partners entitled “The Role of Local Governments in the Reception and Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Cities of the Americas” confirms these trends. It proposes that there are opportunities for the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, and it shows that local actors can play a key role in the reception and integration of this population. Despite numerous challenges, the cases presented in the study demonstrate that with political will, innovative ideas, respect for human rights, and the support of international organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and the media, progress can be made at the local level to ensure a successful reception and integration of migrants and refugees in the region.

Based on the results of 231 interviews in 109 localities in 25 countries, the study proposes at least four lessons to capitalize on the work being done by the local governments facing these arrivals. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that local governments do not operate in a vacuum when working on the reception and integration of migrants and refugees, but there is an important influence of national governments on local actions—both in positive and negative ways. Migration policies are usually established at the national level, and local governments must respond with these in mind. It is, therefore, no surprise that for most local governments, coordination with national policies represents one of their main challenges. Another factor that also influences their work (and often supports it) is that of civil society and international organizations. They play a key role in most of the localities studied, and fill institutional gaps to meet the needs of migrants and refugees.

A second lesson from the study refers to the variation in local structures and capacities across cities in the Americas. Indeed, the study confirms that there is significant diversity in the structures and capacities of the 109 localities studied in the report. On one side of the spectrum, there are localities with a long migratory history and with resources which have stable structures designed to provide services to migrants and refugees. As documented in the study, some examples include the Mayor’s Office for Migration Affairs in New York City in the United States and the Coordination of Policies for Immigrants and Promotion of Decent Employment of São Paulo in Brazil. Other cities are facing new migratory dynamics, which has pressured their governments and have had to rely on international organizations as they develop local response initiatives, such as seen in several non-border localities in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

At the other end of the spectrum are border localities that are generally isolated and have few resources to respond comprehensively to the needs of migrants and refugees. These include border or rural cities that are in people’s migratory trajectories. One example is the locality of Darien in the border between Colombia and Panama. Lastly, in terms of capacities, although there are still significant gaps, training programs for local officials on issues of reception and integration of migrants were reported in 47 percent of the localities assessed. It is important to emphasize, however, that 42 percent of these programs are based on normative and rights issues, and do not focus on practical aspects of policy design and implementation.

Thirdly, the report also indicates that most local government actors prioritize socio-economic integration, followed by reception, although needs and priorities vary by type of locality. This suggests that upon arrival, cities really need to provide access for migrants and refugees to goods and services—including employment—to meet their basic needs and those of their families. The pre-condition for this access is providing them with regularization options or legal pathways. It is worth highlighting that for border localities in particular, the priority was reception, although this was often understood as the rapid processing of people and not as the comprehensive provision of services for the population. Lastly, in some of the newer destinations, in the absence of sufficient social networks that can provide support to migrants and refugees in host communities, there is greater awareness, urgency, and need for local actors to provide adequate reception and socio-economic integration services. One common challenge for cities evaluated in the report is counting on disaggregated and updated information on migrants at the local level to facilitate the creation and access to appropriate reception and integration services.

One last lesson the study points to refers to political integration and the often-ignored aspect of migrant and refugee integration. In this regard, the study confirms that there is still a long way to go to achieve political integration. In most of the localities studied in the report, there are almost no mechanisms for the political participation of migrants and refugees. Access to identity documents was identified as the main hurdle in this area. Concerning identity documents, it is important to highlight very innovative practices coming from cities to provide identification to these arrivals, who may not always carry a passport or ID with them. The study shows different models of municipal identification that have been adopted in Mexico City and in localities across the United States. Regarding political participation, in cities such as Bogota and São Paulo, permanent spaces for political participation have been developed for migrants and refugees. However, there is a long way to go and a pressing need to adopt an official narrative that presents migrants and refugees as neighbors, newcomers, and citizens and also to encourage social cohesion not only within migrant spaces but in other broader community spaces.

Although the focus on the local level is not entirely new, this report provides one of the first regional perspectives at a continental scale on migration and protection institutions and policies in the Americas, thanks to its comprehensive and diverse voices. What is novel is that it covers a wide variety of localities in a region that is profoundly diverse in terms of structures, institutional frameworks, and capacities, It reflects the perspectives of individuals on the ground who are directly involved in the challenges and opportunities posed by the reception and integration of migrants and refugees. The common denominator that emerges from the analysis is that these cities have been creating positive innovations to provide protection and better opportunities for the populations settled in their territories. It is precisely these positive innovations of receiving, protecting, and integrating that should be replicated and promoted at the hemispheric level.

The opinions in this article are personal. They do not represent those of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian is the Director of the Department of Social Inclusion at the Secretariat for Access to Rights and Equity within the Organization of American States (OAS). As Director, she oversees the OAS’s efforts to promote social inclusion and access to human rights, with a particular focus on vulnerable populations. Additionally, Betilde is a founding member and coordinator of the Network of Latin American Female Political Scientists, known as #NoSinMujeres. This project aims to promote and empower women’s work in Latin American Political Science. Betilde holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University.

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On August 13th, libertarian Javier Milei became the most-voted candidate in the primary elections in Argentina, with his political party La Libertad Avanza also securing the highest number of votes. In this manner, he outperformed both the Juntos coalition candidates (formed and led by former President Mauricio Macri) and Kirchnerist candidate Sergio Massa, current Minister of Economy. The far-right candidate surprised everyone by emerging victorious in an election that was anticipated to be more closely contested, securing 30 percent of the votes. This outcome was unexpected as most polls had placed him in third position. Consequently, Milei may be Argentina’s next president for the 2023-2027 term.

What would a Javier Milei presidency look like? Most of the analyses attempting to address this question refer to the candidate’s ambitious and controversial proposals. These include a profound State reform aimed at reducing public expenditure, the elimination of the Central Bank, and the dollarization of the economy, which stand out as some of his most popular ideas. Nonetheless, significantly less attention has been paid to Milei’s foreign policy views, how he sees the world, and Argentina’s position. Of course, foreign policy is seldom among the top issues on a presidential candidate’s agenda in Argentina, as well as voters’ interest. This is arguably reasonable in a country with enormous macroeconomic problems, including over 120 percent annual inflation.

Consequently, this article aims to dissect some elements embedded within Milei and some of his key team members that could offer insights into how Argentina’s foreign policy might unfold under a Milei administration. In pursuit of this goal, we will closely examine Milei’s stance towards Argentina’s most crucial international partners: the U.S. and the Western world, China and its South American partners, as well as the Mercosur trade bloc. 

The “Trump of the Pampas” and Argentina’s Main Partners

In a recent interview, Milei expressed that his key international allies would be the United States and Israel, also mentioning his intention to relocate Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It’s hard not to draw parallels between this statement and the striking similarities to Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right former president of Brazil often referred to as “the Trump of the tropics.”

If that comparison holds true for Bolsonaro, a similar case could be made for Milei as the “Trump of the Pampas.” There are several resemblances between these three leaders, including their employment of populist rhetoric, their articulation of societal dissatisfaction with established politicians, and their conservative outlook on social issues. They also share the identification of socialism, currently manifested as “cultural Marxism” as their central adversary. Remarkably, the announcement regarding the embassy’s move to Jerusalem mirrors the actions of these former presidents (though it’s worth noting that Bolsonaro never successfully executed this move).

While it appears evident that Milei will strive for alignment with the West, it’s equally pertinent to acknowledge that neither Trump nor Bolsonaro currently holds power. As he navigates the international stage, Milei will encounter Western leaders who, for the most part, stand as political adversaries to them (such as Joe Biden) or, at the very least, have displayed substantial divergences. Notably, G7 leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau fall into this category due to their differing perspectives.

However, according to Diana Mondino–a Senior Economic Advisor to Milei and potentially his future Minister of Foreign Relations–Argentina’s approach will be establishing friendly relations with the U.S. and all democratic nations while reconsidering connections and agreements with “autocratic” counterparts. Thereby, Milei seems to be fully aligned with what some have called ‘The Biden Doctrine,’ which identifies the contest between democracies and autocracies as the “center clash of our time.” What remains to be seen, though, is how the Biden administration would receive Javier Milei.

If this approach was implemented, it could trigger highly disruptive consequences for Argentina. This is because China plays an essential role as both a critical trading partner and a significant source of financial aid for Argentina, a country grappling with an exceedingly challenging fiscal predicament due to its International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt. Despite the stern stance Milei might take towards China, practical limitations would significantly curb his ability to execute such actions. The precarious financial situation makes the Chinese Swaps indispensable for Argentina’s survival in the midst of a severe shortage of foreign currency. Additionally, the influential agribusiness sector is unlikely to permit such measures, as China constitutes Argentina’s most paramount export market. Nonetheless, Milei could potentially succeed in creating political distance from China, such as withdrawing Argentina’s candidacy from the BRICS group.

Returning to the matter of relations with the U.S., it remains uncertain how the Biden administration would perceive Javier Milei. On the one hand, there are indications of the administration’s readiness to align with the U.S.’s crucial interests. Conversely, Milei’s strong association with Trump might complicate bilateral relations. Thus, Milei would need to strive to avoid cultivating a Bolsonaro-like dynamic with the White House.

Concerning relations with neighboring countries, Milei has not extensively commented on this matter. One might anticipate challenges in the relationship with Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, given Milei’s affinity with Bolsonaro, whose politically prominent son Eduardo recently rallied support for him after his victory. Regarding the Mercosur trade bloc, Milei had previously advocated for its dissolution a few years back, akin to Trump’s approach towards NAFTA upon assuming office. However, Mondino has conveyed a notably more moderate stance, suggesting that it should be revitalized, potentially aligning with Uruguay’s viewpoint of flexibilization. Regarding Uruguay, the libertarian candidate has expressed a measured level of criticism towards President Lacalle Pou, asserting that he is “far from being a liberal” while acknowledging him as a “genuine Keynesian.” Last but not least, Milei maintains a strong ally in Chile’s far-right candidate José Antonio Kast, who is considered one of the frontrunners for the 2025 presidential elections.

Conclusions

Only two months separate us from Argentina’s general election. Despite the brevity of this timeframe, it can feel like a lifetime in a country like Argentina. Within the week following the primary elections, the government already devalued the official Peso-to-Dollar exchange rate by nearly 18 percent, and economic prices have surged considerably since August 14. In such a complex nation, anything can transpire within 60 days.

Nevertheless, Milei’s position appears, at the very least, formidable. In a country where circumstances are likely to worsen leading up to the October general elections, he holds the advantage of symbolizing the “real” change for the nation, given his lack of prior public office. Consequently, closely monitoring his campaign and proposals will be pivotal. Foreign policy is often marginalized in such analyses, despite its significance for a country that offers numerous opportunities due to its abundance of natural resources, such as food, critical minerals, and renewable energies.

Despite the Trump-like “hawkish” narrative that Milei presents concerning foreign policy, he will face a challenging landscape that might constrain his intentions. The absence of like-minded governments in the region could potentially leave Argentina isolated within the area, at least until Chile’s 2025 elections, where Kast might emerge victorious. However, if Milei were to secure the presidency, the most pivotal geopolitical factor he would need to monitor would be the U.S. elections, particularly if Trump emerges as the GOP nominee. An ideal scenario for the international position Milei envisions for Argentina would involve him as president this year alongside a Trump win in the United States.

A Milei presidency holds the promise of ushering in substantial and disruptive changes to Argentina’s political and economic landscape. Its disruptive nature is already evident in its ability to challenge the dominance of the polarizing Juntos and Kirchnerist coalitions, which have controlled the political spectrum for the past decade. However, as we have previously explored in the context of foreign policy, it remains imperative to closely scrutinize the constraints that would shape his pursuit of the significant transformations he aims to enact.

Fernando Prats is a Senior Analyst at London Politca’s Latin America Desk. He also serves as a research and teaching assistant at Rosario National University in Argentina.

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Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first leftist president, entered office in August 2022, touting a “second chance” in the country’s ongoing efforts to fight crippling poverty and the constant specter of violence that stems from conflict between rebels, drug trafficking organizations, and the government. However, a series of scandals have tanked his approval ratings to the low 30s, putting his ambitious reform agenda at severe risk. With his internal political struggles becoming more prominent, the opposition Congress he faces creates a layer of obstacles that might be too much to overcome.

Despite his victory, Petro’s political party controls not even a quarter of the country’s congressional seats, only one governorship, and relatively few other leadership positions within the state—either at the federal or sub-national level. The coalition he created that led to him winning the presidency began to unravel almost as quickly as they cobbled it together. The center-right and right politicians Petro had convinced to create his support base quickly jumped ship even though some were given cabinet positions in return for their backing. The dissolution of his coalition is a prime example of how large groups are often prone to fragmentation, especially one including politicians from opposing ideological positions. 

Lawmakers that would push back on Petro’s agenda knew he would have to make concessions to turn any significant reforms into reality, putting an opposition Congress in the driver’s seat. The current political environment in Colombia’s executive-legislative relations exemplifies how such systems have evolved in the region. Throughout the course of Latin American history, political dissent and challenges to the status quo have been omnipresent features of its political landscape.

As distinct bodies or movements that counter the prevailing political powers, opposition congresses have often played pivotal roles in the evolution of Latin American democracies. They can also create new challenges that must be handled. The existence of strong opposition blocs within a legislative body can lead to deep-seated political polarization as well as mistrust from the public if corruption takes hold. Polarization can result in legislative gridlock, where essential bills and reforms stall because of political disagreements, preventing smooth governance. A legislative logjam might also encourage someone in Petro’s position, for example, to lean toward democratic backsliding to advance his agenda rather than operating within the constraints of the existing system. These relationships have lasting effects on coalition politics, executive-level objectives, and international relations.

The 20th Century: Opposition in the Shadow of Authoritarianism

Throughout the 20^th century, Latin America faced a recurring cycle of democratically elected governments being overthrown by military coups or authoritarian rulers. In many cases, these regimes dissolved or strictly controlled existing legislative bodies. This repression spurred the creation of alternative congresses or opposition bodies in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

In 1976, for instance, Argentina’s military junta dissolved the National Congress, leading opposition leaders and exiled politicians to create informal platforms for political dissent. Similarly, during Pinochet’s regime in Chile, the opposition formed clandestine assemblies to challenge the dictatorship. Opposition congresses in 20^th-century Latin America were adaptive entities, evolving in response to the region’s shifting political landscapes. While their forms varied, their consistent objective was to challenge, balance, or reform the prevailing powers, with a notable emphasis on championing democratic values and human rights.

The Turn of the Century: A Revitalized Commitment to Democracy?

In the 21st century, Latin America’s political landscape experienced significant changes, marked by the rise of left-leaning governments, a reassertion of democracy in some regions, and persistent challenges to democratic institutions in others. Opposition congresses, reflecting these dynamics, have evolved in behavior, approach, and significance. The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a significant shift in the Latin American political paradigm. With the decline of Cold War-era geopolitics, many countries embarked on a process of democratic transition. Opposition congresses in this period often transitioned from clandestine operations to legitimate political parties and movements.

Yet, challenges persisted. In Venezuela, the early 21st century saw significant political polarization, with the National Assembly at times in direct opposition to President Hugo Chávez and later Nicolás Maduro. This led to the creation of parallel legislative bodies, highlighting the region’s continued relevance of opposition congresses. Some countries have witnessed more collaborative dynamics between the government and opposition, with congresses playing a constructive role. For instance, in Uruguay and Chile, despite ideological differences, there have been instances of legislative collaboration on key national issues.

The 21^st century has been a period of significant dynamism for Latin American politics. Opposition congresses, reflecting the broader socio-political currents, have showcased a spectrum of effectiveness. Their roles have been pivotal in shaping the political discourse, with both positive and negative outcomes. They’ve shown adaptive qualities, navigating challenges, and seizing opportunities to play a crucial role in the region’s evolving democratic tapestry. At times, their behavior underscores the resilience of democratic aspirations, even in the face of formidable challenges.

Nevertheless, while they have played instrumental roles in holding governments accountable and ensuring democratic checks and balances, there have also been instances where their actions have led to political instability and weakened democratic processes. Peru, for example, has witnessed a series of confrontations between the executive and legislative branches, with both sides at times using their powers in ways that led to accusations of overreach.

Latin America’s turbulent political history has seen the rise and fall of numerous opposition congresses. Whether challenging colonial rule, authoritarian regimes, or democratically elected governments, these bodies have consistently played a critical role in advocating for political change and representing dissenting voices. As Latin America continues its democratic journey, understanding the legacy of these opposition bodies offers crucial insights into the region’s quest for genuine democracy.

Committing to the Democratic Process

In Latin America, as in other regions, an opposition congress can create a multi-faceted legitimacy tribulation within the government. An opposition-majority congress may question the legitimacy of an election, especially if there are allegations of fraud or misconduct. The 2019 Bolivian general elections serve as a case. Accusations of electoral fraud led to civil unrest and eventually to a political crisis that culminated in the resignation of then-President Evo Morales. Opposition congresses can contest amendments or reforms introduced by the executive branch, framing them as undemocratic or as power grabs. In various countries like Venezuela and Ecuador, attempts by leaders to change constitutional term limits or concentrate powers were criticized and challenged by opposition factions.

Opposition congresses can set up investigative commissions into alleged government corruption, human rights abuses, or other misconducts. If they uncover wrongdoing, these investigations can seriously undermine a country’s Executive branch’s legitimacy. Brazil’s Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato) scandal, which started as a money laundering investigation, eventually implicated various government officials and business leaders, undermining the legitimacy of multiple administrations. A similar situation could develop for Petro and the ongoing scandal involving his son and corruption charges. Using its platform in Congress, Colombia’s opposition can rally public support against the government, leading to protests, strikes, and other forms of civil unrest. Protests in countries like Venezuela, Chile and Ecuador have seen opposition factions in Congress play supportive or even leading roles in mobilizing public sentiment against ruling administrations. Recent protests against Petro’s reform plans could also lead in this direction.

While opposition congresses play a crucial role in ensuring checks and balances in Latin American democracies, the complexities they introduce are far-reaching and multifaceted. These challenges underscore the need for mature political behavior, open dialogue, and a steadfast commitment to democratic norms from all political actors. Across various countries, opposition parties have not only served as vital counterweights to ruling parties but also as a catalyst for essential political reforms. Yet, the very nature of opposition can lead to political polarization, gridlock, or even instability if not managed with sagacity and restraint. Mature political behavior requires a willingness to compromise and recognize the legitimacy of differing viewpoints rather than resorting to obstruction or confrontation. Open dialogue fosters a culture of respect and understanding, encouraging collaboration even amidst ideological differences. Finally, unwavering adherence to democratic norms ensures that these differences do not undermine the foundational principles of governance but rather strengthen the resilience and integrity of the political system. Together, these elements shape a political environment where opposition does not equate to antagonism—especially the violent form—and where critical voices contribute to, rather than detract from, a flourishing democratic landscape.

Jeffery Allen Tobin is a researcher for the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy specializing in democratization, corruption, and migration. He is a political science doctoral candidate at Florida International University. He was a journalist for more than 20 years.

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