The Caribbean is one of the world’s premier biodiversity hotspots. Coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangrove swamps, and tropical rainforests play a crucial role in the region’s cultural, economic, and ecological fabric. Not only do these ecosystems protect Caribbean coastlines from tropical storms and erosion, as well as provide an important source of food and jobs for local communities, but they also help mitigate climate change. Unfortunately, in the Caribbean, like in much of the world, these precious ecosystems are under immediate threat. A cascade of interconnected crises, from the excessive use of land and sea to climate change, is accelerating biodiversity loss at an alarming rate. Without drastic international, regional, and national efforts, entire ecosystems will collapse, posing a significant risk to the Caribbean region’s economy, security, and bio-natural heritage.

As a result of its insularity, the Caribbean islands possess unique ecosystems with high levels of endemic species. From the Greater and the Lesser Antilles to the Lucayan Archipelago and the Cayman Islands, coral reefs, mangrove swamps, as well as seagrass beds are the habitat of over 12,000 marine species, including mollusks, crustaceans, and fish. In addition, terrestrial habitats contain 12,847 native and introduced flora species. Belize, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana are also gifted with highly biodiverse landscapes. The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS), found off the coasts of Belize, is the largest unbroken barrier reef in the Western Hemisphere and the world’s second-largest, following the Great Barrier Reef of Australia. It is estimated that 500 fish species, 60 coral species, 350 mollusk and marine mammals, algae, and seagrasses live in the MBRS. Guyana and Suriname, located in what is known as the Guiana Shield—a vast ecoregion that lies in the northern part of the Amazon—remain one of the best-preserved reservoirs of biodiversity, carbon, and freshwater in the world. 

Biodiversity is fundamental to the region’s economy as well as to mitigate climate change. A 2016 World Bank study estimated that Caribbean coastal and marine ecosystems are valued at USD 54.55 billion. According to the Resilient Islands Initiative, mangroves and coral reefs are estimated to provide the Caribbean with USD 15 billion annually in fisheries, tourism, and carbon sequestration. Similar studies have shown that coral reef-related tourism alone provides the Caribbean with an estimated annual revenue of USD 7.9 billion—a figure equivalent to more than 10 percent of the region’s Gross Domestic Product. In terms of carbon sequestration, the region plays an major role. The Guiana Shield sequesters approximately 500 million tons of carbon dioxide per year—equivalent to the carbon emissions of nearly 89 million households in one year.

Moreover, the Caribbean’s endemic species are also vital for novel drug treatment developments, including drugs for cancer, cardiovascular diseases, immunological and central nervous system disorders, diabetes, as well as bacterial, viral, and parasitic infections. For instance, Trabectedin—an alkylating agent used as a chemotherapy drug to treat advanced soft tissue sarcoma and relapsed ovarian cancer—was first isolated from a colonial tunicate found in Caribbean mangroves and seagrass blades called Esteinascidia turbinate.

Flora and fauna are also deeply rooted in the region’s social fabric. For Caribbean Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, nature represents a means of livelihood and an essential element of their belief systems. In Dominica, the Kalinago people—the last Indigenous Peoples in the Eastern Caribbean—not only rely heavily on forests for subsistence agriculture, yet maintain a belief system that is also deeply connected to nature. The Kalinago people’s traditional ecological knowledge plays a fundamental role in the Dominican government’s current efforts to achieve its goal of becoming the world’s first country to be resilient to the multiple effects of climate change. In other parts of the Caribbean, local species have become modern symbols of national identity and an essential part of bio-cultural heritage. In Barbados, the flying fish—a tropical and temperate marine species often found in coral reefs in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans—is not only the national dish, but it is also considered a symbol of identity and pride.

Nonetheless, the rapid increase of economic activities, such as fishing, tourism, agriculture, and mining, is contributing to the region’s environmental degradation, inflicting long-term costs. In addition, as human-induced climate change exacerbates, its multiple impacts—such as rising sea temperatures, changing rain patterns, ocean acidification, and sea level rise—pose an everlasting threat. Data from across the region points to the same situation: biodiversity is declining at a fast rate. According to the latest report from the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network on the status and trends of Caribbean coral reefs, “Caribbean coral reefs and their associated resources will virtually disappear within just a few decades.” Related studies show that Caribbean mangrove forests have declined 24 percent in the past quarter-century, tropical rainforests are degrading, and seagrass bed ecosystems are collapsing.

A 2018 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) report on the state of biodiversity in the region highlighted that in connection to the rapid growth of populations and economic activities, the Caribbean’s main threats to its biodiversity include “increasing urbanization, conversion of lands for tourism and commercial development, and the expansion of agriculture. The report also exposes the threats from “invasive species, pollution, and overexploitation of living resources.” In addition, with projections showing an increase in the global temperature by 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100—well above the 2015 Paris Agreement goal to hold the rise of temperatures below 1.5 degrees—scientists expect that climate change will likely become the main driver of biodiversity loss, posing long-lasting and irreversible changes to the ecosystem.

Indeed, according to a 2020 report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s International Institute of Tropical Forestry, climate change is already heavily impacting the Caribbean’s biodiversity. Rising sea surface temperatures and sea levels, changing rain patterns, acidifying oceans, and intensifying extreme weather events such as hurricanes and droughts are among the main climate change parameters affecting biodiversity in the region. Coral bleaching—the process in which corals, driven by changes in conditions such as temperature or nutrients expel the symbiotic algae living in their tissues, turning them completely white and leaving them subject to mortality—is among the most notable and well-documented effects of climate change on marine ecosystems and poses a significant threat to Caribbean reefs. 

With the alarming increase in the temperature of the Caribbean Sea at a rate of 0.24 degrees Celsius per decade, increasingly frequent marine heat waves, and rising sea levels as a result of climate change in combination with local factors associated with changes in land and sea use, projections show a dire future for strategic Caribbean marine and terrestrial ecosystems. Addressing the drivers of biodiversity loss requires practical solutions that will invariably touch upon politically and economically sensitive issues. This may include questioning the region’s developmental strategy and exploitation of natural resources, acknowledging the responsibility of high-emitting countries for warming temperatures, and tackling regional structural problems. Protecting the environment requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses local drivers of biodiversity loss, such as pollution and exploitation caused by the expansion of economic activities in the region, as well as the global threat of climate change.

For more information and recommendations, as well as an analysis of the impacts of climate change on the Caribbean’s biodiversity, read Global Americans’ full report, “Safeguarding Caribbean Biodiversity.”

 Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

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The perceived tension between environmental sustainability and economic development lies at the heart of many domestic and international climate disputes. Brazil, the world’s sixth most populous country and the twelfth largest economy, is no exception. However, one of its “national champions,” the state-owned oil company Petrobras, can forge a path forward reconciling the two interests.

Today, Petrobras might be a confusing choice to spearhead the transition to a low-carbon economy. The company has recently been under increasing environmental scrutiny and embodies physical and transition climate risk dilemmas. Last month, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the country’s environmental agency, denied Petrobras’ petition to drill at the mouth of the Amazon River. Facing only 12 years left of known oil reserves, the Brazilian oil company has appealed the decision.

The governmental back and forth generated a political crisis between the country’s political branches. The uncertainty has also cast doubt on President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s promises to strengthen Brazil’s environmental record, even as he promised at a Paris climate meeting in June to reach zero deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by 2030. In the 2015 Paris Accords, through its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Brazil committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 43 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. Reports suggest Lula could increase the country’s NDC to 50 percent.

Lula has a justified sense of urgency given Brazil’s exposure to physical and transition climate risk. Adverse impacts such as droughts and water level changes could devastate the country, which relies on climate-sensitive sectors. Agribusiness represents 27.5 percent of its GDP and hydropower powers 55 percent of Brazil’s energy. However, Brazil has excellent renewable potential. The Brazilian Northeast has installed 21.03GW of energy in more than 750 wind farms. The region has more than quadrupled solar capacity in 10 years with projections doubling again by 2030.

If Lula intends to meet this more ambitious commitment while reconciling the environmental and labor-focused parts of his base, Petrobras will need to pivot from new drilling exploration to deepening its evolving initiatives to a green transition, such as evaluating possible joint ventures with Norway’s Equinor and China Energy International. Petrobras needs to move faster.

Mauricio Tolmasquim, Petrobras’ energy transition director, mentioned publicly that the company is already late for the energy transition. Petrobras moving to renewables would greatly aid the transition. According to Europar, the sector emissions went from 6.7 percent to 8.9 percent from 2005 to 2019. When assessing carbon emissions by economic sectors, energy, and heat increased the most. The second highest increase came from transport. Both are core parts of Petrobras’ activities.

Petrobras would transition at a time when international investors are increasingly bullish on renewable energy in Brazil. Solving this problem, Brazil and its energy sector stand to lead the region forward in this evolution. Such a transition, however, comes with serious risks. The company must rethink its capital investments while maintaining its social commitments, which rely on oil reserves projected to decrease quickly.

Petrobras’ 2023-2027 strategic plan aligns with recommendations from the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and seeks to increase investment in renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. However, in said plan, the company allocates just six percent (USD 4.4 billion) to low-carbon energy and 83 percent (USD 65 billion) to its oil and gas exploration endeavors. In 2012, Brazil’s Congress implemented a Royalties Law mandating Petrobras to contribute Pre-Salt exploration royalties to health and education, firmly establishing that the company has a defined role within Brazilian society.

In addition to engaging in an energy transition, Petrobras also has economic incentives to abandon business as usual. Brazil currently retains just 12 years of known oil and gas reserves, and according to data from S&P Capital IQ, Petrobras’ profitability is expected to drop 33 percent between 2022 and 2025. The price of Brent crude oil is predicted to decline by 18 percent from August 2023 to July 2028. Brazil’s oil and gas consumption growth rate is anticipated to decrease from 4.9 percent to 1.1 percent between 2023 and 2032. Therefore, Petrobras’ current and upcoming strategic plans should focus more on renewable energy, which has an upside growth potential and helps Brazil meet its Paris Agreement commitments.

Meanwhile, reports by Fitch indicate a surge of agreements with Chinese, French, and Spanish renewable energy corporations and Brazilian state-owned and private companies in the Brazilian states of Minas Gerais and Ceará. Non-hydroelectric renewable energy generation is projected to grow by 5.9 percent, beating the projection of the larger energy market, which sits at 2.5 percent.

Experts acknowledge that Petrobras has a “fundamental role” in supporting a green transition by focusing on biodiesel fuels, sharing energy infrastructure with renewables, carbon capture, and research investments in low-carbon energy. These expectations are in line with the company’s history. In the 1970s, Petrobras helped lead projects in Brazil that laid the groundwork for biofuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel. The company must take center stage in this latest transformation or risk alienating its environmentally conscious domestic and international investors that range from Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES) to Black Rock and Norges Bank.

Petrobras has taken significant steps. Between 2015 and 2022, the company reduced its CO2 emissions by 39 percent and issued a USD 1.25 billion green bond in 2022. This was followed by a statement from Petrobras President Jean-Paul Prates this year that renewables and wind power are company priorities—as seen in the recent creation of a new director position for energy transition and sustainability.

Yet, most of its emissions decline came from reducing power generation, while emissions from exploration and production fell only 19 percent. Petrobras would need to overhaul its strategy to cut its emissions sustainably, but leaning into the energy transition will put the company in a position to command this emerging field. In May, it proposed a revision to the strategic plan that would allocate as much as 15 percent of its capital expenditures to low-carbon projects. Petrobras should increase by raising that amount annually and incrementally to at least 40 percent by 2030. This new plan and allotment will be voted on in November.

Brazil’s government also has a role to play. Brazil’s Congress revised the Royalties Law in 2013 to provide socially oriented royalty money to non-petroleum-producing states. Combining the spirit of that revision with the need to incentivize social buy-in for the transition, Congress should again revise the law to create a new royalty category for the social distribution of royalties from green energy production.

Given Petrobras’ high profile in the energy sector with proven expertise in low-carbon emission technologies, such as hydropower and biofuel, taking the discussed steps could secure Brazil as a hemispheric leader in green energy and the decarbonization transitions. These activities will establish Petrobras as a vital energy and environmental agent and will maintain the company’s role as a contributor to social good while assisting the country in achieving its NDC commitments.

Fernanda Barbosa is a strategic consultant for SMEs and was formerly an asset manager in private equity real estate. She earned her MBA at the Bayes Business School in London, finished a specialization in Sustainable Finance at the University of Cambridge, and has her civil engineering degree from Unicamp. Fernanda is based in São Paulo, Brazil.

Steven Hyland Jr. teaches Latin American history and sustainable finance courses at Wingate University and researches capital markets and sustainability. He is also a Senior Consultant at Responsible Alpha.

Travis Knoll teaches religion, social movements, and Latin America at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and Wingate University. He is also a Senior Consultant at Responsible Alpha.

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As we mark World Ocean Day, El Niño raises sea surface temperatures to record-breaking heights and a novel threat looms over the ocean floor. The practice of deep-sea mining is advancing closer by the day. Multiple corporations have a vested interest in extracting rare earth minerals deposited in nodules across the ocean floor. These minerals are integral to technologies such as smartphones, electric vehicles, and wind turbines. While they have historically been sourced through land-based mining, terrestrial reserves are dwindling at a time when demand is increasing for these products. The first application to lease the seabed for exploitation is expected as early as this July. However, concerns from the scientific community have fueled stakeholder backlash, causing companies and countries alike to boycott this industry. Despite the controversy, however, there appear to be no plans to pause the pursuit of extraction.

Figure 1: Map of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone

Source: United States Geological Survey.

The deep sea is one of the most extreme, remote, and mysterious ecosystems on Earth. Once deemed lifeless, emerging research indicates that this seemingly inhospitable biome may actually host staggering levels of biodiversity. Recently, over 5,000 new species were discovered inhabiting the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), an undersea submarine fracture zone west of Mexico, and a key target for seafloor prospecting. Still, researchers estimate that 88 to 92 percent of the species inhabiting this area remain undiscovered. Many are likely to hold immense medicinal potential. Deep-sea organisms and their esoteric biological adaptations have propelled exciting new pharmaceutical advances—treating cancers, infectious diseases, and even Alzheimer’s. Many species in these deep-sea environments do not exist anywhere else on Earth. The disturbance of one habitat could risk entire species-level extinction events.

The seafloor has never been mined before. With little to no prior experimentation, mining poses unknown risks to deep-sea ecosystems. However, researchers have predicted that the impact will be far-reaching. Machinery equipped with powerful floodlights risk blinding organisms that are adapted to sunless conditions. The noise generated by drilling into the seabed will add to the cacophony of anthropogenic sound pollution already emanating across the entire ocean. The plowing of the seabed could disrupt benthic microbial communities that play a critical role in marine nitrogen cycling—risking the productivity of surrounding waters and posing significant economic risks to Mexican and Central American fisheries. The extraction and processing of these minerals can also generate toxic sediment plumes capable of traveling vast distances across the ocean, burying coral reefs, and muddying seawater. Scientists are only just beginning to identify these risks—much less hypothesize how to mitigate them.

Figure 1: Schematic of Deep-Sea Mining

Source: National Academy of Sciences.

Given our current lack of understanding of the full impacts of deep-sea mining, proceeding with plans to mine will likely risk the existence of a myriad of deep-sea biota—rendering countless unknown organisms extinct before we have the chance to discover them. Given this risk, scientists are imploring that companies wait to mine the seabed until the resilience of the ecosystem and totality of risks are better understood. Corporations such as Google, Volkswagen, Samsung, and Volvo have pledged not to purchase or profit from minerals sourced from the seabed. Within the Western Hemisphere, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama have called for a precautionary pause.

Despite this backlash, the organization in charge of regulating extraction, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), has failed to take action to halt, or even slow, this process. The ISA is an intergovernmental body tasked with the conflicting roles of regulating deep-sea mining and protecting the deep-sea ecosystem. Created in 1982 under the UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the organization is in charge of managing resource extraction in all areas of the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. This is an area representing over 50 percent of the planet’s seabed. Despite its connection to the United Nations, the ISA is not required to abide by many of the UN policies adopted since its inception—including the recent High Seas Agreement, which enshrined the Precautionary Principle in its guidelines, cementing the preference for caution and review in situations with unknown consequences. Though designed for impartiality, the ISA has made no concessions to the concerns of the scientific community. The ISA receives a considerable USD$ 500,000 for every exploration lease they approve, raising concerns about a potential financial conflict of interest.

Many scientists are concerned by the lack of impartiality of the ISA and its leaders. When confronted with scientists’ environmental concerns, ISA Secretary-General Michael Lodge asserted, “If you spend your whole life studying the worms that live on nodules, then you get very attached to that. And I’m not sure that they really see the woods for the trees.” However, the worms that live on deep-sea nodules are unlikely to be the only organisms affected by mining—the impact will be felt across the ocean and impact the globe.

The rush to begin deep-sea mining is unjustified and dangerous. Many of the areas targeted for mining are virtually unexplored, and the consequences of mining are unknown and unpredictable. Science has a long history of underestimating biodiversity in the oceans. A just-released study, for example, finds scientists have been drastically underestimating the ocean’s microbial biodiversity and that just 99 Pacific coral reefs harbor more microbes than the entire planet. It is not too late to slow this process of degradation down and safeguard similar future ocean discoveries.

Sophia Marencik is a Conservation Policy Intern with Ocean Doctor.

David E. Guggenheim, Ph.D., is the Founder and President, Ocean Doctor.

The post The Dangers of Deep-Sea Mining in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone appeared first on Global Americans.

Climate change and the global energy transition place Latin America and the Caribbean at a crossroads: it can either take a leap forward to become a more prosperous and relevant region, or it can fail and see our human and economic development stagnate. To address this dilemma and seize opportunities while avoiding impending risks, the region must follow the path of the three “Ds”—Decarbonize, Diversify, and Depolarize.

Decarbonize

Scientific evidence tells us that decarbonization must happen if we want to have a planet for the next generation. When Costa Rica launched its decarbonization plan in 2019, it was the first of its kind to propose the transformation of the entire economic and social operation of the country by 2050. While this was a brave and visionary effort, it was also an isolated one.

Today the scenario is very different. This path is rapidly advancing in key public and private sectors worldwide, with strong steps being taken to reduce demand for fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas. The United States, for example, recently passed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which invests USD $370 billion in U.S. industries specifically working in the energy transition and the fight against climate change. Similar actions are being taken in major economies such as the European Union, India, and China. Germany’s Mercedes-Benz will stop selling vehicles with internal combustion engines by 2030. Similarly, both the state of California and the European Union will require all cars and light trucks sold to be zero-emission vehicles by 2035.

While these big economies are making important strides, Latin America and the Caribbean remain highly dependent on fossil fuels. A study by the World Resources Institute showed that fossil fuels account for 55% of exports in Colombia, 39% in Ecuador, 32% in Bolivia, and 14% in Brazil. Fiscal revenues from fossil fuels are also very high in the cases of Trinidad and Tobago (35%), Suriname (28%), Ecuador (19%), and Mexico (18%). If this scenario is not changed in the coming years, opportunities will be missed and risks will materialize.

In the United States, the IRA and other policies are likely to be environmentally and economically successful, but this national success could occur in the midst of a regional failure to enact similar policies. If so, the entire Hemisphere could be at a competitive disadvantage relative to the European and Asian trading blocs that are moving more coherently toward such goals. Faced with this scenario, the worst thing that can happen to Latin America and the Caribbean is to ignore or resist the reality of the need to invest in decarbonization. We must embrace the process and ride the wave it represents, so as not to be swept away by it. We must break our addiction to fossil fuels.

Diversify 

The second strategic pillar must therefore be production diversification. Today, the Latin American and Caribbean region participates in the global economy mainly through extractive activities such as fuels or materials, the agri-food production, and some services. Electrification resulting from decarbonization will increase demand for metals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, as well as the so-called rare earths—some of which are found in the region.

However, to take advantage of new opportunities, individual countries and the region as a whole should strive to design, explore, and conquer more sophisticated niches in the international economy. These could serve as launching pads to build prosperity with social inclusion, political stability, and sustainability at the center of development in the region.

Defining where to direct our education, training, financing, research, and industrial policies to take advantage of these new employment opportunities must be a shared task. We need a concerted effort of foresight, analysis, and creativity from the best minds in the region—from universities, multilateral banks, the private sector, and civil society at all levels and with the highest degree of inclusion. Without a concerted effort, we will repeat the mistakes of the past and fall again into the traps that resource extraction can bring. Innovative initiatives such as BOGA (Beyond Oil and Gas), launched by Denmark and Costa Rica, are bringing urgent attention to this crucial discussion.

Depolarize 

Of course, efforts to decarbonize and diversify the economy do not happen overnight. Rather, they are deliberate commitments by societies that must be sustained over time and across administrations. This is an extremely complex task given the high levels of political and social polarization in the region.

Populism, post-truth, and polarization, to use Moisés Naim’s term, are hindering progress. Each administration—whether from the left or the right side of the political spectrum—have their own nuances and incorporate their own priorities. However, the region must make a conscious effort to overcome extremely polarized debates to understand that there is more at stake and that there are constructive ways to improve the lives of our peoples.

By suppressing pluralism, autocracies can maintain a constant direction over time. However, this apparent advantage comes at an enormous and unacceptable cost in terms of human rights, freedom, and sustainability. Aware of this, intelligent political leaders with strong democratic convictions must undertake extraordinary efforts to reach agreements on the basic tenets of effective public policies. While maintaining their differences and criticisms, ruling parties and the political opposition, must be able and willing to find common ground.            

Embracing decarbonization to give the next generation a livable future, diversifying our economies to reap the benefits of this global transformation, and depolarizing politics to have the democratic tools to make good change possible are the necessary paths forward for the Latin American and Caribbean region and the Western Hemisphere as a whole.

Carlos Alvarado-Quesada is a former President of Costa Rica (2018-2022) and currently a Professor of Practice of Diplomacy at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and President of the Climate, Democracy and Inclusion Institute.

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In July 2022, UN Secretary General António Guterres warned the world about the growing set of challenges climate change poses to the Caribbean—describing the region as “ground zero” for the climate emergency. Despite having a minuscule carbon footprint compared to large industrialized nations, Caribbean countries—like most small island developing states (SIDS)—are disproportionately impacted by climate change. These climate change impacts include the increasing intensity of extreme weather events like tropical cyclones, droughts, floods, and landslides. These extreme events represent major humanitarian and economic challenges for the Caribbean. To respond to these challenges, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) has led regional efforts to prepare for growing climactic dangers and has built an impressive network of regional institutions. However, many Caribbean countries still remain far behind the curve. Thus, national governments, regional institutions, and the region’s partners must build upon existing advancements to ensure the wide adoption of resilience measures and protection of all communities.

Tropical cyclones or hurricanes historically represent the most dramatic and devastating extreme weather phenomenon in the region. Hurricanes have caused 18,000 deaths and over $163 billion in damages since 1950. Worryingly, scientists like Global Americans Working Group Member Kevin Reed, have highlighted how climate change makes hurricanes more powerful and destructive than in previous decades. In 2017, the losses and damages associated with Category 5 Hurricane Maria cost the island nation of Dominica approximately 226 percent of the country’s 2016 GDP. Unfortunately, as the impacts of climate change worsen, what happened to Dominica is likely to happen again. Emerging data suggest that the percentage of storms that reach Categories 4 or 5 will continue to increase. Such predictions have led the Inter-American Development Bank to estimate that by 2050 annual losses related to extreme weather events will cost the region $22 billion—a figure representing 10 percent of the current regional economy.  

To ensure their continued economic and social survival, Caribbean countries have no option but to take effective action to build resilience. In recent years, several governments have intensified their efforts to anticipate, absorb, and recover from the effects of extreme weather events. To date, most Caribbean countries have designed national strategies to bolster resilience. International and regional organizations and partners have also increased their cooperation with these nations to improve emergency preparedness and response. However—as in much of the developing world—these efforts remain insufficient and highly unequal. Luckily, the region has built an important network of institutions to implement international mechanisms and set a common regional policy that serves countries and territories to respond to the extreme impacts of climate change. 

To anticipate, accommodate, and recover from natural disasters, CARICOM and its member states have established institutions such as the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH), the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC), and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). In addition, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Central America and Dominican Republic Center for Coordination and Disaster Prevention (CEPREDENAC, per its Spanish acronym) are advancing climate resilience throughout the Caribbean basin. For their part, international organizations—such as the United Nations—as well as international partners—like the United States and the European Union—are also playing an important role in helping these organizations by providing resources to fund projects aimed at enhancing climate resilience across the region. Despite these initiatives and the significant progress made at the regional level, there are still multiple challenges to be addressed. According to the 2023 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration—signed at the VIII Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americans and the Caribbean (RP23)—current investment in disaster risk reduction is insufficient to address existing needs. The Declaration also warned of significant challenges associated with the implantation, monitoring, and reporting of the targets set by the Sendai Framework. 

Despite these efforts and various multilateral agreements urging developed countries to cut global greenhouse emissions and provide financial and logistical assistance to SIDS, the extent of the region’s challenges remain unclear at best and existential at worst. In addition, the lack of a supranational institution responsible for implementing climate regulation has left nation-states as the main actors responsible for taking climate action. 

Given the Caribbean region’s diverse set of political, economic, and social realities, it is important to look at a variety of countries and contexts to identify best practices for resilience building. Understanding the challenges the governments of Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Dominica, and Barbados face in building climate resilience allows for tailored policy recommendations as well as identifiable regional trends. These countries and territories not only represent some of the most climate-affected in the world but also have different levels of economic development, corruption, government effectiveness, as well as political leadership. These are important factors that better position nations to build resilience than those that lack these governance-related characteristics.

On the national level, governments should also look to promote resilience building and disaster risk reduction measures as central components in infrastructure-project planning, implementation, operation, and maintenance. In doing so, they must use a multidisciplinary approach to disaster risk governance and management that includes hard and soft sciences. Both perspectives are indispensable to a comprehensive understanding of the needs and concerns of diverse, impacted communities. At the regional level, Caricom must enhance capacity building through the existing network of regional institutions such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), and the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH).

On the extra-regional level, multilateral institutions and the region’s partners must coordinate their efforts to build resilience subject to the needs as defined by the recipient countries. Resilience-boosting efforts, whether from organizations like the UN or partners like the U.S., must aim to strengthen the capacities of the local and national institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction and promote the transfer of information, knowledge, and technology on voluntary and mutually-agreed upon terms. Crucially, multilateral development banks need to expand concessional loads to upper-middle and high-income SIDS regardless of country-specific income classifications. In all collaborative cases, partners should implement frameworks with the understanding that the nature of the Caribbean’s climate challenge necessitates funding and timelines that recognize the dire threats therein.     

With or without climate change, extreme weather events will exist and regrettably affect people in the Caribbean and worldwide. However, as global average temperatures warm, the Caribbean stands out as particularly vulnerable to the catastrophic, compounding effects of climate change in the form of extreme weather events. Contending with tropical cyclones, droughts, heat waves, and heavy rains require practical solutions which will invariably touch upon politically sensitive issues—ranging from questioning the rationale of the current international financial architecture, acknowledging the responsibility of high-emitting countries for warming temperatures, and tackling regional structural problems such as corruption and government mismanagement. Given this reality, there is a pressing need to strengthen international and regional mechanisms, as well as improve national and regional governance to bolster climate resilience.

For more information and recommendations, as well as an analysis of the impact of climate change on extreme weather events in the Caribbean, read Global Americans’ full report, “Extreme Weather Events and Resilience in the Caribbean.”

Jackson Mihm is an Associate Editor at Global Americans and the Project Lead for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

Alejandro Trenchi is a Research Assistant at Global Americans for the organization’s High-Level Working Group on Climate Change in the Caribbean.

The post June Marks the Beginning of Atlantic Hurricane Season—So, How Can the Caribbean Bolster its Resilience? appeared first on Global Americans.

In late April 2023, the government of President Gabriel Boric announced a long-awaited plan for Chile’s lithium mining sector. The new policy line envisions a dominating state role with a junior partnership role for foreign companies. While the Chilean government has eschewed the term nationalization, much of the financial media have called it just that, evoking shades of Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, where little or no compensation accompanied the state takeover of private sector companies. This is hardly the case in Chile. Nonetheless, although the Boric administration wants to find an eco-friendlier way of mining and augmenting national wealth, some see the proposed lithium plan as a potential red flag for new companies looking for lithium in Chile. Additionally, it raises big questions over the geopolitics of Chile’s lithium, an element that both China and the United States need to make the great energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables.  

Chile holds a significant position in the global economy. As the world shifts from a dependence on fossil fuels to clean and renewable sources of energy, batteries have become a key part of the transition. Lithium, sometimes called “white gold,” is a critical component in batteries. Chile is the world’s second-largest lithium producer behind Australia and is a major supplier to the United States and China. The country is part of South America’s “lithium triangle” that includes Argentina and Bolivia, which have slightly larger reserves than Chile. Consequently, what happens in Chile does not stay in Chile.  

The Boric administration’s proposed lithium plan is based on greater state control over the national lithium sector, following an approach of state guidance and participation in the extraction and processing of lithium for export. There is also a desire to create a value-added dimension with the development of a local battery industry. To facilitate this, the Chilean government proposes to create a new state company, the National Lithium Company, which will manage the lithium sector. Codelco, Chile’s state-owned copper company, will serve as its model—which, unlike many state-owned companies, has a solid reputation in the global mining industry. While the state establishes the new lithium company, Codelco will be mandated to manage and negotiate agreements concerning lithium.

The proposed plan will see state control of a little over 50 percent of shares in joint ventures with private investors. Current agreements with the two major companies involved in Chile’s lithium sector are SQM and the world’s largest lithium producer, U.S.-based Albemarle (ALB). SQM and ALB have long-term contracts, expiring in 2030 and 2043, respectively.  

According to the new plan thus far, the two companies’ contracts will be respected, but upcoming negotiations with the government could result in changes. Reports indicate that SQM has already agreed to invest USD 2 billion into sustainable technologies to meet the government’s environmental goals, possibly to create a positive path to negotiations. New companies will have to agree to terms that include using state-of-the-art technology to reduce or eliminate environmental damage, better conditions for workers, and consulting with Indigenous and other local communities in the Atacama Desert region.

Two other major provisions are worth noting. First, Codelco and Enami (another state-owned mining company) will be granted a special permit to explore and mine lithium in regions where they are active and in the salt flats that are of commercial interest. The second is that the government will run tender processes to grant exploration and exploitation in “special lithium operation agreements,” which will have relevant state participation.

President Boric went out of his way to clarify that the new policy is not a nationalization. Indeed, it can be argued that the Chilean government, dating back to the Pinochet era (1974-1990), had already put into place a law specifying that lithium could only be exploited by the state (either directly or through its companies), through administrative authorizations, or special lithium operation contracts. Companies such as SQM and ABL operate under concessions made in the pre-1979 legal regime.

Responses

The Chilean political left and fellow leftists in Latin America like the Chilean plan as it fits into a wave of resource nationalism throughout the region. It is also popular to some degree across Chilean society, considering the success of Codelco, which has helped share the national wealth. At the same time, international investor reaction was largely negative, including a sharp sell-off in SQM and ALB stock and with the financial press labeling the new policy as “nationalization.” It can be argued that it is a nationalization, but it appears limited to assuming a state majority control.

The outcome could range from 51 percent to 49 percent, but there is a potential for it to increase to 60 percent to 40 percent in the long term for all lithium production in the country, making Chile a major player in the sector the way Codelco is with copper. Daniel Jiménez, a long-time SQM employee of 28 years, expressed his thoughts on the matter: “If it was my money, I would go and explore Argentina, Brazil, and Africa. You’ll get ripped off in Chile.”

The main risk for Chile is that when foreign mining companies and investors look for lithium opportunities, they may regard the country as less attractive. Indeed, in March 2023, ALB, which has been less active in Chile on the investment side, made a USD 3.7 billion bid to acquire Liontown Resources, an Australian lithium producer. SQM is developing a USD 1.4 billion lithium project with a local company in Australia.  

Although Chile’s program is less controlling than Bolivia’s—which has until recently prevented through its own policies a lithium export business—Argentina is more open to foreign investment and foreign companies have flowed in, including those from Asia, Australia, North America, and Europe. Moreover, the growing demand for lithium (and batteries) is resulting in new finds of the critical metal in Africa and India. There is a risk that Chile could outprice itself.

China’s Role in Chile and Beyond

What may help Chile with the development of its lithium and battery industry is a plan announced by China’s major elective vehicle (EV) battery producer BYD to build a USD 290 million cathode-manufacturing plant in Chile’s Atacama Desert city Antofagasta. The Chilean government has given it preferential prices on lithium carbonate, which is critical for battery making. Chinese companies have proven to be flexible with demands for enhancing the local value-added industry. Although the project has yet to launch, a deal with China’s CATL (the world’s largest EV battery maker) was recently announced with Bolivia to mine lithium and help develop a local battery industry.

Chinese companies already have a stake in Chile’s lithium business through partial ownership of SQM, and China is Chile’s major trade partner. In a strategic play, Chinese companies are likely to be willing to deepen their investment in Chile’s lithium sector. Despite tougher regulations, the policy changes could help them maintain and secure supplies of a key ingredient in the great energy transition. China’s economic statecraft has made China the market maker in the next wave of energy. China processes 69 percent of the nickel, 75 percent of the cobalt, and 44 percent of the lithium that goes into batteries, as well as 70 percent of the share of the global stock of batteries.

The United States and other Western Hemisphere countries are playing catch-up to China. The Biden administration’s ambitious electrification plan, pushed along by the USD 369 billion Inflation Reduction Act, is largely oriented to jumpstart the clean energy sector in the U.S. with an emphasis on EVs and battery production. However, environmental regulations in the United States have made opening new lithium mines difficult, leaving Chile—which has a free trade agreement with the U.S.—and Argentina as its main suppliers. Together they accounted for a little over 90 percent of imports in 2021. Chile’s new policy direction raises questions as to the future dependability of Chile as a major supplier, especially if China assumes a greater role in the sector.

Looking ahead, the Boric administration is walking a narrow path between maintaining Chile as a destination for investment in lithium mining and navigating through domestic political constituencies. Chile must balance national interests in an increasingly competitive global critical metals sector. In this, the attraction of a state-led governing model is understandable, especially considering President Boric’s ideological leanings and the country’s relatively positive experience with Codelco. However, one need only look at Bolivia’s unfulfilled dreams of a lithium industry and Venezuela’s oil sector to see the downside risks of too heavy a state hand. Watch this space, as there is more to come with Chile’s lithium policies.

Scott B. MacDonald is Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Research Fellow at Global Americans, and Founding Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium. His latest book, The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean, was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan.

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Tras las detenciones, Maduro, en pos de aumentar su escasa credibilidad interna y legitimidad internacional, intensificó sus esfuerzos, afirmando en una reunión con los principales funcionarios del Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) que este es solo el “primer golpe” contra la corrupción en su gobierno, asegurando su “absoluta decisión de ir hasta la raíz misma para desmembrar todas estas mafias”. En una fuerte muestra de apoyo a Maduro, los arrestos también fueron respaldadas por otros aliados y posibles rivales internos, incluyendo al Primer Vicepresidente del PSUV, Diosdado Cabello, el presidente de la Asamblea Nacional, el jefe negociador, Jorge Rodríguez y el principal jefe militar de Venezuela, Vladimir Padrino López. 

Desde que Maduro asumió la presidencia en 2013, esta campaña podría considerarse el esfuerzo más significativo del régimen para “combatir” la corrupción entre los propios partidarios de su gobierno. Como tal, es posible que más funcionarios del régimen sean investigados. De hecho, hay motivos sólidos para creer que Maduro enfrentará la corrupción entre sus filas políticas con seriedad. En definitiva, el régimen venezolano no ha sido el único régimen autocrático en perseguir a funcionarios y antiguos camaradas por malversación, fraude e incompetencia. Lee Kuan Yew en Singapur, Khalifa al-Thani en Catar y Paul Kagame en Ruanda son reconocidos ejemplos de líderes no democráticos que redujeron de forma efectiva y exitosa la corrupción dentro de sus gobiernos. Al reducir la corrupción, estos regímenes autocráticos no solo lograron obtener mayor legitimidad y apoyo popular, sino que también consiguieron centralizar aún más poder y mejorar el desempeño económico. Teniendo en cuenta la variedad de problemas que existen actualmente en Venezuela, es posible que Maduro recurra a estas mismas prácticas autoritarias para hacer frente a la corrupción del régimen y mantener el poder político. Además de ser el presidente más repudiado de la región, Maduro se enfrenta a unas difíciles elecciones presidenciales en 2024, el salario mínimo más bajo de América Latina y un historial nefasto en la lucha contra la corrupción.

Además de motivaciones domesticas, el régimen de Maduro necesita enviar señales de liberalización política a espectadores internacionales, especialmente a Estados Unidos. Considerando las sanciones estadounidenses contra los responsables de la catástrofe económica y política venezolana, Maduro podría anotar puntos con Washington al dirigir las investigaciones anticorrupción contra funcionarios sancionados, como El Aissami, o arrestar a funcionarios procesados en cortes estadounidenses, como Joselit Ramírez. De hecho, John Kirby, Coordinador de Comunicaciones Estratégicas del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (NSC), afirmó que la administración Biden apoya las investigaciones de corrupción en Venezuela y “espera que las autoridades venezolanas” investiguen los esquemas de corrupción dentro del régimen “de manera muy responsable, transparente y creíble”. Esto es sumamente relevante en un contexto internacional mucho más favorable para Maduro, dada su decisión de regresar al proceso de negociación en México, así como la suavización de las sanciones estadounidenses en la comercialización del crudo venezolano y un enfoque diplomático más conciliador por parte de la administración Biden.

Si bien las experiencias de otras autocracias y condiciones políticas actuales sugerirían que Maduro está abordando la corrupción de buena fe, la realidad es que estos esfuerzos anticorrupción reflejan una táctica autoritaria para consolidar más poder, reorganizar las redes de corrupción y redistribuir sus beneficios dentro del régimen. Es ampliamente sabido que Maduro suele respaldarse en fachadas supuestamente democráticas que le sirven para purgar a rivales, expandir redes y oportunidades de corrupción y consolidar la disciplina partidista y gubernamental. 

Por ejemplo, en 2021, Maduro anunció inesperadamente que el PSUV se sometería a elecciones primarias para elegir candidatos para las elecciones regionales de ese año—en lugar de utilizar el método tradicional de selección de candidatos a dedo. Eventualmente, las primarias sirvieron para recompensar a aliados cercanos y leales, y castigar a funcionarios no confiables e ineficientes. La participación del régimen de Maduro en negociaciones con la oposición también ha mostrado ser una táctica destinada a ganar tiempo y dividir a la oposición. En fin, si bien la campaña anticorrupción puede mostrarse alineada con prácticas de transparencia democrática, es muy probable que esta cruzada culmine con una dictadura más consolidada y cohesionada internamente.

Los recientes esfuerzos anticorrupción de Maduro reflejan un amplio pedigrí de prácticas de “buena gobernanza” que es improbable que suprima la principal fuente de ingresos del régimen: las extensas redes de corrupción. Desde que las sanciones de Estados Unidos afectaron a la industria petrolera venezolana en 2017, el régimen se ha sustentado de otras fuentes de ingresos, a menudo turbias o ilícitas. El contrabando de oro y el tráfico de drogas se han convertido en fuentes recurrentes de divisas desesperadamente necesarias para el gobierno. Asimismo, miembros del PSUV, funcionarios estatales, jueces y oficiales militares ahora dominan la economía venezolana, con el apoyo financiero y logístico del régimen, al establecer importantes y lucrativos negocios en el sector privado.

Las recientes investigaciones anticorrupción también pueden aparentar ser, erróneamente, una lucha entre facciones en un régimen internamente fracturado. Sin embargo, las investigaciones exclusivamente en PDVSA y la selectividad de algunos funcionarios sobre otros sugieren que se trata de una falsa campaña anticorrupción diseñada por Maduro—probablemente destinada a reorganizar los esquemas de corrupción estatales y mantener el apoyo de los principales grupos políticos y militares. El hecho de que se hayan arrestado individuos relativamente desconocidos, pero no al importante exministro del petróleo Tareck El Aissami—quien es poco probable que enfrente encarcelamiento—indica que esta cruzada ni es un intento serio de abordar la corrupción, ni demuestra que el régimen está débil y fracturado.

Entonces, para aquellos que anhelan que los recientes esfuerzos anticorrupción de Maduro y sus aliados conduzcan a una reducción de la corrupción, la aplicación de la justicia contra altos jerarcas del gobiernos y mejores condiciones económicas, la realidad arroja una imagen mucho menos optimista. El régimen venezolano sigue manteniéndose en el poder firmemente y sin desafiantes creíbles. Por lo tanto, Estados Unidos y otros socios internacionales harían bien en no caer en las tácticas de Maduro y llamar a su reciente intento de frenar la corrupción por lo que realmente es: otro intento dictatorial para consolidar el poder.

Leonardo Di Bonaventura Altuve es estudiante de posgrado en la Universidad de Oxford y futuro estudiante de doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de California, Berkeley. Di Bonaventura Altuve es oriundo de Guanare, Estado Portuguesa (Venezuela)

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On March 19, 2023, Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, initiated an unprecedented and unexpected anti-corruption campaign on Venezuela’s battered oil industry. The action provoked the resignation of oil minister Tareck El Aissami, a high-profile Chavista sanctioned by the United States. It also spurred dozens of arrests executed by Maduro’s “National Police Against Corruption”—including Joselit Ramírez (head of Venezuela’s crypto control agency), a legislator to the National Assembly, a mayor, judges, and junior military officials. The operation occurred upon uncovering that at least three billion dollars had gone “missing” from the state-owned petroleum company, PDVSA, from oil exported via sanction-circumventing channels. Many Latin American watchers were surprised by these anti-corruption actions given the Venezuelan regime has ranked among the most corrupt in the world in the recent years—even higher than countries like North Korea and Yemen. 

Following the detentions, Maduro doubled down in an attempt to earn much-needed domestic credibility and international legitimacy by stating at a meeting with key officials of his party—the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)—that this is just the “first blow” against corruption in his government and assured his determination to get to the “very root to dismantle all these mafias.” These investigations against inner-circle officials were endorsed by other Maduro allies and potential challengers. These include PSUV Deputy Leader Diosdado Cabello, National Assembly President and Chief Negotiator Jorge Rodríguez, and Venezuela’s top military official, Vladimir Padrino López. The wide spread support for these measures demonstrates Maduro’s broader approval and support among key figures within his government. 

This anti-corruption campaign could be considered the most significant regime-led effort to “combat” corruption against Maduro’s own government supporters since he took office in 2013. As such, it is possible that more regime officials fall prey to this corruption probe. In fact there are sound motives for Maduro to address corruption in earnest. After all, the Venezuelan regime has not been the only autocratic regime to target officials and former friends for embezzlement, fraud, and incompetence. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Khalifa al-Thani in Qatar, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda are popularly acclaimed examples of nondemocratic leaders who similarly initiated top-down, intra-regime campaigns that curbed corruption. These efforts have produced favorable results for these autocrats, allowing them to further centralize power, improve economic performance, and, above all, gain greater legitimacy and popular support. Beyond his standing as the region’s most disliked president, Maduro also faces challenging presidential elections in 2024, the lowest minimum wage in Latin America, and a comparatively awful record in curbing corruption. Given the myriad of issues in Venezuela today, Maduro may employ authoritarian practices to tackle regime corruption and maintain political power. 

Beyond domestic motivations, the Maduro regime may follow this corruption-control strategy to send signals of political liberalization to international audiences—especially the United States. In the face of American sanctions motivated against corrupt individuals responsible for Venezuela’s economic and political catastrophe, targeting listed officials—such as El Aissami—or arresting indicted individuals—such as Joselit Ramírez—could earn Maduro points with Washington. Indeed, President Biden’s Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council (NSC), John Kirby, stated that the administration supports corruption investigations in Venezuela and “expects Venezuelan authorities” to investigate intra-elite corruption schemes “in a very accountable, transparent, and credible way.” This is especially relevant in an international context that is much more favorable to Maduro given his decision to return to the negotiation process in Mexico as well as eased U.S. sanctions in oil trading and a softer diplomatic approach from the Biden administration. 

While experiences from other autocracies and current political conditions may suggest that Maduro is tackling corruption in good faith, the reality is that anti-corruption efforts likely reflect an authoritarian measure to consolidate power and reshuffle corruption networks. Maduro has often relied strategically on “good governance” practices and democratic facades that serve to purge current or would-be rivals, expand graft networks and opportunities, and consolidate intra-regime discipline. For instance, in 2021, Maduro caught everyone by surprise when he announced that his PSUV party would undergo primary elections to choose candidates for that year’s regional elections rather than using the traditional method of hand-picking candidates. However,, the primaries served to reward close allies and punish unreliable officials. Maduro’s participation in negotiations is also a well-known tactic aimed at buying time and splitting the opposition. While the anti-corruption campaign may appear in line with good governance and democratic practices, the outcome will likely result in a more united and powerful autocracy in Venezuela. 

Maduro’s recent anti-corruption efforts complement a long pedigree of “good governance” practices that are unlikely to curb the regime’s main source of income: extensive graft networks. Since U.S. sanctions hit Venezuela’s oil industry in 2017, the regime has relied on other—often shady or illicit—sources of income. Gold smuggling and drug trafficking have become recurrent sources of desperately needed hard currency. At the same time, party members, state officials, judges, and military personnel now dominate the Venezuelan economy—aided with financial and logistical support from the regime—by setting up new or taking over existing large and lucrative businesses. 

The recent anti-corruption investigations may strike one as a feud between factions in an internally fractured regime. However, the exclusive inquiries on PDVSA and selective targeting of some regime loyalists suggests that this is a phony anti-corruption campaign by Maduro—probably aimed at reorganizing corruption schemes and maintaining the support of key political and military groups. The fact that relatively unknown individuals were arrested, but not former oil minister Tareck El Aissami—who is unlikely to face prison and has put himself at the disposal of the PSUV to collaborate with the investigation—signals that this is neither a serious attempt to tackle corruption, nor is the regime weak and fractured. 

There is hope that recent anti-corruption efforts by Maduro and allies will lead to reduced corruption, the application of justice against wrongdoers, and better economic conditions. However, the true picture is less optimistic. The Venezuelan regime continues to hold on to power without credible challengers. The United States and other international partners would do well to not buy into Maduro’s tactics and call his recent attempt at curbing corruption what it really is: another authoritarian attempt to consolidate power.

Leonardo Di Bonaventura-Altuve is a graduate student at the University of Oxford and incoming Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Di Bonaventura-Altuve is a Venezuelan from Guanare, Portuguesa State.

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La “Economía Azul” es un nuevo marco de desarrollo para la economía de los océanos, que busca equilibrar tres objetivos: el desarrollo económico de los sectores marítimos, la equidad social y la sostenibilidad del medio ambiente. Para que un programa pueda enmarcarse en este innovador marco de desarrollo, las actividades de la Economía Azul deben ser sostenibles desde el punto de vista medioambiental, equitativas desde el punto de vista social y viables desde el punto de vista económico. Un aspecto crucial es que la Economía Azul difiere del Crecimiento Azul: mientras que este último trata de maximizar el crecimiento económico, el primero se centra en la sostenibilidad. La Economía Azul incorpora sectores económicos específicos capaces de equilibrar los objetivos ya señalados, siendo los más relevantes y consolidados la pesca, el turismo y el transporte marítimo, mientras que los más relevantes y emergentes son las energías marinas renovables en alta mar, la acuicultura, las actividades extractivas y la biotecnología. Por el contrario, algunos autores han sugerido que las industrias extractivas de recursos no renovables, al no ser sustentables, no pueden formar parte de la definición de Economía Azul.

La importancia económica, social y ambiental de la Economía Azul

La región de América Latina y el Caribe tiene más de veinte mil kilómetros de costa y la necesidad de desarrollar y promover actividades sostenibles en sus océanos es crítica, ya que sus océanos están sometidos a una gran demanda, la pesca ha alcanzado niveles insostenibles y la deforestación de los manglares es de tres a cinco veces mayor que la de los bosques terrestres. La Economía Azul podría desempeñar un papel más relevante en la región mediante una acción coordinada para proteger el medio ambiente marino y costero y a las comunidades que dependen de él. Sólo el turismo y otros importantes sectores que dependen de los océanos pueden representar más del 20% del PIB de la región. La Economía Azul ampliada representa notables oportunidades económicas y comerciales. Por ejemplo, la recuperación de las poblaciones de peces sobreexplotadas podría aumentar la producción mundial anual en 16,5 millones de toneladas, lo que sería equivalente a unos ingresos anuales de entre 53.000 y 83.000 millones de dólares. Los países de América Latina podrían llevarse buena parte de esta producción, ya que son exportadores netos de pescado. La Economía Azul también es relevante por sus beneficios para la humanidad. Según el Pacto Mundial de las Naciones Unidas (UNGC, por sus siglas en inglés), el océano podría proporcionar de forma sostenible alimentos suficientes para alimentar a toda la población mundial en estado de vulnerabilidad alimentaria. Además, desempeña un rol fundamental para aliviar la demanda de recursos terrestres y favorecer la mitigación del cambio climático y la adaptación al mismo.

La Economía Azul en la región

América Latina está empezando a adoptar la Economía Azul. Recientemente, un estudio clasificó los territorios de América Latina y el Caribe según la aplicación de estrategias de fomento de la Economía Azul por parte de los respectivos países. Encontró que a pesar de que el concepto está siendo incluido en el discurso de al menos el 80 por ciento del territorio, sólo el 23 por ciento está vinculado a estrategias regionales de Economía Azul, mientras que las estrategias o proyectos nacionales cubren sólo el 16 por ciento del mismo. Sobre las estrategias regionales, el estudio mapeó dos esfuerzos: la Estrategia Regional para el Crecimiento Azul en los Países del Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA), liderada por la Organización del Sector Pesquero y Acuícola del Istmo Centroamericano (OSPESCA), que incluye ocho países centroamericanos: Belice, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá y República Dominicana; y el Marco Regulatorio de la Economía Azul Sostenible, que vincula a los países miembros del Parlamento Andino: Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Chile y Bolivia. En cuanto a las Estrategias Nacionales, el estudio mapeó de los esfuerzos de Bonaire, Colombia y Trinidad y Tobago, que cuentan con planes y programas propios, junto con Montserrat, Barbados y las Islas Vírgenes Británicas, con planes elaborados junto con el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), Antigua y Barbuda, basados en el marco del Commonwealth, y Granada, con un plan de referencia mundial asistido por el Banco Mundial. El estudio muestra la diversidad de enfoques de la Economía Azul en la región, pero subraya la necesidad de vincular el discurso sobre políticas a la estrategia.

Otro estudio relevante apunta a los esfuerzos de organizaciones internacionales y bancos multilaterales para apoyar proyectos de Economía Azul en la región. Encontró que, aunque, entre 2012 y 2020, los donantes internacionales aportaron 13.300 millones de dólares a la región -representados en 434 proyectos azules-, concentraron los recursos en algunos sectores y países. Por ejemplo, Brasil fue el mayor receptor en número de proyectos (81), seguido de Colombia (62), Perú (55) y Panamá (54). Brasil también tuvo la mayor inversión dedicada a sus proyectos. Asimismo, el estudio constató que los recursos fueron orientados preferentemente hacia proyectos de desarrollo del estado costero (5.000 millones de dólares), seguidos de proyectos energéticos (3.200 millones), gestión y conservación de recursos medioambientales (2.500 millones), agricultura (600 millones), turismo (500 millones) y pesca y acuicultura (170 millones). 

Estos estudios muestran que los programas que promueven la Economía Azul en América Latina se enfocan en objetivos diversos, que abarcan desde el desarrollo económico, la sostenibilidad y hasta el desarrollo social. Mientras países como Brasil, Chile y Perú priorizan sus esfuerzos de Economía Azul en el desarrollo costero y la conservación del medio ambiente; países como Colombia, Nicaragua y Honduras lo hacen en la explotación económica del océano. Sólo países como Ecuador y Costa Rica se orientan en mayor medida hacia la sostenibilidad del océano, la pesca y la acuicultura. Sin embargo, el turismo se prioriza en todos los documentos regionales y nacionales como un sector clave a desarrollar.

Los desafíos de la Economía Azul en la región:

La aplicación de un enfoque holístico de Economía Azul en la región se enfrenta a numerosos desafíos, entre los que cabe destacar los siguientes: 

La adopción del concepto de Economía Azul en todas sus dimensiones. La confusión entre Economía Azul y Crecimiento Azul puede generar una desviación en los objetivos regionales y específicos de cada país. Por ejemplo, el enfoque en el desarrollo económico ha marginalizado a sectores como la pesca artesanal de la planificación e inversión a gran escala. Del mismo modo, el enfoque en la industria turística a gran escala ha puesto en riesgo la sostenibilidad y la equidad social. El turismo puede generar tensiones entre la comunidad local y los turistas, así como brechas socioeconómicas derivadas de la reubicación forzosa por el aumento de los ingresos en los lugares turísticos.

La cristalización de los objetivos en planes concretos y financiados. Los países de América Latina y el Caribe aún deben adoptar estrategias regionales o desarrollar proyectos nacionales para casi el 60% de su territorio con el fin de fomentar la Economía Azul. También es necesario destinar más recursos de los presupuestos nacionales de los países de América Latina y recursos de la cooperación internacional, para responder a las necesidades de implementación de la Economía Azul en la región.

Frágil implementación de los marcos legales para la gobernanza costera y oceánica. Esta debilidad genera fenómenos como la sobreexplotación de especies, la pérdida de biodiversidad y la vulnerabilidad al cambio climático. Por ejemplo, en Panamá, el uso sostenible de los recursos marinos es posible pero no se aplica debido a la falta de herramientas de gestión que el gobierno tiene asignadas. Esto permite que grupos ilegales exploten los recursos, perjudicando al ecosistema de la región y a los pescadores artesanales.  Además, en Costa Rica y Colombia la gobernanza costera y oceánica es débil debido a la escasa coordinación entre los organismos gubernamentales y a problemas políticos como la corrupción y la priorización de los beneficios económicos.

El enfrentamiento entre los derechos de las comunidades y la industria tradicional. Los intereses de los actores convencionales de las grandes industrias estratégicas limitan la incorporación de los intereses de los grupos minoritarios a las estrategias de la Economía Azul. Por lo tanto, los grupos de pequeños y medianos pescadores y las mujeres suelen quedar excluidos, o sus intereses minimizados, en el diseño de planes y programas. Por ejemplo, en Brasil es difícil que los pescadores artesanales tengan poder e influencia sobre la pesca industrial y las infraestructuras, ya que hay menos oportunidades de participación pública y supervisión en la gobernanza de los océanos. Situaciones similares se han dado en Colombia, Panamá, Costa Rica y otros países.

Conclusiones

La incorporación de la Economía Azul en América Latina aún necesita trabajo. Aunque hay evidencias de avances en el desarrollo de planes y programas regionales y nacionales, éstos sólo cubren el 39 por ciento del territorio de la región. A su vez, los marcos de gobernanza vigentes son frágiles y en ocasiones se apartan del concepto. La adopción del concepto de Economía Azul en la región requiere un enfoque holístico y global que equilibre los beneficios económicos con los posibles impactos sobre el medio marino y las comunidades locales. El desarrollo de este enfoque requiere mejores marcos de gobernanza, medidas eficaces de seguimiento y gestión, y la construcción conjunta con todas las partes interesadas, incluidas las comunidades locales, para garantizar la inclusión y el beneficio de todas las partes.

Camilo Ayala es un exdiplomático colombiano que ocupó cargos en Ecuador y EE.UU. Durante varios años lideró el equipo de abogados de la Oficina Comercial de Colombia en Washington, D.C. También fue Jefe de Gabinete y encargado de asuntos en la Embajada de Colombia en Ecuador. Es abogado internacional (LL.M.) especializado en asuntos económicos, y tiene una maestría en estudios internacionales en American University, Washington, D.C. Camilo tiene más de 20 años de experiencia, asesorando a gobiernos, bancos, asociaciones, exportadores e inversionistas en diversos asuntos de derecho corporativo, empresarial, comercio e inversión, y finanzas. Ha dirigido con éxito programas de internacionalización, proyectos, asuntos gubernamentales y negociaciones. En la actualidad, Camilo dirige su propia empresa de consultoría en comercio internacional (www.millanandayala.com), centrada en el comercio entre ALC y EE.UU.

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The “Blue Economy” is a new development framework for the oceans’ economy, seeking to balance three objectives: the economic development of the maritime sectors, social equity, and environmental sustainability. To qualify a program under this innovative development framework, Blue Economy activities must be environmentally sustainable, socially equitable, and economically viable. Crucially, the Blue Economy differs from Blue Growth—while the latter tries to maximize economic growth, the former focuses on sustainability. The Blue Economy incorporates specific economic sectors capable of balancing the objectives mentioned above, with the most relevant, established ones being fishing, tourism, and maritime transport, while the most relevant, emerging ones are offshore renewable marine energy, aquaculture, activities extractives, and biotechnology. In contrast, some authors have suggested that the extractive industries of non-renewable resources, being non-sustainable, cannot be part of the definition of the Blue Economy.

The economic, social, and environmental importance of the Blue Economy

The Latin American and the Caribbean region has more than twenty-thousand kilometers of coastline, and the need to develop and promote sustainable activities in its ocean is critical—as its oceans are under severe pressure, fishing has reached unsustainable levels, and deforestation of mangroves is three to five times greater than that of terrestrial forests. The Blue Economy could play a more significant role in the region through coordinated action to protect the marine and coastal environment and the communities that depend on it. Tourism alone and other major ocean-based sectors can account for more than 20 percent of the GDP in the region. The expanded Blue Economy represents noteworthy economic and commercial opportunities. For example, rebuilding overfishing stocks could increase global annual output by 16.5 million tons, equivalent to annual revenues of USD $53 to 83 billion. Latin American countries could take a good part of this output, as they are net fish exporters. The Blue Economy is also relevant for its benefits to humanity. According to the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the ocean could sustainably provide sufficient food to feed the entire world population in a state of food vulnerability. Moreover, it plays a central role in relieving pressures on land resources and fostering mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

The Blue Economy in the region

Latin America is just adopting the Blue Economy. One study recently classified Latin America and Caribbean territories according to the countries’ implementation of strategies to foster the Blue Economy. It found that despite the concept is being included in the discourse of at least 80 percent of the territory, only 23 percent of it is linked to regional Blue Economy strategies, while national strategies or plans cover only 16 percent of it. On regional strategies, the study mapped two efforts: the Regional Strategy for Blue Growth in the Countries of the Central American Integration System (SICA), which is led by the Organization of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector of the Central American Isthmus (OSPESCA), including eight Central American countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Dominican Republic; and the Regulatory Framework of the Sustainable Blue Economy, linking up the member countries of the Andean Parliament: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. On National Strategies, the study mapped the efforts of Bonaire, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago, which count on self-formulated plans and programs, along with Montserrat, Barbados, and the British Virgin Islands, with plans developed along with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Antigua and Barbuda, based on the Commonwealth framework, and Grenada with a world-reference plan assisted by the World Bank. The study shows the diversity of approaches to the Blue Economy in the region but highlights the need to link policy discourse to strategy.

Another relevant study points to international organizations and multilateral banks’ efforts to support Blue Economy projects in the region. It found that even though, between 2012 and 2020, international donors contributed $13.3 billion to the region—represented in 434 blue projects—they concentrated the resources in some sectors and countries. For example, Brazil was the largest recipient in the number of projects (81), followed by Colombia (62), Peru (55), and Panama (54). Brazil also had the largest investment dedicated to its projects. Furthermore, the study found the resources were oriented preferably toward coastal state development projects ($5 billion dollars), followed by energy projects ($3.2 billion), management and conservation of environmental resources ($2.5 billion), agriculture ($0.6 billion), tourism ($0.5 billion), and fishing and aquaculture ($0.17 billion). 

These studies show that programs promoting the Blue Economy in Latin America point to diverse objectives, ranging between economic development, sustainability, and social development. While countries like Brazil, Chile, and Peru prioritize their Blue Economy efforts on coastal development and environmental conservation; countries like Colombia, Nicaragua, and Honduras do so on the economic exploitation of the ocean. Only countries like Ecuador and Costa Rica are oriented more toward the sustainability of the ocean, fisheries, and aquaculture. However, tourism is prioritized in all regional and national documents as a key sector to develop.

Challenges of the Blue Economy in the Region:

The implementation of a holistic Blue Economy approach within the region faces many challenges, among which it is important to highlight as follows: 

The adoption of the concept of Blue Economy in all dimensions. The confusion between Blue Economy and Blue Growth may generate a deviation in regional and country-specific objectives. For example, the focus on economic development has marginalized sectors such as artisanal fisheries from large-scale planning and investment. Similarly, the focus on the large-scale tourism industry has put sustainability and social equity at risk. Tourism can generate tensions between the local community and tourists, and socioeconomic gaps resulting from forced relocation due to increased income in touristed places.

The formalization of the objectives in concrete and financed plans. Latin American and Caribbean countries still need to adopt regional strategies or develop national plans for nearly 60 percent of their territory to foster the Blue Economy. It is also necessary to allocate more resources from the national budgets of Latin American countries and resources from international cooperation, to meet the needs of implementing the Blue Economy in the region.

Fragile implementation of legal frameworks for coastal and oceanic governance. This weakness generates phenomena such as overexploitation of species, loss of biodiversity, and vulnerability to climate change. For example, in Panama, sustainable use of marine resources is possible but not enforced due to a lack of management tools assigned to the government. It allows illegal groups to exploit resources, harming the region’s ecosystem and small-scale fishers.  Furthermore, in Costa Rica and Colombia, there is weak coastal and ocean governance due to poor coordination between government agencies and political problems such as corruption and prioritization of economic gains.

The clash between the rights of communities and traditional industry. The interests of conventional actors in large, strategic industries limit the incorporation of minority group interests into Blue Economy strategies. Therefore, groups of small and medium fishermen and women are often excluded, or their interests minimized, in the design of plans and programs. For example, in Brazil, it is difficult for small-scale fishers to have power and influence over industrial fishing and infrastructure, as there is less opportunity for public participation and oversight in ocean governance. Similar situations have played out in Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and others.

Conclusions

The incorporation of the Blue Economy in Latin America still needs work. Although there is evidence of progress in developing regional and national plans and programs, they cover only 39 percent of the region’s territory. Additionally, existing governance frameworks are fragile and sometimes deviate from the concept. Adopting the Blue Economy concept in the region requires a holistic and comprehensive approach that balances economic benefits with potential impacts on the marine environment and local communities. Developing this approach requires better governance frameworks, effective monitoring and management measures, and joint construction with all stakeholders, including local communities, to ensure the inclusion and benefit of all parties.

Camilo Ayala is a Colombian former diplomat holding positions in Ecuador and the U.S. For several years he led the lawyer’s team at the Colombian Trade Office in Washington, D.C. He was also Chief of Staff and charge d’ affairs at the Colombian Embassy in Ecuador. He is an international lawyer (LLM) specializing in economic matters, and holds a master’s degree in international studies at American University, Washington D.C. Camilo has over 20 years of experience, advising governments, banks, associations, exporters, and investors on a range of corporate, business, trade and investment, and finance law matters. He has successfully managed internationalization programs, projects, government affairs, and negotiations. Nowadays, Camilo runs his own international trade consulting company (www.millanandayala.com), focusing on trade between LAC and the U.S. 

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